The Armed Palestinian Terrorist Organizations in Lebanon

Overview^[1]

• The Palestinian terrorist organizations have maintained an armed presence in the Lebanese refugee camps for decades without intervention by the authorities. Because of the Palestinians’ involvement in the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and reluctance to take action against the Palestinian “struggle,” the authorities did nothing about the Palestinian weapons in Lebanon.
• The end of the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in November 2024, in which armed Palestinian terrorist organizations participated, Hezbollah’s weakening and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria created conditions for the discussion about the state monopoly on weapons, including Palestinian weapons and the disarmament of the refugee camps.
• During Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas’ visit to Lebanon in May 2025, an agreement was reached to establish a joint committee to examine the situation in the Palestinian refugee camps and to disarm them. The Lebanese authorities announced that the process was expected to begin in June 2025.
• The purpose of this report is to map the main armed Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon, primarily Fatah and Hamas, and including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Islamist jihadist organizations. It examines the nature of their activity and their military capabilities, and the possibility that the Lebanese security forces will be required to use force to implement the state monopoly on weapons in accordance with government directives.
• In ITIC assessment, the limited ability of the Palestinian leadership, namely Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, to impose its authority over the various organizations in the refugee camps, especially Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the extreme Islamist elements, coupled with the Lebanese government’s reluctance to be drawn into violent confrontation with them, casts doubt on implementing the declarations regarding the complete disarmament of the camps.
• In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah is opposed to the move, which would be a precedent paving the way for its own future disarmament. Therefore, it is likely to seek to thwart any attempt to disarm the organizations, including by the use of force, and will try to limit the process to understandings and restrictions regarding how Palestinian terrorist weapons will be used, while granting legitimacy to their presence in the refugee camps.
• Iran may hinder disarmament, fearing it will harm the Palestinian organizations in which it has invested financial support, means and training over the years as part of the “resistance axis,”^[2] chiefly Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. That is in addition to the possible impact of disarmament on Hezbollah, Tehran’s most important proxy in Lebanon and the region.

Palestinian Terrorist Organization Weapons in Lebanon

• After Jordan, the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon is the second largest outside Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. According to UNRWA, there are close to half a million refugees registered with the agency in Lebanon, but the exact number is unknown due to a lack of data on migration and deaths. About 45% of the Palestinian refugees live in 12 recognized refugee camps in Lebanon, spread from the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near the city of Tripoli in the north to the al-Rashidiya camp south of the city of Tyre in south Lebanon, whose residents arrived fleeing Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 (UNRWA, February 2025).

• Alongside civilian activity, various armed Palestinian terrorist organizations maintain a military presence in the refugee camps spread across the country. Their presence was arranged in November 1969 as part of the PLO-Lebanon Cairo Agreement, according to which the “armed organizations” would be able to attack Israel from Lebanese territory. It was also agreed that local Palestinian committees would run the camps, and the Organization for Armed Struggle would ensure the connection with the authorities and oversee the presence of weapons inside the camps, while the Lebanese army would not enter. The agreement was annulled by the Lebanese parliament in 1987, but unwritten understandings regulated the relationship between the state and the armed Palestinian terrorist organizations, whereby Palestinian weapons would be concentrated in the refugee camps under the pretext of “self-defense needs,” within the broad autonomy enjoyed by the Palestinians that turned the camps into territories effectively outside the control of Lebanese law enforcement.^[3]
• Following the Cairo Agreement, and especially after the expulsion of the Palestinian organizations from Jordan following the Black September events in 1970, the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon grew stronger, mainly in the south of the country, and forced Israel to conduct military activity inside Lebanon. Alongside terrorism against Israel, the PLO’s terrorist organizations took an active part in Lebanese Civil War which broke out in 1975. The First Lebanon War in June 1982, when the IDF’s invaded of Lebanon, severely damaged the PLO’s capabilities and its leadership was expelled. With the weakening of the PLO, especially Fatah, the presence of pro-Syrian armed Palestinian terrorist organizations in the refugee camps grew stronger. The removal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon in spring 2005, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, again changed the balance of power in the Palestinian arena in Lebanon, as Fatah managed to restore its status at the expense of the pro-Syrian organizations; Hamas received official status in Lebanon in 2000.
• The extensive presence of Palestinians is fertile ground for a wide range of Palestinian organizations which maintain both political and military-terrorist activity Lebanon, whose extent varies from organization to organization. Over the years, the issue of Palestinian weapons has been a sensitive matter which the Lebanese authorities shy from addressing, given the bitter historical memory of the Civil War and the First Lebanon War, and the political consensus concerning the need to support the Palestinian issue. At the same time, disagreements arose between the Palestinian organizations regarding the use of weapons. In September 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1559 calling on all armed organizations in Lebanon to disarm. While the PLO expressed willingness to give the Lebanese state responsibility for security and the maintenance of order inside the camps, Hamas and other terrorist organizations refused any concession of armed “resistance” against Israel.^[4]

