Tag Archives: Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda’s Repudiation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria – Overview and Implications

Published: 17/02/2014

From the text of Al-Zawahiri’s announcement concerning Al-Qaeda’s repudiation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria.The announcement was published on Islamist forums affiliated with Al-Qaeda (www.muslm.org)

Overview

1. On February 3, 2014, Islamist forums posted an announcement on behalf of the General Command of Al-Qaeda, led by Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri.The announcement, dated January 22, denies any connection with the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria^[1](hereinafter: the “Islamic State”), led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (hanein.info; muslm.org).

2. Al-Zawahiri’sannouncement is an unequivocal decision in favor of the Al-Nusra Front in the power struggles that took place over the past year between this organization and the Islamic State, headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.We believe the announcement could strengthen the position of the Al-Nusra Front versus the Islamic State, intensifying the rift between them, and that the Al-Nusra Front may continue to join forces with other rebel organizations against its rival.However, despite the internal power struggles, we believe that organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad will continue to enjoy meaningful influence among rebel groups in Syria.

3. In its conduct in the face of the power struggles in Syria and Iraq, Al-Qaeda’s leadership, led by Al-Zawahiri, displayed weakness and a lack of effective control over its branches in the Middle East in the post-Osama bin Laden era.On the other hand, the Middle East, with Syria in its center, has become the new worldwide power center for Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, taking advantage of the chaos created by the Syrian civil war, the deepening Sunni-Shiite schism, and the weak governance in key countries in the Middle East due to the regional upheaval.This new power center is liable to threaten the Arab-Muslim world as well as Israel and the West.

4. Thus, in Syria, the new global jihad center, a bipolar system of rival organizations, both of them identifying with Al-Qaeda’s ideology, has now been created:at one pole of the system there is the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s formal branch, which has better military and logistical capabilities than its rival, and whose status among the rebels and among the population is stronger. At the other pole of the system there is the Islamic State, which does not obey the instructions of Al-Qaeda’s leadership and relies on its infrastructure in Iraq, Syria’s “backyard.”Between these two rival poles there are rebel groups in Syria, with tens of thousands of operatives. They adopt the jihadi ideology and are prepared for ad hoc cooperation with the Al-Nusra Front and sometimes with the Islamic State as well. However, those jihadi groups refuse to be formally affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

5. The internal rift among organizations affiliated with the ideology of Al-Qaeda is liable to have an impact on other global jihad networks throughout the Middle East.At this stage, the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, the prominent terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip affiliated with the global jihad, has already taken a stand in the conflict in favor of the Islamic State (while paying lip service to Ayman al-Zawahiri).Other organizations in various countries in the Middle East may also join one side or the other, while others may prefer to “sit on the fence”.Hence we may be witnessing the beginning of a process in which a new regional system of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad is taking shape, with far more complex and decentralized characteristics than those that characterized Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Osama bin Laden era.

Al-Qaeda’s announcement regarding its repudiation of the Islamic State

6. The announcement, published by the overall leadership [Al-Qiyada al-‘Amma] of Al-Qaeda, said in part: “The Qaedat al-Jihad group [i.e., the Al-Qaeda organization] announces that it has no connection with the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria.It did not announce its establishment, it is not its head, it does not advise it, it does not operate to fulfill its wishes and it has even ordered it to cease its activity.Therefore, it [i.e., the Islamic State] is not a branch of Al-Qaeda and has no organizational connection with it.Moreover, it [i.e., the General Command of Al-Qaeda] is not responsible for its [i.e., the Islamic State’s] conduct.”

7. The announcement went on to state that Al-Qaeda’s leadership adheres to the principle of unity of the Islamic nation, in accordance with Osama bin Laden’s perception, and to the principle of avoiding harmful controversy.The announcement also notes that Al-Qaeda’s leadership has no part in the struggles between the various factions of the jihad fighters in Syria, is calling on them to stop, and has expressed an interest in maintaining good relations with all jihad fighters.

