The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement The Lebanese Point of View

Overview^[1]

• On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon went into effect, halting the fighting which broke out on October 8, 2023. According to the agreement, Israel will gradually withdraw its forces from south Lebanon over 60 days, while the Lebanese army will deploy its forces in south Lebanon and work to prevent armed organizations, primarily Hezbollah, from holding weapons or operating military facilities south of the Litani River. An American-led committee will oversee the implementation.
• Hezbollah is attempting to establish a narrative of victory, claiming that the fighting ended with an Israeli defeat, despite the heavy losses to the organization, including the killing of its secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and its military leadership. Na’im Qassem, the new secretary general, claimed it was a greater victory than the one in the 2006 war, adding that the organization was committed to cooperating with the Lebanese army to implement the agreement. A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist said Hezbollah would free its prisoners “by any means.”
• Immediately after the ceasefire, thousands of displaced persons began returning to their homes in south Lebanon, the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, and the Beqa’a. However, the IDF and the Lebanese army warned them not to return to villages near the border, and the IDF opened fire on Lebanese attempting to return to south Lebanon. From Hezbollah’s perspective, the return of the displaced to their homes in south Lebanon is another expression of victory, in contrast to Israelis, who cannot return to their homes along the border. A survey published on Hezbollah’s television channel indicated that nearly 60% of Lebanese believed the agreement would not last for 60 days.
• Lebanon’s interim prime minister and other government officials said they would give the army all the necessary authority to implement the ceasefire agreement in south Lebanon. Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said that Lebanon had overcome “Israeli aggression” and announced that Parliament would convene on January 9, 2025, to elect a new president.
• Hezbollah’s political and social media opponents expressed wonder and criticized Hezbollah’s declarations of victory, given the extensive destruction in Lebanon and the blows to the organization. They also expressed hope that the agreement would lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament and criticized the “resistance axis”^[2] for its claims of supporting Lebanon while not paying a price.
• In our assessment, Hezbollah will continue to promote and reiterate its victory narrative and adopt a policy of brinkmanship. Its operatives will attempt to challenge the implementation of the ceasefire until the planned withdrawal of IDF forces from south Lebanon by the end of January 2025. Even after the withdrawal, the Lebanese army will most likely be unable to enforce the ceasefire, prevent Hezbollah operatives from reaching south Lebanon or fully oversee the dismantling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River, due to Hezbollah’s efforts to integrate its activities into the local population and the army’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Hezbollah.

The Ceasefire Agreement

• On November 27, 2024, at 4:00 a.m., a ceasefire went into effect, ending the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah which began on October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah launched attacks on Israel under the pretext of being a “support front” for the Gaza Strip.
• The ceasefire agreement, which was brokered by the United States in coordination with France, was accepted by the governments of Israel and Lebanon, although Hezbollah was not a party to the agreement. The agreement is based on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted at the end of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, and prior UN resolutions.^[3] The main points of the agreement are the following (Lebanese news agency, al-Jadeed, November 27, 2024):^[4]
  • The Lebanese government will prevent Hezbollah and all other armed groups within Lebanon from carrying out any actions against Israel, while Israel will refrain from any offensive military actions against civilian, military or state-related Lebanese targets, on land, from the air or at sea within Lebanon. However, both Israel and Lebanon retain the right to self-defense.
  • Lebanon’s official military and security forces will be the sole entities allowed to bear arms. Ten thousand Lebanese army soldiers will be rapidly deployed to the area south of the Litani River. The Lebanese government will direct them to dismantle all military facilities and unauthorized weapons and prevent the illegal entry of weapons into Lebanon.
  • Israel will gradually withdraw its forces south of the Blue Line (the unofficial border between Israel and Lebanon) while the Lebanese army simultaneously deploys in the area and begins action against military facilities and unauthorized weapons. This process will last 60 days.
  • Israel and Lebanon want to conduct indirect negotiations, with the assistance of the U.S. and the UN, to resolve remaining disputes along the Blue Line.
• A mechanism to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire was established under American leadership, involving the Lebanese army, the IDF, UNIFIL and France. Amos Hochstein, the American envoy, will co-chair the mechanism until a permanent appointment is made, with Major General Jasper Jeffers (CENTCOM X account, November 28, 2024).
• According to the IDF spokesperson, the IDF will act against any attempt to violate the ceasefire agreement (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024). Since the agreement took effect, the IDF carried out several strikes in response to activities which violated the understandings, including targeting terrorist operatives loading weapons onto vehicles in south Lebanon, operations at a rocket launch site near Sidon, and a vehicle involved in missile production deep inside Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, November 28-30, 2024). The IDF also warned residents not to return to more than 60 villages in south Lebanon and imposed a nightly curfew on movement south of the Litani River (Avichay Adraee’s X account, November 27–December 1, 2024).

