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Spotlight on Global Jihad (June 8-14, 2017)

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Spotlight on Global Jihad

Spotlight on Global Jihad

SDF fighter at an ISIS car bomb workshop which has been located in searches at Al-Mashlab neighborhood (YouTube, June 13, 2017).

SDF fighter at an ISIS car bomb workshop which has been located in searches at Al-Mashlab neighborhood (YouTube, June 13, 2017).

Detonation of an ISIS car bomb in the Al-Mashlab neighborhood (Haqq, June 8, 2017).

Detonation of an ISIS car bomb in the Al-Mashlab neighborhood (Haqq, June 8, 2017).

Turki al-Binali delivering one of his sermons in Sirte (Haqq, June 9, 2017)

Turki al-Binali delivering one of his sermons in Sirte (Haqq, June 9, 2017)

A Syrian Army commander reports on the achievements of the Syrian Army on the Syrian-Iraqi border (Syrian TV YouTube account SyrianTVChannels7, June 12, 2017)

A Syrian Army commander reports on the achievements of the Syrian Army on the Syrian-Iraqi border (Syrian TV YouTube account SyrianTVChannels7, June 12, 2017)

Iraqi police force in the Zanjili neighborhood taken over from ISIS (Al-Sumaria, June 10, 2017)

Iraqi police force in the Zanjili neighborhood taken over from ISIS (Al-Sumaria, June 10, 2017)

The scene of the attack in the town of Musayyib (Sawt Al-Iraq, June 10, 2017)

The scene of the attack in the town of Musayyib (Sawt Al-Iraq, June 10, 2017)

The scene of the attack on the Kirkuk-Baghdad road (Al-Sumaria, June 10, 2017)

The scene of the attack on the Kirkuk-Baghdad road (Al-Sumaria, June 10, 2017)

The five squad members of ISIS who carried out the combined attack in the Majles building and at the Khomeini Mausoleum (Haqq, June 9, 2017)

The five squad members of ISIS who carried out the combined attack in the Majles building and at the Khomeini Mausoleum (Haqq, June 9, 2017)

Weapons, explosives and an ISIS flag found in the possession of four ISIS operatives in Hormozgan Province (Tasnim, June 12, 2017)

Weapons, explosives and an ISIS flag found in the possession of four ISIS operatives in Hormozgan Province (Tasnim, June 12, 2017)


Main events of the week

  • The main event of the week was a combined attack carried out by ISIS in Tehran against the Majles Building (the Iranian Parliament) and the Khomeini Mausoleum compound. Seventeen people were killed and 52 wounded in the attack, most of them apparently in the Parliament building. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, and its media threatened to carry out additional attacks against Iran and the Shiites.
  • The combined ISIS terrorist attack in Tehran is the first of its kind. It may indicate that ISIS has developed operational capabilities that allow it to operate in the heart of Iran against symbolic targets of the Iranian regime. The attack in Tehran is a blow to the prestige of the Iranian regime which, for the first time, was also exposed to ISIS showcase attacks. ISIS’s media outlets are threateningto continue attacks against Iran and the Shiites. On the other hand, it is expected that the Iranian security forces will intensify their preventive activities (which have already begun) to expose ISIS-affiliated networks operating in Iran.
  • ISIS is under severe pressure on the ground. In Al-Raqqah, the SDF forces are advancing in several neighborhoods in the west, east and north of the city. According to reports, they have reached the walls of the Old City (the SDF has still left escape routes for ISIS in the south of the city). In Mosul, the Iraqi forces have completed their takeover of another neighborhood, and now ISIS holds two neighborhoods in the Old City, where the “last battle” for the takeover of Mosul is expected to take place.
  • Along the Syria-Iraq border, the competition for control is increasing between the US and the rebel organizations that it supports on the one hand, and the Syrian regime and its allies on the other. On June 9, 2017,it was reported that the Syrian forces had reached the Syrian-Iraqi border about 20 km north of the Al-TanfCrossing and set up an informal border crossing. According to Syrian television, the crossing has already begun to function. On the other hand, the Americans have transferred a portable missile system (HIMARS) from Jordan to Al-Tanf, in light of the increasing threat from the Syrian forces.

 

Russian involvement in Syria

Russia
  • Sergei Rudskoy, a senior officer in the Russian General Staff, and Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Russian forces in Syria, held a press conference on the situation in Syria. The commander of the Russian forces in Syria reported that during the past month, the Russian Air Force carried out 1,268 sorties in Syria, destroyed 3,200 terrorist installations and mopped up an area of about 3,922 square kilometers from the presence of terrorists. According to him, the terrorist targets that were destroyed included: an ISIS headquarters, weapons depots, training camps, and a transit base.
  • During the press conference, the two criticized the activity of the international coalition countries in the Al-Tanf area (the tri-border area of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq). They noted that the United States’ fear of the Syrian forces reaching the border was unjustified because Russia is supporting the advance of the regime’s forces along the Syrian-Iraqi border, as well as between Syria and Jordan. They also said that the coalition countries had allowed ISIS to move from Al-Raqqah to Palmyra and Deirez-Zor (TASS News Agency, June 9, 2017).
  • In a speech given by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a conference of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,[1] he said that Russia has information that ISIS is working to destabilize southern Russia and Central Asia. He called on countries participating in the conference to increase their intelligence cooperation (TASS News Agency, June 9, 2017). Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygusaid at the conference that Russia’s fighting in Syria against Islamic groups had halted their spread to the member states of the organization (Russia, Central Asia, and China). He also stressed his concern over the expansion of ISIS’s activity in Afghanistan. He called on the organization’s members to create effective tools for cooperation against Islamic terrorism (Sputnik, June 9, 2017).
  • In a UN Security Council briefing on terrorist attacks, Evgeniy Zagaynov, the Russian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said that since 2015, ISIS’s revenues from crude oil trading had significantly dropped, as a result of the involvement of the Russian Air Force in Syria.According to him, ISIS’s oil revenues have dropped from $25 million a month to $12 million. According to Zagaynov, since Russia began to operate against ISIS in Syria, about 4,000 gas tankers, 176 oil refineries, 112 pumping stations and about 206 gas and oil production facilities have been destroyed (TASS News Agency, June 9, 2017).

Main developments in Syria

The campaign to take over Al-Raqqah
  • Fighting inside the city of Al-Raqqah, which started on June 6, 2017, continues. SDF forces, supported by the US-led International Coalition, are attacking the city simultaneously from several directions. Several neighborhoods in west, north and east Al-Raqqah were taken over by the SDF fighters, who continue their advance toward the center of the city. In south Al-Raqqah, ISIS operatives still have the option to flee the city. According to TalalSelo, the SDF spokesman, after the forces drive away ISIS from Al-Raqqah, they intend to deliver the city to the management of a civilian and military tribunal, which will be composed of local residents (Lebanon 24, June 8, 2017).

 