Initial reactions to Al-Zawahiri’s announcement

8. The Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, chose not to comment on the announcement to date.The Islamic State, however, reacted sharply to both Al-Qaeda and the Al-Nusra Front.

9. On February 4, 2014, a response announcement was uploaded to the forum of the Islamic State. The announcement states that no one is above the Islamic State, and “that the brothers in Al-Qaeda will do whatever they want.”The announcement severely attacked the leader of the Al-Nusra Front:“Unfortunately, the presence of [Abu Muhammad] Al-Julani, soldier, deserter and insubordinate son of its leader, Al-Baghdadi [the leader of the Islamic State], will be one of the reasons for the collapse of Al-Qaeda, God forbid…”The announcement goes on to state that “the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria will expand, will run institutions, and will implement the laws of Allah.”

The Islamic State’s announcement attacking Al-Qaeda and the Al-Nusra Front (alplatformmedia.com)

10. The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem(hereinafter: the “Shura Council”), the most prominent global jihad organization in the Gaza Strip, has taken a stand in favor of the Islamic State, paying lip service to Ayman al-Zawahiri and his call (in the past) for unity among jihadi organizations.

11. On February 2, 2014, the Shura Council published a detailed announcement replete with Islamic religious and historical motifs.The announcement begins by condemning the civil war in Syria between jihad fighters, which is rooted in “the unjust behavior towards the Islamic State and its leader, the Emir of the Believers, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.Muslims, according to the announcement, are obliged to help the members of the Islamic Stateand establish its foundations, but instead, “various people” have fallen into a civil war and have washed their hands of the jihad fighters.

12. The announcement goes on to express its support for the call of “our sheikh, the smartest man in our nation, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, may Allah preserve him, regarding the need for jihad fighters in Syria to join together in an Islamic state, which they will agree on, because jihad needs a leader…”However, the announcement does not refer to Al-Zawahiri’s latest announcement, repudiating the Islamic State, and fails to mention the Al-Nusra Front.

13. The announcement goes on to reiterate its support of the Islamic State:“It […] should be noted that the campaign in Iraq and al-Sham (Syria) is one; and that the heads of the Islamic State in Iraq have already proved their righteousness and their ability to manage the nation’s campaigns […]” The announcement again calls on jihad fighters to reach agreement on a single ruler who will lead them according to Islamic law, who will impose Islam and who, “with Allah’s help, will topple the vile heretics” (bentaymia.tumblr.com).

From a statement by the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem supporting the Islamic State (bentaymia.tumblr.com)

The background of Al-Zawahiri’s announcement

14. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s announcement is an unequivocal decision in favor of the Al-Nusra Front in the fierce power struggles conducted over the past year between Al-Qaeda’s branches in Iraq and Syria.The Al-Qaeda command, headed by Ayman Zawahiri, was dragged into these power struggles, but its attempts to resolve the conflict or at least calm the situation have only exacerbated it.Following are some milestones in thesebattles:

a. The Al-Nusra Front was founded in Syria in January 2012 by Al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq, which initially ran it.Initially, the Syrian “Emir,” Abu Muhammad al-Julani, received his orders from the “Emir” of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who controlled both branches of Al-Qaeda, in Iraq and in Syria.In order to formalize his seniority and control, on April 9, 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the merger of the organizations in Iraq and Syria under the name of “the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria.”

b. Abu Muhammad al-Julani, leader of the Al-Nusra Front, refused to subordinate his organization to the leader of the Islamic State.One day after Al-Baghdadi’s announcement (April 10, 2013), he quickly pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda.Al-Zawahiri, who was dragged into the power struggles between the two organizations, took sides on June 10, 2013, when he announced the cancellation of the merger between the Al-Nusra Front and the Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq.In a letter to the operatives of the Al-Nusra Front, he announced that Al-Baghdadi had erred when he declared the merger without the approval of Al-Qaeda’s leadership, but called on the two branches to cooperate with one another.