Hezbollah

• Immediately after the ceasefire went into effect, Hezbollah began inventing its narrative of a victory over Israel, despite the severe blow to the organization’s leadership, including the elimination of secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, his designated successor Hashem Safi al-Din and the organization’s military leadership, as well as the loss of thousands of operatives and significant infrastructure damage. After the ceasefire Hezbollah claimed it had upheld its “commitment and jihad” for more than 13 months and had been victorious over the “delusional enemy, which could neither undermine its resolve nor break its spirit.” Hezbollah claimed its “fighters” had prevented the enemy from achieving its goals, defeated its army, and had written their steadfastness and perseverance with their blood in the battles of Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Brave Campaign. Hezbollah added that it would continue monitoring IDF activities and that its “hand will remain on the trigger to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty,” reaffirming its commitment to continuing the path of “resistance” with even greater determination (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 27, 2024).

Speech by Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah secretary general

• On November 29, 2024, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem delivered a televised speech in which he declared a “divine victory” and stated that the organization would cooperate with the Lebanese army in implementing the agreement south of the Litani River. He also related to post-conflict reconstruction efforts and Hezbollah’s involvement in Lebanese domestic politics (al-Manar, November 29, 2024):
  • He reiterated that Hezbollah had made clear from the beginning of the conflict that it was prepared for war if “the enemy” imposed it. He claimed the objective of Israel’s “aggression” was to eliminate Hezbollah, return Israel’s northern to their home in the north, and create a new Middle East. He admitted that the pager attack and the subsequent killing of secretary general Hassan Nasrallah had caused Hezbollah pain but added that the organization had recovered, seized the initiative, organized command and control and struck the Israeli home front. He praised the “resistance” fighters for their “legendary steadfastness which astonished the world,” forcing “the enemy” to negotiate under fire, and without which “the enemy” would not have ended “aggression” without achieving its goals.
  • He declared this victory greater than the 2006 war as the campaign had lasted longer, and the “resistance” faced an “enemy” supported by the United States and Europe. According to him, Hezbollah succeeded because it prevented the organization’s elimination and the end of the “resistance,” noting that Prime Minister Netanyahu admitted the Israeli army had been weakened in the campaign.
  • He observed displaced persons returning to their homes immediately after the ceasefire, claiming they were talking about “victory” and willingness to sacrifice for the “resistance” and for the sake of Nasrallah as proof of Hezbollah’s victory. In contrast, he pointed out that “settlers” on the other side of the border had not returned to their homes.
  • He called the ceasefire agreement a new agreement between states with no normalization [of diplomatic relations] and based on Resolution 1701. He claimed that coordination between the “resistance” and the Lebanese army would be at the highest level, with no disputes, as the soldiers “are our compatriots committed to ensuring security.”
  • Regarding Hezbollah’s role in the “day after,” he claimed that the organization would assist in the reconstruction process and provide shelter for displaced persons, cooperate with the government and assisting countries and ensure the completion of constitutional institutions by electing a president. He said he hoped the president would be elected on the scheduled date of January 9, 2025, adding that Hezbollah would remain involved in Lebanon’s political and economic life “according to circumstances,” and criticized elements in the political system who, he claimed, “expected Israel to win.” However, he added that Hezbollah would cooperate with anyone working to build an independent homeland who believed that the homeland belonged to its people. He declared Hezbollah’s commitment to national unity, civil peace and strengthening Lebanon’s defensive capabilities.
  • He offered thanks and praise to all the shaheeds who “paved the way for dignity and pride,” foremost among them Nasrallah, as well as Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government. He stated that [the Shi’ite organizations] Amal and Hezbollah were “one heart” in defending Lebanon. He also thanked Iran, Yemen, Iraq and Syria, noting that support for “Palestine” would continue through other means. [Until the ceasefire, Hezbollah had refused to discuss ending the fighting as long as the war in Gaza continued, adhering to a principle set by Nasrallah. Qassem’s statement on continuing support for “Palestine” partly explains his agreement to a ceasefire despite the ongoing war in Gaza.

