Terrorist Organizations - The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement: Reactions and Insights

On April 16, 2026, the United States announced a ten-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon to advance direct bilateral talks for a peace agreement. The American administration said in a statement that Israel would retain its right to self-defense, but the United States "prohibited" Israel from attacking in Lebanon; IDF forces remained in south Lebanon and eliminated terrorists who posed a threat. Two IDF soldiers were killed in two incidents after the start of the ceasefire; and reiterated its usual demands: an end to the "aggression," the withdrawal of IDF forces to the border, the release of Lebanese held in Israel, the return of the displaced and the reconstruction of the country. Hezbollah claimed that Iranian pressure helped achieve the ceasefire and warned President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam not to continue direct negotiations with Israel; Lebanese President Aoun claimed the ceasefire showed that Lebanon would determine its own fate and ignored Iran when he thanked the countries that helped stop the fighting. Parliament Speaker Berri reiterated Iranian assistance in achieving the ceasefire and his opposition to direct negotiations; Thousands of displaced civilians returned to south Lebanon despite warnings from the IDF and the Lebanese army, while residents of the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia admitted they were still afraid to return to their homes for fear of renewed fighting; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah will continue to represent the ceasefire as a Hezbollah-Iran achievement while attempting to challenge IDF forces maintaining the agreement to be able to accuse Israel of "violating the agreement." At the same time, Hezbollah can be expected to escalate internal criticism against the Lebanese leadership, which will raise the tension in Lebanon between Hezbollah's supporters and opponents. The Lebanese government will try to use the momentum to advance direct talks with Israel and implement the state’s monopoly on weapons, especially applying its sovereignty in south Lebanon to convince the United States to pressure Israel to withdraw to the border. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (February 24-March 3, 2026)

IDF forces continued operations within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to locate and destroy weapons and terrorist infrastructure. The forces eliminated terrorist operatives who attempted to approach the forces and attacked in response to violations of the ceasefire agreement; Hamas reportedly smuggled essential materials by sea, enabling it to manufacture dozens of rockets; Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) condemned the Israeli-American war against Iran and the elimination of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, but said they would not intervene due to the consequences of the Gaza Strip War. According to reports, the Iranian-backed Palestinian terrorist organizations fear complete collapse because of the economic pressure on Tehran; Israel closed the crossings to the Gaza Strip because of the state of emergency inside the country, but stressed that there was sufficient humanitarian aid in the Strip. Sharp price increases of basic commodities were reported in the markets of Gaza; The Turkish IHH said a flotilla of more than 100 vessels carrying thousands of activists was expected to depart in April 2026 for the Gaza Strip to "break the siege," along with the dispatch of land convoys; A member of the American mediation team said the administration was preparing a proposal for the "gradual disarmament" of Hamas, adding that employees in the Hamas administration would be integrated into the new governing mechanisms under the Palestinian technocrat committee for the management of the Gaza Strip; The secretary of the PLO Executive Committee said he opposed disarming Hamas or designating it as a terrorist organization, calling the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre a "strategic mistake" [sic]. Read more...

Hamas Criticism of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Revealed in Seized Documents from the Gaza Strip

The military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have cooperated closely in wars and rounds of fighting against Israel, including during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, and together they operated a joint operations room with the other terrorist organizations in the Strip; Despite the cooperation, in several instances the two movements have disagreed, mainly due to PIJ's independent rocket fire, which led to short rounds of fighting against Israel, contrary to the "controlled escalation" policy which Hamas tried to promote while making secret preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas documents brought back by the IDF from the Gaza Strip indicated that Hamas was displeased by the PIJ's independent conduct; The documents also confirmed that many of the rockets fired at Israel by the PIJ fell inside the Gaza Strip, killing civilians and causing damage, which was also a serious problem for Hamas; In an attempt to reduce the PIJ's "rogue" actions, Hamas tried to impose its will on the PIJ and even subjugate the organization to its direct control. The documents included information regarding problems the PIJ caused the "resistance," including immoral behavior and intelligence infiltration, and measures to ensure that the PIJ would act in accordance with Hamas' interests at the political and military levels. The documents reveal a pragmatic and interest-based relationship between Hamas and the PIJ. Hamas views the PIJ as undisciplined and in need of constant control and supervision, while the PIJ seeks to gain public support by being more active against Israel. Although it is not known whether Hamas succeeded in fully implementing its plans to take over the PIJ, the war in the Gaza Strip showed that the two movements were able to overcome their differences and cooperate in dealing with Israel, including the deals to release the hostages. In ITIC’s assessment, although Hamas will ostensibly relinquish political control in the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, both organizations can be expected to refuse to disarm and continue to attack Israeli security forces and civilians in accordance with the vision of a jihad war until the "annihilation of Israel." However, if Hamas is pragmatic, in all probability the conflict between the two movements will resume and intensify, publicly as well. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March 30 – April 14, 2026)