• The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon of November 27, 2024, which ended the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in which Palestinian terrorist organizations also participated, led the Lebanese authorities to declare their aspiration to implement the state monopoly on weapons throughout the country. Their commitment was strengthened under the new president, Joseph Aoun, and the new government headed by Nawaf Salam, especially after it was discovered that Hamas was behind firing two rockets at Israel at the end of March 2025. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which had sponsored some of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Lebanon, also made it easier for the government to advance the disarmament moves.^[5]
• On May 21, 2025, Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Mahmoud Abbas arrived in Lebanon for a three-day visit, during which he met with government officials and agreed to the establishment of a joint Lebanese-Palestinian committee which would deal with the situation in the refugee camps in Lebanon and the issue of weapons. It was later reported that disarmament was expected to begin in mid-June 2025 in the refugee camps in Beirut (Shatila, Burj al-Barajneh, Mar Elias), in the following month continue to the camps in the Beqa’a Valley and in the north of the country (Wavel, al-Badawi, Nahr al-Bared), and later in the camps in south Lebanon (al-Rashidiya, Burj al-Shamali, al-Buss, Ain al-Hilweh). Anyone who did not cooperate would be subject to severe punishment, such as cancellation of residence permit and even expulsion from the country.^[6]
• According to “Palestinian sources,” a senior official in Lebanese army intelligence had already formally informed a delegation of the Coalition of Palestinian Forces of the intention to take responsibility for the weapons in the refugee camps in Lebanon in stages, beginning in mid-June. According to “the sources,” he demanded they cooperate and hand over their medium and heavy (al-Nashra, May 28, 2025). According to “a senior security source,” collecting weapons in the first camps might proceed without disturbance since Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas’ movement, controlled them. However, the challenge would be in the next camps, especially Ain al-Hilweh, where there was a significant presence of terrorist organizations which did not obey Fatah and the Palestinian leadership and had ties to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and various Islamist jihadist organizations (Independent Arabia, May 30, 2025).

Fatah

• The Fatah movement, the oldest and largest member of the PLO (which claims to be the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people), maintains a presence in all the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 23, 2025). In addition to Muhammad al-Assaad, the PA ambassador to Beirut, who replaced Ashraf Dabbour, Fatah is also represented in Lebanon by Fathi Abu al-Ardat, Fatah secretary general in Lebanon, and Subhi Abu Arab, who heads the Palestinian national security forces, which operate in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon as a kind of internal police force responsible for maintaining order and which is in contact with the Lebanese army (Raseef 2, March 22, 2022).

• Meanwhile, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Fatah’s military-terrorist wing, challenges the status of the official Palestinian leadership. Its leader in Lebanon is Muneir al-Maqdah from the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp, whose policies are contrary to the Fatah ideology espoused by Mahmoud Abbas, which opposes armed struggle against Israel. Thus the Fatah leadership’s control of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Lebanon is questionable, since al-Maqdah regards himself as Yasser Arafat’s successor (Quds Press, November 10, 2022).