c. Al-Zawahiri’s taking sides in the dispute did not resolve the conflict between the two rival organizations. On the contrary, in retrospect it exacerbated it.During the six months that have passed since Al-Zawahiri’s announcement, the rivalry between the two organizations has increased and has, from time to time, erupted into violent confrontations between them.Hence, in practice, two rival organizations have emerged in Syria, both affiliated with Al-Qaeda’s ideology,each of which has adopted operating methods that distinguish it from the rival organization.While the Al-Nusra Front has conducted itself relatively pragmatically,in its attitude to the population and its cooperation with other rebel organizations, the Islamic State has adopted rigid doctrinal operating methods that have caused severe tensions between the Islamic State and the Syrian population, and between it and the other rebel organizations, which have initiated violent confrontations against it.

d. Another attempt to mend the rift was made by Ayman al-Zawahiri on October 11, 2013. In an appeal distributed on Islamist websites, he called on Islamic forces operating in Syria to unite in order to establish a jihadi country that would pave the way for the return of the Islamic Caliphate and the “liberation of Jerusalem.” However, this request also fell on deaf ears: The rift between the two organizations has grown, and the tension between them, accompanied by violent clashes, has increased. Thus, Al-Zawahiri has been forced to take a unilateral stand, employing more rigid and aggressive rhetoric towards the Islamic State.

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^[1]In Arabic: Ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fi al-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām.

Using suicide bombers as weapons

Published: 11/02/2014

The suicide bomber known as Abu Usama al-Australi (aka Abu Usama al-Muhajir) reads his will standing on the roof of the truck he used in his suicide bombing attack.

Scent of the Attack (January 2, 2014) (Alhayat.com, January 4, 2014)

Scent of the Attack (January 2, 2014) (Yemeneconomist.com)

The gas station in Hermel near the site of the suicide bombing attack (Aleqt.com)

Sandbags protect the entrance to a store in the southern suburb of Beirut (Bintjbeil.org)

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Using Suicide Bombers in Syria and Lebanon

1. Using suicide bombers to attack the Syrian regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon is a modus operandi adopted from Al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq and other Islamic confrontation zones. In the three years of the Syrian civil war, suicide bombing attacks have become the trademark of the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria ("the Islamic State"), both affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. Suicide bombing attacks were carried out extensively in 2012 and 2013 and inflicted heavy losses on the Syrian regime in terms of casualties and damage to property and infrastructure. They also had a detrimental effect on the symbols of its governance and sovereignty, and raised the standing of the suicide bombing organizations. At the beginning of 2014 they began carrying out suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon as well, where it became the leading modus operandi of the struggle against Hezbollah and the Shi'ites.

2. The Al-Nusra Front, a branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria, is the rebel organization responsible for the largest number of suicide bombing attacks in Syria during the civil war. Between its founding in January 2012 and the end of December 2012, the organization claimed responsibility for 43 of the 50 suicide bombing attacks against the Assad regime (LongwarJournal.org). In 2013 the Al-Nusra Front carried out 34 suicide bombing attacks. Nine others were carried out by the Islamic State, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which began suicide bombing attacks in Syria at the end of May 2013. In 2013 the two organizations carried out a total of 43 suicide bombing attacks (similar to the number carried out by the Al-Nusra Front in 2012). Fifty-three suicide bombers participated in the attacks. The attacks in Syria accounted for approximately 15% of all the suicide bombing attacks carried out around the globe in 2013.^[1] Suicide bombing attacks have since seeped into Lebanon, where five have been carried out since the beginning of 2014, four by the Al-Nusra Front and one by the Islamic State.

3. The attacks in Syria were carried out by suicide bombers wearing explosive belts who blew themselves up at targets associated with the Syrian regime. In some instances they detonated cars or trucks loaded with large quantities of explosives to cause more casualties and destruction. Some of the attacks were combined and involved two and sometimes even three car bombs which were detonated simultaneously or in succession. According to our analysis, some of the suicide bombing attacks were highly sophisticated and expertly planned: six suicide bombing attacks were carried out simultaneously in two nearby locations. Some of the attacks against preferred targets were carried out by several suicide bombers. Most of them were foreign fighters, mainly from the Arab-Muslim world (especially Saudi Arabia).