The IDF forces continued operations to locate terrorists and destroy weapons and infrastructure within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip. Terrorists who violated the ceasefire and planned terrorist attacks were eliminated, among them an al-Jazeera correspondent who belonged to Hamas' military wing and operatives involved in the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre. Hamas accused Israel of targeting police checkpoints and security forces; A Hamas delegation held meetings in Cairo with the mediators, the Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Board of Peace high commissioner, Nikolay Mladenov. Hamas opposed beginning disarmament before Israel met all its commitments in the first phase of the ceasefire agreement. Ahead of the talks in Egypt, Hamas held meetings in Turkey with President Erdogan and other officials; A dispute arose between Hamas and commissioner Mladenov over the number of aid trucks entering the Gaza Strip. The Hamas administration continues spreading propaganda claiming humanitarian distress; Hamas' security forces and armed militias receiving Israeli support clashed, and there were reports of clashes between operatives of militias opposed to Hamas; The organizers of the Global Resilience Flotilla announced the departure of a new international flotilla from the Port of Barcelona to the Gaza Strip; Incidents of Jewish terrorism against Palestinians in Judea and Samaria continue. A Palestinian was killed in clashes near an illegal outpost; The Palestinian Authority leadership welcomed the ceasefire between the United States and Iran, adding that any regional arrangement had to include the Palestinian issue. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (March 29 – April 13, 2026)

The IDF forces continued military activity in Lebanon from the air and on the ground, eliminating terrorist commanders and operatives in Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations from the air, including the commander of Hezbollah's southern front. Six IDF soldiers were killed; During the past two weeks Hezbollah issued more than 660 claims of responsibility for attacking IDF forces in south Lebanon and civilian, military and security targets in Israel with rockets, missiles and UAVs. Hezbollah also claimed having launched a cruise missile at an Israeli navy vessel; it reportedly hit a British destroyer; Hezbollah secretary general claimed the capabilities of the "resistance" had surprised Israel, adding that they would continue fighting and would not return to the status quo ante of the current hostilities; Israel and Lebanon agreed to direct talks which will begin with a meeting of the ambassadors of the two countries in the United States under American oversight. Officials in the Lebanese administration demanded a ceasefire before the start of the formal negotiations; The Lebanese government's decision to implement the state's monopoly on weapons throughout Beirut and the announcement of direct negotiations with Israel exacerbated the tension with Hezbollah. The organization opposed talks with Israel and accused the government of acting against the "resistance" instead of fighting alongside it; Iran's leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said the Islamic Republic would continue to support the "resistance," and his senior advisor warned the Lebanese government of "irreversible dangers" if it did not recognize Hezbollah's role; According to the Lebanese ministry of health, more than 2,000 people have been killed since the beginning of the hostilities on March 2, 2026, and more than one million people have been displaced; Syrian authorities announced that they had arrested a Hezbollah-affiliated cell which was planning to attack a rabbi in Damascus. Read more...

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (March 30—April 15, 2026)

Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani praised the involvement of the “Resistance Axis” in the campaign alongside Iran, noting that they waged a “heroic war”; Until the ceasefire in Iran on April 8, 2026, the Houthis claimed responsibility for four attacks against Israel using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. It was reported that three ballistic missiles were either intercepted or fell in open areas, and one drone was intercepted; The pro-Iranian militias in Iraq continued their attacks using rockets, missiles, and drones against US bases and facilities in Iraq, the Gulf states, and Jordan until the ceasefire. The militias announced that at least eighty commanders and operatives were killed in strikes attributed to the United States against Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) bases in Iraq during the campaign; Senior Iranian officials strongly condemned the IDF strikes in Lebanon following the ceasefire between Iran and the United States, claiming they violated the understandings reached with the United States. The IRGC and “Resistance Axis” militias warned that continued strikes would lead to a harsh response on their part; The Supreme Leader of Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei, sent a message to Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, emphasizing Iran’s support for the “resistance against the Zionist and American enemy.” The Iranian Supreme Leader’s advisor warned the Lebanese Prime Minister that ignoring the role of the “resistance” would expose Lebanon to “irreversible security risks”. Read more...

