The Israeli protests against the judicial legislation as reflected in Hamas documents

Dr. Igal Shiri and Dr. Hayim Iserovich

Overview

• The demonstrations and protest which began in Israel in January 2023 against the judicial legislation promoted by the Israeli government received systematic, extensive attention from the Palestinian media, with commentary on the implications for Israeli society and its military strength.
• Senior Hamas figures did not publicly comment on the protests in Israel, but Hamas documents brought back by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War showed they were monitoring the reports daily and referred to them in conversations among themselves and with their partners in the “resistance axis,”^[1] especially in light of preparations for implementing the practical plan for the vision of “the destruction of Israel.”
• Among the documents were reports from Hamas intelligence departments which gave extensive coverage to the developments surrounding the government’s proposed “judicial reform” and the protest, and the possible implications for the IDF’s functioning in light of the reservists’ protest.
• From the documents it appears that Hamas intelligence personnel warned Yahya al-Sinwar, the head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, that given its internal events, Israel would respond with force to any “resistance” initiative, and therefore they recommended waiting and allowing the crisis in Israel to deepen. Nevertheless, al-Sinwar continued the preparations and ordered the execution of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre while Israel’s internal crisis was still ongoing, reinforcing assessments regarding Israel’s response as presented in the Hamas intelligence documents.

Background Information

• The demonstrations which began in Israel in January 2023 to protest against the judicial legislation promoted by the Israeli government received systematic, extensive attention from the Palestinian media. The reports especially dealt with the protests by reservists who threatened to stop volunteering, while op-ed pieces claimed the events indicated that Israel’s military was weak and had lost its deterrence, there was a deepening societal rift, and there was an opportunity to attack and weaken Israel.^[2]
• The Hamas leadership did not publicly deal with the domestic Israeli protest, but did monitor the developments in Israel. Dr. Bassem Na’im, head of Hamas’ political and international relations department in the Gaza Strip, said that Yahya al-Sinwar, the head of the Hamas political bureau and movement leader in the Gaza Strip,^[3] who spent 22 years in prison in Israel and knew Hebrew, was always aware of all the details of what was happening in “Zionist society.” Na’im said al-Sinwar listened to Israeli channels, read reports and studies and received reports from Hamas personnel in various departments, including the political department, intelligence and general security, and “was aware of the smallest details.” According to Na’im, Hamas knew Israel was battling a deep internal crisis, which he called “the curse of the eighth decade [since the founding of the State of Israel],” similar to what occurred during the periods of the First and Second Temple, which collapsed from within. Hamas knew the crisis involved internal division in Israeli ideology, society, religion, security and identity, which had led to a division between “the State of Jerusalem,” led by the extreme right, and the liberal “State of Tel Aviv.” Na’im claimed that Israel was divided regarding its military and security, in its cities and streets, and that it was necessary to follow what was happening in order to find “the right moment to strike the blow that would help dismantle it.” Therefore, he stated that the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre had caused “irreversible damage” which would contribute to the eventual collapse of Israel (website of Al Jazeera presenter Ahmed Mansour, March 17, 2025).
• Hamas documents discovered by the IDF in the Gaza Strip during the war provide evidence of how senior Hamas figures, led by al-Sinwar and Isma’il Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau,^[4] monitored the protest demonstrations in Israel as they made preparations for implementing the vision of “the destruction of Israel” before October 7, 2023.^[5]

Senior Hamas Figures Relate to the Protest in Israel

• On January 14, 2023, Isma’il Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, addressed members of the Hamas executive committee who convened in Doha, some of whom had come from Turkey and the Gaza Strip. Haniyeh described the Israeli escalation following the establishment of the right-wing government and called it “dangerous” since it threatened the Palestinian issue, particularly regarding “Jerusalem and al-Aqsa, the settlements, the land of 1948, and the siege on Gaza and its strangulation.” For that reason, in Haniyeh’s assessment the conflict with “the enemy” was approaching a broad “clash.”
• Haniyeh also noted that the Israeli government “contains within it the seeds of the entity’s internal explosion,” given the demonstrations on both sides of the political spectrum. In his opinion the rifts and internal crises in Israel were not ordinary political disputes, but expressions of the deep structural disintegration of the society and the state, with the “collapse process,” already clearly visible. He also quoted the Quranic verse “and their hearts are divided”^[6] to show that the division was deep and irreconcilable.