  • During the week, the SDF forces had additional achievements:
  • In east Al-Raqqah, the forces took over the Al-Mashlab neighborhood and several sites in the Al-Jazra neighborhood (Al-Sham Network, June 8, 2017). The forces continue their advance towards the Al-Sina’ah neighborhood (Qasiyoun, June 9-10, 2017) and the center and reached the Old City wall, west of the Al-Sina’ah neighborhood (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; Reuters, June 12, 2017). After taking over the Al-Jazra neighborhood, the SDF forces exposed a tunnel network which was used by ISIS to escape Coalition airstrikes and transfer weapons and ammunition to the city neighborhoods (EnabBaladi, June 12, 2017). In the Al-Mashlab neighborhood, SDF fighters uncovered a car bomb workshop.
  • In northwest Al-Raqqah, the Al-Sha’abiyya quarter was taken over. On June 11, 2017, it was reported that after two days of fighting, the SDF forces took over the Al-Roumaniyya neighborhood (Al-Sham Network, June 11, 2017). On the outskirts of the west Al-Raqqahneighborhood of Hittin, clashes take place between the parties (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 14, 2017).
  • In north Al-Raqqah, on June 12, 2017, the SDF forces took over parts of the former base of the Syrian Army’s Division 17 and the compound of the sugar factory (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; Reuters, June 12, 2017). According to Mus’ab al-Hussein, SDF forces fighter, the sugar factory is of “strategic importance” since it allows shooting at Al-Raqqah’s northern neighborhoods (YouTube, June 12, 2017).
  • Similarly to the campaign for Mosul, ISIS operatives also made extensive use of suicide bombers who blew themselves up with car bombs and explosive belts to try and curb the advance of the SDF forces in Al-Raqqah. According to ISIS reports, on June 7, 2017, an ISIS operative detonated a car bomb near a building where the SDF forces were staying, in the Al-Mashlab neighborhood. On June 11, 2017, ISIS operatives detonated a car bomb near a gathering of SDF forces in the Al-Roumaniyya neighborhood (Al-Sham Network, June 11, 2017).
Open corridor for ISIS operatives to retreat from Al-Raqqah southwards
  • This week as well, there were reports of ISIS operatives leaving Al-Raqqah to the south. A delegation of tribes affiliated with ISIS is reportedly negotiating with SDF representatives in an attempt to reach an agreement on the safe departure of ISIS operatives from the city towards Deirez-Zor, in return for surrendering the city to the SDF forces. Ibrahim al-Hassan, member of the civilian council of the Al-Raqqah Province, denied the above (Shafaq News, June 11, 2017).
The US supplies weapons to the SDF
  • According to a report on the Al-Jazeera Channel, after the announcement of the opening of the campaign to take over Al-Raqqah, convoys of US arms including advanced weapons arrived in the region. According to SDF Spokesman TalalSelo, the arms included light, medium and heavy weapons, as well as anti-tank weapons and armored vehicles. According to the SDF forces, not only does the US equip the forces, it also trains them and provides them with logistic support. Senior White House officials noted that the support of the SDF is limited to an ad hoc purpose, i.e., the takeover of Al-Raqqah (Al-Jazeera, June 10, 2017).
Palmyra
  • Fighting continues in the Palmyra region between the Syrian forces and ISIS operatives: This week, the battles focused on the Tell Sawane area and the area of the grain silos northeast of Palmyra (Al-Sham Network, June 10, 2017). According to reports, there were also battles between ISIS and the Syrian forces in the area of the Aarak gas field, about 24 km northeast of Palmyra. The purpose of the Syrian forces is reportedly to take over the town of Al-Sukhnah, on the road leading to Deirez-Zor(Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 11, 2017).
Deirez-Zor
  • This week, fighting continued between ISIS and the Syrian forces in the military airfield and the Panorama Square (about 6 km southeast of Deir ez-Zor). According to media affiliated with the Syrian regime, ISIS sustained dozens of killed and wounded (Syrian Army Spokesperson's Office, June 10, 2017).
  • ISIS announced that Turki al-Binali, a senior ISIS operative, was killed in a US airstrike in Deir ez-Zor. Al-Binali was among the leaders of ISIS’s Libyan branch and used to deliver sermons in the city of Sirte when ISIS controlled the city. He was considered a senior religious authority in ISIS and used to move between Libya and Syria (Haqq, June 9, 2017).
The Syrian-Iraqi border
  • On June 9, 2017, the Syrian Chief of Staff announced that the Syrian security forces and their allies had taken over the Al-Tanf Border Crossing between Syria and Iraq and several sites of strategic importance in the heart of the Syrian Desert. The announcement also stated that the forces had taken over a total area of 20,000 square kilometers east and south of the city of Palmyra, and killed hundreds of ISIS operatives. The Syrian Chief of Staff described these achievements as a “strategic turning point in fighting against terrorism” (Syrian TV; Syrian TV YouTube channel SyrianTVChannels7, June 10, 2017). Rebel forces and Syrian opposition elements denied the above (Al-Jazeera, June 10, 2017; Al-Sham Network, June 9, 2017).
  • However, on June 13 and 14, 2017, it was reported that on June 9, 2017, the Syrian forces had reached the Syrian-Iraqi border, at a distance of 20 km northeast of the Al-Tanf Border Crossing (rather than the crossing itself, as claimed by the Syrian Chief of Staff). The Syrian regime claimed that its forces had opened an unofficial border crossing 20 km northeast of the Al-Tanf Crossing, which was already functional. Syrian TV broadcasted photos showing trucks carrying goods passing from Syria to Iraq and from Iraq to Syria (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, June 14, 2017).
  • Pentagon officials reported that the US Army had transferred a portable missile system (HIMARS) from Jordan to the Al-Tanf Crossing. A Pentagon officer said that the Americans had reinforced their presence and their foothold in Al-Tanf against any threat by the forces supporting the Assad regime (almasdarnews.com, June 14, 2017).
Southern Syria
  • The Shura Council of the ISIS-affiliated Khaled bin Al-Walid Army appointed Mohammad Rifat al-Rifai, aka Abu Hashem, as the new commander (emir) of the organization. The previous emir Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi was killed on June 6, 2017, in an airstrike in the town of Al-Shajara, in the Yarmouk Basin. Mohammad al-Rifai is from the town of Tell Shehab, west of Daraa. He served as the military emir of the Shuhada Al-Yarmouk Brigade (EnabBaladi, June 9, 2017; Twitter, June 6, 2017).

Main developments in Iraq

The campaign for the takeover of Mosul
  • During the week, the Iraqi forces continued their campaign to complete the takeover of ISIS’s enclave in west Mosul. A senior Iraqi police official reported that the Iraqi forces had taken full control of the Zanjili neighborhood, one of the last neighborhoods near the Old City. ISIS’s operatives are now concentrated in two neighborhoods of the Old City. ISIS operatives are reportedly barricaded around Al-Nuri Mosque, where the Islamic Caliphate was declared (Al-Mayadeen, June 11, 2017). During the liberation of the Zanjili neighborhood, the Iraqi security forces exposed a large factory equipped with state-of-the-art machinery for manufacturing rockets, mortar shells, and rocket launchers (Al-Sumaria, June 10, 2017).

 

  • The deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization Units, the pro-Iranian militias supporting the Iraqi government in the fight against ISIS, announced that his forces had finished the missions they were assigned west of Mosul. According to him, so far, the forces have killed about 2,000 ISIS operatives, and they are now waiting for the instruction of the Supreme Commander of the Iraqi Armed Forces (the Iraqi Prime Minister) to start the operation to liberate Tal Afar District (Al-Sumaria, June 9, 2017). Tal Afar District is between Mosul and the Syrian-Iraqi border, and it still includes an ISIS enclave.
ISIS’s terror and guerrilla activities throughout Iraq
  • ISIS continued to carry out terrorist and guerrilla attacks throughout Iraq, mainly in areas with a Shiite population:
  • In the holy city of Karbala, which is sacred for the Shiites,[2]a suicide bomber blew himself up with an explosive vest among a crowd of Shiites. Thirty people were killed and 35 others were wounded (Haqq, June 9, 2017).
  • In the town of Musayyib in Babil Province, about 50 km south of Baghdad, a suicide bomber blew himself up with an explosive vest. A total of 37 people were killed and forty others were wounded (Haqq, June 9, 2017). According to Iraqi sources, twenty people were killed in the attack and 21 others were wounded (Al-Sumaria, June 9, 2017).
  • Kirkuk: A car bomb driven by a suicide bomber exploded about 20 km south of Kirkuk, on the Kirkuk-Baghdad road, near a checkpoint of the Iraqi security forces. The checkpoint personnel sustained two fatalities and three wounded (Al-Sumaria, June 10, 2017). Apparently, ISIS was behind the attack.

Global jihad activity in other countries

ISIS’s combined terrorist attack in Tehran
Overview
  • On the morning of June 7, 2017, five ISIS terrorists carried out a combined terrorist attack in Tehran:
  • In the Majles(Iranian Parliament), a shooting attack was carried out, apparently by three terrorists.
  • In the Mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Iranian Revolution, which is a tourist site, two terrorists carried out a shooting attack. They were supposed to blow themselves up with explosive belts.

 

  • The Iranian Interior Ministry announced that 17 people had been killed and 52 wounded in the terrorist attack in Tehran. Apparently, most of the victims were in the Majles building. Several dozen people were detained on suspicion of helping to carry out the attacks. Revolutionary Guard forces were deployed around regime institutions, and the Intelligence Ministry declared the highest alert (Tasnim, June 7, 2017).
  • The five terrorists who carried out the attacks were killed. The codenames of the five, which appeared on ISIS’s weekly Al-Naba, indicate that they were of Iranian descent (Al-Naba, June 8, 2017). According to several reports, the attacks were carried out by Iranians of Kurdish descent (Al-Hayat, June 12, 2017). ISIS’s news agency posted a video where the five terrorists are seen before leaving for the attack. According to the Iranian intelligence minister, the place where the video was filmed has been located (Fars, June 9, 2017).
  • According to the Iranian Intelligence Ministry, the interrogation of the incident revealed that the perpetrators of the attacks had joined ISIS in 2016 and taken part in the fighting in Mosul and Al-Raqqah. They arrived in Iran about a year ago, along with their commander, codenamed Abu Aisha, seeking to examine the possibility of carrying out terrorist attacks in the Iran’s holy cities. The group was exposed by the Iranian authorities, and their senior figures, including Abu Aisha, were killed. The rest fled Iran (Tasnim, June 8, 2017; Al-Hayat, June 12, 2017).
Another incident in southern Iran
  • The Iranian police announced on June 12, 2017, that it had killed four armed ISIS operatives and detained five others in Hormozgan Province, southern Iran, as part of a series of detentions carried out by the Iranian security forces against ISIS networks in the region. Two of the operatives killed are foreign nationals. The Iranian authorities released photos of weapons and explosives found in the possession of the four operatives and an ISIS flag that they had carried (PUKmedia, June 12, 2017; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, June 13, 2017).
Iranian reactions
  • The Iranian regime was quick to blame Saudi Arabia of direct responsibility for the terrorist attacks. The United States and the “Zionist regime” were also blamed for the attack. The various statements stressed the high capability of the Iranian security services to foil terrorist attacks and the terrorists’ difficulty operating in Iran. The objective of statements was to belittle the significance of the attacks in the Majles and Khomeini Mausoleum.