Renewal of Hostilities and Negotiations with Israel Increase Tension between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government

On March 2, 2026, Hezbollah’s renewal of the hostilities against Israel hardened the position of the Lebanese leadership, which accused Hezbollah of dragging the country into unwanted confrontations. The government took measures against Hezbollah and Iran, declaring Hezbollah’s military wing illegal, expelling the Iranian ambassador and all representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps present in Lebanon, and implementing the state’s monopoly on weapons throughout Beirut; In an attempt to end the hostilities, Lebanese President Aoun presented an initiative for direct talks with Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu signaled his approval and the talks are expected to be conducted by Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors under American mediation; Hezbollah accused the government of acting against the "resistance" instead of joining it to fight Israel and strongly opposed talks with Israel, which were described as "surrender." The organization warned of a "popular tsunami" against the government and demanded it apologize to the "resistance" and rescind the "negative orders." Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets accused the president and the prime minister of betrayal; Hezbollah and Amal jointly called on their supporters not to hold mass demonstrations in order to preserve civil peace, and Arab and European countries reportedly warned Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri that any attempt to storm the government or carry out a coup would be met with a harsh response; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah's status in Lebanon is challenged by continued military pressure from Israel despite the ceasefire in the war in Iran and by the measures taken by the Lebanese regime to establish its governance throughout the country, including disarming the organization. The opening of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon is a severe blow to Hezbollah’s status, possibly leading the organization to undermine the government’s stability by having its ministers resign and shifting to protests in the streets. However, attacking political figures or attempting to take over state institutions could further isolate Hezbollah within Lebanon and drag the country into an internal conflict. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism – March 2026

During March 2026, fighting between Israel and Hezbollah resumed in the wake of the American-Israeli war against Iran, which began on February 28, 2026. The Houthis also renewed their attacks on Israel. The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip continued, while Hamas increased its governance in the areas under its control; Three terrorist attacks were carried out, killing one Israeli civilian, Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism measures in Judea and Samaria. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March 24-30, 2026)

IDF forces continued operations to locate terrorists and destroy weapons, infrastructure and assets within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip and eliminated terrorist operatives who violated the ceasefire and planned attacks; The Board of Peace's high commissioner, Nikolay Mladenov, said that the first stage of the United States' 20-point plan had largely been completed, adding that the disarmament of Hamas was the only way to move forward toward reconstruction and an Israeli military withdrawal. Hamas and other armed terrorist organizations criticized the Board of Peace's disarmament plan; The Hamas security forces continued attacking "collaborators" and members of Israeli-supported militias; Hamas continued to promote propaganda of humanitarian distress despite the entry of enormous quantities of goods into the Strip; Settler terrorism continued in Judea and Samaria, and reportedly one person was killed by settler gunfire near an illegal outpost; The representative of the Palestinian Authority in France submitted her credentials to President Macron as ambassador of the "State of Palestine." Read more...

Jihad Activity under the al-Sharaa Regime in Syria, a Potential Threat to Israel

The overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the rise of the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) changed the map of Salafi-jihadist terrorism in Syria; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (the strongest of the jihadist organizations which opposed the Assad regime) disbanded, along with its affiliated militias, which helped bring down the previous regime. Their operatives were integrated into the security forces of the new government, including foreign jihad fighters; A few jihad organizations which had cooperated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham opposed the pragmatic positions of the new government and refused to integrate into its ranks. The most prominent example is the Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, which attacked the security forces and Alawite civilians; The regime change in Syria and the absence of a governmental or security presence across large parts of the country provided ISIS with an opportunity to reorganize and establish itself in the Syrian desert in the east of the country and to expand its activity into populated areas near Damascus and the regions of Aleppo, Homs and southern Syria. However, Syria's joining the United States-led international coalition helped reduce the number of the organization's attacks during 2025. Despite the hostile positions of the Salafi-jihadist organizations still active in Syria toward Israel, they have not attacked IDF forces deployed in southern Syria or against Israeli territory. However, the detention of an ISIS operative in southern Syria indicated the potential threat; In ITIC assessment, the growing cooperation between the Syrian regime and the international coalition will make the situation on the ground harder for ISIS, even though the organization will continue its efforts to establish itself in areas where the regime's control remains weak, such as the Syrian desert, and to attack Syrian security forces and civilian localities. Other jihad organizations opposing the regime may also attempt to undermine the stability of the al-Sharaa government. Given that the extra-establishment jihadist elements are focused on the internal Syrian arena, their desire to harm IDF forces or Israeli territory is in all probability a lower priority, although they may try to build facilities in southern Syria that would enable them to threaten Israeli interests in the future. Read more...