Second: the [Israeli] government, as much as it threatens the Palestinian people, carries within it the seeds of the entity’s internal explosion. The contradictory and opposing statements we are hearing and the demonstrations indicate that the entity is in an unprecedented internal state.

Yesterday, [Ehud] Barak issued an extraordinary statement: we must fight everywhere to bring down this government.

There is a demand to arrest the opposition leadership.

The factors behind the internal explosion of the entity have become clear, in accordance with the words of Allah “and their hearts were divided.”

• On April 4, 2023, a conversation took place between Yahya al-Sinwar and member of Hamas political bureau, Muhammad Nasr (Abu Omar), who was based in Beirut. The conversation dealt with the state of the Hamas movement, preparations for the future campaign against Israel and regional developments. The conversation also dealt with the protest within Israel and its possible impact on the confrontation. Nasr noted that the internal Israeli division was an opportunity for Hamas and the Palestinians, but only if the Palestinians overcome their own internal division.

– There is a real opportunity for the [Palestinian] cause and the [Hamas] movement, and herein lies the danger of division in the political position or in the political line. The internal division in Israel is the greatest destructive force that can destroy Israel, and any [Palestinian] internal division delays the achievement of the goals.

– This is an opportunity for us to reap the fruits, as the balance of power has now shifted in our favor, and we must seize the opportunity. The obstacle facing us is the internal division on the political issue.

• Al-Sinwar agreed with Nasr’s assessments regarding the “state of the enemy.” He noted that although a certain calm could be observed in the protest within Israel, it was only temporary and it was a “severe crisis” in the foundations of the “entity,” which even the dialogue efforts promoted by President Isaac Herzog did not help resolve.

– The general line is 100% correct and the assessment is precise, whether it concerns the situation of the enemy, the region or the existing opportunities.

– The [political] calm among the enemy is temporary, only an apparent calm, and the crisis is greater and deeper.

– The talks taking place with the Zionist president are limited and their impact is weak.

– The crisis strikes the depth of the entity.

– From interviews in the media with enemy leaders, the picture becomes clear. The crisis in the entity is deep, not just a civil war, but a disintegration of the glue that holds the entity’s components together, and a breakdown of the formulas that preserve the entity’s existence and continuity.

– Anyone familiar with the enemy’s affairs notices that if this situation continues for some time, it will lead them to a condition more serious and dangerous than Harb al-Ghufran [the Yom Kippur War].

• On March 6, 2023, al-Sinwar sent a letter to Haniyeh before his visit to Iran, in which he dealt with how Hamas interpreted its role in the eyes of the Iranians and presented points for discussion in the context of the preparations for the “campaign of liberation, return and destruction of the entity.” Al-Sinwar noted that the “internal situation of the enemy” should also be addressed in the discussions, although only in a focused manner.

The internal situation of the internal enemy, its disagreements, conflicts and crises must be given a place, focused even if small.

Hamas Intelligence Assessment of the Protest and Its Implications

• Even before the Israeli government’s announcement of its intention to advance judicial legislation in January 2023 and the start of the protest, Hamas identified the potential for escalating disagreements and polarization within Israel. On November 27, 2022, more than three weeks after the elections for the 25^th Knesset, and while coalition negotiations were still underway to form the new government under Benjamin Netanyahu, Hamas military intelligence sent Yahya al-Sinwar (Abu Ibrahim) a document titled “Policy of the enemy’s right-wing government led by Netanyahu,” which presented assessments of expected policy regarding the Palestinians, Syria and Lebanon, foreign relations and the promotion of normalization.^[11] According to the document, Netanyahu would be able to form a right-wing government based on 64 members from “extreme” right-wing parties and it would be “the most homogeneous of the enemy’s previous governments.” The government would reinforce “structural instability” and lead to “escalation of the confrontation” between the right and the center-left, and would also attempt to increase pressure on “institutions considered to be under the control of the center-left.”