4. The organizations in Syria affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad have gained experience and expertise in orchestrating suicide bombing attacks. In our assessment, that expertise poses a threat whose implications go beyond the Syrian arena. Current proof of the threat is that the suicide bombing attacks have seeped into Lebanon, where they are being used to attack Hezbollah, undermining of Lebanon's fragile internal stability. The longer the Syrian civil war continues, the greater the chances that suicide bombing attacks originating in Syria will seep into other countries. Foreign jihadist fighters who return to their countries of origin from Syria are liable to initiate or participate in suicide bombing attacks, utilizing the operational experience they gained and the operational contacts they made with Al-Qaeda and global jihad handlers. In addition, in our assessment the organizations in Syria affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad are liable to initiate suicide bombing attacks in Western countries, the State of Israel and Arab countries (although their top priority is still overthrowing the Assad regime).

Methodological Notes

5. This study analyzes 43 suicide bombing attacks carried out in Syria during 2013, 34 by the Al-Nusra Front and nine by the Islamic State. It is based primarily on claims of responsibility issued by the organizations. In our assessment, they correspond approximately to the number of suicide bombing attacks actually carried out. In addition, there were suicide bombing attacks that were prevented or went awry about which we have no information. We have not included attacks carried out by other Islamic and jihadist rebel organizations, which account for only a small fraction. In addition, the study analyzes five suicide bombing attacks carried out in Lebanon by the Al-Nusra Front and Islamic State from the beginning of January 2014 to the beginning of February 2014.

6. The attacks in Syria referred to include six combined suicide bombing attacks carried out simultaneously by two suicide bombers at two locations in the same area. Each one of them is counted as two attacks. However, a combined attack of two or more suicide bombers carried out at one target is considered as one attack.

7. Our main sources of information were the Internet sites of the jihad organizations, especially postings of responsibility and videos issued by the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State. They were cross-referenced with information from Arab and Western media about the civil war in Syria and events in Lebanon.

Results of the Analysis of Suicide Bombing Attacks in Syria in 2013

8. The main findings were the following:

1) Suicide bombing attack targets: Most of the attacks targeted facilities, bases and individuals associated with the Syrian security forces and administration. Prominent were attacks on roadblocks, headquarters, military bases and camps belonging to the Syrian army and security and intelligence entities affiliated with the regime. Institutions affiliated with the government were also attacked (police station, prison, munitions factory), as were the residences of Syrian security force personnel. Although the attacks were directed at government and security targets, they often caused collateral damage in the form of heavy civilian losses. On occasion civilian targets where members of the security force congregated were also attacked. The harm done to civilians created a problem for the organizations' image, especially the Al-Nusra Front, which makes an effort to gain the support of the Syrian population (the Islamic State is less sensitive about its image).

2) Modus operandi: Most of the attacks were carried out by a lone suicide bomber who either detonated an explosive belt or blew himself up in a car bomb. In some instances the attack was the combined effort of three, four or even five suicide bombers, either at one location or simultaneously at several adjacent locations. The complex attacks were carried out by the Al-Nusra Front, whose operational capabilities are higher than those of the Islamic State.

3) Objectives: There are two main types of suicide bombing attacks. One is the preparatory attack, carried out as the first stage before the main attack on a preferred target, such as a post, roadblock, camp or facility associated with the Syrian regime. The other is the mass-casualty attack, an attack intended to kill as many people as possible without a subsequent assault on a physical target.

