The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement: Insights and Responses

Yuval Rosenberg

Overview^[1]

• On June 26, 2026, at the conclusion of the fifth round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel in the United States, the ambassadors of the two countries signed a framework agreement in the presence of the United States secretary of state. Its main provisions are:
  • Mutual recognition by each state of the other’s sovereignty, for the first time since May 1983, שand a commitment to continue negotiations to end the state of war and establish peace.
  • A gradual Israeli withdrawal from pilot areas in south Lebanon, into which the Lebanese army will enter to dismantle all non-state armed groups^[2] and enforce the state’s sovereignty. The IDF withdrawal will be completed only after the dismantling of the groups and their infrastructure has been officially verified.
  • A commitment from the Lebanese government to implement the state’s monopoly over the possession of weapons and to prevent any state or non-state actor from depriving the state authorities of their authority to decide matters of war and peace.
  • Preventing the transfer of funds to any entity identified with non-state armed groups.
• Lebanese President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam called the agreement a diplomatic achievement and a foundation for restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty and strengthening the institutions of the state.
• Hezbollah and its allies rejected the framework agreement outright, claiming it was “surrender,” undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty and could lead to civil war. They stressed they would not abandon the “resistance” and said the Iran-United States memorandum of understanding was the only document capable of bringing the war to an end. Hezbollah supporters demonstrated in Beirut and the Beqa’a Valley, and the authorities instructed the security forces to enforce public order.
• Hezbollah’s opponents praised the agreement and said they were confident it would reduce Hezbollah and Iran’s influence over decision-making in the country, although in their assessment the organization would oppose the agreement publicly and politically.
• The Iranian foreign ministry claimed only the implementation of the memorandum of understanding with the United States would establish regional stability and called on the United States to compel Israel to set a timetable for unconditional withdrawal.
• In Amit Institute assessment, the signing of the framework agreement marks a turning point in the Lebanese arena, since for the first time the Lebanese leadership has presented a political framework linking an Israeli withdrawal to the expansion of state sovereignty and the disarmament of Hezbollah. Accordingly, the agreement is not merely a security and political issue vis-à-vis Israel but also a struggle for Lebanon’s future identity.
• The framework agreement will be tested by Lebanon’s ability to put into practice the provisions concerning the state’s control over the country’s security. In that sense, the agreement has initiated a new phase in Lebanon’s internal struggle for its centers of power. While the Lebanese leadership, with American and Arab backing, seeks to reestablish the state as the sole governing authority, Hezbollah views the move as a direct threat to its status, to the concept of the “resistance” and to Iran’s regional position in Lebanon. It regards the United States-Iran memorandum of understanding as the salient framework for discussions concerning Lebanon’s future and the organization’s status. Consequently, Lebanon’s political, public and institutional arenas are expected to become additional focal points along with the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. The Lebanese government faces the challenge of asserting its authority without sliding into a violent confrontation with the Shi’ite camp. Hezbollah faces the challenges of preserving its status as the leading extra-state military and political force and of preventing Iran from being pushed out of Lebanon. Those conflicting interests could develop into a violent confrontation which could further destabilize the country’s fragility and spill over into renewed fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.

Main Points of the Agreement

• On June 23, 2026, the fifth round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel began in the United States, with parallel political and security courses. The talks focused on the pilot areas in south Lebanon, from which IDF forces would withdraw to allow the Lebanese army to enter and prevent the presence of Hezbollah and other “armed groups.” The main dispute centered on Israel’s demand that the pilot areas also include territory beyond the security zone in which the IDF is currently deployed (al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Jadeed, Nidaa al-Watan and MTV Lebanon, June 23-25, 2026).
• On June 26, 2026, one day after the date on which the fifth round was scheduled to conclude, Israel and Lebanon finalized a “framework agreement,” signed by the ambassadors of the two countries and by State Department Counselor Daniel Haller, in the presence of Secretary of State Marco Rubio. According to agreement, the shared objective was to achieve sustainable peace and security and both countries declare their aspiration to end the conflict between them, ensure the sovereignty and security of both states, and establish peaceful neighborly relations between the two states. The main provisions of the agreement are as follows (full text on the State Department website, June 26, 2026):
  • Israel and Lebanon affirm each state’s right to exist in peace and their mutual desire to live in security as neighboring sovereign states. The two countries also affirm their readiness to resolve all issues through direct negotiations, mediated and supported by the United States, for the state of war between them to end. It is the first time Lebanon has signed an official document recognizing Israel’s sovereignty since the Israel-Lebanon Agreement of May 17, 1983.^[3]

