The Anniversary of Nasrallah’s Death and the Challenges facing Hezbollah

Overview

• Hezbollah held formal ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the pager attack and the deaths of secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor Hashem Safi al-Din, among others. The ceremonies exposed the challenges facing the organization, led by the demand it disarms, its status in Lebanon, continued Israeli attacks and economic and other internal difficulties.
• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem and others used the ceremonies as a platform to reiterate that the “resistance”^[1] would not disarm and threatened violence if disarmament were implemented by force. On the other hand, President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam reiterated their intention, with increasing American pressure, to achieve a state monopoly on weapons: Aoun was the more cautious of the two, fearing civil war.
• Hezbollah ignored the ban on projecting pictures of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din on the tourist site of the Raouche [Pigeon] Rock in Beirut, causing the tensions between the organization and Prime Minister Salam to resurface; Salam demanded the arrest of those responsible and threatened to resign.
• In ITIC assessment, the Lebanese state’s inability to enforce its sovereignty over Hezbollah, despite the blows inflicted on the organization in the past two years, reflects the Lebanon’s fundamental weakness and the difficulty of the international system to motivate the state’s institutions to act. Hezbollah, on the other hand, maintains its military capabilities and has a wide enough circle of loyalists to allow it to challenge the decisions of the government of which it is a part and to use threats of force to achieve its goals. However, the continuing attempts to disarm Hezbollah and the continued Israeli enforcement of the ceasefire agreement may cause Hezbollah to use force in the domestic arena, or attempt to act against Israel as a “common Hezbollah and Lebanon enemy,” despite its weakness and its restraint so far.

Challenges to Hezbollah a Year after the Death of Nasrallah

• During September 2025, Hezbollah held events marking the anniversary of Israeli attacks on the organization and targeted killings during the war which began on October 8, 2023:
  • On September 17, 2025, a ceremony was held to mark the anniversary of the pager attack, which injured and maimed thousands of Hezbollah operatives.^[2] Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem called the injured terrorist operatives “the educators and instructors” and said he saw three things in them: recovery, awakening and continuity (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 17, 2025). Hezbollah-affiliated media dealt with three main narratives: “unbreakable resilience,” that is, the determination of the wounded (“the wounded who responded to the call”) as proof of Israel’s failure to break the spirit of the “resistance;” “strategic defiance,” linking the event to the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip and promising to prevent the return of “settlers” [Israeli civilians] to northern Israel; and the glorification of “sacrifice,” calling the wounded terrorists “martyrs” and representing them as a symbol of a “holy struggle.” The narratives noted the importance of Hezbollah’s power in the battle for hearts and minds by turning a tactical defeat and an Israeli military achievement into a Lebanese moral victory strengthening internal cohesion and projecting power outwards (al-Manar and al-‘Ahed, September 17, 2025).

     
Posters praising the “resistance” and the wounded in the pager attack. Right: The Arabic reads, “In every wound there is a ray of life, and in every scar is the imprint of the resistance.” Left: The Arabic reads, “The wounds replace the gifts of heaven” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 17, 2025)

• • On September 19, 2025, Hezbollah held a ceremony for the anniversary of the deaths of Ibrahim Aqil, head of Hezbollah’s operations and commander of the Radwan Force, and 14 other Radwan Force commanders; Na’im Qassem delivered the keynote speech (al-Manar, September 19, 2025).^[3]
  • On September 27, a ceremony was held for the deaths of Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din, his designated successor and chairman of Hezbollah’s executive council, who was killed in an attack on the night of October 3, 2024.^[4] Hezbollah held memorials in its strongholds throughout the country, with the main ceremony taking place at Nasrallah’s burial site in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, attended by thousands of the organization’s supporters, senior movement figures, and Ali Larijani, secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council. A recorded speech by Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem was delivered (al-Manar and al-Mayadeen, September 27, 2025).