4) Locations: About a third of the attacks were carried out in Damascus and the villages surrounding it (the ghouta). In our assessment, the intention was to deal the regime a painful blow, to expose its vulnerability and to achieve the greatest possible media coverage. About two thirds were carried out in Al-Nusra Front and Islamic State combat zones in northern and eastern Syria: Aleppo, Hasakah, Idlib, Hama, Homs and Deir ez-Zor. One suicide bombing attack was carried out on the Golan Heights and another in the region of Daraa', in southern Syria. In our assessment, the small number of suicide bombing attacks on the Golan Heights and around Daraa' indicate the relative weakness of the organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in those regions, at least so far (although the attacks were complex and painful for the regime).

5) Frequency: The Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State kept up a steady series of suicide bombing attacks throughout 2013, usually about two a month. In January, June, August and September there were four or five attacks each month. In February 2013 there were ten suicide bombing attacks. In our assessment, maintaining a continuing succession of suicide bombing attacks, including complex integrated attacks, indicates well-developed operational capabilities and a large reservoir of highly-motivated operatives ready to sacrifice themselves for jihad in Syria.

6) Collaboration with other organizations: Most of the Al-Nusra Front or the Islamic State attacks were not coordinated with other rebel organizations. Some were carried out in collaboration with other rebel organizations, almost all of them jihadist in nature. Only in one instance was there coordination between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in carrying out a suicide bombing attack.

7) The suicide bombers' wills: In some cases videos were posted of suicide bombers reading their wills. An analysis of the wills indicates the emphasis the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State put on the sectarian nature of the struggle between Sunnis and Alawites. Much was made of continuing the path of jihad against "infidels" as the personal duty (fard ayn) of every Muslim (according to the school of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's ideological mentor). The wills are disseminated to the Arab-Muslim world and the West by jihad websites, and their themes and messagesare transmitted to the countries of origin of the foreign fighters when they return from Syria.

Foreign Fighters in Suicide Bombing Attacks

9. Fifty-three suicide bombers participated in Al-Nusra Front and Islamic State suicide bombing attacks. Most of them were carried out by a single bomber, although in certain instances there were three, four or even five suicide bombers.

10. Of the 53 suicide bombers, we verified the names of 30: 23 foreign fighters and seven Syrians. The identities of the rest are unknown. We based our identification of their countries of origin primarily on their nicknames, which usually, although not always, indicate where they came from. We cross-referenced the nicknames with other information which in most instances helped verify their countries of origin.

11. Of the 23 foreign fighters, 13 were from Saudi Arabia (more than half). Eleven were identified as definitely Saudi Arabian and two others had nicknames linking them to Saudi Arabia. Four were verified as coming from Jordan, three were from Iraq (two Kurds identified by their nicknames), one from Tunisia (identified by nickname), one from Australia (identified by nickname) and one foreign fighter whose country of origin could not be identified. A Canadian foreign fighter apparently carried out a suicide bombing attack but his identify and the circumstances of his death could not be verified.^[2]

12. The relatively large number of foreign fighters who carried out suicide bombing attacks was mainly a function of the large number of foreign fighters in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State. In our assessment, it may also indicate their high level of jihad motivation, exploited by the two organizations. They are motivated by the jihad ideology that led them to Syria, where their motivation is fostered by religious indoctrination which increases their ideological fervor and prepares a large cadre of potential suicide bombers. However, it can be assumed that some of the foreign fighters who were offered the opportunity to carry out a suicide bombing attack refused, although the organizations do not release that information (for example, we know of an Israeli Arab who joined the ranks of the rebels and was offered the opportunity to carry out an attack but refused. In our assessment he was not unique.).

The Large Number of Saudi Arabian Suicide Bombers

13. More than half of the suicide bombers we identified were Saudi Arabian (13 of 23). Moreover, there are large numbers of foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State (the reason that relatively so many Saudi Arabians among the foreign fighters have died in Syria). Thus it is not surprising that there are many Saudis among the suicide bombers. Saudi Arabia, the principal foreign supporter of the revolt against the Assad regime, was the hothouse in which the seeds of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad were sown, despite the efforts of the Saudi regime to shirk responsibility for it (most of the terrorists who participated in the September 11, 2001 attack were of Saudi Arabian origin).