• • The two countries commit to a mutual, gradual and phased process, under which the Lebanese army will restore sovereignty throughout Lebanese territory, subject to the disarmament of all “non-state armed groups” and the dismantling of their “associated infrastructure.” The IDF will gradually redeploy out of Lebanese territory only after the process has been officially verified.
  • The parties will formulate a “security annex” with American support, under which the Lebanese army will gradually assume full and effective security responsibility in pilot areas, which will serve for the gradual and verified redeployment of the IDF and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces; agreement was reached on the first two pilot areas. Only after confirmation that the armed groups and their infrastructure have been dismantled and the Lebanese army has assumed full responsibility will reconstruction begin with international support and residents be permitted to return. That makes the Lebanese army the central actor required to bridge the gap between American and Israeli demands and Lebanon’s political and sectarian realities while attempting to avoid direct confrontation with Hezbollah.
  • The Lebanese government reaffirms its commitment to restoring full sovereignty over the entire territory of the state. The government will also restore the state’s monopoly on the use of force, achieve the complete and verified disarmament of all “non-state armed groups” and ensure that said groups have no military or security role or armed capability anywhere in Lebanon. The government declares that it alone possesses the sovereign authority to decide matters of war and peace and rejects any claim by any state or non-state actor to use force in its name without its explicit authorization [an explicit reference to Hezbollah and Iran].
  • The government of Israel states that its military operations in Lebanon are solely the result of attacks and threats posed by non-state armed groups, foremost among them Hezbollah. According to the Israeli position, removing the threat through disarmament and security arrangements will eliminate any future need for IDF military action or its presence in Lebanon. Israel declared that it had no territorial claims in Lebanon.
  • The Lebanese government commits to advancing “a rigorous, performance-based plan” aimed at strengthening the capability of the Lebanese armed forces to establish full military and security control throughout the country, in accordance with security arrangements to be agreed upon during the negotiations, and to implement the disarmament of all non-state armed groups. All new American assistance would be “strictly conditioned on verifiable benchmarks, full transparency, demonstrated results and ongoing oversight.”
  • Lebanon and the United States commit to preventing the transfer of funds to any entity, organization or individual identified with non-state armed groups and to taking all available legal measures to outlaw their activities. The Lebanese government commits to preventing reconstruction funds from reaching non-state armed groups and associated entities.
  • Lebanon and Israel will establish working groups to formulate a “comprehensive and complete” peace and security agreement. They will maintain parallel channels of direct and ongoing dialogue, under American mediation, until full and lasting peace is achieved. Both commit to refraining from any “hostile or harmful” actions in international political or legal forums, and undertake to work toward locating and returning the remains of missing persons for burial and securing the release of detainees.
• At the signing ceremony, the parties emphasized different messages regarding the significance of the agreement. Rubio described it as “a first step” toward a broader arrangement intended to stabilize the border and lay the groundwork for a future agreement between the countries. Lebanese Ambassador Nada Hamada Mouawad represented it as a step toward restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty, while Israeli Ambassador Yechiel Leiter said it was a measure to reduce the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon and as a possible foundation for future peace. Accordingly, Israel underscored the agreement’s political potential, while Lebanon was careful to represent it as a step toward restoring its sovereignty rather than as a peace agreement (Lebanon 24 and al-Diyar, June 26, 2026).
• Rubio attributed the continuing instability to Hezbollah and Iran, arguing that the organization had undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty, threatened Israel’s security, destabilized the region and acted against American interests. He said the agreement outlined a gradual path toward restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty through Hezbollah’s disarmament and the dismantling of its military infrastructure, while simultaneously enabling Israel’s withdrawal once the security threat to its northern border had been removed. He further announced the establishment of a trilateral Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L), led by the United States, to supervise realization of the agreement, and said Washington would allocate $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Lebanon and more than $30 million to strengthen the capabilities of the Lebanese army, enabling it to exercise the state’s sovereignty throughout its territory (United States State Department website, June 26, 2026).
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said agreement had been reached on the pilot plan, according to which Hezbollah would be disarmed and the area transferred to the control of the Lebanese army in two regions adjacent to the Yellow Line (the security zone), one around the villages of Zawtar al-Sharqiya and Zawtar al-Gharbiya, and the other near the village of Ghandouriya (Israeli prime minister’s office website and Israeli media, June 27, 2026). However, the mayor of Froun, near Ghandouriya, denied reports that the town was expected to be included in the pilot areas. He said Froun was not located in occupied territory and lay outside the Yellow Line and therefore there was no reason to include it. The municipality called on the Lebanese state and the international community to guarantee Lebanon’s territorial sovereignty and the rights of its citizens while rejecting any Israeli attempt “to impose arrangements or conditions ” (al-Diyar, June 27, 2026).