     
Right: A ceremony at Nasrallah’s burial site in Beirut for the anniversary of his death (al-‘Ahed, September 26, 2025). Left: The main memorial ceremony for Nasrallah and Safi al-Din (al-Manar, September 27, 2025)

• Despite Hezbollah’s attempt to use the events to show the importance of the “resistance” and the organization’s ability to recover, a year after the blow to its leadership and operational capabilities it continues to face complex challenges:^[5]
  • The issue of disarmament:^[6] Hezbollah faces increasing pressure from inside Lebanon and beyond to disarm after in early August the Lebanese government approved 2025 the plan to disarm all armed militias, including Hezbollah, in accordance with the principles presented in a document by United States special envoy Thomas Barrack. In early September 2025 the government also adopted the Lebanese army’s plan to implement a monopoly on weapons by the end of the year.
  • Internal-organizational rehabilitation: Hezbollah continues to analyze the failures which made it possible for Israel to attack its leadership and military capabilities. “Sources” reported that secretary general Na’im Qassem was conducting a comprehensive military-security, political and media review to reinforce the organization’s position ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2026 (Lebanon24, September 21, 2025). It was also reported that Hezbollah’s leadership was dismantling the Coordination and Liaison Unit, headed by Wafiq Safa, and planning to appoint a “flexible academic figure” to manage communications with state institutions (al-Janoubia, September 17, 2025).
  • Continued Israeli attacks: Israel continues to enforce the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon from November 27, 2024, attacking in south Lebanon and other areas when and where attempts to reconstruct Hezbollah’s military capabilities are identified. Hezbollah terrorist operatives, including field commanders, have been eliminated, and military and precision weapons production facilities have been attacked. While Hezbollah tries to represent itself as a “resistance” organization, it shifts responsibility for dealing with Israeli “violations” to the Lebanese government and does not take “independent activity” against Israel. Reportedly, Lebanon fears an Israeli escalation against Hezbollah targets as the attacks expand (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 20, 2025).
  • Reconstructing military capabilities and replenishing its arsenal: Following the Israeli attacks, Hezbollah’s efforts to smuggle weapons from Syria continue despite action by the new regime. “Syrian security sources” reported that Hezbollah had recently increased its smuggling activities to obtain light and medium weapons from Syria, using networks operating on its behalf (Aram News, September 23, 2025). In one raid, Syrian Interior Ministry forces seized a vehicle in the al-Qusayr area, near the border with Lebanon, and confiscated RPG shells, mortars and machine guns. The forces also raided a warehouse containing about 200 Grad rockets (Syrian Interior Ministry Telegram channel September 27, 2025).

• • Imposing restrictions on aid from Iran: In February 2025 the Lebanese government stopped regular flights between Iran and Lebanon, fearing Israeli attacks on the airport. That forced Hezbollah to find alternative ways to smuggle the funds and weapons it wanted. Before the events marking the anniversary of Nasrallah’s death, the government reportedly refused to allow two Iranian planes to land at Lebanon’s international airport (al-Jadeed, September 26, 2025). However, it allowed Ali Larijani, secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, to land.
  • The economic challenge: The imposition of restrictions on Iranian financial aid damaged Hezbollah’s ability to repair the destruction to Lebanon and compensate its Shi’ite supporters. That was compounded when the Central Bank of Lebanon instructed the country’s financial institutions not to cooperate with al-Qard al-Hassan, Hezbollah’s financial arm, since it is subject to American sanctions.
  • Status inside Lebanon: Over the past year Hezbollah focused its efforts on ensuring the popular support of the Shi’ite community and attempting to preserve political alliances with members of other communities, which traditionally granted the organization a “Lebanese facade” extending beyond the narrow Shi’ite circle (al-Akhbar, September 22, 2025). Hezbollah’s achievements in the local elections in Lebanon showed that it still maintained its power base in its Shi’ite strongholds, but delays in repairing the destruction, its economic difficulties and the absence of external aid to Lebanon could affect its standing ahead of the general elections.
• According to an article on the political changes taking place in Hezbollah, the veterans’ wing of the Da’wah Party, which helped establish Hezbollah and is represented by Na’im Qassem, Mohammad Raad, Mohammad Fneish, and Mahmoud Qamati, now had an advantage at the expense of the diminishing presence of other traditional figures such as Mohammad Yazbek and Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid. According to the article, that reflected Hezbollah’s transition from a “military” phase to a “political” phase, as decisions were now [allegedly] being made by leadership that was more party-governmental than military-security (al-Janoubia, September 25, 2025).
• According to a different article, Hezbollah faces the most significant challenge since its establishment, and is pursuing a policy of “steadfastness” in an effort to emerge from the crisis it finds itself in. According to the article, under the leadership of Na’im Qassem, who lacks the charisma and special status enjoyed by Nasrallah, Hezbollah has turned from a body with regional influence extending beyond Lebanon’s borders into an organization focused on surviving and restoring its standing in the internal Lebanese arena (al-Nashra, September 27, 2025).