2. This government will reinforce the ongoing state of structural instability in the enemy’s entity as a result of right-wing control over its governing components, which will deepen the sense of alienation among Western Jews [Ashkenazis] and the center-left movement, particularly due to the control of figures from the extreme right over the entity’s institutions (such as Smotrich and Ben Gvir), which will lead to an escalation of the confrontation between the right-wing and center-left movements within the entity, using various means of influence (such as the media) and pushing toward confrontation over the right-wing’s control of the entity’s components.

3. The Netanyahu government will exert more pressure on institutions considered to be under center-left control in light of the right-wing’s clear agenda to influence the entity’s institutions, such as the judicial system. The right will seek to legislate the “reasonableness clause” and thereby weaken the influence of the Supreme Court, which will contribute to legislation protecting the prime minister from prosecution and strengthening the executive branch over the judiciary.

4. The current government will provide Netanyahu with governmental stability and near-total control over the decision-making process, which will assist him in making decisions according to his vision, especially since the “cabinet” in this government would have limited influence over decision-making.

• The issue of proposed judicial reform and its possible implications for Israeli society and the military was also presented in reports by the political and foreign relations department of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which analyzed the situation in the Palestinian, Israeli and regional arenas. In a report dated September 6, 2023, the position of the attorney general was presented, stating that she refused to defend the government’s position in the High Court of Justice hearing on the cancellation of the “reasonableness clause”and supported striking down the cancellation. The authors of the document assessed that the High Court would decide to strike down the cancellation of the “reasonableness clause,” creating a constitutional crisis between the court and the government.

The severity of the issue lies in the growing expectations that the court will strike down the law. As a result, Netanyahu and the government are expected to reject the court’s decision and claim it is outside its jurisdiction. That will lead to a constitutional crisis in the country, with the most dangerous impact being on the army and security forces due to their obedience to the court and their refusal to obey the government.

• On July 25, 2023, “Yasser”^[14] from intelligence in Hamas’ military wing sent Yahya al-Sinwar a classified assessment of “the impact of protests in the ranks of the ‘enemy army’ on operational readiness and the security situation on the fronts.” The introduction noted that the army was facing a crisis of “dangerous” protests among reserve soldiers and officers, mainly in the air force and intelligence, and if they escalated it could affect preparedness to face the challenges on the front.

Introduction:

1. The enemy army is in the midst of a crisis of increasingly serious protests among reserve soldiers and officers, who are considered a key pillar in the army’s operations, especially in the Air Force. This will negatively affect the army’s operational capability if the intensity of the demonstrations and refusals escalates and reaches more significant levels. It will also affect the army’s offensive capability and its preparedness to deal with the challenges existing on the front. The demonstrations have so far focused on several sectors [of the army], the most prominent of which are the Air Force and Intelligence.

2. Reserve service in the Israeli army is mandatory for any citizen or permanent resident who is not exempt and is not in the regular army. Reserve service is intended to strengthen the regular army in emergencies, military operations and natural disasters, as well as in participation in daily routine operations such as training and ongoing security operations.

• The document noted that during July 2023 there was an increase in the intensity of the demonstrations against the government’s intention to advance the legislation, with dozens of officers and soldiers declaring their refusal to serve and hundreds more announcing they would refuse to continue serving if the legislation passed. Subsequently, information was presented on the nature of the protest within the army, apparently based on publications in the Israeli media at the time. For example, it was reported that 161 pilots, soldiers and officers in the Air Force “announced the suspension of their reserve service in the Air Force in protest of the continuation of the judicial legislation process,” and a breakdown by rank was presented. It was also noted that 1,142 soldiers and reserve officers in the Air Force threatened to terminate their voluntary service if the legislation passed, of which 235 were fighter pilots, 167 at the Air Force Headquarters and 80 from the 669^th Search and Rescue Unit. It was also noted that 1,500 soldiers and officers from Military Intelligence said they would refuse to serve, of which 1,400 were from Unit 8200.^[16]

3. The enemy army has received a letter signed by 1,142 soldiers and officers in the Air Force reserve, threatening to stop their voluntary service if the “reasonableness clause” is finally approved. The data shows that the number has increased to 1,194 officers and soldiers.