• According to the IDF, Muneir al-Maqdah operates on behalf of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, directing terrorist attacks and transferring money and weapons to terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria (IDF spokesperson, March 25, 2024). On August 21, 2024, his brother Khalil al-Maqdah was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Sidon (IDF spokesperson, August 21, 2024). At the end of September 2024, an Israeli attack on Muneir al-Maqdah house in the Ain-Hilweh refugee camp failed to eliminate him (Reuters, October 1, 2024).
• Unlike other armed Palestinian organizations active in Lebanon, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades apparently did not engage in direct military activity from Lebanese territory during the Gaza Strip War and no incidents are known in which its operatives were killed in clashes with IDF forces along the Lebanon border. However, Fatah announced that Dr. Radwan Abdallah, who was a member of the central Fatah recruitment and organization monitoring committee Lebanon, was killed in a strike in Ain al-Delb, east of Sidon (Fatah in Lebanon website, September 29, 2024).
• According to recently published data, the number of armed men loyal to Fatah in the refugee camps in south Lebanon (al-Rashidiya, Burj al-Shamali, al-Buss) stands at 1,300 operatives (al-Madan, May 20, 2025). However, there is no reliable information about the total number of forces under al-Maqdah’s control or their deployment in the refugee camps in other parts of Lebanon.

Hamas

• Hamas openly conducts political activity in Lebanon, one of its main headquarters abroad since its offices were closed in Jordan in 1999 and later in Syria in 2011. Ahmed Abd al-Hadi has been the movement’s official representative in Lebanon since 2019, while Ayman Shana’ and Rifat Mara are responsible for organizational activity in the refugee camps. Also residing in Lebanon are Osama Hamdan, a member of the Hamas political bureau, and Ali Baraka, head of foreign relations for Hamas, both of whom previously served as Hamas representatives in Lebanon (Independent Arabia, May 9, 2025). In September 2024, Baraka was included in an indictment filed by the United States Department of Justice against six senior Hamas operatives, including Yahya al-Sinwar and Khaled Mashal, for responsibility of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre (United States Department of Justice website, September 3, 2024).
• In addition to official political activity, Hamas runs an extensive covert terrorist network in Lebanon, and is considered the most important Palestinian power in the country. Over the years, figures of unclear reliability have been published about the number and type of Hamas’ forces and the organizational structure of its terrorist activity in the Lebanese arena. Its activity is apparently led by the West Bank Office, under which the Works Department operates, which includes about 1,500 operatives deployed mainly in the Palestinian refugee camps of Burj al-Shamali and al-Buss in the Tyre area of south Lebanon. However, Hamas also has a presence in the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut and in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 15, 2023).