Reactions of other senior Hezbollah figures

• Other senior Hezbollah figures repeated the “victory” narrative while expressing readiness to resume fighting:
  • Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, claimed they had achieved a victory for “Arab national security” after two months of “continuous jihad, steadfastness and willpower,” claiming that “the enemy” had failed to achieve any of its objectives. He claimed that victory was “when the enemy fails to achieve its goals and reaches a military dead end.” Qamati praised the “resistance” fighters for their determination and patience, describing them as “faithful and willing to sacrifice.” He added that Hezbollah was preparing for the funerals of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din, continued to follow the issue of “prisoners” [Hezbollah detainees in Israel], and remained committed to supporting “Palestine” in the way which would be decided in the future (al-Mayadeen, November 27, 2024).
  • Mohammed Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed Hezbollah had defeated “the enemy” and its plans but acknowledged that Hezbollah operatives, while victorious, were bitter because of the “resistance’s” weak media presence compared to the “strength and mobilization” of the “opposing” media; difficulties in defending Hezbollah’s stance alongside Gaza against those who supported or justified the “Zionist aggression” or doubted the benefits of Hezbollah’s position; divisions in Lebanese public opinion between those who were neutral regarding the “aggression” against Gaza and “Palestine” and those who supported the “resistance”; the killing of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din; and the targeting of “selected figures associated with the resistance in the ‘pager massacre’.” Despite the blows, Raad claimed that Hezbollah successfully filled the leadership void and fulfilled its missions, preventing Israel from achieving its “illusions of drawing a new map for the Middle East.” He added that Israel failed to return northern residents to their homes without an agreement with Lebanon and would not receive its captives from Gaza without an agreement with Hamas (al-Akhbar, November 28, 2024).
  • Ibrahim al-Moussawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed the swift return of displaced persons to their homes sends a clear message to Israel that it could restore its citizens back to their homes, while Hezbollah was capable of doing so even “under fire” (al-Manar, November 27, 2024).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, another member of the Hezbollah faction on the Lebanese Parliament. Claimed that “the enemy” had wanted to destroy them but failed because of the steadfastness of the “resistance” at the border. He called for “national understanding and dialogue” to find solutions to Lebanon’s crisis (al-Jazeera, November 28, 2024). He also said that if “the Israeli enemy” decided to go to war, they would “resist,” claiming that no problems existed between the “resistance” and the Lebanese army and that Hezbollah “wanted the Lebanese state to extend its control over all its territory” (al-Nashra, November 28, 2024).
• To reinforce the “victory narrative,” Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, was seen publicly just hours after the ceasefire began. It marked his first documented appearance since reports of his injury in an Israeli strike in Beirut on October 10, 2024 (LBCI, November 27, 2024).

• On November 30, 2024, Hezbollah launched a multi-day audiovisual exhibition in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in southern Beirut, at the site where Hassan Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike on October 27, 2024. The exhibition features illuminated images of Nasrallah and excerpts from his speeches. Hundreds of people reportedly lit candles and expressed support for the loss of “a figure who left a significant mark on the Lebanese scene” (al-Manar, November 30, 2024).

Activity of the Hamas-affiliated media

• Hezbollah also utilized its affiliated media outlets to amplify the victory narrative. Ali Shoeib, a al-Manar network correspondent, toured the village of Marjayoun in south Lebanon, despite the prohibition on civilian entry to areas near the border with Israel. Shoeib presented footage allegedly showing remnants of Israeli tanks damaged in the fighting (Ali Shoeib’s Telegram channel, November 28, 2024).