Lebanese Leadership

• The Lebanese leadership, led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, said the framework agreement was a major diplomatic achievement and the foundation for restoring the state’s sovereignty after years during which Hezbollah had been a central actor in “security” decision-making. The government described the agreement not as a concession to Israel but as a process which would strengthen state institutions, enable Israel’s withdrawal, allow the deployment of the Lebanese army throughout the country and restore the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The Lebanese government sought to provide the agreement with public legitimacy and present it as a direct continuation of the principles of the Taif Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701, rather than as an exceptional measure or a surrender to external pressure:
  • Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed the signing of the framework agreement, calling it a first step toward restoring the state’s full sovereignty. He thanked the United States and the countries that supported the negotiations, praised the Lebanese delegation and the public’s resilience during the war, and said the agreement would pave the way for an Israeli withdrawal, the return of the displaced persons, the reconstruction of the country and the restoration of Lebanon’s full sovereignty. He added that the government was committed to continuing the implementation of the agreement until its objectives had been achieved (Lebanese presidency X account, June 26, 2026).
  • Aoun also spoke with the American president, who welcomed the signing of the agreement and noted the administration’s commitment to supporting its implementation. He expressed support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the expansion of state authority through the Lebanese army and the strengthening of the country’s economy and legitimate security institutions. Aoun said the Lebanese government was committed to implementing the agreement but asked the United States to ensure Israel fulfilled its commitments, especially a complete withdrawal from the areas under its control in south Lebanon, to enable the deployment of the Lebanese army up to the international border (Lebanese presidency X account, June 27, 2026).
  • Prime Minister Salam said the framework agreement was a mechanism which would ensure Israel’s withdrawal, restore state sovereignty and allow residents to return to their homes. He said extending state authority and ensuring the exclusive possession of weapons by the legitimate security forces did not represent a change in policy, but rather the implementation of the principles of the Taif Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the 2024 ceasefire arrangement. He thanked the United States, the Arab states and the international parties which assisted in formulating the agreement and expressed hope that it would enable reconstruction in south Lebanon to begin (Nawaf Salam X account, June 26, 2026).
  • Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji spoke with the Jordanian foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, who congratulated him and said he hoped the agreement would advance Lebanon’s interests and enable the state to enforce its sovereignty throughout its territory. Rajji called the agreement a victory for diplomacy, placing the authority of the state and its institutions above all other actors (Youssef Rajji’s X account, July 27, 2026).

Hezbollah and Its Allies

• Hezbollah, its allies and the religious and political elements identified with the “resistance camp” called the agreement “surrender to American and Israeli dictates,” a blow to Lebanon’s sovereignty and a move to disarm Hezbollah through political pressure after Israel had failed to achieve it in the fighting. Hezbollah said the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States was the only framework for stopping the hostilities and securing an Israeli withdrawal. It also tried to represent Lebanon’s leadership as acting against the national interest, warn against a slide into civil war if an attempt were made to implement the agreement by force and preserve the public legitimacy of the “resistance”^[4] as a national security asset and as an alternative to the government’s policy.