 

  • Following are several statements by senior Iranian officials in the wake of the terrorist attacks:
  • Iranian Intelligence Minister Mohammad Alaviannounced that Iran had detained the elements that were behind the attacks. According to him, during the past two years, the Iranian intelligence has foiled over a hundred attempts to carry out terrorist attacks in Iran. Furthermore, he noted that it was not yet possible to determine whether Saudi Arabia was involved in the incidents. However, the impact of the Saudi support on terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria is clearly evident (ISNA, June 8, 2017).
  • HosseinNaqavi-Hosseini, the spokesman for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Majles, said that the terrorist attack was a result of the US-Zionist regime-Saudi Arabia triangle. He stressed that the terrorist operatives had not succeeded in operating in Iran, although they had tried to do so time and again. According to him, the Iranian security forces managed to prevent the terrorist operatives from carrying out their plan at Khomeini’s Mausoleum. However, he admitted that they had been less successful in the Majles (Mehr, June 10, 2017).
  • Revolutionary Guard Commander Ali Jaafarideclared that Saudi Arabia, the US, and the Zionist regime had supported the terrorist operatives. According to him, Iran had precise information that Saudi Arabia not only supported the terrorist operatives but even instructed them to carry out the attack in Iran (Fars, June 12, 2017).
ISIS’s claim of responsibility
  • ISIS was quick to claim responsibility for carrying out the attacks in Tehran. According to the announcement released by ISIS, after a long period in which many Shiites sustained losses in various countries around the world, ISIS decided to carry out an attack on Iranian soil. According to the announcement, those who carried out the attacks were armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades and wore explosive belts. ISIS took the unusual step of releasing a video filmed in the Iranian Majles building by one of the squad members while carrying out the attack (Twitter, June 7, 2017).
  • The recent issue of ISIS’s weekly Al-Naba featured an infographic entitled “The Invasion of Tehran.” According to the infographic, the first squad consisted of two suicide bombers who detonated their explosive vests among a crowd of Shiite visitors at the Khomeini Mausoleum compound, killing and wounding dozens of people. Another squad, consisting of three terrorists wearing explosive belts,broke into the Iranian Majles. They took control of it and killed whoever they encountered (Al-Sawarim, June 7, 2017).
ISIS calls for the continuation of the terrorist attacks against Iran and the Shiites
  • nIn the recent issue of ISIS’s Al-Naba weekly, an ISIS “security source” was quoted claiming that the terrorist attack in Iran was only the beginning of larger actions, which would turn Iran into a new site of terrorist attacks for ISIS operatives. According to that source, Tehran streets should become an open battle zone for soldiers of the Islamic State. He called on Muslims to attack the Iranian regime and its interests, and also Shiites in Iran and elsewhere (Al-Naba, June 8, 2017).

 

  • Following the attacks in Tehran, ISIS released a video in Farsi, accompanied by Arabic subtitles, showing five masked operatives, members of the squad that carried out the two attacks. The speaker calls on Sunni Muslims to initiate jihad and spill the blood [of the Shiites] as they spill the blood of [Sunni] Muslims everywhere. Subsequently, the speaker also threatens Saudi Arabia and notes that the Saudis should know that after Iran, their turn will also come and “Allah willing, we will hit you in your homes” (Haqq, June 9, 2017).
The Philippines
  • Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir, the commander of the Soldiers of the Caliphate in East Asia (ISIS’s Province of East Asia), granted an interview to ISIS’s Al-Naba weekly. He said that his people’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS was made immediately after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the Caliphate. However, the announcement of this event was delayed. He also said that the situation of ISIS operatives in the Philippines was getting better, they are increasing in number, as is the amount of weapons in their possession. He noted that during the recent two years, they waged fierce battles against the Philippine Army and caused them tremendous losses. He dismissed the promise made by Philippines President Duterte to eliminate them.

Counterterrorim and preventive activity

Lebanon
  • The Lebanese security forces announced that they had detained seven suspects, four of them Palestinians, who intended to carry out suicide bombing attacks against Lebanese targets. All the suspects are reportedly affiliated with ISIS. Among the targets mentioned: senior army and government figures, the international airport, Beirut’s Southern (Shiite) Suburb, and restaurants. Two additional operatives who belonged to the terrorist squad are currently outside Lebanon (Al-Akhbar; MTV, June 10, 2017).

The battle for hearts and minds

Calling on ISIS operatives to sacrifice themselves in Syria and Iraq and to increase attacks worldwide
  • Recently, ISIS published an English-language message addressed at Muslim residents of Russia and Western countries (the USA, Russia, France, Britain, Canada, Belgium, Australia, and Italy). The message calls on them to stay away from places frequented by Christians (such as shops, gardens, and streets) because they constitute legitimate targets for attacks by ISIS in various forms, such as detonating IEDs, vehicular attacks, and slitting throats. The message tells the Christians that ISIS has prepared thousands of “individual lions” (i.e., lone wolf terrorists) for them, who are prepared to act for the sake of Allah. The message ends with a call on “the soldiers of the Islamic State” to increase their activity in the countries of the “infidels” (Haqq, June 9, 2017).
  • On June 12, 2017, ISIS’s Al-Furqan Media Foundation released a new audiotape by ISIS spokesman Abul-Hasan Al-Muhajir. Two noteworthy topics on the tape:
  • Strengthening the morale of ISIS operatives fighting in Mosul, Al-Raqqah, Tal Afar (west of Mosul) and other battle zones in Iraq and Syria. The spokesman noted that the Islamic State now faces a “divine ordeal” against the “infidel nations” that are fighting it. He compared the steadfastness of ISIS operatives to that of Mohammad and his supporters in the early days of Islam, when they faced trials and tribulations that only strengthened their faith and led to their ultimate victory. The spokesman called on ISIS operatives to intensify their activities during the month of Ramadan, to strike at their enemies with all their might, to adhere to their faith in Allah, and to sacrifice themselves in the fighting.
  • Calling on ISIS operatives to continue jihad and to take action against their opponents.In the various fighting zones around the world: The spokesman called on ISIS operatives in Sinai, Egypt, Khorasan (Afghanistan and Pakistan), West Africa, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and elsewhere around the world to continue the jihad. He praised ISIS operatives in the Philippines (East Asia) for their activities in Marawi. The spokesman also praised ISIS operatives in Iran, noting that “the home of the Iranians is weaker than a spider web.” He called on Muslims in Western countries to take action against their enemies by reminding them that paradise is achieved through jihad (Haqq, June 12, 2017).

[1]The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an international organization established in 2001 to build confidence and enhance political, economic and security cooperation between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
[2]Karbala is the most sacred city for the Shiites, after Najaf. The Shiites believe that Imam Ali is buried there. The Battle of Karbala took place in 680 C.E. between Ali’s followers and the army of the Omayyad Caliph Yazid. The descendants of Imam Ali were killed in the battle, mainly the imams Hossein bin Ali and Abbas bin Ali, who are buried in Karbala.

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Hamed Bafandeh and Ahmad Gholami, who were killed fighting in Syria (defapress.ir, April 24, 2017).

Hamed Bafandeh and Ahmad Gholami, who were killed fighting in Syria (defapress.ir, April 24, 2017).

Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the IRGC's ground forces (Fars, May 2, 2017).

Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the IRGC's ground forces (Fars, May 2, 2017).

Javad Tork Abadi (second from left) presents his credentials to the Syrian foreign minister (Mehr, April 26, 2017).

Javad Tork Abadi (second from left) presents his credentials to the Syrian foreign minister (Mehr, April 26, 2017).

The Syrian chief of staff (left) meets with the Iran defense minister (IRNA, May 1, 2017).

The Syrian chief of staff (left) meets with the Iran defense minister (IRNA, May 1, 2017).

The defense ministers of Russia, Iran and Syria meet in Moscow (Tasnim, April 27, 2017).

The defense ministers of Russia, Iran and Syria meet in Moscow (Tasnim, April 27, 2017).

Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran (Tasnim, May 1, 2017).

Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran (Tasnim, May 1, 2017).

Iranian ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi (second from left) meets with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi (right) (ABNA, April 24, 2017).

Iranian ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi (second from left) meets with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi (right) (ABNA, April 24, 2017).