14. On the other hand, there is genuine criticism in Saudi Arabia of the young Saudis who join the ranks of organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, although that criticism has yet to be translated into steps effective enough to keep them from joining. An article published in the Saudi daily newspaper Al-Watan on January 27, 2014, countered the accusations in the Arab media against Saudi preachers that they were encouraging young Saudis to go to Syria to fight:

"There is no doubt that there are scholars and preachers, well known to the state and to members of the various schools of Islam, who instruct our young men, according to religious law, to go to Syria and even urge them to equip themselves with explosives and sacrifice their lives in vain…Unfortunately, our youngsters fuel the civil war being waged in Syria. They went there to perform a religious duty, but they lack knowledge, experience and political awareness. Their emotions have been exploited by innocent scholars, who did not know the young men would only serve interested parties and even be used by regional and global intelligence services…"

Hezbollah in the Crosshairs: Suicide Bombing Attacks Seep from Syria into Lebanon

Overview

15. Since the beginning of 2014 the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State have claimed responsibility for suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon carried out using methods familiar from the Syrian arena (suicide bombers and car bombs). Between January 2 and February 4, 2014, there were five suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon: the Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for four and the Islamic State for one. They were carried out in the southern Shi'ite suburb of Beirut and in the Shi'ite town of Hermel, in the northern Beqa'a Valley. Most of the attacks were carried out by a lone suicide bomber who detonated a car bomb.

Short Descriptions of the Suicide Bombing Attacks

16. On January 2, 2014, a car bomb was detonated in the southern suburb of Beirut by a suicide bomber. The attack targeted Hezbollah and was carried out in close proximity to some of its most important institutions. The Islamic State claimed responsibility (by means of its Twitter account, which has since been closed). The attack killed four people and wounded more than 66. The Arab media reported that the suicide bomber was Qutayba Muhammad al-Satem, 20, a student from the village of Wadi Khaled on the Syrian-Lebanese border. It was also reported that in the past he had participated in the fighting in Syria in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, January 4, 2014).

(Yemeneconomist.com) (Alhayat.com, January 4, 2014)

The Islamic State's claim of responsibility for the suicide bombing attack on January 2, 2014. It notes that the organization attacked "the party of Satan [i.e., Hezbollah]" on its own doorstep in the southern suburb of Beirut. It calls the attack "the first small installment of a long bill waiting for [payment by] the criminal infidels" (Daawla.tumbir.com).

17. On January 17, 2014, a suicide bombing attack was carried out in the Shi'ite village of Hermel in the northern Beqa'a Valley. The Lebanese media reported that a suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt blew himself up in a car bomb. The attack killed four people and wounded 38. According to the Lebanese media, the explosion occurred near government offices in Hermel in a crowded commercial area. (According to Agence France-Presse, on January 16, 2014, there was an explosion near a Hezbollah stronghold in Hermel). The Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that it had targeted a stronghold of "the party of Iran" [i.e., Hezbollah]. The attack, it said, had been carried out by one of the "Al-Nusra Front lions in Lebanon" in response to Hezbollah's crimes in Lebanon against Sunni women and children (Jihadology, January 16, 2014).

The Al-Nusra Front claims responsibility for the suicide bombing attack in Hermel (Dawaalhaq.com)

18. On January 21, 2014, there was a suicide bombing attack in the Shi'ite neighborhood of Haret Hreik in the southern suburb of Beirut. The Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility on its Twitter account. It said the attack was in response to the slaughter inflicted by "the party of Iran" [i.e., Hezbollah] on the children of Syria and Arsal^[3] (a Sunni village in the northern Beqa'a Valley, a stronghold of Hezbollah opponents). The Lebanese media reported that a lone suicide bomber blew himself up inside a car bomb. According to Al-Hayat (January 22, 2014) the car contained three 120mm mortar shells connected to 20 kilos, or 44 pounds, of explosives. The Lebanese media reported that the blast killed five people and wounded 74.