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem rejected the framework agreement outright, calling it “humiliation, disgrace and surrender of sovereignty.” He claimed that the Lebanese government had submitted to American and Israeli dictates and signed an agreement which gave Israel achievements it had failed to attain in the fighting. He said conditioning the Israeli withdrawal on Hezbollah’s disarmament gave Israel the right to interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs, enabled its continued presence in south Lebanon and would damage Lebanese sovereignty. He added that the Lebanese government ignored the Iranian-American memorandum of understanding, which included a commitment to end the fighting and to a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon within 60 days, thereby waiving significant Lebanese leverage. He said Hezbollah would oppose any attempt at disarmament, would work to bring about a full Israeli withdrawal by “all means at its disposal” and would adhere to the “path of resistance” until all Lebanese territory had been “liberated.” He called on the Lebanese government to renege on the agreement and work toward internal cooperation around liberating the land, returning the residents and building a national security strategy (website of the Hezbollah secretary general, June 27, 2026).
• Hezbollah Lebanese Parliament member Hassan Fadlallah denied reports that he had participated in formulating Lebanon’s position ahead of the negotiations with Israel. He claimed that in meetings he had held with official figures, he noted the organization’s opposition to direct negotiations with Israel and warned that the chosen political discourse damaged Lebanese sovereignty, widened internal division and led to unilateral concessions serving Israel’s interests. He later criticized the framework agreement and the Lebanese government, declaring that Hezbollah would not allow it to be realized because it granted Israel, through the political process, achievements it had failed to attain in the fighting. He said Hezbollah rejected any attempt to deploy the Lebanese army in areas north of the Litani River within the framework of pilot areas, opposed any move to disarm it and viewed it as an internal Lebanese issue in which Israel or the United States had no right to interfere. He added that the Lebanese government’s decisions regarding disarmament were a “crime” and damaged the “resistance” while it continued to fight Israel. He said he had confidence in Hezbollah’s capabilities, “Iranian support” and the fact that Israel would withdraw from south Lebanon only through pressure from the “resistance” and not through political arrangements. He accused the Lebanese government of acting, directly or indirectly, to sabotage the contacts between Iran and the United States, thereby delaying the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (al-Diyar and al-Manar, June 26, 2026).
• The chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, Muhammad Raad, called the agreement a “cursed declaration” and “the cry of an owl,” a warning of an approaching disaster. He said the agreement “falsified reality” and presented Hezbollah as threatening Lebanon, while, he said, the “resistance” was the “protector of the state’s sovereignty.” He accused the Lebanese government of total submission to American dictates and of cooperating with Israel, claiming that the agreement legitimized Israel’s “continued occupation” by conditioning withdrawal on Hezbollah’s disarmament. He claimed the Lebanese government had surrendered its leverage, including the understandings he said had been reached between Iran and the United States. He called on all “patriotic forces” in Lebanon to oppose the agreement and defend the state’s sovereignty against its implementation (al-Akhbar, June 27, 2026).

• After a Lebanese government meeting, Labor Minister Muhammad Haidar and Health Minister Rakan Nasser al-Din, both affiliated with Hezbollah, said they opposed direct negotiations with Israel and supported only indirect negotiations, following Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. They denied the government had authorized any party to conduct negotiations with Israel and claimed the issue had not been on the meeting’s agenda. They claimed they had discussed only that any future agreement would be submitted to the government for approval in accordance with constitutional procedures, and not with granting authorization to conduct negotiations, adding that any interpretation stating the government had approved authorization for negotiations was incorrect (al-Manar, June 26, 2026).
• Hezbollah Lebanese Parliament member Ibrahim al-Mousawi stated that when Prime Minister Netanyahu described the agreement as an achievement, it meant it was a “historic concession and submission to the enemy’s dictates.” He claimed the agreement was not legally or constitutionally valid and had no legitimacy, and therefore meant nothing “to us or to any honorable and independent Lebanese citizen” (al-Mousawi’s X account, June 28, 2026).

Amal

• Amal’s political bureau claimed the agreement was unbalanced, established gains in Israel’s favor, undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty and did not guarantee a full Israeli withdrawal and therefore could not serve as the basis for a just settlement. It reiterated its demand for a full Israeli withdrawal, deployment of the Lebanese army throughout the country’s territory, return of the residents, reconstruction of the affected areas and continuation of indirect negotiations only on the disputed issues and called on all political forces to exercise restraint and avoid fitna [civil strife], which served Israeli interests (Amal Telegram channel, June 27, 2026).
• Parliament speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri, reportedly not involved in formulating the agreement and only informed of its contents after it had been published, said the agreement could lead to fitna. He quoted a saying attributed to Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, that “During civil strife, be like the young camel: it has no back to be ridden and no udder to be milked,” as a call to avoid a descent into a general Lebanese confrontation and not become a tool in the hands of those seeking to ignite a conflict (al-Mayadeen and al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 27, 2026). He spoke with Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, speaker of the Iranian Majlis (parliament) and head of the negotiating team with the United States, regarding the situation in Lebanon and regional developments during the past week (Tasnim, June 28, 2026).
• Sources in the “Shi’ite duo” claimed the agreement not only damaged Lebanese sovereignty but its objective was to undermine the understandings between Iran and the United States by escalating the internal Lebanese arena. They sent a double message: opposition to the agreement and to direct negotiations with Israel, while attempting to prevent any deterioration into a violent confrontation between Hezbollah and the institutions of the Lebanese state (al-Diyar and al-Akhbar, June 27, 2026).