• Senior Hamas figures are stationed in Lebanon to maintain close ties with Hezbollah and with the “Palestine” branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. Their close coordination was mainly in intelligence during the IDF’s Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 (al-Mayadeen, July 8, 2021). In addition, on April 6, 2023, Hamas fired 34 rockets at Israel from south Lebanon, while at the same time rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip and from south Syria in response to clashes between Israeli police officers and Palestinians in the al-Aqsa Mosque plaza on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. However, according to reports, the rocket fire was coordinated in talks between Hamas, Hezbollah and Qods Force commander Esmail Gha’ani.^[7]
• Following Operation Guardian of the Walls, Muhammad Saeed Izadi (Haj Ramadan), the head of the “Palestine” branch, led the effort to regulate the activity of the Hamas military-terrorist wing in Lebanon. Hamas documents captured by the IDF in the Gaza Strip included correspondence between Khaled Mashal, Hamas leader abroad Marwan Issa, deputy head of the military-terrorist wing, dated May 22, 2022. It related to Mashal’s meeting with Izadi in Lebanon and the details of Hamas cooperation with Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to Mashal, Izadi told him that establishing a project for Palestinians in Lebanon reflected the Iranian philosophy of including all nationalities, Lebanese, Iraqi and Yemeni, for the sake of the “liberation project” [the destruction of the State of Israel]. At the same time, he raised concerns from past experience: Lebanon’s sectarian and political structure which rejected the “project,” Palestinian history in Lebanon and its negative connotations in Lebanese memory, as well as the events in Syria and Hezbollah’s concerns about the possibility that Palestinian weapons would be directed against Hezbollah forces inside Lebanon. Therefore, Izadi sought to address concerns regarding Hamas by imposing armament restrictions on Hamas activity in Lebanon, as well as determining who would command the Hamas forces in Lebanon.^[8]
• The first evidence of Hamas military activity in Lebanon was on December 10, 2021, when there was an explosion in the Burj al-Shamali refugee camp, east of Tyre in south Lebanon. An investigation revealed that it had occurred in a weapons depot located beneath the Abi Ibn Kaab Mosque, which was under Hamas supervision. Hamas claimed the explosion was caused by an electrical short circuit in a warehouse that contained a large number of oxygen balloons and cleaning and disinfecting materials intended for distribution as part of the fight against the Coronavirus, and rejected the claims that it was a weapons depot. However, Hamas published a mourning notice for the death of Hamza Ibrahim Shahin (Abu Muhammad), an engineer who was noted as an operative in the Hamas military-terrorist wing and who was reported as killed during “jihad activity as part of training and preparation for battle.” Senior Hamas figures participated in his funeral, and Isma’il Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, visited the mourning tent, evidence of Shahin’s senior status.^[9]
• On October 8, 2023, the Hamas military-terrorist wing in Lebanon joined Hezbollah in fighting Israel, mostly in concentrated rocket launches at civilian and military targets and in attempted cross-border infiltrations. Hamas’ first claims of responsibility were the firing of 15 rockets at the western Galilee on October 10, 2023, and the attempted infiltration of three operatives of the elite Nukhba Unit near Moshav Margaliot on October 14, 2023. Senior-level coordination continued between Hamas representatives and the Hezbollah leadership, led by secretary general Hassan Nasrallah.^[10]

• According to reports, on October 7, 2023, the organization began recruiting fighters in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (al-Jazeera, December 18, 2023). “Senior Hamas figures” and “senior Lebanese officials” noted that hundreds of new operatives from the 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon had joined the ranks of the Hamas military-terrorist wing. However, apparently most of the recruits remained in the camps to assist in local activity, and only occasionally reached the border area, usually to fire rockets. A New York Times correspondent who visited the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon reported street signs calling for enlistment in the military-terrorist wing and offering a training workshop for the “new al-Aqsa generation” (New York Times, August 24, 2024).
• In December 2023, Hamas announced the establishment of a new youth movement in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon called Pioneers of the al-Aqsa Flood, which was especially prominent in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp. According to “sources” in Hamas, the movement was established to serve as a “vanguard force of the resistance, which would take part in the liberation of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque.” In practice, its objective was to serve an organizational framework for ideological recruitment and training young Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon as terrorist operatives who would act within Hamas against Israel from the Lebanon border, according to the model of youth movements of other terrorist organizations.^[11]
• Throughout the fighting and after the ceasefire went into effect, the IDF carried out targeted killings of Hamas senior officials in Lebanon responsible for directing terrorist activity against Israel and against Israeli civilians abroad:
  • On November 21, 2023, Khalil Kharaz, deputy commander of the Hamas military-terrorist wing in Lebanon, was killed in an airstrike in the Tyre area (al-Nashra, Kana al-Nabatiyeh Telegram channel, Lebanese National News Agency, November 21, 2023, al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 22, 2025). According to the Mossad and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), Kharaz led Hamas terrorist activity in Europe and was responsible for part of the Hamas networks discovered in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany (Israeli media, January 13, 2024).
  • On January 2, 2024, Salah al-‘Arouri (Abu Muhammad), deputy head of the Hamas political bureau and the movement’s leader in Judea and Samaria, was killed In a strike in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. Killed with him were Samir Fndii (Abu Amer), from the al-Rashidiya refugee camp, who was responsible for the military activity of the military-terrorist wing in Lebanon; Azzam Husseini al-Aqra, aka Abu Abdallah (Abu Amer), a commander in the Hamas military-terrorist wing who was responsible for the Hamas military portfolio abroad and for carrying out attacks in Judea and Samaria; and terrorist operatives Mahmoud Zaki Shahin, Muhammad Bashasha, Muhammad al-Rayes, and Ahmed Hamoud.^[12]
• On August 9, 2024, Samer Mahmoud al-Hajj, who commanded Hamas in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp, was killed in an airstrike in Sidon. According to reports, he was responsible for promoting and carrying out terrorist operations from Lebanon into Israel, and for recruiting and training terrorist operatives to attack the State of Israel (IDF spokesperson, August 9, 2024).
  • On October 5, 2025, Hamas military-terrorist wing operative Said Ala’a Nayef Ali was killed in an airstrike in Tripoli. Reportedly, he led attacks on Israeli targets and recruited terrorist operatives for Hamas (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024). Hamas confirmed that “commander” Said Atta Allah Ali was killed in a strike on his house in the al-Badawi refugee camp in the Tripoli district of north Lebanon (Hamas Telegram channel, October 5, 2024).
  • On February 17, 2025, in an aerial attack in the Sidon area, the IDF eliminated Muhammad Shahin, head of the operations department of Hamas in Lebanon. He promoted terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians from Lebanon with Iranian funding (IDF spokesperson, February 17, 2025). Hamas media confirmed that Muhammad Shahin was the operations chief of the military-terrorist wing in Lebanon and directed of the “resistance” in north Samaria (al-Aqsa TV, February 17, 2025).
  • On April 4, 2025, in an attack in Sidon, the IDF eliminated Hassan Ahmed Farhat, the commander of the Hamas western sector in south Lebanon. He was responsible for promoting terrorist activity against IDF forces and Israeli civilians both during the war and afterward, including the rocket fire at Safed that killed an IDF soldier in February 2024 (IDF spokesperson, April 3, 2025).

