Tag Archives: Al-Qaeda

The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli civilian was killed.


צילום מסרטון בו נראים שני המחבלים מהתארגנות אלתוחיד ואלג'האד, שנהרגו בעת הפיגוע על גבול ישראל מצרים
Scene from a video showing two of the Tawhid wal-Jihad terrorist operatives killed in the attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012. Left: the terrorist calling himself Abu Salah al-Masri, from Egypt. Right: the terrorist calling himself Abu Hazifa al-Hudhali, from Saudi Arabia. They represented the terrorist attack as a double suicide bombing attack whose objective was to hurt the "Zionist enemy" on the "Egyptian-Palestinian" border. According to a different video, the two had recently returned from Libya where they fought in the ranks of the global jihad against Gaddafi's regime.

Overview

1.On June 18, 2012, a terrorist attack was carried out on the Israeli-Egyptian border which was supposed to include the detonation of a massive explosive device. An Israeli civilian was killed in the attack. A new umbrella network of Salafist-jihadi groups operating in the Gaza Strip calling itself The Shura Councilof the Mujahideen of Greater Jerusalem claimed responsibility for the attack. In reality, it was carried out by Tawhid wal-Jihad ("oneness and jihad"), a Salafist jihadi network which has been operating in the Gaza Strip since 2008. Its "emir" (leader) is an Al-Qaeda operative named Hisham Saidani, who in the past spent time in Jordan, Iraq and Libya (where he joined forces with global jihad operatives). In March 2011 he was detained by Hamas and released on August 2, 2012.

2. The shooting attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border, which, according to the statements of its perpetrators was supposed to be a suicide bombing attack, was the first successful terrorist attack in recent years by the global jihad networks operating against Israel from the Gaza Strip. The attack and the attack near the Kerem Shalom crossing in which 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed, were an indication of the efforts being made by the networks to use the Sinai Peninsula as a springboard for their attacks against Israel. To that end they exploit the rampant anarchy and chaos prevalent in Sinai. They are encouraged in their efforts by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's heir and current head of Al-Qaeda.

3. Global jihad networks operating in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula seek to turn Sinai into an arena for intensive activity, relying on long-distance logistic support from countries like Libya (which after the fall of Gaddafi became an important source of weapons), North Sudan and Iraq. The Palestinian terrorist networks operating in the Gaza Strip have easy access to the local Sinai Bedouin tribes which have affiliated themselves with the global jihad and whose motives are both financial and ideological.

4. The June 20, 2012 Tawhid wal-Jihad attack joins the series of attacks against Israel carried out this past year from the Sinai Peninsula, an exploitation of the anarchy and Egypt's governmental difficulties the area. The most prominent attacks were the combined attack on a number of Israeli vehicle north of Israel's southernmost city of Eilat (August 18, 2011), the launching of three 122m Grad rockets targeting Eilat (the night of April 4, 2012), the June 18 attack and the shots fired at a bus full of IDF soldiers north of Eilat (July 22, 2012). The attacks were carried out by terrorist organizations known to be operating in the Gaza Strip (the most prominent of which is the Popular Resistance Committees) and by networks in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula affiliated with the global jihad. The terrorist attack on August 5, 2012, in which 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed, can be added to the list.

5. Hamas generally tries to enforce its policy of restraint in terrorist attacks on organizations affiliated with the global jihad and on the rogue organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, although not often rigorously or with the determination it exhibits when its vital interests are challenged. On the other hand,Hamas tries to promote attacks of its own, keeping a low signature, and allows the other terrorist organizations to carry out similar attacks anonymously. One of the aspects of that policy is finding indirect routes to carry out attacks on Israeli soil through the Sinai Peninsula (rocket attacks, attacks on Israeli targets along the Israeli-Egyptian border, infiltrating or smuggling weapons into Israel). Hamas and the other terrorist organizations are careful to hide most of those attacks, and sometimes even deny their existence. They do so not to expose themselves to Israeli responses and not to complicate their relations with Egypt, especially now that Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood has been elected president.

6. Three appendices follow:

I) The June 18, 2012 attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border and the aftermath

II) Tawhid wal-Jihad in the Gaza Strip

III) Tawhid wal-Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula

Documents captured by the United States army in an Al-Qaeda safe house in Pakistan expose the ambivalent relations between Al-Qaeda and Iran.


The front cover of the CTC analysis of 17 internal Al-Qaeda communications.
The front cover of the CTC analysis of 17 internal Al-Qaeda communications.

Overview

1. On May 3, 2012, a year after Osama bin Laden was killed by an elite navy SEAL team unit, the United States released 17 de-classified documents captured in an Al-Qaeda safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. They were issued in both the original and in English translation and an analysis in a book entitled Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?, published by the Combating Terrorism Center located at West Point.[1]

2. The 17 letters were part of 6,000 documents found in computers and on hard drives taken from a secret bin Laden compound in Abbottabad. They were written between 2006 and 2011, and include electronic letters and drafts written by bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders.