• The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily newspaper al-Akhbar, published a series of articles about the announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon under the headline “We stand firm and are victorious.” According to one article, the situation on the ground had allowed the Lebanese state to adjust and reject the “enemy’s” desire to achieve its objectives. It claimed that in the final hours before the ceasefire, the “enemy” attempted to signal victory through intensified strikes, but Hezbollah escalated its actions in a “qualitative and precise” manner (al-Akhbar, November 27, 2024). The paper also portrayed the convoys of displaced persons returning to south Lebanon as an image of victory, declaring on its front page that “the sea of returnees shocked the occupation and its allies” (al-Akhbar, November 28, 2024).

     
Right: The front page of al-Akhbar, November 27, 2024, with the headline, “We stand firm and are victorious.” Left: Front page of November 28, 2024, “They return as they always do.”

• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of al-Akhbar, noted that despite the “enemy’s” threats intended to prevent residents from returning to their homes, the “resistance family surged in a massive wave” towards the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, south Lebanon, and the Beqa’a. He also claimed that American envoy Amos Hochstein said that the agreement does not include a clause granting Israel freedom of action. Al-Amin also presented Hezbollah’s position regarding the post-ceasefire situation (al-Akhbar, November 28, 2024):
  • No foreign military or security personnel, except UNIFIL forces, are allowed to operate within the multinational force’s missions. Furthermore, the number of UNIFIL member states cannot increase without Lebanon’s consent.
  • Israel must withdraw as soon as possible from all “occupied territories,” otherwise, the “resistance” will continue.
  • Any Israeli “aggression” against any “resistance” individual, senior figure, position or facility anywhere in Lebanon will result in an “inevitable and direct” response from the “resistance.” He claimed that was based on its right to self-defense, despite the agreement granting such rights to the Lebanese state, not Hezbollah.
  • Any attempt to “raid” homes or private property in Lebanon will be “rejected.” He said that no Lebanese or international entity would be allowed near private properties without a court order. That implies searches of private buildings where Hezbollah may hide weapons will not be permitted.
  • If the “enemy” does not release the “resistance prisoners” promptly, the “resistance” reserves the right to act “as it sees fit” to secure their release.
• Ali Haidar, al-Akhbar’s Israel affairs correspondent, acknowledged that while the return of displaced persons to the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia was being celebrated as a victory, it was mixed with sorrow because of the losses suffered by Hezbollah. He stated that the new post-war phase required Hezbollah to adopt new methods and strategies, and the “resistance” aimed to channel the victory into its future plans. He added that Israel faced difficulties because the objectives it presented to the public were far from what was achieved, and the residents of northern Israel were reluctant to return to their homes (al-Manar, November 28, 2024).
• Al-Manar published the results of a survey conducted among 8,200 respondents regarding the ceasefire. According to the survey, 59.55% believed the agreement was “fragile” and would not last sixty days, 20.5% said the agreement paved the way for tensions within Lebanon, and 19.95% believed the agreement would lead to a prolonged period of calm (al-Manar, December 1, 2024).
• Simia, Hezbollah’s social media channel, featured footage of residents raising the organization’s flags and images of its leaders, particularly Nasrallah, while declaring victory over Israel. The channel also published comments attributed to residents in northern Israel and media commentators expressing dissatisfaction with the agreement (Simia Telegram Channel, November 27-29, 2024).

     
Right: The caption reads, “We swept them away” (Simia, the electronic unit of Hezbollah’s Executive Committee, Telegram channel, November 29, 2024). Left: Residents of northern Israel are quoted as warning of a new October 7 (Simia, Telegram channel, November 28, 2024)