Potential Terrorist Threats to Israeli and Jewish Interests in Australia

On December 14, 2025, two Muslim terrorists, who according to assessments by the Australian authorities had been inspired by ISIS, shot participants at a Hanukkah event at Bondi Beach in Sydney. Fifteen people were killed; The attack was the culmination of a wave of antisemitism which has been directed at the Jewish community in Australia since the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023; The October 7 attack was followed by large demonstrations led by pro-Palestinian organizations and fueled a discourse of hatred and anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement, with broad support from the Muslim community in Australia. At protest demonstrations support was voiced for Hamas, despite its being designated a terrorist organization in Australia, alongside calls for the destruction of Israel; Australian authorities identified Iran as responsible for several antisemitic attacks, following which the Iranian ambassador was expelled and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was declared a terrorism-supporting entity; As the attack in Sydney revealed, figures associated with extreme Islamist worldviews, including Muslim preachers against whom no legal measures have been taken by the authorities, also play a prominent role; The expanding circle of threats against Israeli and Jewish interests in Australia poses a significant challenge for the country's authorities, who are attempting to balance the need to combat antisemitic incitement and the threats it fuels with the need to preserve liberal values, especially freedom of expression, religion and assembly for pro-Palestinian organizations protesting Israeli activity in the Gaza Strip. In ITIC assessment, as long as the authorities do not take concrete action against the promotion of antisemitic incitement, Hamas, Iran and global jihad organizations will find fertile ground in Australia for recruiting operatives who will turn antisemitic and anti-Israeli rhetoric into acts of violence like the Bondi Beach attack. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism – February 2026

During February 2026 the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was maintained, while extensive counterterrorism activity continued in Judea and Samaria. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah remained in effect, despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah terrorist targets. On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel attacked Iran; the organizations of the "resistance axis" did not attack Israel during the first day; The Gaza Strip: The ceasefire that went into effect on October 10, 2025 continued. IDF forces attacked suspicious individuals who crossed the Yellow Line and eliminated terrorist operatives in response to ceasefire violations, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commanders and terrorists involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre; Israel, Judea and Samaria: There were no terrorist attacks. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria, eliminating or detaining terrorist operatives; Lebanon: The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah terrorist targets to prevent the organization from violating the ceasefire understandings of November 27, 2024 and to keep it from reconstructing its military capabilities and replenishing its arsenal. two Hamas terrorist operatives were eliminated in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp and two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operatives were eliminated on the Lebanon-Syria border, and a senior figure in the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was detained; IDF forces continued to operate in southern Syria, and a weapons depot belonging to al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was located; The Houthis have not attacked Israel or ships since the beginning of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism – December 2025

During December 2025 the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip continued, which also led to a halt in the Houthi attacks. Counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria continued. The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire remained in force, despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The Gaza Strip: The ceasefire of October 10, 2025 remained in force. IDF forces attacked suspects who crossed the Yellow Line and eliminated terrorist operatives in response to ceasefire violations, including Ra'ad Saad, one of the senior operatives in the Hamas military wing; Israel, Judea and Samaria: Six terrorist attacks were carried out in which two Israeli civilians were killed and eight IDF soldiers were wounded. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria; The IDF continued attacks to prevent Hezbollah from violating the ceasefire understandings of November 27, 2024 and to prevent the organization from reconstructing its military capabilities and replenishing its arsenal. Nine Hezbollah terrorist operatives were eliminated, one of whom was also serving in the Lebanese army, and an operative of Iran's Qods Force and one from the Amal Movement were eliminated; IDF forces continued operating in southern Syria, detained an ISIS operative and confiscated weapons; The Houthis did not attack Israel or shipping in the Red Sea, and have not since the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect. They also announced the deaths of senior figures killed in United States attacks in early 2025; Two Muslim terrorists suspected of being affiliated with ISIS carried out a shooting attack at a Hanukkah event at Bondi Beach in Sydney, killing 15 people. Read more...