3. The documents include correspondence from 2009 and 2010 between Osama bin Laden and a senior Al-Qaeda figure (aka Atiah) dealing with the release of Al-Qaeda operatives detained in Iran, and Al-Qaeda's view of Iran in general. The letters clearly reflect Al-Qaeda's grave suspicions of Iran, which it regards as an infidel Shiite country headed by a gang of criminals whose policy towards Al-Qaeda is hypcritical.

4. Shiite Iran and Sunni Al-Qaeda have a traditionally ambivalent relationship, the result of  deep ideological and religious differences. However, the two also collaborate on operational matters to promote common interests. One of Iran's goals in collaborating with Al-Qaeda is to prevent it from operating against Iran; another is to exploit its operational capabilities (and those of the global jihad) in the Middle East and around the globe to attack their mutual enemies, i.e., the United States, Israel and the Jewish people.

5. The letters show that the complex relations between the two have improved since 2009 when Iran released Al-Qaeda operatives and relatives of bin Laden who had been detained several years previously. A practical expression of the improved relations was Iran's permitting an Al-Qaeda network to operate an important route in Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan to focal points of terrorism in the Middle East and beyond. The network dealt with transferring operatives and funds while the Iranian regime turned a blind eye and perhaps even provided practical support (despite Al-Qaeda's terrorist activities in countries like Syria and Iraq which harm Iranian interests, especially in view of regional upheavals).

6. In conclusion, Iran is important to Al-Qaeda for advancing its logistic activities (transferring operatives and funds)  and as a base for its operational activities, which is why the Al-Qaeda leadership regards the network in Iran as an important asset. That is especially true in view of regional upheavals and Al-Qaeda leadership's desire to strengthen its foothold in the area, and in view of the Al-Qaeda's having been weakened in Pakistan by the targeted killings of many of its senior leaders there (the latest of whom was Abu Yahya al-Libi) and the possibility that the release of detainees would strengthen its ranks.

[1]  For the original letters see http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined

A document captured by the United States army at Bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan

The CTC’s analysis of the letters.

The CTC’s analysis of the letters.

the Arabic text of the letter from the Army of Islam captured at Bin Laden’s hideout.

the Arabic text of the letter from the Army of Islam captured at Bin Laden’s hideout.

The emblem of the Army of Islam

The emblem of the Army of Islam

Army of Islam operatives in Gaza

Army of Islam operatives in Gaza

Mumtaz Dughmush, the founder and leader of the Army of Islam (right), with one of the organization’s members

Mumtaz Dughmush, the founder and leader of the Army of Islam (right), with one of the organization’s members


Overview

1.    On May 3, 2012, one year after Osama Bin Laden was killed by an elite Navy SEAL team, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the United States Military Academy (West Point, NY) published 17 declassified documents captured at Bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The documents, published under the title “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?”, were made available in complete English translation accompanied by an analysis of the information contained therein.[1]

2.    The 17 documents published constitute a very small selection from 6,000 documents captured on computers and hard drives taken from the compound where Osama Bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad. The documents, the earliest of which is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011, include letters and draft letters written by Osama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders.

3.    One of the documents, apparently written in 2006, reveals correspondence between the Army of Islam, a Gaza Strip-based global jihad organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Al-Qaeda leadership. The correspondence focuses on the question of whether the Army of Islam is permitted by Islamic religious law to accept funding for its terrorist activities from other Palestinian organizations (e.g., the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah) and, by implication, from such “infidel” countries as Shi’ite Iran (which, according to the Army of Islam, provides generous financial assistance to the PIJ). Al-Qaeda answered in the affirmative, i.e., that Islam permits the acceptance of money from other organizations and infidel countries for the purposes of jihad (a practice employed by the PIJ) (see Appendix I for details on the correspondence).

4.    The Army of Islam is a Gaza Strip-based Salafi-jihadist organization that has considerable operative capabilities compared to similar networks affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Established in the beginning of 2006, the organization is led by Mumtaz Dughmush, a member of an influential Gaza Strip clan. Two Army of Islam operatives took part in the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. The organization is notable for its efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel via the Sinai Peninsula; in addition, it conducts activities against Western and Egyptian targets reminiscent of those conducted by the global jihad. In the past, the Army of Islam was accused by the then Egyptian interior minister of responsibility for a terrorist attack against the Coptic church in Alexandria (January 2011) and the Khan el-Khalili market in Cairo (February 2009). The Army of Islam has a close relationship with Hamas, giving it ample freedom of action on the Gaza Strip scene and on the Egyptian scene (see Appendix II for details).

5.    As already mentioned, the “case study” that motivated the Army of Islam’s question to Al-Qaeda was the close relationship between the PIJ and Iran. According to one of the letters sent by the Army of Islam, the (Sunni Muslim) PIJ receives considerable financial assistance from “infidel” Shi’ite Iran for its jihadist activities, which has even led some of its operatives (“perish the thought”, the letter said) to adopt the Shi’ite school of thought. In practice, Iran does provide the PIJ with generous military and financial assistance, which has turned it into the second strongest organization in the Gaza Strip (after Hamas). In exchange for the assistance, the PIJ, not bound by the kind of constraints placed upon Hamas, is ready to promote Iran’s interests in the conflict with Israel and on the interior Palestinian scene.

[1] The original documents can be found at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined. For the analysis, see http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbottabad_WEB_v2.pdf