Statements from Hezbollah Leaders

• Senior Hezbollah figures, headed by secretary general Na’im Qassem, used the memorial ceremonies to make it clear they had no intention of disarming the “resistance,” which was a “red line” because so much as discussing the issue served Israel’s interests. They also warned that any attempt to disarm Hezbollah by force would lead to civil war:
  • In a speech for the anniversary of the death of Ibrahim Aqil, head of Hezbollah’s operations, Qassem said that any pressure on the “resistance” was a net gain for Israel. He called on actors inside Lebanon, including those considered hostile to Hezbollah, not to serve Israel’s interests. He also said was forbidden to give the Lebanese army any weapon which could reach Israel, its aircraft or IDF forces. He added that the only way to confront “the threat from Israel” was to unite against the “common enemy,” and called on Saudi Arabia to reconcile with Hezbollah (al-Manar, September 19, 2025).
  • In a speech for the anniversary of the death of Nasrallah, Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah would never give up its weapons and would choose a “martyr’s death” instead. He called the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah “a sin” caused by American pressure and said it was desirable that the government revoke the decision. Qassem added that the government wanted the army to fight its own people, but Hezbollah would continue to stand by the army and fight with it against the “real enemy.” He also said Hezbollah was in the middle of “jihadi rehabilitation,” which would enable it to “confront” Israel again, adding that Israel’s continued refusal to cease its attacks on Lebanese territory and withdraw from the areas it had occupied along the border “obligated” Hezbollah to adhere to the path of “resistance” (al-‘Ahed, September 27, 2025).

• • Qassem met with Ali Larijani, secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, who arrived in Beirut to attend the memorial ceremonies for Nasrallah. He said Lebanon stood firm against the challenges and threats of the United States and Israel, adding that Hezbollah was open to all and ready for any form of cooperation with those standing against the “Israeli enemy,” which he claimed was “a danger to everyone, without exception.” He noted Iran’s support for Lebanon and “its resistance” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 28, 2025). Larijani said Hezbollah was a strong organization and possessed sufficient military capabilities to defend Lebanon against Israel (Mehr News Agency, September 27, 2025).
  • Ihab Hamadeh, member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the American demands of the Lebanese government regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament were pushing the country toward internal conflict and that “only Hezbollah’s restraint” saved Lebanon from being dragged into civil war (MTV, September 18, 2025).
  • Sheikh Ali Damoush, head of Hezbollah’s executive council, said that anyone who thought Hezbollah would surrender to pressure and threats was delusional. He called on the Lebanese government not to involve the Lebanese army in a confrontation with the “resistance,” adding that the only solution was a national dialogue on Lebanon’s defense strategy, and claimed that Hezbollah was open to discussion and to engage in dialogue (al-Akhbar, September 18, 2025).
  • Mahmoud Qamati, a member of Hezbollah’s political council, said the organization was in the process of “military recovery and closing the gaps” (al-Alam, September 25, 2025).