Overview
  • Two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed in the region of Hama, Syria.
  • The commander of the IRGC's ground forces said his fighters would continue to serve as advisors in Syria alongside the Qods Force. He said Iranian support for Syria, which included advice on fighting techniques and tactics, demanded its advisors' presence in the field.
  • Javad Tork Abadi has assumed his position as the new Iranian ambassador to Damascus. He replaced Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani, whose term as ambassador ended in October 2016.
  • At the beginning of May, Ali Ayoub, the chief of staff of the Syrian army, paid a visit to Tehran and met with Mohammad Bagheri, his Iranian counterpart, and Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian defense minister. They discussed recent developments in Syria and ways to strengthen Iranian-Syrian military ties.
  • Iran denounced the April 27, 2017 attack on Hezbollah arms storehouses near the Damascus airfield, attributed to Israel. The Iranian foreign ministry spokesman claimed the objective of the Israeli attacks was to weaken the Syrian government.
  • Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran, caused an uproar in Iran by publicly criticizing Iranian's military involvement in Syria. The attorney general of Isfahan said the judiciary planned to bring him to trial.
  • Iraj Masjedi, the new Iranian ambassador to Iraq and former senior advisor to the commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, assumed his position at the end of April. He met with senior Iraqi officials and held a reception at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad for representatives of the Iraqi public.
  • Iran denounced Turkey's aerial attacks on targets in northern Iraq affiliated with the Turkish underground on April 26, 2017.
  • Iran and the Palestinian Authority (PA) fiercely criticized one another after an advisor to the Iranian foreign minister accused the PA chairman of committing "crimes" in the service of the United States and Israel by cutting both the salaries of public servants in the Gaza Strip and fuel subsidies to the Strip's power plant.
  • The Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat reported that Iran increased its funding for Hamas' military-terrorist wing following Yahya al-Sinwar's election as the new leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 

 

Iranian Intervention in Syria
  • Two IRGC fighters were killed in the region of Hama, Syria.
  • On May 2, 2017, Mohammad Pakpour, commander of the IRGC's ground forces, told the Fars news agency that his fighters would remain as advisors in Syria, alongside the IRGC's Qods Force. He said the advisors were experienced fighters whose support included advice on fighting techniques and tactics, and that demanded their presence in the field. He said advisors from the Saberin special forces brigade were also operating in Syria. According to Pakpour, deploying advisors was sufficient and there was no need for regular army forces because the number of terrorists operating in Syria was not exceptionally large and the Syrian forces could deal with them by themselves.
  • Pakpour said Syria was particularly important because it was at the forefront of the resistance to Israel. If Hezbollah, which should be in readiness to fight Israel, were not today fighting the terrorists in Syria, Syria would fall to the supporters of the Zionists, and that would weaken the struggle against Israel. He said that if all the groups fighting against the Syrian regime joined forces to fight against Israel, Israel's situation was not as good as it currently was.
  • Javad Tork Abadi, Iran's new ambassador to Damascus, assumed his position at the end of April. On April 26, 2017, he presented his credentials to Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian foreign minister, and on May 2 to President Assad. Javad Tork Abadi, who was formerly Iranian ambassador to Sudan, Bahrain and Nigeria, as well as Iranian chargé d'affaires in Kuwait, replaced Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani, who ended his term as ambassador in October 2016 (Mehr, April 26, 2017). In recent months the delay in appointing a new ambassador to Damascus led to strong criticism in Iranian political circles, especially in view of the ongoing civil war in Syria. In December 2016 several members of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) appealed to Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, with an urgent demand that he appoint a new ambassador to Damascus immediately.
  • On May 1, 2017, Ali Ayoub, the Syrian chief of staff, paid a visit to Tehran and met with Mohammad Bagheri, the Iranian chief of staff, and with Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian defense minister. They discussed recent developments in Syria and strengthening Damascus-Tehran military ties. The Iranian chief of staff praised the resistance of the Syrian army and people to the "takfiri terrorists" operating in the country, and condemned the aerial attacks recently carried out in Syria by the United States and Israel. Ali Ayoub thanked Iran for its military support and said it played a definitive role in Syria's continuing resistance and victories over the terrorists (IRNA, May 1, 2017).
  • On April 27, 2017, the defense ministers of Iran, Russia and Syria met on the sidelines of the Sixth Moscow Conference on International Security and discussed recent developments in Syria. Sergey Shoygu, the Russian minister; Hossein Dehqan, the Iranian minister, and Fahd Jassem al-Freij, the Syrian minister, noted that their countries would continue their joint efforts in the ongoing military campaign in Syria. They criticized the April 6, 2017 American attack on the Syrian air force base in Homs (western Syria). At a previous meeting of the Iranian and Russian defense ministers, Shoygu said Russia was pleased with Iranian-Russian cooperation in the "struggle against terrorism" in Syria (Tasnim, April 27, 2017).
  • On May 3, 2017, peace talks recommenced in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, attended by representatives of Russia, Iran and Turkey. The Iranian delegation was headed by Hossein Jaberi Ansari, deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs. As part of ongoing Iranian-Russian consultations about Syria, on May 3, 2017, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, spoke on the phone with Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia's Security Council. They discussed recent Syrian political and security developments, and their countries' cooperation in Syria (Asr-e Iran, May 3, 2017).
  • Iran strongly condemned the April 27, 2017 attack on Hezbollah arms storehouses near the Damascus airfield, allegedly carried out by Israel. Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, claimed Israel's ongoing aggression was a violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of international law. He said the objective of Israel's attacks was to weaken the Syrian government and called on the UN to keep Israel from attacking again (ISNA, April 28, 2017).
  • Writing to Hassan Qazizadeh Hashemi, Iran's minister of health, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Qods Force, thanked him for his ministry's support of the IRGC fighters in Syria. That included, he wrote, guidance, supplying medicine and medical equipment, and medical treatment for the wounded. In reply Hashemi wrote to Soleimani, thanking him for the activity of the IRGC in Syria against the "takfiri groups." He said the Iranian people would never forget the IRGC fighters who had sacrificed their lives in Syria, fighting for the sake of Iran's security (Fars, April 28, 2017).
  • Gholam Hossein Karbaschi, former mayor of Tehran and affiliated with Iran's reformist camp, was strongly criticized by conservatives in Iran when he publicly spoke against Iran's military involvement in Syria. At the end of April a video of a speech made by Karbaschi at a conference of President Rouhani's supporters in Isfahan circulated on social media. Karbaschi said that restoring peace in Syria did not require military involvement and that the crisis could be resolved through diplomacy. He said no one contested the need to bring peace to Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and to support the Shi'ites in those countries, but there were other ways to do it besides sending money, selling arms and killing (Tasnim, May 1, 2017). Supporters of the Iranian regime were enraged by his speech, accusing him of being an enemy of Iran. The attorney general of Isfahan said his judiciary was planning to bring Karbaschi to trial because of the speech.
  • It is not the first time Iran's support for the Assad regime has been the subject of public criticism. In recent years criticism of Iran's continuing support of the Assad regime has increased among political circles affiliated with the reformist movement in Iran. It has had, however, no practical influence on Iran's policies in Syria.
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • On April 24, 2017, Iraj Masjedi, Iran's new ambassador to Iraq, met with Iraqi President Fouad Masoum to discuss bilateral relations and cooperation. Masjedi stressed Iran's support for Iraq in its fight against ISIS (ISNA, April 24, 2017). The following day Masjedi met with Iraq Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for the first time. They discussed Iran-Iraq relations, regional developments and Iran's support for Iraq in its fight against ISIS (Fars, April 25, 2017). On April 28 Masjedi held a reception at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad, attended by members of the Iraqi parliament and local councils, representatives of the various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, newspaper correspondents, academics, community activists, religious figures and commanders of the Iraqi militias (Tasnim, April 28, 2017).
  • Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, condemned the aerial strikes carried out by Turkey on April 26, 2017, on targets affiliated with the Kurdish underground (PKK) in northern Iraq. He said the attacks in the region of Sinjar in northwestern Iraq were a violation of Iraq's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and increased regional destabilization (Fars, April 26, 2017).
Iranian Intervention in the Palestinian Arena
  • Hossein Sheikholeslam, advisor to the Iranian foreign minister for international affairs, strongly attacked the Palestinian Authority (PA), saying that its chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, had committed crimes in the Gaza Strip in the service of the United States and Israel. His statement came in the wake of the PA's decision to cut both the salaries of workers in the public sector in the Gaza Strip and fuel subsidies for the Strip's power plant. Interviewed by Hamas' al-Risalah, he said the PA was waging an unjust war on the Gaza Strip, and called on the PA chairman to change his current policy which, said Hossein Sheikholeslam, served Israel and worked against the interests of the Palestinians.
  • Nabil Abu Rudeina, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, angrily replied to Iran, saying that those who had signed the nuclear agreement [with the West] and been a partner in the creation and continuation of two Palestines, one in the Gaza Strip and the other in the West Bank, had no right to talk about Palestine, interfere in its internal affairs or insult the PA chairman. Nabil Abu Rudeina criticized Iran's regional policies, saying Iran helped wage internal wars throughout the Arab world. He said Hossein Sheikholeslam's remarks served only the interests of Israel and the enemies of the Arab nation (Asr-e Iran, May 1, 2017).
  • On May 2, 2017, the daily newspaper al-Hayat reported that Iran had increased its support for Hamas' military wing and that there had been a significant improvement in Iranian-Hamas relations. Palestinian sources told the paper that Yahya al-Sinwar, the new leader of Hamas' political bureau in the Gaza Strip, had played a major role in the improvement. Iran-Hamas relations had reached an impasse over the civil war in Syria and Hamas' decision not to side with the Assad regime. Iranian support for Hamas' military-terrorist wing has continued, however, even in recent years.

* Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

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Spotlight on Iran

March 12 – 26, 2017 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Hojjat-ul-Islam Ali Saidi, representative of the supreme leader to the IRGC (Sepah News, March 15, 2017).

Hojjat-ul-Islam Ali Saidi, representative of the supreme leader to the IRGC (Sepah News, March 15, 2017).

Rasoul Sanaeirad (Tasnim, March 12, 2017).

Rasoul Sanaeirad (Tasnim, March 12, 2017).

Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Members of the Tasnim News delegation to Lebanon visit the graves of Imad and Jihad Mughnieh (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Members of the Tasnim News delegation to Lebanon visit the graves of Imad and Jihad Mughnieh (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Mojtaba Sardad IRGC fighter killed at Tel Afar (Twitter, March 19).

Mojtaba Sardad IRGC fighter killed at Tel Afar (Twitter, March 19).


Main Points
  • The political deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) rejected reports published following Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's visit to Moscow that Iran was planning to construct a naval base in Latakia, Syria. The deputy commander claimed that the reports were intended to incite the countries of the region against Iran and justify the deployment of American forces in Syria.
  • Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence, said Iran had sent equipment to Syria to collect information about terrorists operating in the country.
  • Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, warned the United States and Saudi Arabia against deploying military forces to Syria.
  • Iran strongly condemned the Israeli attack in Syria on the night of March 17, 2017, and called on the UN to prevent further attacks.
  • A delegation of the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency visited Lebanon and Syria, and met with senior Hezbollah officials, including Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general.
  • An IRGC fighter was killed near Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Iraq.

 

General Information

1.   Hojjat-ul-Islam Ali Saidi, representative of the supreme leader to the IRGC, said the Islamic Revolution in Iran was a prelude to the internationalizing of Islam. He said the revolution faced both internal and external threats, especially from the "arrogance front" led by the United States and secular liberals within Iran. Speaking at a conference in Tehran, he said the might of the Islamic Revolution had so far succeeded in thwarting American plots and plans. He added that the United States itself considered Iran as one of the most influential powers in the world and that its influence could be seen in the regional balance of power. The American strategy of providing the Zionists with security had not only failed, but the "Zionist occupiers," who in the past pursued a strategy of "from the Nile to the Euphrates," were not secure even within the borders of the "occupied territories" (Sepah News, March 15, 2017).

2.   Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, strongly rejected American claims that Iran supported terrorism. He claimed the American accusations of Iranian involvement in terrorism were fabricated, baseless and entirely political. He made the statement in response to the decision of the American State Department to designate the Bahraini al-Ashtar Brigades, which are supported by Iran, as a terrorist organization and impose sanctions on the organization's activists (Tasnim, March 18, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon

3.   Rasoul Sanaei-Rad, IRGC commander's political deputy, rejected reports published in the media following Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's visit to Moscow, according to which Iran was planning to construct a naval base in Latakia, Syria. He claimed the reports were baseless and that their objectives were to accuse Iran of establishing a permanent presence in an Islamic state, incite the countries of the region against Iran and justify the deployment of American forces in Syria. Rasoul Sanaeirad said Iran had no interest in constructing a naval base in Latakia, where the Russians have a military base, and that Iran's presence in Syria was based exclusively on advisors, who were there at the official request of the Syrian government (Tasnim, March 12, 2017).

4.   Mahmoud Alavi, Iranian minister of intelligence, said Iran has sent equipment to Syria to collect information about terrorists operating in the country. At a conference in Isfahan he said a technical crew from the ministry of intelligence had installed powerful surveillance devices in Syria to monitor activity at terrorist bases (Fars, March 14, 2017).

5.   Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, warned the United States and Saudi Arabia not to deploy military forces to Syria. He said the presence of foreign forces in Syria without its government's authorization was "occupation" and support for terrorist elements in the country. He accused the American administration and the Saudi Arabian regime of ongoing support for the terrorists operating in Syria (IRNA, March 17, 2017). His remarks were in response to statements made by Mohammad bin Salman al-Saud, minister of defense and deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia, who, after having met with James Mattis, the American secretary of defense, said Riyadh might consider deploying forces to fight in Syria.

6.   Iran strongly condemned the Israeli attack in Syria on the night of March 17, 2017. Bahram Qasemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, called on the UN to condemn the attack and act to prevent the "Zionist regime" from further attacks, which undermined peace and security. He said the Israel attack proved that Israel was interested in strengthening the "Zionist-infidel terrorists" (Fars, march 18, 2017).

7.   A delegation of the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency visited Lebanon and Syria, and met with senior Hezbollah officials, including Hassan Nasrallah, the organization's secretary general. Meeting with Nasrallah, Majid Qolizadeh, Tasnim News managing director, said his agency had invested large sums of money in its foreign bureau to provide the best possible coverage of international news for its regional audience. The delegation also met with Sheikh Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, and with the head of Hezbollah's operational committee, Hashem Safi al-Din (Tasnim, March 14, 2017).

Iranian Intervention in Iraq

8.   Mojtaba Sardad, an IRGC fighter, was killed at Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Iraq.

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

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The head of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation admits that 2,100 fighters sent by Iran to Syria and Iraq have been killed so far

Published:
Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani, the prominent figure in the Iranian involvement in Syria, at the grave of an IRGC fighter killed in Syria (afsaran.ir, April 14, 2015)

Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani, the prominent figure in the Iranian involvement in Syria, at the grave of an IRGC fighter killed in Syria (afsaran.ir, April 14, 2015)

Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, the head of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Mehr, March 6, 2017).

Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi, the head of the Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Mehr, March 6, 2017).

Hossein Hamedani, killed in the Aleppo area in October 2015 (Tasnim News, October 9, 2016)

Hossein Hamedani, killed in the Aleppo area in October 2015 (Tasnim News, October 9, 2016)

Joint Syrian-Iranian operations room set up in Aleppo before the Syrian Army attack in October 2015, with the participation of Iranian fighters. The poster in the upper left-hand corner shows Khomeini, Khamenei and an unidentified person. The Iranian correspondent who reported about the activity of the operations room is seen on the right (Fars, October 22, 2015)

Joint Syrian-Iranian operations room set up in Aleppo before the Syrian Army attack in October 2015, with the participation of Iranian fighters. The poster in the upper left-hand corner shows Khomeini, Khamenei and an unidentified person. The Iranian correspondent who reported about the activity of the operations room is seen on the right (Fars, October 22, 2015)

Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani briefing fighters, apparently in the Latakia area in Syria (Facebook, October 13, 2015)

Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani briefing fighters, apparently in the Latakia area in Syria (Facebook, October 13, 2015)


http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20909Overview

1.   In a conference held on March 6, 2017, to commemorate the Martyr Day in Tehran, the head of the Martyrs Foundation Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi said that the number of fatalities among the fighters sent by Iran to Syria and Iraq had reached 2,100 (Mehr, March 6, 2017).[1] The number of fatalities announced by the Foundation director does not refer only to fighters of Iranian nationality, but to all fighters sent on behalf of Iran to Syria and Iraq. These fighters include Lebanese Hezbollah operatives as well as Shiites of Afghan, Pakistani and Iraqi descent, handled by the IRGC.[2]

2.   Ali Alfoneh, IRGC researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who monitors the involvement of Iran and its proxies in Syria and Iraq, has so far identified 2,603 fatalities (thus, there is a discrepancy of 503 dead between his findings and the figure cited by the head of the Martyrs Foundation). From Ali Alfoneh’s findings we learn that:

a.   In Syria, 473 Iranian fighters, 1,045 Hezbollah operatives, and 801 operatives of the Shiite militias operating in Syria (Pakistanis, Afghans, and Iraqis)were killed. Thus, the total of fatalities among the Iranian forces and Iran’s proxy organizations in Syria has reached 2,319.

b.   In Iraq, Alfoneh identified 38 Iranian fighters and 246 operatives of the Iraqi Shiite militias. Thus, the total of fatalities in Iraq has reached 248.

c.   The total of fatalities in Syria and Iraq is 2,603. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 503 dead between this figure and the figure cited by the head of the Martyrs Foundation, which, in the ITIC's assessment, stems from different database and methodologies for counting the dead (for instance, maybe the head of the Martyrs Foundation doesn’t count the Iranian fatalities in Iraq).