• The report included statements and warnings from army commanders regarding the protest among reserve service members and the possible impact on operational readiness, based on publications in Israel. Statements were offered by the Chief of Staff at the time, Herzi Halevi, and the Air Force Commander, Tomer Bar, alongside quotes from “enemy sources” regarding how the IDF was preparing to deal with the consequences

The army has prepared an emergency plan to prevent damage to operational capability and to deal with the reservists’ avoiding service. Each reserve commander will speak with his subordinates and conduct a situation assessment. Officers and soldiers will be classified into three categories: those who have announced they will not report for reserve service, those who are not affected by the issue, and those who are not threatening to refuse to serve.

• The report then presented statements by senior political figures regarding the crisis in the army, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Opposition Chairman Yair Lapid, Minister of the Minister of Defense Yoav Galant; Minister of Energy Yisrael Katz; and Chairman of the Yisrael Beytenu Party, Avigdor Lieberman, who called on the Chief of Staff to resign upon the passage of the law abolishing the “reasonableness clause.” Positions of the Israeli public regarding the protest in the ranks of reserve servicemen were also presented.

4. A public opinion poll showed that about 54% of the public opposes the decision of some reserve soldiers to stop volunteering if the law to abolish the “reasonableness clause” is approved in the Knesset, while 36% support the decision.

5. A clip prepared by right-wing supporters showed the level of social polarization that exists between the Air Force and the ground forces, with the Air Force refusing to assist the ground forces with fire unless they oppose the legal changes. Ben Gvir published the clip and refused to delete it. The clip sparked widespread controversy, and the army and the Minister of Defense attacked it and its creators.

• The interpretive section of the document noted that the legal issue was unnerving the “enemy” and had created a serious crisis for all sectors of Israeli society, especially the army, which was having difficulty in limiting its consequences. According to the report, the effects of the crisis depended on the number of soldiers and officers who did not report for service, their roles and the difficulty of the command echelon in maintaining cohesion within the army and separating the army from the social and political crisis. The greater the number of those avoiding service, the greater the direct impact on operational capability and readiness for conflict, especially a multi-sector conflict. Pilots were considered the most influential because “their number was modest compared to other specialties and their role was extremely important.” The report also linked the crisis in the army regarding the proposed legal legislation to a deeper crisis within Israeli society, noting that “the backbone of the air force consists of secular Ashkenazis from the center [of the country], while the backbone of the ground forces were Mizrahis^[20] who came from the periphery.”^[21]

7. The main challenge facing the enemy army in the face of this crisis is its ability to deal with threats in all arenas. The threats on the various fronts still exist, some are urgent and some are threats.

8. The enemy is faced with the increasing offensive spirit from the “resistance” forces, especially Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, and with their desire to exploit the internal situation within the Zionist entity to their advantage. The commanders of the Zionist intelligence community are spreading the information to push the

political forces in Israel to reach internal understandings, since preoccupation with the political crisis weakens strategic deterrence.

9. In the assessment of the right wing that rules Israel, the scope of the crisis for the army if the laws are passed has been exaggerated. The coalition believes that it can overcome the crisis of the refusal of some sectors to serve in the army.

• According to the July 2023 report, the number of soldiers and officers refraining from service did not yet significantly impact operational readiness, but the crisis was expected to be exacerbated if additional laws were passed or if the sides failed to reach agreements and a constitutional crisis erupted. The IDF would still be capable of managing a confrontation with the Gaza Strip unless more than half of the reserve pilots did not participate, whereas the lack of a quarter of the reserve pilots would impair readiness for a multi-front confrontation. In addition, Israel would avoid initiating a military campaign, but warned that it would be “more sensitive” to action by the “resistance” and therefore expected to respond forcefully.

The assessment:

1. The number of soldiers and officers refusing service does not yet significantly affect the army’s operational readiness. However, the refusal crisis may worsen if additional laws are passed (in October and November), the parties fail to reach an agreement and the enemy entity undergoes a constitutional crisis. As a result, the military command will face extensive challenges and there will be a direct, though partial, impact on its level of preparedness and operational readiness regarding confrontation and large-scale war.

2. The enemy is still capable of managing a confrontation at a standard level of readiness, and its readiness will not be damaged unless more than half of the reserve pilots refuse service. However, refusal by a quarter of the reserve pilots

would constitute a significant blow to its ability to cope with a multi-front confrontation.