The Religious Leadership

• The Shi’ite mufti, Ahmad Qabalan, said the agreement was “the worst national disaster to befall Lebanon and has no legitimacy.” He said that through the agreement the current Lebanese government represented only itself and not Lebanon, and the agreement with “terrorist Israel” granted the IDF effective patronage over the activities of the Lebanese army and over the “occupied” territories of Lebanon (al-Nashra, June 26, 2026).

Public Protests

• Following the signing of the framework agreement Hezbollah mobilized its supporters to take to the streets and protest demonstrations were held in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia and other areas of Beirut, and in the Beqa’a Valley. Demonstrators blocked roads with burning tires, held a protest in the al-Tayyouneh area^[5] and gathered outside the Grand Serail (government headquarters), waving Hezbollah flags and chanting slogans against the agreement; motorcyclists rode in convoys carrying Hezbollah flags. The demonstrators claimed that the agreement undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty, contradicted the principles of the “resistance” and served Israel’s interests (al-Manar and Nidaa al-Watan, June 26-27, 2026).

• As the protests expanded, the Lebanese army deployed at several locations to reopen roads and prevent the demonstrations from spreading to additional areas. The public prosecutor at the court of appeal instructed the heads of Lebanon’s security forces to prevent public disturbances, roadblocks, damage to public and private property and the disruption of daily life. The security forces were instructed to identify those involved in the protest incidents and prepare the ground for legal action against them (al-Joumhouria, June 27, 2026).

    
Right: A motorcycle convoy of Hezbollah supporters. Left: Demonstrators identified with the Hezbollah camp protesting outside the Grand Serail in Beirut (al-Manar, June 27, 2026)

The Media

• According to op-eds in the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, the framework agreement was the product of heavy American pressure on the Lebanese leadership to disconnect the Lebanese arena from the contacts between Iran and the United States, institutionalize the conditioning of an Israeli withdrawal on Hezbollah’s disarmament and pave the way for a future peace agreement with Israel. According to the paper, President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam adopted the American-Israeli view that Hezbollah’s weapons, rather than the continuing Israeli occupation, were the central problem, thereby legitimizing Israel’s continued presence in south Lebanon. It further claimed that the Lebanese military delegation had been effectively excluded from the negotiations after opposing the expansion of the pilot areas north of the Litani River, the absence of a binding timetable for withdrawal, security coordination mechanisms with Israel and American oversight of the Lebanese army’s activities. Another op-ed claimed Aoun’s rhetoric, representing the agreement as a step toward restoring sovereignty and liberating the south, was inconsistent with reality and with Israeli statements that withdrawal would be conditioned on Hezbollah’s disarmament and that Israeli forces would continue to hold the “security zone” until then. The articles maintained that the agreement shifted the focus of the conflict from the Israeli occupation to the internal Lebanese arena, could push the Lebanese army into a confrontation with Hezbollah, undermine its unity and perpetuate the Israeli presence in south Lebanon. Therefore, they argued, the agreement was unlikely to gain legitimacy within the “resistance” camp and might ultimately prove unsustainable (al-Akhbar, June 26-27, 2026).

Organizations Affiliated with Hezbollah

• The Syrian Social Nationalist Party^[6] described the agreement as a “crime” and a renewed version of the May 17, 1983 agreement. The party claimed it was surrender to Israel and American pressure, undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty, legitimized the continuation of the “Israeli occupation” and did not guarantee any of Lebanon’s demands. It warned that the agreement could ignite a civil war because it could lead to the use of state forces against the “resistance,” and called on the Lebanese government to renege on the agreement and preserve national unity. It noted its support for the continued “resistance” as a means of defending Lebanon’s sovereignty and foiling “Israeli and American attempts” to impose a new political order on the country (al-Diyar, June 27, 2026).
• Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was more reserved. It supported the restoration of state authority and the achievement of a full Israeli withdrawal, but opposed conditioning the withdrawal on disarmament and called for internal dialogue instead of imposing an external solution (Lebanon Debate, June 27, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Opponents