Lebanon

The political arena

• On the morning of November 27, 2024, the Lebanese government approved the ceasefire agreement, which had already gone into effect. Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, stated that he demanded Israel commit to implementing the ceasefire, withdraw its forces from all areas, and adhere to Resolution 1701. He claimed the Lebanese army had authority over the security of the south of the country, rejecting Israel’s claims to the contrary. He described it as a “national and historic moment” for Lebanon, expressing hope for a new chapter for the country and the election of a new president (al-Nashra, November 27, 2024; Lebanese prime minister’s X account, November 27, 2024).
• Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, who led the ceasefire negotiations on behalf of Lebanon and Hezbollah, said Lebanon succeeded in overcoming Israeli “aggression.” He added that the war had revealed Lebanon’s true unity and national cohesion. He thanked Nasrallah, whom he called the “nation’s shaheed,” for entrusting him with “responsibility for political resistance.” He urged displaced people to return to their lands, which the “resistance” had rendered untouchable. He also called on all political factions to maintain a strong and united Lebanon (al-Nashra, November 27, 2024). Berri also announced that parliament would convene on January 9, 2025, to elect a new president after more than two years without a president (al-Nashra, November 28, 2024).
• Statements from Lebanese ministers:
  • Defense Minister Maurice Sleem stated that the most important aspect of the ceasefire agreement was that it does not compromise national sovereignty and ensured the people’s security. He affirmed that the army would do everything necessary to implement the agreement. He noted that the government would increase the number of soldiers deployed in south Lebanon to 10,000, claiming that the Lebanese army and UNIFIL would be the only forces present in Lebanese territory (al-Nashra, November 27, 2024).
  • Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib reported that 5,000 Lebanese army soldiers had already been sent to the south, joining 5,000 UNIFIL troops. He said he hoped Hezbollah operatives would not return to south Lebanon after the IDF’s withdrawal, as only the Lebanese army and UNIFIL had legitimate authority to secure the border. He added that there was already an agreement with the Americans to convene the five-nation committee to discuss the 13 disputed border points (al-Jazeera, November 28, 2024).
  • Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi declared that the Lebanese people were “one community” despite reports of tensions between various groups and the displaced. He said he was optimistic that Lebanon’s unity would serve as an example for rebuilding the nation. He added that the army commander had briefed ministers on a three-phase deployment plan in south Lebanon to ensure the return of displaced persons and to secure Lebanese territory (MTV Lebanon, November 28, 2024).
  • Economy Minister Amin Salam claimed that Israel had been “forced” into the ceasefire but still harbored “malicious intentions” towards Lebanon. He noted that the government had informed the United States about Israel’s violations of the ceasefire and accused Prime Minister Netanyahu of wanting war to “save himself from trial in Israel” (al-Jazeera, November 28, 2024).
• Hezbollah’s political opponents welcomed the ceasefire, noting that Hezbollah had initiated the fighting under the pretext of supporting the Gaza Strip. They also called for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (of 2004), which mandates the disarmament of Hezbollah and all other armed groups:
  • Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces Party, stated that Hezbollah’s weapons became illegitimate by government agreement and decision after the ceasefire agreement had been reached. He argued that Hezbollah now had to adhere to its commitments, and criticized Hezbollah for initiating the war on October 8, 2023, stating it brought no benefit to Gaza but only caused extensive destruction in Lebanon. He also condemned the “resistance axis” for its claims of unity while Lebanon suffered the greatest losses (Lebanese Forces website, November 29, 2024).
  • Ghayath Yazbeck, a member of the Lebanese Parliament from the Lebanese Forces movement, called on Hezbollah not to violate Resolution 1701 again as it had after the 2006 war. He said he was relieved there was no longer fighting and “systematic killing” which had destroyed the country “for reasons unrelated to Lebanon.” Yazbek face-palmed himself when Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah declared the fighting ended in “victory” (al-Arabiya, November 29, 2024; Nabatieh News, November 29, 2024).

• • Gebran Bassil, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, who until recently was considered a political ally of Hezbollah, congratulated the Lebanese people on the cessation of hostilities and expressed hope that it would serve as “preparation for a complete ceasefire under the sovereignty of the state.” He also emphasized the need for the return of displaced persons to their homes (Gebran Bassil’s X account, November 27, 2024).
  • Neemat Frem, a member of the Free Patriotic Movement bloc, stated that “legitimate Lebanon” was not part of the war. He warned that the ceasefire was fragile and that a genuine risk of a return to fighting remained. He said he hoped the Lebanese army would not get caught in the crossfire between Israel and Hezbollah and stressed that the most important aspect of the ceasefire agreement is its implementation (al-Hadath, November 28, 2024).