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (February 11-18, 2026)

The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council met in Qatar with a Hamas delegation and discussed developments in the Palestinian arena; Iran’s ambassador to Beirut held farewell meetings with senior Lebanese officials ahead of the conclusion of his mission in Lebanon. He stated that the suspension of direct flights between Iran and Lebanon harms Lebanon; Iran’s permanent representative to the UN again criticized Israel’s ongoing military activity in southern Syria; The Iranian foreign minister discussed regional developments and bilateral relations with his Iraqi counterpart; Reports indicate closer ties between the Houthis and Iran and al-Qaeda branches in Yemen and Somalia, including the smuggling of weapons and joint training. Read more...

The Turkish IHH, which led the Mavi Marmara flotilla, operates in the Gaza Strip and is involved in its reconstruction

The Turkish IHH organization announced the launch of a project to clear rubble and open blocked roads in the Gaza Strip as part of reconstruction efforts, following the declaration of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The organization was involved in launching flotillas to the Gaza Strip, foremost of which was the Mavi Marmara flotilla which ended in a violent confrontation with IDF forces in May 2010 and the Global Sumud ("resilience''') flotilla, which was halted by the IDF in October 2025; The IHH is an NGO founded in 1992 and with close ties to the Turkish government. It promotes radical Islamist, anti-Israeli and anti-Western activity. Bülent Yıldırım, the head of the organization, has repeatedly made anti-Israeli and antisemitic statements; The IHH also has ties with Hamas and was outlawed in Israel in 2008 due to its involvement in a network of charity associations which raised funds for Hamas institutions abroad; This study is based on dozens of report issued about the IHH by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) since 2010. It summarizes the main aspects of the ties between the organization and Hamas and the central role Bülent Yıldırım plays, in cooperation with Hamas, in the campaign to delegitimize Israel; In ITIC assessment, the IHH's involvement in reconstruction activity in the Gaza Strip may be another way of strengthening Hamas' influence over affairs in the Strip even after the ceasefire goes into effect. The locating of Hamas headquarters in Turkey, which is one of the sponsors of the ceasefire agreement, and the ties between the movement and the IHH, may also provide Hamas with a direct channel for transferring funds and equipment to restore the military wing, under the cover of humanitarian aid. In addition, the direct connection between the IHH and the Turkish government, one of the signatories to the ceasefire agreement and an unreserved supporter of Hamas, gives the Turkish regime a foothold in the Gaza Strip and increases its regional influence on Israel's border. Read more...

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (March 25-30, 2026)

The Majles speaker praised the participation of components of the “Axis of Resistance,” led by Hezbollah, in the campaign between Iran, the United States, and Israel; The Houthis joined the campaign alongside Iran, claiming responsibility for two attacks against targets in southern Israel using missiles and drones, for the first time since halting their activity following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip in October 2025. A ballistic missile, a cruise missile, and a drone were reportedly launched. The IDF Spokesperson announced the interception of two drones; Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq continued attacks using missiles, rockets, and drones against American bases and facilities in Iraq, the Gulf states, and Jordan, at the same time with continued attacks attributed to the United States against Popular Mobilization bases in Iraq; The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman made clear that Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon would remain in Beirut and continue his duties, despite the Lebanese Foreign Ministry's deadline for his departure; The Iranian foreign minister spoke with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and discussed developments in the war in Iran and Lebanon; Amid activity by Iraqi militias alongside Iran, the Iranian president spoke with his Iraqi counterpart and condemned US and Israeli attacks on Iraqi targets. Read more...

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (March 18-25, 2026)

The Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared Iran’s ambassador in Beirut persona non grata and demanded that he leave Lebanon, while clarifying that this does not constitute a severance of relations between the two countries. Hezbollah condemned the decision, calling it a “sin” contrary to Lebanon’s interests; It was reported that approximately one hundred IRGC officers arrived in Lebanon following the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah, with the aim of restoring Hezbollah’s capabilities. They reportedly assumed direct command of the organization’s military wing in order to prepare it for the current campaign against Israel; Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani, who had not been seen since the beginning of the campaign in Iran, stressed in his first statement the importance of the “Resistance Front” in the campaign against the United States and Israel and warned of additional surprises from Iran’s regional proxies; Senior Houthi officials continued to express support for Iran and emphasized their readiness to join the campaign, though without committing to timing; Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq continued attacks using missiles, rockets, and drones against US bases and facilities in Iraq, Jordan, and Gulf states, concurrently with continued attacks attributed to the United States against bases of the Popular Mobilization Forces and the targeting of militia leaders. Read more...