19. On February 1, 2014, there was a suicide bombing attack near a gas station on the main street of the Shi'ite village of Hermel in the northern Beqa'a Valley. A suicide bomber driving a car bomb carried out the attack. According to the Lebanese media, five people were killed and 20 wounded. The Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility on its Twitter account. It said that the attack had been carried out in "the den of the party of Iran" [i.e., a Hezbollah stronghold] because of [Hezbollah's] continuing crimes against the Syrian people.

20. On February 3, 2014, a suicide bomber blew himself up on the road passing through the Druze neighborhood of Choueifat near the southern Shi'ite suburb of Beirut. The attack killed two people and wounded several. According to the Lebanese media, the suicide bomber was wearing an explosive belt with five kilos, or 11 pounds, of explosives and was a passenger on a minibus going to the southern suburb of Beirut. According to Lebanese "security sources" he blew himself up by accident, while other sources claimed he blew himself up after the bus driver or passengers became suspicious of him (Al-Joumhouria, February 4, 2014).

21. The Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State claimed responsibility for five suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon. In addition, there was also a combined, mass-casualty suicide bombing attack carried out at the entrance to the Iranian embassy in Beirut on November 19, 2013. Responsibility was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a terrorist organization affiliated with the global jihad operating in Lebanon.^[4] Two suicide bombers blew themselves up in succession, similar to the modus operandi of the suicide bombing attacks carried out in Syria by the Al-Nusra Front in 2013, indicating that operational capabilities may have been passed from Syria to Lebanon.

Hezbollah's Response

22. Hezbollah accused the organizations operating in Syria affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad (what they refer to as the takfir organizations) of the suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon. Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah claimed they drove car bombs into Lebanon from the Al-Qalamoun mountains in Syria through the town of Arsal in the northern Beqa'a Valley. He gave a speech in which the security threat was represented as the main justification for increasing Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war.^[5] On the ground, Hezbollah instituted a series of security measures, among them piling sandbags in front of stores as protection, especially in the southern suburb of Beirut. However, so far such measures do not seem to be an effective response to the threats of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad terrorism, which have reached Hezbollah's front door.

Conclusion

23. In our assessment, the main objective of the wave of suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon is to disrupt Hezbollah's military involvement in the fighting in Syria by forcing it to deal with homeland security. The seeping of suicide bombing attacks into Lebanon from Syria may indicate that the Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State and other global jihad-affiliated organizations have improved their operational capabilities in Lebanon. Thus they pose a serious challenge to Hezbollah, which has not yet found a way to counter them. Moreover, the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State's capabilities for terrorism, which are currently being used in Syria and Lebanon, may make their way in the future to other Arab states, the Palestinian arena, and even to Israel and the Western countries.^[6]

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* Continuation of the September 23, 2013 bulletin "The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) is an Al-Qaeda Salafist-jihadi network, prominent in the rebel organizations in Syria. It seeks to overthrow the Assad regime and establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, a center for regional and international terrorism and subversion."
^[1]See the INSS Insight No. 507 by Yotam Rosner, Einav Yogev at Yoram Schweitzer, "A Report on Suicide Bombings in 2013," January 14, 2014, at http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6408. According to the report, in 2013 291 suicide bombing attacks were carried out in 18 countries and led to approximately 3,100 deaths. About 50% of the attacks (148) were carried out in the Middle East, 98 of them in Iraq. The statistics may indicate that Syria has become the second largest arena for suicide bombing attacks, after Iraq, for Al-Qaeda and the global jihad.
^[2]At the beginning of February 2014, a suicide bomber from Britain was identified. The Al-Nusra Front released a video of a British foreign fighter who carried out a suicide bombing attack during an attack on a prison in Aleppo (February 6, 2014). He was Abd al-Wahid Majed, who drove a truck bomb into the prison and blew himself up in it.
^[3]On January 18, 2013, five siblings were killed by a rocket hit in Arsal. Hezbollah was accused but that was not verified.
^[4]For further information see the November 27, 2013 bulletin "Mass-casualty double suicide bombing attack carried out at the Iranian embassy in Beirut.”
^[5]For further information see the December 25, 2013 bulletin “In late 2013, Hezbollah again intensified its military involvement in the Syrian civil war, suffering heavy losses.”
^[6]Updated evidence of the intention of creating an operational connection between the global jihad network in Israel and the operatives in Syria was revealed by the exposure of three operatives of a network affiliated the global jihad at the end of December 2013. Two of them were residents of east Jerusalem and were handled by an operative from the Gaza Strip, mainly through the Internet. The network planned, among other attacks, to carry out a double suicide bombing attack, simultaneously bombing the International Conference Center in Jerusalem and the American embassy in Tel Aviv. One of the operatives was supposed to go to Syria via Turkey for military training and coordination for the planned attack (Israel Security Agency website and Haaretz, January 23, 2014).

