UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

Dr. Igal Shiri

Overview^[1]

• On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for “the day after.”
• The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of “armed groups.”^[2]
• The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a “credible pathway” to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms.
• Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an “occupying force” if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas’ position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip.
• In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for “the day after” in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an “occupying force,” will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the Palestinian Authority’s ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip.

The Main Points of UN Security Council Resolution 2803

• On November 17, 2025, the Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the American 20-point plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for regulating “the day after” and calls for its full implementation. The resolution was passed with the support of 13 members of the Council, including Algeria, Pakistan and Somalia, while China and Russia abstained. The main points of the resolution are the following (UN website, November 18, 2025):^[3]
  • A Board of Peace (BoP) will be established as a temporary governing body to coordinate the reconstruction of the Strip and will remain in place until the Palestinian Authority (PA) completes all the required reforms in a satisfactory manner, according to the American president’s 2020 peace plan (the so-called Deal of the Century) and the joint declaration of France and Saudi Arabia (the July 2025 New York Declaration for the Two-State Solution), after which it will be able to reassume control of the Strip.
  • A temporary international stabilization force (ISF) will be established, composed of soldiers from various countries, which will operate alongside a trained and vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination and cooperation with Israel and Egypt. The objective of the force is to assist in securing the borders, stabilizing the security environment to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip, including the destruction of military, terrorist and offensive infrastructure and the prevention of their rehabilitation, and the permanent disarmament of “non-state armed groups,”^[4] protecting civilians and humanitarian operations, training and providing support to Palestinian police forces, and coordinating the security of humanitarian corridors.
  • All bodies and forces which will operate in the Gaza Strip will be subject to the authority and supervision of the BoP. They will be funded by contributions from donor states and the BoP’s financing mechanisms. The World Bank and other financial bodies will operate a designated fund for the reconstruction and development of Gaza.
  • The resolution notes the importance of full renewal of humanitarian aid to the Strip in coordination with the BoP. The aid will be transferred through recognized organizations, led by the UN, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, while ensuring that the aid is not seized by “armed groups.”
  • After the international force achieves control and stability on the ground, the IDF will withdraw from the Strip in accordance with standards, milestones and timetables which will be linked to demilitarization, subject to agreement between the IDF, the ISF force, the states guaranteeing the agreement and the United States. The IDF will be allowed to maintain a limited security presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.
  • The BoP and the international civilian and security presence will continue to operate in the Strip until December 31, 2027. Any further extension of the mandate of the ISF will be carried out in full coordination with Egypt, Israel and additional states participating in its activity. In addition, the Board must submit a progress report to the Security Council every six months.
  • The resolution does not include an unequivocal statement regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, it states that the Security Council hopes that after completion of the reforms in the PA in a credible manner and progress in the reconstruction of the Strip, conditions will be created for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and the establishment of a state. Within this framework, the United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians for agreement on a political horizon for prosperous coexistence by peaceful means.

Palestinian Responses

• Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip condemned the Security Council resolution and calling it a tool intended to help Israel achieve its objectives while ignoring Palestinian aspirations. They warned that they would view the international stabilization force to be deployed in the Strip as a threat if it attempted to disarm them:
  • Hamas rejected the Security Council resolution since, it did not pass the threshold of the political and humanitarian demands and rights of the Palestinian people, especially after two years of “a brutal war” in the Strip. Hamas called the resolution an international trusteeship mechanism to realize Israel’s objectives after it failed to do so militarily, and to detach the Gaza Strip from the “overall Palestinian geographic entity.” Hamas said “armed resistance^[5] is a legitimate right,” adding that the issue of weapons was an internal Palestinian matter linked only to a political course that would ensure the end of the “occupation.” Hamas warned that any international force operating inside the Gaza Strip and engaging in disarmament would lose its neutrality and become a party on behalf of Israel (Hamas Telegram channel, November 18, 2025).

• • Muhammad Nazzal, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said Hamas wanted the confrontation to remain focused on the “Israeli occupation” and not engage the rest of the world. He stated that even if a ceasefire was achieved in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian people would continue “resistance and to confront Israel” wherever possible. He said that as far as Hamas was concerned, the only solution to the conflict was full recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and “victory over the occupation”^[6] (Al Jazeera, November 18, 2025).
  • Osama Hamdan, a Hamas figure in Lebanon, said the Security Council resolution strengthened United States support for Israel and provided it with cover for its [alleged] “crimes” while ignoring the rights of the Palestinian people. He called the resolution “dangerous,” claimed it violated every existing international arrangemen, and reiterated that the battle had not ended and would continue until the “liberation of Jerusalem” (Telegram channel of the Palestinian Media Center, November 18, 2025).
  • Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said the addition of the clause to the resolution regarding a Palestinian state was cosmetic rather than practical (Telegram channel of journalist Isma’il Abu Amar, November 19, 2025).
  • The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also rejected the Security Council resolution. It reiterated Hamas’ claim that the resolution imposed an international trusteeship over the Gaza Strip and attempted to achieve objectives that the “occupation” had not achieved in the war. The PIJ claimed that the resolution attempted to detach the Gaza Strip from the rest of the Palestinian territory, to impose a new situation violating the rights and red lines of the Palestinian people, and to rob them of their right to self-determination and “resistance,” which it described as “a right recognized by international law” (PIJ Telegram channel, November 18, 2025).
  • PIJ spokesperson Muhammad al-Hajj Musa condemned the resolution and harshly criticized the Arab and Islamic states which supported it, asking what gave them the right to hand over Gaza to the United States and Israel and to detach it from Judea and Samaria. He added that the PIJ did not wat confrontation with anyone, and certainly not with Arab and Islamic states, but as long as the resolution existed, the PIJ would regard any force operating in the Strip as an “occupying force,” and threatened that if they entered the Gaza Strip, “they would have a problem” (al-Jazeera Mubasher, November 18, 2025).
  • The Palestinian terrorist organizations said in a statement that the resolution was a tool of trusteeship and international cooperation in the “murder” of the Palestinian people. It that the resolution, which supposedly spoke of “peace,” did not address the roots of the problem and the lack of true peace and did not call for an end to the “occupation.” The terrorist organizations also rejected the definition of “resistance” as “terrorism” and the desire to disarm the Palestinians of weapons used “to defend the people” (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 18, 2025).
• However, the Palestinian Authority (PA) welcomed the resolution and noted the urgent need to implement it to ensure the return to normal life, protection for the Gazans and a full withdrawal of Israeli forces. The PA claimed it was completely prepared to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip and to cooperate with all bodies, including the United States administration, Security Council members, the European Union and all members of the international coalition, to advance a process that would lead to peace, security and stability between Palestinians and Israelis (Wafa, November 18, 2025). The PA foreign ministry said the resolution strengthened the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, independence and life free of the “Israeli occupation,” a right which was unconditional and not subject to negotiation, and which was consistent with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which determined the illegality of the “occupation” and the need to end it immediately (Wafa, November 19, 2025).