3. The crisis could become fundamental (a state of general chaos, significant weakening of military strength and a basic strategic decline in army readiness), but that is not expected in the foreseeable future.

4. This crisis will have profound effects related to cohesion within the army, the multi-year plan, military preparedness and operational readiness, the tendency to take offensive initiative and the combat motivation of soldiers and officers and motivation for enlistment.

5. The enemy is not expected to pursue strategic military initiatives as a way to extricate itself from the internal crisis. No military campaign will solve the internal crisis because the disagreements between the two sides are extremely deep, and any military move will be tied to existing tensions.

6. The enemy will want to focus on handling the internal crisis and, in doing so, will want to address existing threats in the arenas in a way that does not lead to a broad confrontation. Moreover, the enemy will be more sensitive to any initiative by the resistance, which will push it to strike forcefully.

7. In the event of a flare-up on any front against the enemy, some of the soldiers and officers will regret their refusal and return to military service. In addition, Netanyahu will try to capitalize on the new security situation to achieve his political goals.

• The July 2023 report ended with recommendations for exploiting the crisis in Israel, particularly within the army, as a means to advance the vision of “the destruction of Israel.” Their main recommendation was not to initiate a military confrontation but rather to wait for the crisis to worsen and in the meantime to focus on psychological warfare, including promoting the narrative of the collapse of past Jewish political entities due to internal divisions and the failure of Prime Minister Netanyahu to retrieve the bodies of the kidnapped soldiers held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip.^[24]

The recommendations:

1. Avoid entering a military confrontation based on the development of the internal crisis within the enemy. The crisis should be allowed to deepen further, since if it does not become a severe crisis, the benefit of the internal crisis in any military intervention will not be significant.

2. Coordinate with the comrades [other “resistance” organizations] to conduct psychological warfare, and focus on disseminating information that will inflame the internal situation.

3. Invest in demonstrations to promote the issue of the captive soldiers and present it to the enemy’s public as one of the matters Netanyahu has failed to manage.

4. Continue to make the connection between the collapse of the political entities of the Jews due to internal disagreements and the exploitation of the current situation by the enemies.

5. The movement’s leadership [Hamas] should respond to the political situation within the enemy entity before the [Palestinian] public and the national forces, and present the situation as an opportunity to achieve the goals of the Palestinian people.

1. Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and the Houthis in Yemen, all of whose objective was to destroy and eliminate the State of Israel.

2. For further information, see the March 2023 ITIC report, Protests in Israel and the rejection of the government’s new legal reforms from the perspective of the Palestinians and Hezbollah and the July 2023 report, Israel’s legal reforms continue to be of interest to the Palestinians, Hezbollah and Iran, who perceive the country as weakened. ↑Al-Sinwar, who was appointed head of the Hamas political bureau in August 2024 was killed by the IDF on October 16, 2024. ↑

3. Eliminated by Israel in Tehran on July 30, 2024.

4. For further information, see the March 2025 ITIC report, Hamas’ strategy to destroy Israel: from theory into practice, as seen in captured documents and the April 2025 report, Operation Guardian of the Walls as a watershed moment in Hamas’ strategy for the “destruction of Israel,” as reflected in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip.

5. "Even united, they would not dare fight against you except from within fortified strongholds or from behind walls. Their malice for each other is intense: you think they are united, yet their hearts are divided..." (Sura 59 Verse 14).

6. For the original document click [Document 1]. The translated section is marked in red.

7. For the original document click [Document 2]. The translated section is marked in red.

8. For the original document click [Document 2]. The translated section is marked in red.

9. For the original document click [Document 3]. The translated section is marked in red.

10. The normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states.

11. For the original document click [Document 4]. The translated section is marked in red.

12. For the original document click [Document 5]. The translated section is marked in red.

13. Apparently the head of Hamas’ military intelligence, Muhammad Odeh.

14. For the original document click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

15. IDF intelligence.

16. For the original document click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

17. For the original document click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

18. For the original document click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

19. Jews of North African and Middle Eastern heritage.

20. Israel's north and south.

21. For the original document click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

22. For the original document click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

23. Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin.https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2025/06/117_doc_6e.pdf

24. For the original document click [Document 6]. The translated section is marked in red.

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