 

3.   Among the dead in Syria, particularly high is the percentage of Hezbollah operatives (about 40 percent of the total number of fatalities). In the ITIC's assessment, this stems from the fact that Hezbollah operatives are a quality, available force,which has been involved in the most important, deadly battles (such as the battle for Aleppo), and therefore sustained a large number of fatalities. The number of the Iranian fatalities, relative to the limited scope of the Iranian force in Syria, is also relatively high (with more than ten high-ranking officers of the rank equivalent to a brigadier general). The percentage of the Shiite militias in the total number of fatalities is small as they mainly serve as an auxiliary force rather than a quality military force sent to the front line in the important battle zones.

4.   What is the impact of the Iranian fatalities on the decision makers in Tehran?In the ITIC's assessment, decision makers in Iran are highly sensitive to fatalities. At least in the past, this sensitivity drew internal criticism and raised questions as to whether the campaign in Syria is worthwhile. The Iranian fatalities, which were high relatively to the scope of the force stationed in Syria, required the Iranian leadership to provide explanations as to the benefit and legitimacy of the Iranian involvement in Syria. These explanations included the use of Shiite religious symbols, glorification of the value of sacrifice and defending the Shiite holy sites, and emphasizing the importance of involvement in Syria for protecting Iran’s interests and national security. On the other hand, the level of sensitivity in Tehran to Hezbollah’s fatalities and all the more so to fatalities of the Shiite militias is much lower.


 

5.   The large numberof fatalities among the Iranian fighters and the concern that the fatalities would draw criticism of the involvement in Syria were apparently what led to a significant decrease of the Iranian order of battle in Syria. The order of battle decreased from about 1,500-2,000 at its peak to several hundred fighters and advisors at present. Today, the Iranians prefer to conduct their involvement in the fighting by proxy organizations, among which Hezbollah is the most prominent in its performance (see Appendix: Milestones of the Iranian involvement in the civil war in Syria). The modus operandi of a widespread use of proxies and limited direct Iranian involvement also characterizes the network of subversion and terror which Iran employs in the Middle East for promoting its interests and regional influence.[3]

Affiliation of the fatalities of Iran and its proxy organizations in Syria and Iraq

6.   As a rule, the Iranian media does not refrain from reporting on fatalities among the Iranian fighters and the forces operating on behalf of Iran in Syria and Iraq. These reports also include details of senior officers who died in the fighting. Yet, the Iranian media does not always provide full information regarding the identity, rank and organizational affiliation of the dead.

7.   Ali Alfoneh, an IRGC researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has been closely monitoring the IRGC fatalities in Syria and Iraq. His findings are based on official reports published in Iranian media regarding the dead as well as on media reports about funerals of fighters killed in Syria and Iraq. Until mid-February 2017, Alfoneh estimated that 473 Iranian fighters had been killed in Syria since the beginning of 2012, of which 466 belonged to the IRGC and seven to the Iranian regular army. In addition, since April 2014, a total of 38 IRGC fighters had been killed in Iraq. Thus, the total of Iranian fatalities in Syria and Iraq, according to Alfoneh, reaches 511.

 

8.   According to Alfoneh's findings, the number of fatalities among Iran’s proxy organizations in Syria and Iraq has reached 2,092 fighters. Following is their breakdown:

a.   1,045 Hezbollah operatives have been killed in Syria since October 2012.

b.   584 Afghan fighters, operating in Syria as part of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, have been killed in Syria since September 2013.

c.   136 Pakistani fighters, operating in Syria as part of the Zainabiyoun Brigade, have been killed in Syria since November 2014.

d.   81 Iraqi fighters, from among the Shiite pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, have been killed in Syria since October 2012

e.   246 Iraqi fighters, from among the Shiite pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, have been killed in Iraq since July 2014.

9.   Among the Iranian fighters killed since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, there are more than ten senior Iranian officers in a rank equivalent to brigadier general. Among the dead, there is a senior officer who was killed at the Syrian-Lebanese border (in an attack attributed to Israel), and another officer killed in the Golan Heights (also in an attack attributed to Israel). Several other officers were killed innorthern Syria (in the areas of Aleppo and Hama), where the Iranian and their proxies sustained the heaviest losses.

10.    Following are details on the senior Iranian officers killed:

a.   Hassan Shateri – killed in February 2013 at the Syrian-Lebanese border in an attack attributed to Israel.

b.   Abdollah Eskandari –former head of the Martyrs Foundation in Fars Province, killed in May 2014.

c.   Mohammad Ali Allahodadi – killedin an airstrike attributed to the Israeli Air Force in the Quneitra area, in January 2015.

d.   Hadi Kajbaf –killed in April 2015 in the Daraa area

e.   Hossein Hamedani –served as a senior military advisor in Syria, on behalf of the IRGC, and was killed in the Aleppo area in October 2015.

f.     Reza Khavari – killed in the Hama area in October 2015.

g.   Farshad Hassounizadeh – former commander of the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, killed in October 2015.

h.   Hamid Mokhtarband – former commander of the IRGC Brigade in Ahvaz, killed in October 2015.

i.     Sa’id Sayyah Taheri – killed in January 2016 in the Aleppo area.

j.     Hassan Ali Shamsabadi – killed in March 2016.

k.   Gholam-Reza Samaei– killed in October 2016.

l.     Gholam-Reza Qollizadeh– killed in January 2017.

Appendix
Milestones of the Iranian involvement in the civil war in Syria
1.   Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, the IRGC’s Qods Force under the command of Qassem Soleimani has led the Iranian involvement in Syria. In the first stage of the civil war, when the existence of the Assad regime was in jeopardy, the Iranian involvement was intended to prevent the fall of Damascus and strategic outposts in northern Syria in the hands of the rebels and the collapse of the Syrian regime. Subsequently, the involvement of Iran and its proxies was intended to assist the Syrian regime to expand its control territories, stabilize its rule in the areas taken over, defend Shiite population and Shiite holy sites, secure the Syrian-Lebanese border area, and prevent the “spillover” of the global jihad to Lebanon. In the long run, the Iranian involvement was intended to secure Iran’s hold on Syria and its influence on the Syrian regime, and allow the use of Syrian territory as a launching pad for Iranian presence and activity in the Middle East.

 

2.   The Iranian involvement in the various stages of the civil war in Syria has been expressed in several ways: At first, in the transfer of weapons, providing economic assistance and sending Iranian advisors, who operated in close coordination with the Syrian Army and the Syrian security forces. Then, the indirect Iranian involvement has turned into direct involvement through an Iranian force which was dispatched to Syria. Side by side with this force, Iran employed proxy organizations. Among these proxy organizations, the most professional has been the Lebanese Hezbollah, while organizations of lesser quality have been units of Shiite fighters of Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani descent.

3.   Until September 2015, the Iranian involvement in Syria had been conducted by several hundred Iranian advisors and several thousand Shiite fighters belonging to military frameworks handled by the Qods Force. The IRGC’s military presence on Syrian soil was intended in the first place mainly for advisory missions. At that stage, the Iranians refrained from employing organic army units against the rebel organizations, and usually were not directly involved in the fighting. However, the IRGC operatives were caught from time to time in the crossfire between the Syrian forces and the rebel organizations and thus died in the fighting.

4.   The cumulative achievements of ISIS, the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel organizations in northwestern Syria during 2014-2015 raised doubts among the Iranians as to President Bashar Assad’s ability to remain in power in the long run. This required Iran to substantially increase its support of the Assad regime and change its modus operandi in Syria. In view of the Syrian regime’s predicament, in mid-September 2015 Iran reinforced its troops in Syria, apparently adding 1,500-2,000 fighters, some of whom took an active part in the fighting. The Iranian reinforcement, which consisted of IRGC operatives and Shiite fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, was intended to assist the Syrian Army in the attack started in northern Syria in early October 2015. At the same time, the scope of Hezbollah’s force operating in Syria increased, as did its involvement in the various fighting zones.

5.   The fierce battles in northwestern Syria in late 2015 caused heavy losses to the Iranian fighters, who were at the front lines of the attack. During the first months of the attack, over a hundred Iranian fighters were killed, with a large number of officers, including senior officers. The majority of the dead belonged to the IRGC’s regular combatant units. Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani led the attack in northwestern Syria, coordinating the activity of the Syrian Army, the IRGC, and Hezbollah. Most of the military effort was based on fighters who belonged to the IRGC’s regular units (infantry, armor, and Special Forces). The relative size of these units (compared to the Qods Force, relatively limited in scope) allowed them to send larger numbers of fighters to the battlefield and address Iran’s constraint at that time in Syria.[4]

6.   In the spring of 2016, Iran sent to Syria forces of the Iranian regular army limited in scope (probably several hundred fighters), with the objective of reinforcing the IRGC forces. This was the first time since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) that fighters belonging to the Iranian regular army were sent to a military campaign outside the borders of Iran. Within a short while, the regular army troops also sustained losses.