• On March 22 and 28, 2025, rockets were fired at northern Israel, violating the ceasefire agreement. A Lebanese army-security services investigation found that behind the rocket fire were Lebanese and Palestinians affiliated with Hamas (Lebanese army X account, April 18, 2025). An indictment was filed against nine people on charges of establishing an armed group to damage the authority and prestige of the state, firing rockets at Israel, collecting medium and heavy weapons and military equipment, preparing for additional operations not carried out for reasons beyond their control, and possession of weapons, explosive, and rockets. The defendants, most of them Lebanese and all Hamas operatives, violated the measures taken by the State of Lebanon regarding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and exposed Lebanon to the danger of hostile actions (Lebanon Debate, May 5, 2025).
• On May 2, 2025, the Lebanese Supreme Defense Council recommended that the government warn Hamas not to use Lebanese territory for actions which threatened the state’s national security (al-Nashra, May 2, 2025). Major General Hassan Shaqir, head of Lebanese General Security, summoned Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, Hamas representative in Lebanon, and warned him not to undertake actions which would undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty. Abd al-Hadi said he was prepared to hand over the four Palestinians wanted for firing rockets at northern Israel at the end of March 2025, including the planner, and claimed the rocket fire was “an individual act” and unrelated to Hamas. Hamas reportedly promised not to violate Lebanon’s sovereignty in the future (al-Arabiya, May 3, 2025). Then, apparently to placate the Lebanese leadership, Hamas handed over three of the four wanted Palestinians to the Lebanese army (Lebanese army X account, May 4–6, 2025).

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

• For years, the center of PIJ activity was in Damascus, from where the organization apparently also managed its activity in Lebanon. Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the rise to power of Ahmed al-Sharaa, who strongly opposed the presence of Iran and its proxies in Syria, the PIJ leadership was forced to leave Damascus. Ziyad al-Nakhalah, PIJ secretary general, reportedly transferred his center of activity to Iran, while Akram al-Ajouri, in charge of military-terrorist activity, had left Damascus even earlier, and according to various reports, on the eve of the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, was living in Beirut under Hezbollah protection (Mehr News Agency, October 2, 2023), and later found refuge in Iraq (Israeli TV channel Kan 11, December 8, 2024). After PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas visited Syria in April 2025, Syrian security forces arrested Khaled Khaled and Abu Ali Yasser, two senior PIJ operatives who remained in Damascus (al-Quds al-Arabi, April 21, 2025).
• The PIJ, traditionally close to Iran, operates in Lebanon under Hezbollah sponsorship and in close coordination with the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Its representative in Lebanon is Ihsan Ataya, the head of the department of Arab and international affairs and a member of the political bureau (Lebanon Debate, May 9, 2025). He works with Shakib al-Ayna, who is responsible for foreign relations (al-Jazeera, October 12, 2023).