The Lebanese army

• Immediately after the ceasefire agreement went into effect, the Lebanese army announced it was taking the necessary steps to complete its deployment in south Lebanon in accordance with the Lebanese government’s directive. It stated that it was working to implement its tasks in coordination with UNIFIL forces under Resolution 1701. The army also released footage of armored vehicle convoys making their way to southern villages, welcomed with cheers by the residents (Lebanese Army X account, November 27, 2024).
• The army urged residents to delay their return to southern villages “penetrated by Israeli enemy forces” and cautioned those returning to other areas to be wary of unexploded ordnance and suspicious objects. The army noted that it was operating in south Lebanon, the Beqa’a and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, helping to clear roads and detonating unexploded ordnance (Lebanese Army X account, November 27–28, 2024).
• Given IDF reports of attacks on Hezbollah violations of the ceasefire agreement, the Lebanese army accused Israel of multiple violations. According to the army, Israel violated Lebanese airspace and attacked Lebanese territory using various weapons. The army command stated it was monitoring the “violations” in coordination with “relevant authorities” (Lebanese Army X account, November 28, 2024).

   
Right: Lebanese army forces deploying in the southern part of the country (Lebanese army X account, November 27, 2024). Left: Lebanese army forces remove debris from a road in south Lebanon (Lebanese army X account, November 28, 2024)

• According to reports, Lebanese Army Commander General Joseph Aoun provided only a brief overview during the cabinet meeting which approved the ceasefire agreement and did not elaborate on the army’s deployment plan in south Lebanon. According to the report, when ministers demanded details about the plan, he responded that it was classified. A “senior source” stated that Aoun did not believe he needs to be accountable to the government (al-Akhbar, November 28, 2024).
• According to “military sources,” that the Lebanese army has begun deploying in areas where there were are no Israeli forces present. According to the report, the 7^th Brigade was deployed in the Marjayoun district, the 5^th Intervention Regiment was deployed in parts of the Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil districts, and the 5^th Brigade was deployed in Bint Jbeil and Tyre. The “sources” added that the army would have a presence across all parts of Lebanon and would carry out its deployment along Lebanon’s border as required (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 28, 2024).

The Lebanese media

• Lebanese media published articles and commentary regarding the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the challenges it posed for state authorities and Hezbollah:
  • The daily al-Joumhouria claimed the Lebanese army was the cornerstone of Resolution 1701’s implementation, while maintaining its security responsibilities across the rest of the country. “Official sources” suggested that Israeli strikes on Lebanese army forces might be intended to send a “bloody message” pressuring the army to sever ties with Hezbollah. They added that the Lebanese army understood the gravity of its responsibilities and was committed to fulfilling its duties under Resolution 1701, asserting that it protected the borders and residents of Lebanon, not Israel. The “sources” noted the need to develop a policy enabling the army to equip itself with essential systems and train its combat units in guerrilla warfare (al-Joumhouria, November 27, 2024).
  • The daily al-Modon reported four challenges facing Hezbollah: . Organizing a funeral for Hassan Nasrallah to gather hundreds of thousands of supporters, solidifying the organization’s popular and political power, and gaining recognition for the new leadership; implementing the ceasefire agreement and disarming heavy weaponry south of the Litani River, while insisting on retaining weapons north of the river; rebuilding and compensating individuals whose homes and livelihoods were damaged during the fighting. This, it noted, would require agreements with Iran, but the aid must be overseen by U.S. supervision; securing the release of operatives held by Israel, likely tied to achieving a ceasefire agreement in Gaza and the release of captives (al-Modon, November 29, 2024).
  • Qasem Qasir, a writer for Asas Media, claimed all of Lebanon supported the “resistance” and that the public understood it was Lebanon’s “sole defender.” He claimed Israel’s failure to destroy all [Hezbollah’s] rocket launchers or occupy Lebanese territory was a “major gain for the country.” According to Qasir, the durability of the ceasefire depends on Israel, which he referred to as an “illegitimate entity.” He stated that as long as Israel met its commitments, Hezbollah would not need to respond (OTV Channel, November 2024).

The Lebanese Public

• Immediately after the ceasefire went into effect, convoys of displaced persons made their way back to their homes in south Lebanon, the Beqa’a and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. Hezbollah operatives and supporters flew Hezbollah flags and displayed pictures of killed leaders, particularly Hassan Nasrallah. Supporters of the Amal movement, which fought alongside Hezbollah in south Lebanon, distributed candy and pastries to returning residents (al-Manar, November 27 to December 1, 2024; al-Quds al-Arabi, November 27, 2024).
• The returning residents openly expressed their satisfaction. Kamel Aqal Askar, who was displaced from his home in the town of Sidiqin, stated that he felt “great joy for us and for the resistance, which made us feel victorious.” He also rejected the Israeli demand for displaced persons not to return to their homes in south Lebanon, declaring that he would return to his home even if it were bombed (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 27, 2024).