Responses from Iran and the Shi’ite Axis

• The Iranian foreign ministry condemned the Security Council resolution and expressed “deep concern” that some of its clauses contradicted the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, while imposing a trusteeship regime on the Gaza Strip in a way that prevented Palestinians from self-determination and the establishment of a state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital. The ministry said that any international force operating in Gaza had to be under UN supervision and focus only on ensuring the ceasefire and the entry of humanitarian aid, while stressing “the legitimacy of resistance against the occupation” (Tasnim, November 19, 2025).
• Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, alleged that many members of the Security Council had expressed concern regarding the resolution because it was intended to neutralize the responsibility of the UN and the Security Council itself, but voted in favor of the resolution only to stop the “bloodshed” in the Gaza Strip. He said Iran’s position was that the resolution and its mechanisms should not be implemented or interpreted in a way which harmed or undermined the legitimate rights of the Gazans. He said a temporary Palestinian committee should administer the Gaza Strip and called for the prevention of the possibility of “annexation, occupation, forced displacement” within the framework of the new resolution (Tasnim, November 19, 2025).

• The Houthis’ political bureau condemned the Security Council resolution and claimed that it meant a trusteeship and regime of patronage under American supervision, serving the objectives of the “Israeli enemy” which it had failed to achieve through military force. The statement expressed regret that Arab and Muslim states supported the American position and emphasized “the right of the Palestinian people to resist the enemy” (Telegram channel of the Houthi movement, November 18, 2025).

Responses in the International Arena

• The American president welcomed the UN Security Council vote approving the establishment of the Board of Peace under his leadership. He claimed the board would include the “strongest and most respected leaders in the world” and would be recorded as one of the most important resolutions in the history of the UN, leading to a deepening of world peace (Truth Social, November 18, 2025). United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the resolution as a “historic milestone in building a calm and prosperous Gaza, governed by the Palestinian people and not by Hamas.” He added that the resolution brought the achievement of a Gaza Strip that was “demilitarized, non-extremist and stable” closer (al-Sharq, November 18, 2025).
• Egypt supported the resolution but voiced reservations and concern regarding the process of demilitarizing the Strip without Hamas’ cooperation in light of the movement’s statement regarding disarmament. An “Egyptian source” stated that Cairo sought to obtain support and cooperation from the Palestinian terrorist organizations and from Cairo’s perspective, the international force to be deployed in the Strip would not engage in disarming the “resistance,” but would focus on “neutralizing” the weapons and preventing the digging of new tunnels and the holding of military[-terrorist] exercises by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations (al-Akhbar, November 19, 2025).
• Despite the support of 12 members of the Security Council in addition to the United States, representatives of some of the states expressed reservations, especially in light of the uncertainty regarding the two-state solution: the representative of Sierra Leone, who serves as Security Council president, said the Council had no right to revoke or condition the Palestinian right to a state; Slovenia and Somalia were concerned the ambiguity regarding the role of the UN and the PA and regretted the absence of an explicit reference to the two-state solution; Guyana claimed that the “occupation” violated international law and said the PA had to have an integral role in the reconstruction of the Strip without vague preconditions; the French representative demanded that the resolution be implemented within a clear political and legal context that included a two-state solution, the return of a strengthened PA to the Gaza Strip, the removal of Hamas from any governing role, and the preservation of “the unity of the Strip and Judea and Samaria [sic].” However, the states emphasized that they had supported the resolution to prevent renewed escalation and enable progress in reconstruction and the political process. The representative of China said his country had abstained because the resolution was vague and unclear regarding the structure of the BoP, its composition and its authority, barely addressed the Palestinians and in practice sidelined the UN (UN website, November 17, 2025; New York Times, November 17, 2025).
• The Jordanian political commentator Muhammad Abu Arida claimed that the Security Council vote was a new nakba for the Gazans and should be rejected absolutely. He said Russia and China should have used their veto power, because the resolution was a “black day” for the Palestinian people. He added that the disarmament of the “Palestinian resistance”^[7] was as “illegitimate,” because weapons were a “legitimate right,” noting that the “Palestinian resistance” was determined to keep its weapons, since it regarded them as the “only option” for restoring the rights of the Palestinian people (al-Aqsa TV, November 19, 2025).

 Appendix: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] The Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.
^[3] For the full English version, see the Appendix.
^[4] Terrorist organizations.
^[5] Anti-Israel terrorism and violence.
^[6] The destruction of the State of Israel.
^[7] Palestinian terrorist organizations.

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