The Lebanese Government

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated his commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament and the realization of state sovereignty, as he declared in his inaugural speech in January 2025, but is cautious and seeks to avoid direct confrontation with Hezbollah:
  • Speaking at the UN General Assembly, President Aoun attributed the delay in disarming Hezbollah to the continuation of Israeli “violations” of Lebanon’s sovereignty, given its attacks in south Lebanon and its refusal to withdraw from the five points it holds on Lebanese territory. He said the current struggle was over Lebanon’s identity, whether it would be a land of life and joy, connected to the region and the world, or become a “deathbed,” a battlefield and a launching pad for spreading conflicts to all its neighbors. He said Lebanon had made its choice, the proof of which was the government’s decision on disarmament (al-Nashra, September 23, 2025). During his meetings with foreign officials in New York, Aoun reportedly stated that the option of disarming Hezbollah by force was not on the table lest it lead to civil war (Naharnet, September 25, 2025).
  • In a statement for the anniversary of Nasrallah’s death, Aoun did not condemn the event but emphasized the need to unite behind the state. He stated that “there can be loyalty to the victims only in a united stance and convergence around the project of one strong and just state.” He expressed hope that the anniversary would help strengthen the belief that Lebanon “could be saved only by being one state, and having one army and constitutional institutions defending the sovereignty and dignity of the state” (Lebanese presidency X account, September 27, 2025).
• Prime Minister Nawaf Salam also noted Lebanon’s commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament in accordance with the government’s decisions from early August 2025 and expressed full confidence in the Lebanese army’s plan to achieve the goal, which won government approval in early September 2025 (al-Jazeera, September 23, 2025).
• However, Salam’s positions on Hezbollah are more critical than those of Aoun, as reflected in angry statement he issued after Hezbollah projected pictures of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din on the Raouche Rock in the Mediterranean off the coast of Beirut, in defiance of the ban imposed by the authorities (see below). Salam also did not issue a statement for the anniversary of Nasrallah’s death, unlike the statement he issued on the 43^rd anniversary of the assassination of Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, in which he condemned political assassinations and called for ending the era of violence (Nawaf Salam’s X account, September 14, 2025).
• Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, remained Hezbollah’s only ally in “the ruling triangle.” However, he did not rule out the possibility of limiting the weapons of the “resistance,” saying a dialogue had to be held, but only after the end of the Israeli “violations” (al-Hadath, August 17, 2025). In a statement for the anniversary of Nasrallah’s death, he said the death of senior Hezbollah figures was intended “to preserve Lebanon, to prevent conflicts and to protect civil peace” and that was the best path “against the absolute evil of Israel” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 27, 2025).
• American special envoy to Lebanon Thomas Barrack did not hide his frustration regarding the conduct of the Lebanese authorities on Hezbollah’s disarmament. He said “all Lebanon does is talk” and that no practical action had been taken, while Hezbollah was rebuilding its strength and had received about $60 million “from somewhere.” He said Lebanon feared to disarm Hezbollah because it thought it would lead to civil war, and he admitted that the Lebanese army was not sufficiently equipped for the task, but demanded that the Lebanese authorities fulfill their duty (Sky News Arabic, September 22, 2025). On another occasion, he said that if the Lebanese people wanted one state and one army, they had to disarm Hezbollah while avoiding civil war, and he noted the United States’ support for any step the Lebanese leadership would take within the framework of independent decision-making (al-Jazeera, September 27, 2025). In response, Prime Minister Salam said that the government was committed to expanding the state’s authority over all its territory and limiting weapons to the state (al-Nashra, September 24, 2025).