7.   The heavy losses among the Iranian fighters required the Iranian leadership to reassess the deployment of Iranian troops in Syria. In late 2015, there were widespread Western media reports that Iran had started to withdraw its military troops from Syria due to its heavy losses. These reports were denied by senior Iranian officials, who stressed that Iran’s “military advisors” continued to operate along with the Syrian regime to assist it in its campaign against terrorism. The ITIC believes that even though Iran had not withdrawn its forces from Syria, it significantly decreased its order of battle in Syria, which is currently estimated at several hundred advisors and fighters.

8.   The military achievements of the Syrian forces with Russian support during the recent year, which culminated in the takeover of Aleppo once again from the rebel organizations in late 2016, allowed Iran to once again rely mainly on Hezbollah fighters and the Shiite foreign fighters operating along with the Syrian Army, and content itself with a limited cadre of advisors.The return to the previous modus operandi reduced Iranian fatalities. However, in the ITIC's assessment, it also compromised Iran’s ability to impact events on the ground and Iran’s political influence in Syria. Iran’s role as the main superpower on which the Syrian regime relies was now taken by Russia, while Iran had to content itself with a secondary role in the military and political moves that took place during recent months.

 

[1]The Iranian Martyrs Foundation was established in the early 1980s on the order of Revolution Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Its purpose is to assist families of the martyrs of the Islamic Revolution and the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War that broke out in September 1980. Today, the Foundation also supports the families of fighters who died in the course of the Iranian involvement in Syria and Iraq. The Foundation also has a Lebanese branch, which supports the families of Hezbollah martyrs, and a Palestinian branch, which also operates from Lebanon, supporting families of Palestinian martyrs.
[2]It is not the first time that Shahidi cites the number of fatalities among the troops sent by Iran (referred to by Iran as the “Defenders of the Holy Sites”). In November 2016, Shahidi said that the number of fatalities among the Iranian forces in Syria alone exceeded 1,000 (Tasnim News, November 22, 2016). In both cases, Shahidi did not specify the breakdown of the fatalities and did not refer to their national affiliation. In the ITIC's assessment, this may partially account for the discrepancy between the two figures. It seems that the current figure also includes operatives of the proxy organizations handled by Iran in Syria and Iraq.
[3]Iran employs proxy organizations in the various arenas in the Middle East: In Lebanon, it operates through Hezbollah; In Iraq, through Shiite pro-Iranian militias; In Yemen, through the Houthi rebels; In the Palestinian arena, the organization which is most clearly affiliated with Iran is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
[4]For further details, see the ITIC's Information Bulletin from November 16, 2015: “Profile of IRGC fighters Killed in Syria during the Past Month (Updated to November 16, 2015)”, www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20909.

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An analysis of threats against Israel made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah

Published:

Hassan Nasrallah in a speech on the annual memorial day for the three high-ranking Hezbollah shahids (“the shahid commanders”) Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Abbas Mussawi, and Imad Mughniyeh. The figures of the three shahids, whom Hezbollah has turned into symbols of sacrifice, appear on the left (Al-Manar, February 16, 2017)
Hassan Nasrallah in a speech on the annual memorial day for the three high-ranking Hezbollah shahids (“the shahid commanders”) Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Abbas Mussawi, and Imad Mughniyeh. The figures of the three shahids, whom Hezbollah has turned into symbols of sacrifice, appear on the left (Al-Manar, February 16, 2017)

Overview

1.   In his speech on the anniversary of the killing of Hezbollah’s three high-ranking shahids (Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Abbas Mussawi, and Imad Mughniyeh), and in an interview with an Iranian TV channel, Hassan Nasrallah referred at great length to the issues of war with Israel. According to Nasrallah, Israel considers Hezbollah a paramount strategic threat, and therefore it often threats with war and elaborates on the heavy damage that will be caused to Lebanese infrastructures in that war (the so-called Dahiya doctrine). Nasrallah says that threats of this kind have been made in the past, but they recently increased in number after Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. Nasrallah notes that he doesn’t believe that Israel intends to go to war. He says once again that Israel is deterred from going to war because it is well aware of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, which will prevent it from achieving a decisive victory in the next war.

2.   To demonstrate these capabilities, thereby strengthening the message of deterrence, Nasrallah emphasizes the ability of Hezbollah’s precision missiles to inflict heavy damage on Israel. He points out his own “contribution” to the transfer of the ammonia tank from Haifa Bay, and boasts (based on monitoring Israeli media) that even if the ammonia tank is transferred to another site, Hezbollah will hit it.Nasrallah adds that Hezbollah is able to hit the ship the carries the ammonia to Haifa Bay. In addition, he notes that Hezbollah is able to hit the nuclear reactor in Dimona and inflict heavy damage on Israel. As he points out, Israel is aware of the fact that “if [Hezbollah’s] missiles hit this reactor, it [i.e., Israel] will be hit, their entity will be hit”. To the Iranian interviewer’s question whether Hezbollah will really attack Dimona, Nasrallah replies, “We are ready to carry it out and we have the courage to do so…”

Analysis of the background and the significance of Nasrallah’s statements

3.   In the ITIC's assessment, at the background of Nasrallah’s statements are the regional and international developments, which raised the level of fears of Hezbollah (and Iran, Hezbollah’s sponsor). In the United States, a new president came to power, who is perceived as pro-Israel and as one who may resort to a more vehement policy towards Iran. In Syria, Hezbollah carries on with its deep involvement in the civil war, while investing a lot of resources in it and sustaining many casualties,[1] and is harshly criticized in Lebanon and in the Arab world. In the regional arena, a struggle is going on between the Shiite axis under the leadership of Iran and the Sunni axis led by Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah, which is Iran’s “long arm”, is involved in supporting Iran’s proxies in the various arenas (Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen).

4.   In the ITIC's assessment, the rising level of fear has caused Nasrallah once again to send messages of deterrence against Israel. Nasrallah’s statements on the heavy damage that Hezbollah is capable of inflicting on Israel, which he has repeated over and over again during the recent years, are based on the upgrade of Hezbollah’s military capabilities after the Second Lebanon War. Part of this upgrade is the supply of state-of-the-art weapons by Iran, including long-range precision missiles. In addition, Hezbollah possesses drones that can be launched against pinpoint targets in Israel. These capabilities allow Hezbollah to seriously hit strategic targets inside Israel, causing many losses among civilians in wartime.

5.    The availability of these capabilities in Hezbollah’s hands allows Hassan Nasrallah in recent years to threat Israel over and over again in order todeter it from a military move against Hezbollah. In his statements he points out that Hezbollah has a pool of targets, the hitting of which “can turn the lives of hundreds of thousands of Israelis into hell.” This pool of targets includes, according to Nasrallah, targets of civilian, economic and industrial nature, including power stations and nuclear facilities (Al-Mayadeen Channel, September 3, 2012). One such statement was Nasrallah’s speech about a year ago, in which he threatened hitting the ammonia tank in Haifa, claiming that the effect of such hit will be similar to a “nuclear bomb”.[2]   

Cartoon of Hassan Nasrallah standing on coffins of Hezbollah’s operatives while saying, “We are in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria” (Twitter account of someone calling himself in Arabic “ex-Hezbollah member”, February 16, 2016)
Cartoon of Hassan Nasrallah standing on coffins of Hezbollah’s operatives while saying, “We are in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria” (Twitter account of someone calling himself in Arabic “ex-Hezbollah member”, February 16, 2016)

6.   The ITIC believes that, given the regional and international developments, Nasrallah wishes to strengthen once again the message of deterrence against Israel. This message, from Hezbollah’s perspective, relies on Hezbollah’s advanced military capabilities, mainly its arsenal of rockets and missiles, which creates an “equation of deterrence” between Hezbollah and Israel.The main point of this equation is that both sides refrain from military initiatives against each other for fear from the damage that the other side can cause them. This “equation of deterrence”, from Nasrallah’s perspective, is the basis for the calm in the Israeli-Lebanese border, which allows Hezbollah to deepen its involvement in the war in Syria without having to fear that Israel would seize this opportunity to engage in an offensive initiative against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena.

Appendices

7.   This document includes three appendices:

a.   Appendix A:Reference to Israel in Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on the annual memorial day for the three high-ranking shahids of Hezbollah (February 16, 2017)

b.   Appendix B:Reference to Israel in Hassan Nasrallah's interview with Iranian TV, Channel 1 (IRIB1) (February 20, 2017)

c.   Appendix C:Commentary in the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, expressing Hezbollah’s positions (February 24, 2017)

[1]According to an article in the Israeli daily Haaretz, Israeli Army Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot said in the Israeli Knesset’s Foreign Relations and Defense Committee that Hezbollah had had 1,700 dead and over 6,000 wounded in the war in Syria (article by Amos Harel, Haaretz, February 24, 2017).
[2]See the ITIC's Information Bulletin from February 25, 2016: “Hassan Nasrallah’s “Ammonia Speech:” The Threat for Israel and its Significance.”