• The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, has a presence mainly in the Palestinian refugee camps in south Lebanon, but there is no reliable data regarding their order of combat or actual deployment. The movement’s military-terrorist activity in Lebanon is concentrated under a dedicated unit called the Shaheed Mahmoud al-Majdoub Battalions, which PIJ announced a few days before the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre (Sama, October 6, 2023).
• During the Gaza Strip War, PIJ terrorist operatives fought against IDF forces along the northern border, attacking at least seven times, most of them attempted infiltrations into Israel. The only Jerusalem Brigades claim of responsibility was issued on October 9, 2023, following an infiltration attack in northern Israel in which three IDF soldiers were killed. The PIJ confirmed that two of its operatives were killed (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 9, 2023, Quds News Agency, October 10, 2023).
• According to the Israeli security establishment, hundreds of the PIJ terrorist operatives from Syria were integrated into the fighting under the direct command of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force (Israeli TV channel Kan 11, February 14, 2024): the PIJ issued announcements about operatives killed in the fighting, and of 58 announcements issued since October 8, 2023, 46 operatives belonged to the Shaheed Ali al-Aswad Battalions, the PIJ’s branch in Syria, and only 12 belonged to the branch in Lebanon (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 9, 2023 – April 21, 2025).

    
Right: Mourning notice for a terrorist operative from the PIJ’s Lebanon branch. Left: Mourning notice for a terrorist operative from the PIJ’s Syria branch (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, February 21, 2025)

• On August 28, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked the Syria-Lebanon border and Firas Qassem, a senior PIJ official, was eliminated. He was reportedly responsible for the PIJ’s operational plans in Syria and Lebanon and took part in recruiting Palestinian terrorist operatives for Hezbollah. The attack also eliminated other PIJ operatives who were en route to Lebanon on behalf of Hezbollah (IDF spokesperson, August 28, 2024). The PIJ military-terrorist wing confirmed that Firas Hussein Qassem was killed along with two other operatives from the Syrian branch of the Jerusalem Brigades “while carrying out their jihad duty” (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, August 28, 2024).
• “Palestinian sources” reported that when operation al-Aqsa Flood began on October 7, 2023, the military-terrorist wings of Hamas and PIJ in Lebanon moved to the south of the country under Hezbollah’s protection (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 15, 2023). Ihsan Ataya, PIJ representative in Lebanon, said the “Palestinian resistance” and the “resistance axis,”^[13] especially Hezbollah, coordinated at the highest levels, and joint operations rooms had been established to monitor “the progress of the fighting from all angles” (al-‘Ahed, October 26, 2023). The leadership also coordinated: on October 25, 2023, Ziyad al-Nakhalah, PIJ secretary general, met with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, and Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of the Hamas political bureau. According to reports, they agreed on continued coordination and ongoing monitoring of developments on a daily and permanent basis (al-Nashra, October 25, 2023).