Hezbollah’s Opponents

• Hezbollah’s political rivals are harshly critical of the delay in disarming Hezbollah. Samir Geagea, chairman of the Lebanese Forces party, said Hezbollah’s intransigent refusal to cooperate was causing the delay in establishing an orderly state in Lebanon, economic recovery and reconstruction, regardless of Israeli attacks (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 24, 2025).
• Marwan Hamadeh, member of the Druze faction in the Lebanese Parliament, condemned Hezbollah for projecting the images of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din on the Raouche Rock and said that “the funeral is lively, although the dead man was a dog.” Although Hamadeh’s associates claimed that the remarks had not been directed at Nasrallah and he apologized for the misunderstanding, Hezbollah supporters held demonstrations outside Hamadeh’s house (al-Nashra, September 27, 2025).
• However, in the absence of practical tools to advance their position outside the government framework, Hezbollah’s rivals an only make declarations, and for the time being they have not convinced the official state leadership to adopt a harsher line against the organization or to set strict timetables that would obligate Hezbollah to hand over its weapons.

The Raouche Rock Affair: The Tension between Hezbollah and the Authorities

• Hezbollah announced that the memorial ceremony on September 25, 2025, would pen with pictures of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din projected on the Raouche Rock (Pigeon Rock), a famous Lebanese tourist site in the Mediterranean off the coast of Beirut (al-Manar, September 16, 2025).
• Hezbollah opponents called it a “provocative and unacceptable move” and called on the authorities to take action against it. Waddah al-Sadek, a member of the Lebanese Parliament, said the two were not official figures and that most residents of Beirut rejected their policies, and urged the government to prevent Hezbollah and others from provocation. Parliament member Ashraf Rifi said that the Raouche Rock was a unifying national symbol and not a space for “rejected sectarianism” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 17, 2025).
• According to reports, Marwan Abboud, the governor of the Beirut Governate allowed a gathering to be held in front of the Raouche Rock, with the organizers committing not to block roads or disrupt traffic, but no permit was given to illuminate the rock or project pictures onto it. Lebanese security agencies also raised the alert level for fear of clashes in the area (al-Joumhouria, August 25, 2025).
• On the afternoon of September 25, 2025, many Hezbollah supporters gathered on the promenade opposite the rock, among them Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit. Clashes developed between Lebanese army soldiers and demonstrators waving Hezbollah flags and pictures of the organization’s leaders while calling for the “resistance”^[7] to continue. Despite the ban, pictures of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din were projected onto the rock, in addition to pictures of Nasrallah with other Lebanese politicians, including former prime ministers Rafik and Saad al-Hariri (al-‘Ahed, al-Mayadeen and al-Joumhouria, September 25, 2025).

     
Right: Hezbollah supporters gathered in front of the rock. Left: Pictures Nasrallah and Safi al-Din projected onto the Raouche Rock (al-Ahed, September 25, 2025)

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said it was a blatant violation of the permit given by the governor of Beirut to Hezbollah. He said he had instructed the ministers of the interior, justice and defense to take the necessary measures, including arrests, against those who had broken the law. He called it “a reversal of Hezbollah and its supporters’ commitments and a new failure for the organization, affecting its credibility in dealing with the logic of the state and its institutions” (Nawaf Salam’s X account, September 25, 2025). Reportedly, the events at the Raouche Rock caused Salam to announce that he would resign if the perpetrators were not arrested, but he had received a “message” from abroad telling him to calm the situation, and as a result he resumed meetings at his office (al-Diyar, September 28, 2025).

^[1] Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[2] For further information, see the September 2024 ITIC report, "Hezbollah Communications Devices Explode."
^[3] For further information, see the September 2024 ITIC report, "Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force."
^[4] For further information, see the September 2024 ITIC report, "Israeli Attack in Beirut Eliminates Hassan Nasrallah"
^[5] For further information, see the May 2025 ITIC report, "Challenges Faced by Hezbollah after the November 27, 2024 ceasefire."
^[6] For further information, see the August 2025 ITIC report, " Lebanese Government Decides to Disarm Hezbollah – Positions of Power Actors."
^[7] Attacks on Israel.

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