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Spotlight on Iran

November 7-20, 2016 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt

Main Points
  • Three Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fighters were killed in Syria. In addition, a correspondent for Iranian broadcasting was killed by mortar fire in Aleppo, and an Iranian TV cameraman was wounded in the same attack.
  • Faysal Meqdad, the Syrian deputy foreign minister, paid a visit to Tehran and met with senior Iranian officials. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, advisor to the speaker of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) for international affairs, told him Iran would continue to support Syria in its fight against terrorism.
  • Mohammad Bagheri, the Iranian chief of staff, said that a number of years ago Iran had built a factory for the manufacture of missiles in the region of Aleppo, and that during the Second Lebanon War the missiles produced there had been used to attack Israel. Several months ago Hossein Sheikholeslam, advisor to the Iranian foreign minister, also stated that Iran had built a factory for the manufacture of missiles used by Hezbollah to attack Israel. This past week he claimed Iran had not limited itself to missile production in Syria, but had spread the technology and necessary information in territories bordering on Israel.
  • A senior official in the Iranian foreign ministry said that in the near future Iran would appoint a temporary chargé d'affaires for its embassy in Syria. He would serve until Iran appointed a permanent ambassador, which would be done in the coming months. Last month Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani ended his five-year term as Iranian ambassador to Syria and a replacement has not yet been appointed.
  • On November 7 and 8, 2016, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, paid a visit to Lebanon. He met for the first time with Michel Aoun, the newly-elected Lebanese president, and with other senior Lebanese officials, including Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah.
  • Iranian police patrol cars were recently dispatched to Iraq, apparently to reinforce the security of the approximately two million Iranian pilgrims in Shi'ite cities in Iraq for the fortieth day after the anniversary of the martyrdom of Shi'ite Imam Hussein ibn-Ali.
  • On November 13, 2016, Haidar al-Abadi, vice president of Iraq, paid a visit to Tehran. He met with senior Iranian officials and discussed political developments in Iraq and the ongoing campaign against ISIS.

 

Iranian Intervention in Syria and Lebanon
  • During the past two weeks three IRGC fighters were killed fighting in Aleppo, Syria. Also killed was Mohsen Khazaei, correspondent for the Iranian broadcasting company; he was killed by mortar fire. An Iranian TV cameraman was wounded in the same attack (Fars, November 12, 2016).
  • On November 7, 2016, Faysal Meqdad, Syrian deputy foreign minister, paid a visit to Tehran where he met with senior Iranian officials. Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis, told him Syria was in the front lines of the resistance to Zionism and terrorism. He stressed the need for greater political, economic and parliamentary ties between Iran and Syria (Mehr, November 7, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, told Meqdad that America would never realize its dream of partitioning Syria and Iraq. Meqdad stated that the Syrian government was determined to continue the campaign against terrorism, and relied on support from Iran (IRNA, November 7, 2016). Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, advisor to the speaker of the Majlis for international affairs, told Meqdad that Iran would continue to support Syria in its fight against terrorism (ILNA, November 9, 2016).
  • Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, said that a number of years ago Iran had built a factory for the manufacture of missiles near Aleppo, and that during the Second Lebanon War the missiles produced there had been used to attack Israel (Tasnim, November 10, 2016). Several months ago Hossein Sheikholeslam, advisor to the Iranian foreign minister, also stated that as part of its military support for Lebanon, Iran had built a factory for the manufacture of missiles, which Hezbollah had used to attack Israel (Tasnim, August 3, 2016).
  • This past week Sheikholeslam again noted the support Iran gave to regional countries in the form of missile-producing facilities. On November 12, 2016, Mizan News reported his saying that since the Islamic Revolution, Iran had based its strategy on the destruction of the "Zionist regime." Iran's policies, he claimed, made it clear to Israel that the response to any Israeli mistake would be harsh. To that end, he claimed, Iran needed hundreds of thousands of missiles that could strike anywhere in Israel, including its important and sensitive centers. Iran, he said, was aware of Israel's missile-interception capabilities, and therefore had created conditions making it possible to launch 500 missiles at Israel at the same time. Thus even if Israel intercepted 100 of them, 400 would still hit their targets. He added that Iran's missile capabilities prevented Israel and its allies from carrying out their plans to strike Iran's nuclear facilities. He said that missile-manufacture capabilities supplied by Iran were not limited to Syria, and that Iran had given the necessary technology and information wherever it could in territories bordering Israel.
  • In the meantime, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC aerospace and missile force, gave a speech at the Amir Kabir University in Tehran. He said the United States had destroyed a weapons factory built by Iran in Aleppo whose manufacture included surface-to-surface missiles. He did not provide further details about the incident (ISNA, November 14, 2016).
  • Last week Mohammed Reza Naqdi, commander of the IRGC's Basij militia, denied reports that thousands of Iranian fighters had been deployed to Syria. He claimed that Iran had not deployed military forces to Syria and that Iranian presence in Syria and Iraq was limited to advisors, sent to enable local fighters to profit from their experience (Elaph, November 16, 2016).
  • On November 13, 2016, Mohammad Irani, director general for Middle East affairs in the Iranian foreign ministry, told Tasnim News that in the near future Iran would appoint a temporary chargé d'affaires for its embassy in Syria. He said that because the issue of the Iranian embassy in Damascus was important and sensitive, a temporary charge d'affaires would be appointed until a decision could be made regarding the appointment of a new ambassador. That would occur, he said, in the coming months. Last month Mohammad-Reza Raouf-Sheibani ended his five-year term as Iranian ambassador to Syria. The Iranian media reported that his likely successor would be Hossein Sheikholeslam, who served as ambassador to Syria from 1998 to 2003, and is today an advisor to the defense minister. However, the report has not been officially confirmed.
  • On November 7 and 8, 2016, Mohammad Javad Zarif, foreign minister of Iran, paid a visit to Lebanon where he met with senior Lebanese officials, among them Michel Aoun, the recently-elected president; Tammam Salam, the prime minister; Gebran Bassil, the foreign minister; and Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah. Meeting with other diplomats and Iranian representatives in Lebanon, Zarif said Hezbollah and Nasrallah stood at the head of and were the symbols of the resistance, and a source of pride (Tasnim, November 8, 2016).
Iranian Intervention in Iraq
  • This past week videos were posted to the Iraqi social networks showing Iranian patrol cars marked "Tehran police" on the roads in Iraq. They were apparently dispatched to reinforce the security of the approximately two million Iranian pilgrims in the holy Shi'ite cities in Iraq for the fortieth day after the anniversary of the martyrdom of Shi'ite Imam Hussein ibn-Ali.
  • Civilian organizations in Najaf opposing Iranian intervention in Iraq posted the pictures, saying that "Despite Iraqis' oppositionto Iranian intervention…the Iranian authorities have only contempt for the Iraqi people and challenge Iraq's sovereignty and honor….the Iranian security forces drive through Iraqi streets and supervise traffic as though they were in Qom or Tehran" (Facebook page of a prominent political activist in Najaf, November 16, 2016).
  • On November 13, 2016, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian foreign minister, met with Khazir al-Khazaei, Iraqi vice president. They discussed political developments in Iraq and the ongoing campaign against ISIS. While in Tehran al-Khazaei also met with Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian Majlis (Mehr, November 13, 2016).
  • Ali-Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Iranian supreme leader for international affairs, met with Hervé Morin, the former French minister of defense. He told Morin that Iran opposed any attempt to change the borders of the Middle East or partition regional countries. He said one of the reasons Iranian advisors were in Iraq was the effort made by the terrorists to partition the country and take control of it. He added that to a large extent regional peace and stability depended on cooperation between Iran and Iraq, and that the pilgrimage of millions of Iranians to Iraq and of millions of Iraqis to Iran proved the countries' close relations. He said he was confident of the liberation of Mosul from ISIS and of the defeat of the terrorists, but said it was liable to take time (Mehr, November 15, 2016).
  • Haidar al-Abadi, Iraqi prime minister, denied reports that Iranians and Jordanians were participating in the fighting against ISIS in Iraq. At a press conference in Baghdad he said Iraq had asked its neighbors and the rest of the world as well to send arms and supply it with intelligence regarding the activities of the terrorists in Iraqi territory. However, he said, so far Iraq had not allowed armed forces, with the exception of the international coalition, to participate in the military campaign (Khabar Online, November 16, 2016).

[*]Spotlight on Iran is an Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center bulletin illuminating Iran's activities to establish its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It is based on reports in the Iranian media and written for the ITIC by Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran's politics, society, foreign policy and social networks.

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