     
Displaced Lebanese return to the homes, some in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia holding pictures of Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din (al-Mayadeen, November 27, 2024)

• According to Lebanon’s emergency committee, there has been a 77% decrease in the number of displaced persons residing in evacuation centers following their return home since the ceasefire. Nearly 300 out of over 1,000 evacuation centers have already been closed (al-Akhbar, November 29, 2024). Minister Nasser Yassin, who heads the emergency committee, toured Nabatieh and called the return of residents “the true victory,” adding that the second victory would come when institutions, schools, and homes were rebuilt (al-Akhbar, November 30, 2024).
• On the other hand, Hezbollah opponents in Lebanon blamed the organization for the heavy destruction Lebanon suffered and rejected Hezbollah’s claims that the war had ended in victory:
  • Lebanese Shi’ite journalist Dima Sadek, a known Hezbollah opponent, criticized the organization on her X account (848.7 thousand followers), questioning its claims of “victory” over Israel. She noted the continued presence of Israeli forces in south Lebanon and villages where residents were still barred from returning. She referred to the IDF Arabic spokesperson Avichay Adraee as the “governor of border villages” and asked, “How can they talk about victory? How can anyone think this way?” (Dima Sadek’s X account, November 28, 2024).
  • Lebanese journalist Tony Boulos wrote on his X account (81.3 thousand followers) that Hezbollah “surrendered after destroying Lebanon, its society and its environment, fighting over dismembered Lebanese bodies so that [Iran’s Supreme Leader] Khamenei could negotiate over the ruins of our cities and villages” (Tony Boulos’ X account, November 27, 2024).
  • Dr. Ahmed Yassin, a Hezbollah opponent exiled in France, posted to his X account (31.3 thousand followers) that before Hezbollah could talk about victory, it had to account for the “leaders of your axis who were dragged out of holes wearing their underwear.” In a video accompanying his post, Yassin questioned Hezbollah’s claims of victory, noting the organization’s loss of its senior leadership and the thousands of operatives who lost eyes and fingers due to pager explosions (Dr. Ahmed Yassin’s X account, November 28, 2024).

• • Bacho Haddad, a Lebanese Christian activist, posted videos to his TikTok account (19.6 thousand followers) openly mocking Hezbollah after the ceasefire. In one video he bursts out laughing, saying that Hezbollah rushed to agree to the ceasefire so quickly that they forgot to include a clause addressing the release of their “prisoners” (hadchitie.haddad4 TikTok channel, November 27, 2024).
• Hezbollah opponents also shared cartoons on social media mocking the organization’s claims of “victory:”

   
Right: Hezbollah upraised hand with a white flag instead of a rifle (Yorgo IGhsayn X account, November 27, 2024). Left: Someone whose fingers got blown off by an exploding pager making the V for victory. In the upper right-hand corner, under the spoon the Arabic reads, “We ate s***” (haif alsafi’s X account, November 27, 2024)

   
Right: Israel and Hezbollah Indian wrestle. The Hezbollah terrorist operatives claims, “We won” (X account of Dijwar Ibrahim, a Kurdish cartoonist, November 27, 2024). Left: An ass lying on the rubble in Beirut as bombs go off. The Arabic reads, “Victors” (Mike Harb’s X account, November 26, 2024)

Appendix – The Ceasefire Agreement

“Announcement of a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements Toward the Implementation of UNSCR 1701

After discussions with the governments of the Republic of Lebanon (hereinafter “Lebanon”) and the State of Israel (hereinafter “Israel”), the United States of America and France understand that Lebanon and Israel seek a sustainable end to the current escalation of hostilities across the Blue Line and are each prepared to take steps to promote conditions for a permanent and comprehensive solution. These understandings reflect the commitments of Israel and Lebanon to fully implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, recognizing that UNSCR 1701 also calls for the full implementation of its predecessor resolutions, including the “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon,” so that the only forces authorized to carry arms in Lebanon will be the Lebanese Armed Forces, Internal Security Forces, Directorate of General Security, General Directorate of State Security, Lebanese Customs, and Municipal Police (hereinafter “Lebanon’s official military and security forces”).