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

• The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) operates in Lebanon under the leadership of Haitham Abdo, Marwan Abd Alal and Abdallah Danan. They are responsible for political activity in the refugee camps and for relations with the Lebanese authorities (PFLP Lebanon website, May 22, 2025). Alongside the “civilian” activity, the PFLP also operates the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, its military-terrorist wing, whose leaders include Allam al-Kaabi, born in Nablus, who was imprisoned in Israel and released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal, and is involved in attacking Israel from Lebanese territory against Israel (al-Quds al-Arabi, August 8, 2023).
•   On September 30, 2024, an IDF aerial attack in Beirut eliminated Nidal Abd Alal, who commanded the PFLP in Lebanon, and Imad Odeh, head of the PFLP military-terrorist office in Lebanon. The IDF spokesperson reported that Abd Alal had led the PFLP’s efforts to plan and carry out terrorist attacks against the State of Israel and was responsible for directing PFLP terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria. He was behind an IED attack on a bus in Beitar Illit and a shooting at the Huwara Junction in March 2023 (IDF spokesperson, September 30, 2024). The PFLP confirmed that the attack on an apartment in central Beirut had killed “commander” Muhammad Abd Alal, aka Nidal, a member of the political bureau and head of the military-security department; “commander” Imad Odeh, aka Abu Ziyad, a member of the “military department” and the “military commander” in Lebanon; and “comrade and field commander” Abd al-Rahman Abd Alal (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigadestc , September 30, 2024).

• The PFLP military-terrorist issued mourning notices for the deaths of six of its operatives along the “Palestinian-Lebanese border,” all after the attack in Beirut, when the names of three of the dead were published after the ceasefire began on November 27, 2024. That would indicate the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades were latecomers to the fighting in south Lebanon and their activity was limited (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades Telegram channel, October 26, 2024 – February 25, 2025; Palestinian refugees’ portal, October 30, 2024 and February 7, 2025).
• The funeral of the three eliminated in Beirut and the funerals of most of the movement’s operatives in the fighting in south Lebanon took place in the Palestinian refugee camps of Nahr al-Bared and Badawi in the north of the country, an indication that the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades’ military-terrorist activity is concentrated in those camps, although they are present in other refugee camps in Lebanon (Palestinian refugees’ portal, September 30, 2024). However, there is no reliable information regarding their order of battle or their deployment in the refugee camps.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command

• The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) is represented in Lebanon by Ghazi Dabbour and Anwar Raja, secretary of the political bureau. For years the PFLP-GC was considered a unique Palestinian organization on the Lebanese landscape because it was close to the Assad regime and had “military bases” outside the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, in Qusaya and Sultan Yacoub in the Beqa’a Valley and in the Na’ameh area on the coastal plain at the foot of the Chouf Mountains (al-Nashra, June 24, 2024). However, the Lebanese authorities’ attempts to dismantle the bases to restrict weapons were unsuccessful (Phalanges website, December 12, 2024).
• The PFLP-GC lost Syrian sponsorship when the Assad regime fell and its operatives abandoned the bases. Shortly thereafter, the Lebanese army took control of the Jamila Ain al-Beidha military compound and a tunnel in the Zahle area in the Beqa’a Valley, confiscating large quantities of weapons, ammunition and military equipment (Lebanon 24 and al-Nahar, December 23, 2024). According to reports, the organization abandoned all its posts in Lebanon outside the Palestinian refugee camps and handed them over to the Lebanese army, together with the weapons and equipment they contained, out of faith in the Lebanese army, Lebanon and its institutions, regardless of what happened in Syria, and the Lebanese people were thanked for “hosting the Palestinian people” (al-Akhbar, December 23, 2024).

• Given the aforementioned information and the fact that throughout the Gaza Strip War, the movement did not issue a statement about participation in the fighting against Israel, the status of the PFLP-GC’s activity is uncertain, and apparently the movement has no active terrorist facilities in the country.
• In early May 2025, Tala Najji, the PFLP-GC secretary general, was arrested by the Syrian authorities in Damascus and the organization’s offices were closed. He was interrogated for several hours and released after the involvement of PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Khaled Mashal (al-Mayadeen and Syrian TV, May 3, 2025). Such measures in Syria may legitimize similar steps against the movement’s activity by the Lebanese authorities.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

• The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) maintains a permanent presence in Lebanon led by Fahed Suleiman, the movement’s secretary general, and represented in Lebanon by Youssef Ahmed. Like the other Palestinian terrorist organizations in Lebanon, the movement maintains political ties with Hezbollah (Lebanese National News Agency, April 21, 2024 and February 22, 2025).
• During the Gaza Strip War, the DFLP leadership in Lebanon expressed solidarity with and support for the fighting led by Hezbollah against Israel (Watan, September 23, 2024). However, there is no evidence that the movement’s operatives or its military wing, the Omar al-Qassem Shaheed Forces, were involved in the fighting against Israel from Lebanese territory. It is therefore uncertain if the movement is active militarily on Lebanese soil.