• The response of the “sovereigntist camp” in Lebanon said it viewed the framework agreement not only as a security arrangement with Israel but also as a strategic opportunity to reshape Lebanon’s internal political system. Most elements of the camp said the agreement was foundation for strengthening state institutions, restoring the monopoly on the use of force to the Lebanese army and reducing the Hezbollah-Iranian influence over decision-making in Lebanon. They thought Hezbollah would continue to oppose the agreement primarily through political and public means but would find it difficult to prevent its implementation as long as it enjoyed domestic and international backing.
  • The chairman of the Kataeb Party, Sami Gemayel, welcomed the framework agreement and praised the Lebanese president, the prime minister, the negotiating delegation and the United States for advancing it. He said it guaranteed the restoration of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Israel’s withdrawal and the exclusive authority of the state over security matters, in accordance with the principles his party had promoted for years, “One state, one army, one weapon.” He said the main challenge now was implementing the agreement despite attempts to sabotage it (Sami Gemayel’s X account, June 27, 2026).
  • The chairman of the Change Movement, Elie Mahfoud, said the agreement marked the return of the Lebanese state to its position as having sole responsibility for security and sovereignty. He criticized Hezbollah and Iranian influence in Lebanon, called for dismantling the “state within a state” and restoring the state’s monopoly on the use of force to state institutions, but stressed that Iranian influence should not be replaced by any other foreign patronage (Nidaa al-Watan, June 27, 2026).
  • The Lebanese Democrats Coalition welcomed the agreement, calling it a significant step toward restoring state sovereignty and opening a path to stability and reconstruction. The coalition said its success depended on strengthening state institutions, especially the Lebanese army, and giving precedence to state authority over the existence of “non-state armed forces” (Nidaa al-Watan, June 27, 2026).
  • Lebanese Parliament member Waddah al-Sadek and journalist Ali al-Amin said Hezbollah’s response to the agreement would be determined primarily by Iran and the progress of its contacts with the United States. They said the organization’s position was relatively weak and therefore it was expected to focus on protests and rhetorical escalation, while the likelihood of an internal confrontation or escalation with Israel was low. They added that Hezbollah would be compelled to renew dialogue with state institutions and its future would be influenced by understandings reached between Tehran and Washington (Asharq al-Awsat, June 27, 2026).
  • Lebanese Parliament member Ashraf Rifi said he supported President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam and called the agreement the beginning of the “state project” at the expense of the “sub-state project” represented by Hezbollah. He said the agreement marked the restoration of national decision-making to state institutions, the exclusive possession of weapons by the Lebanese army and the end of Iranian influence over decision-making in Lebanon (al-Joumhouria, June 27, 2026).

The “Resistance Axis”^[7]

• In response to the agreement, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei stated that Tehran noted the need to protect Lebanon’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity and to respect the dignity and security of all Lebanese. He claimed an essential condition for any understanding was an end to the war and to the “occupation by the Zionist regime” against Lebanon. He added that only the full implementation of Article 1 of the memorandum of understanding with the United States, which included ending military activity against Lebanon and the withdrawal of the “occupiers” from all parts of Lebanon, was a necessary condition for reaching a final and sustainable agreement which would establish “regional stability.” He called on the United States to take all necessary measures to compel the “Zionist regime” to stop its “aggression” throughout Lebanon and to establish a timetable for an unconditional withdrawal from all “occupied parts” of Lebanon as soon as possible (Tasnim, June 28, 2026).
• Muhammad al-Farah, a member of the Houthis’ political bureau, said the objective of the agreement between Lebanon and Israel was to eliminate the “resistance” and was an “open conspiracy” against south Lebanon because any Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction were made contingent on the dismantling of the “weapons of the resistance.” He added that the “Israeli enemy” had succeeded in shifting the conflict into Lebanon, where the outcome would either be civil war or “direct Zionist occupation” of Lebanon. He therefore called on the Lebanese people “to overthrow the traitorous government by all means” (Muhammad al-Farah X account, June 27, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Terrorist organizations
^[3] The Agreement on the Termination of Hostilities between Israel and Lebanon was signed on May 17, 1983, to regulate Israel's withdrawal and the security arrangements between the two countries. The Lebanese government annulled it on March 5, 1984, following internal opposition and Syrian pressure. Since then, the agreement has been viewed by Hezbollah and its allies as a symbol of a "surrender" to Israel.
^[4] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[5] An important commercial hub to the south of Beirut.
^[6] The Syrian Social Nationalist Party was founded in the 1930s by the Lebanese Antoun Saadeh under the influence of fascist right-wing circles in Europe and established roots in both Lebanon and Syria. The party, which operates in Lebanon and Syria, adheres to a secular nationalist ideology that does not recognize the state borders established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and regards Syrians (the people of Greater Syria) as belonging to a superior Syrian race. The organization's symbol is a reversed swastika, and its pro-fascist members use the fascist salute. For further information on the party's involvement alongside Hezbollah, see the Amit Institute August 2024 report, The Organizations Assisting Hezbollah in Combat Against Israel
^[7] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

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