The training program of the Hamas al-Shuja’iya Battalion during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a document brought back from the Gaza Strip

Overview^[1]

• On January 19, 2025, a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas made it possible to release the hostages held by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners incarcerated in Israel. The ceasefire lasted until March 18, 2025, when the fighting resumed because of disagreements regarding the continuation of the negotiations.
• A document brought back from the Gaza Strip by the IDF showed that the Hamas military wing had exploited the ceasefire to train new operatives in preparation for a possible resumption of the war. It detailed training held between February 17 and March 1, 2025 for 121 new recruits who would then be integrated into the 4th al-Shuja’iya Battalion.
• According to the document, the training lasted only seven days and its schedule was carefully planned so that the entire process could be completed before the target date set for the end of the ceasefire.
• Given that the training took place during the ceasefire and the trainees were supposed to be integrated immediately into the al-Shuja’iya Battalion, the program included lessons learned from Operations al-Aqsa Flood, the name Hamas gave to the Gaza Strip War.
• The document, which includes the course file for the training, describes the purpose of the training, its format, contents, special aspects, the threshold achievements required and data regarding costs and the rates of successful graduates and dropouts.
• Prospective operatives acquired field skills and were certified in the use of various weapons, including those used by the Israeli forces, and were trained in defense tactics to counter UAVs, first aid in the field and combat documentation. They were also given lectures with religious content and were required to swear fealty to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
• Although Hamas was damaged and suffered significant losses during the war, its military wing apparently still operated with an organizational and operational infrastructure that enabled it to function as a terrorist organization in every respect. In Amit Institute assessment, Hamas used tactical pauses not only for regrouping and rest, but as a critical window for accelerated force-building and the insertion of fresh forces immediately upon the renewal of the fighting. Hamas, by virtue of its ability to learn lessons, did not allow its training to stagnate and incorporated updated operational lessons out of necessity to cope with the IDF’s tactical advantages in the field. The document revealed that Hamas’ training mechanism remained institutionalized, functioning and capable of carrying out complex and multi-branch training under constraints of schedules and security and operational limitations.

Purpose, Objectives and Conditions for Admission

• According to the document, the program was based on lessons learned during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and was intended for new recruits to the 4th Battalion. The supervisory and implementing body was the Brigades’ training and exercises department, in coordination with the Battalion’s training array, and 12 Battalion instructors assisted the Brigade instructors.

Purpose of the Training

• The objective of the training was to give the new operatives practical and theoretical skills suited to the missions of the combat arrays in the field. The specific training objectives were the following:
  • To raise morale and strengthening religious values and the connection to Allah, exalted be his name.
  • To make the “fighter” familiar with basic field skills.
  • To make the “fighter” with the combat area, ambush tactics and how to deal with enemy scenarios based on the operational lessons from Operation al-Aqsa Flood.
  • To train the “fighter” in the use of enemy weapons, M16 + Tavor.
  • To train the “fighter” in anti-tank and engineering tactics and train him to operate them in the field.
  • To train the “fighter” to administer first aid to himself under difficult conditions and under pressure.
  • To give the “fighter” mastery of camera operation skills for the purpose of documenting executed missions.
  • To teach the “fighter” methods for preserving his personal security and the security of his communications networks.
  • To train the “fighter” to distinguish between different types of unmanned aerial vehicles and methods of defense against them.

The Specific Objectives

• The threshold conditions for admission were belief in the importance of the activity and a suitable religious and ideological outlook.

The Threshold Conditions for Admission

• Each trainee was obligated to take the oath of fealty to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. It is a religious oath in which the trainee swears to obey the orders of his commanders, safeguard his military equipment, preserve information security and not transfer his acquired knowledge to any party without the commanders’ knowledge and without receiving authorization.

The Training Program and Its Strict Schedule

• The training consisted of four hours a day for seven days, 18 hours devoted to theory and ten to practice. Four groups trained in two shifts, one in the morning between 07:00 and 11:00 and one in the afternoon between 12:00 and 16:00, with the hours alternating daily between morning and afternoon. A trainee who missed a shift would complete the missing material in the parallel training group in order to avoid gaps which might delay the inflexible objective of completing the training before the date of the end of the ceasefire.

• The course included field skills, personal security procedures, UAV training and methods of defense, training in the use of anti-tank missiles to attack “enemy” armored vehicles, first aid, explanations of the documentation carried out by the combat information unit in the field, instruction in explosive devices and their operation, weapons training, including weapons used by the IDF such as Tavor and M16 rifles, and combat tactics including lessons learned to that point during Operation al-Aqsa Flood.

• Three da’wah (religious preaching) lectures were integrated for the purpose of training “jihad fighters” who had not yet undergone the bay’ah course (religious and organizational oath of fealty), so that the other fighters could also benefit from it:

Emphases, Adminstration and Doordination

• The platoon commander [of the training squad?] would be the company training officer to simplify the methods of communication with the company commander.
• Commitment and adherence to the Brigade timetable were required and no changes were to be made to the dates of the contents and lectures, and no study or lecture slot established in the training timetable was to be canceled.
• The commanders were instructed to implement advance coordination with the medical array, the combat information array, the aerial array and the intelligence array before the beginning of the course, and they had to be prepared to provide support to the instructors with equipment and aids required for the training, documentation, debriefing and lessons learned.
• For example, the importance of field documentation during the training for purposes of learning and lessons learned from the instruction regarding the required advance coordination can be seen from
• Coordination with the information array is required before the beginning of the course for the purpose of allocating an instructor team and cameras for producing lessons learned in the field and documenting the training days.

• The document included a table of the equipment and weapons required for practical training, including quantities and division according to the four companies in the Battalion (10, 20, 30 and 40). Trainees were required to equip themselves with a notebook, pen, chair and table.

End of Training Course

• Conditions and criteria for completing the training and passing the course:
  • At least 95% attendance.
  • A score of 80% and above in the personal skills test.
• Good and appropriate behavior during the training program.
• Evaluation method:
  • Evaluation of the trainee’s daily behavior.
  • Evaluation of the trainee’s practical skills.
  • Evaluation of the trainee’s knowledge and understanding.
• According to the document, of 121 trainees, 116 completed the course successfully, 12 of them graduated with distinction, and five were dropped:

• The total cost was 1,320 shekels, according to the following:

Appendix: The Full Document

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Terrorist operatives.

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