The Jihadist Groups

• In addition to the main Palestinian terrorist organizations, small organizations and local groups also operate in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon which identify with jihadist ideologies more extreme than the Palestinian national narrative. They include the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, Ansar Allah, Fatah al-Islam, Junud al-Sham and Asbat al-Ansar, and others.

       
Right: The Fatah al-Islam logo. Left: The Abdallah Azzam Brigades logo

• The jihadist organizations are not subject to the official Palestinian institutions in the refugee camps, and from time to time challenge the status quo in the refugee camps managed by the PLO and the other major Palestinian terrorist organizations. However, their influence is local and limited, and it is generally assumed that there are relatively few armed forces loyal to them, perhaps only a few hundred.
• In the past the organizations occasionally tried to operate outside the Palestinian refugee camps and challenge the official security mechanisms of Lebanon. For example, clashes broke out between operatives of Fatah al-Islam (the al-Qaeda branch in Lebanon), and Lebanese army forces in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon in 2007. The clashes lasted about three and a half months, during which the Lebanese army used exceptional force and ended Fatah al-Islam’s activity in the camp.^[14]
• In recent years, the friction between jihadist organization operatives and the other Palestinian organizations has focused on the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in south Lebanon. In July-September 2023, clashes were recorded between Fatah operatives and Junud al-Sham operatives, who killed Abu Ashraf al-Armoushi, commander of the national security apparatus in the camp. To restore calm, a joint security force was established under the command of a Fatah officer and with the participation of Hamas and Asbat al-Ansar operatives.^[15]

• Evidence for the challenge to the Lebanese security forces can be expected of face expected in disarming the Palestinian refugee camps came at the end of May 2025, when the intelligence service of the Lebanese army uncovered a large ISIS cell, which for the first time operated under the name Wilayat Lebanon in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp and planned to attack targets in Lebanon (al-Joumhouria, May 29, 2025).

1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.

2. Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, all of whose objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel.

3. The International Crisis Group, "Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps" Middle East Report N°84 – 19 February 2009.

4. For further information, see the February 2006 ITIC report, Disarming Hezbollah and extending the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government to south Lebanon, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) and the Taef Accord (1989)

5. For further information, see the May 2025 ITIC report, Disarming the Palestinian Factions in Lebanon.

6. For further information, see the ITIC report,"Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon, May 19 – 26, 2025."

7. For further information, see the April 2023 ITIC report, Rocket Fire Targeting Israel

8. For further information, see the ITIC report, Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Qods Forces’ “Palestine Branch,” Reflected in Captured Documents.

9. For further information, see the December 2021 ITIC report, The explosion of a weapons storehouse in the Burj al-Shemali refugee camp east of Tyre revealed the extent of Hamas' military presence in Lebanon.

10. For further information, see the August 2024 ITIC report, The Organizations Assisting Hezbollah in Combat Against Israel.

11. For further information, see the December 2023 ITIC report, The Al-Aqsa Flood Pioneers A new youth movement established by Hamas in Lebanon to attack Israel.

12. For further information, see the January 2024 ITIC report, Reactions to the killing of Saleh al-‘Arouri.

13. Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, all of whose objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel.

14. For further information, see the September 2007 ITIC report, "Achievement for Fuad Siniora’s government: victory over Fatah al-Islam, the Al-Qaeda branch in Lebanon, after three and a half months of battles. The Lebanese army completed its takeover of the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in north Lebanon, which for the past year was a center for global jihad activities."

15. Asbat al-Ansar (Band of Supporters) is a a radical Islamist Palestinian organization in Lebanon, mainly in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp. It is connected to global jihad elements and its operatives were involved in firing rockets toward Israel on December 27–28, 2005. For further information, see the weekly ITIC "Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria" reports between July and September 2023.

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