To that end, the United States and France understand the following:

1. Israel and Lebanon will implement a cessation of hostilities beginning at 04:00 hours (IST/EET) on November 27, 2024, in accordance with the commitments detailed below.

2. From 04:00 hours (IST/EET) on November 27, 2024, forward, the Government of Lebanon will prevent Hezbollah and all other armed groups in its territory from carrying out any operations against Israel. In return, Israel will not conduct any offensive military operations against Lebanese targets, including civilian, military, or other state targets, by land, air, or sea.

3. Israel and Lebanon recognize the importance of UNSCR 1701 in achieving lasting peace and security and commit to taking steps towards its full implementation without violations.

4. These commitments do not preclude either Israel or Lebanon from exercising their inherent right to self-defense, consistent with international law.

5. Without prejudice to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and its responsibilities, or to commitments in UNSCR 1701 and its predecessor resolutions, Lebanon’s official military and security forces, infrastructure, and weaponry will be the only armed groups, arms, and related materiel deployed in the southern Litani area, as shown in the attached LAF Deployment Plan (hereinafter “the Southern Litani Area”).

6. Consistent with UNSCR 1701 and its predecessor resolutions, and to prevent the reestablishment and rearmament of non-state armed groups in Lebanon, any sales or supply of arms and related materiel into Lebanon will be regulated and controlled by the Government of Lebanon. Additionally, all production of arms and related materiel within Lebanon will be regulated and controlled by the Government of Lebanon.

7. Upon the commencement of the cessation of hostilities (as per paragraph 1), the Government of Lebanon will provide all necessary authorities, including freedom of movement, to Lebanon’s official military and security forces. It will instruct them, consistent with UNSCR 1701 and its predecessor resolutions, to:

a. Monitor and enforce against any unauthorized entry of arms and related materiel into and throughout Lebanon, including through all border crossings, and against the unauthorized production of arms and materiel within Lebanon.

b. Dismantle all unauthorized facilities involved in the production of arms and related materiel in the Southern Litani Area and prevent the establishment of such facilities in the future.

c. Confiscate all unauthorized arms and dismantle unauthorized infrastructure and military positions in the Southern Litani Area.

8. The United States and France intend to work within the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon (MTC4L) to enable and achieve the deployment of 10,000 LAF soldiers to southern Lebanon as soon as possible. They also intend to work with the international community to support the LAF’s capabilities.

9. Upon the cessation of hostilities, and in coordination with UNIFIL, Israel and Lebanon will reformulate and enhance the tripartite mechanism (hereinafter “the Mechanism”), which will be hosted by UNIFIL, chaired by the United States, and include France. The Mechanism will:

a. Monitor, verify, and assist in ensuring enforcement of these commitments.

b. Strengthen the LAF’s capacity to inspect and dismantle unauthorized sites, confiscate weapons, and prevent the presence of unauthorized armed groups.

10. Israel and Lebanon will report any alleged violations to the Mechanism and UNIFIL, without prejudice to their rights to communicate directly with the UN Security Council.

11. Upon cessation of hostilities, Lebanon will deploy its official military and security forces to all borders and regulate all land, air, and sea crossings.

12. Israel will withdraw its forces south of the Blue Line in a phased manner while the Lebanese armed forces deploy in the Southern Litani Area, as detailed in the attached Deployment Plan. This process will be completed within 60 days.

13. Israel and Lebanon request that the United States, in partnership with the United Nations, facilitate indirect negotiations to resolve remaining disputed points along the Blue Line, consistent with UNSCR 1701.

These commitments aim to enable civilians on both sides of the Blue Line to return safely to their homes and lands. The United States and France further intend to lead international efforts to support capacity-building and economic development throughout Lebanon to promote stability and prosperity in the region.”

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
^[3] UN Security Council Resolution 1559, passed in 2004, calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in the country and the withdrawal of all foreign forces stationed in Lebanon, and extending the state’s control over all parts of Lebanese territory. Resolution 1701, adopted at the end of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, also calls for the implementation of Resolution 1559.
^[4] For the full version on the ceasefire agreement, see the Appendix.

Related Articles