Foreign Fighters in Syria

Published: 01/01/2014

Foreign fighters join the ranks of the jihad in Syria (Nl.media.rbth.ru website)

An American fighter calling himself Abu Dujana al-Amriki, killed in the fighting in Syria.

The unit of immigrants composed mainly of Chechens (Channel4.com, June 14, 2013). Fighters from Arab and other Muslim countries also serve in the unit.

The pictures of 32 foreign fighters killed in fighting the Syrian regime, documented on the dedicated Facebook page (Rightsidenews.com website, April 24 2013). In our assessment most of them belonged to jihadist networks affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

Foreign fighters in Syria (SANA, June 19, 2013)

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This past year saw a marked increase in the involvement of foreigners in the fighting against the Syrian regime. Most join Al-Qaeda- and global jihad-affiliated organizations, gain military experience, and undergo radicalization and jihadization. They are liable to import continue terrorist and subversive activities to their countries of origin when they return (the "Afghanistan model").

Number of Foreign Fighters

1. This study analyzes the phenomenon of foreign fighters participating in the fighting in Syria, most of them in organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. It examines the numbers of foreign fighters coming from the main countries of origin, profiles the fighters and illustrates their potential for terrorism and subversion upon their return to their home countries. It is a continuation of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center's September 2013 study of the Al-Nusra Front and other organizations in Syria affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad.^[1]Analyses of the individual countries and regions from which the fighters come will be issued in the near future.

2. In the civil war in Syria, which has lasted for almost three years, two main organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad gained a foothold, and most of the foreign fighters join them. The most prominent is the Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), a branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Its main competitor is a jihadist organization called the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, a branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. As of December 2013, the two organizations have a combined membership of an estimated 9,000 fighters. Salafist-jihadi organizations not affiliated with Al-Qaeda also operate in Syria. They collaborate with the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in fighting the Syrian regime, logistically and in administering areas taken over by the rebels (the so-called "liberated areas").

3. Our overall estimate of the number of foreign fighters in Syria is between 6,000 and 7,000, from dozens of countries,^[2] and the number continually rises. Most of them (an estimated 6,000) have remained in Syria and participate in the fighting, primarily in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State. Some of them (an estimated 1,000) either returned to their countries of origin or were killed or wounded in the fighting, or captured by the Syrian army. We estimate the number of foreign fighters killed at about 500-700, that is, between 8% and 10% of the total number.

4. Most of the foreign fighters come from the Arab world. We estimate their number at about 4,500, from Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Others come from Western Europe and other Western countries, especially young men who are second and sometimes third generation Muslim immigrants (especially Europeans of Moroccan extraction). We estimate their number at more than 1,000.^[3] Most of them come from Belgium, Britain, France, Holland and Germany. A third group is represented by fighters who come from Muslim countries and Muslim regions in Asia, and they number an estimated 500. Among them are skilled operatives, some with previous military-terrorist experience gained in Chechnya and Pakistan.

5. There are still relatively few Israeli Arabs and Palestiniansfighting in Syria. An estimated 15-20 are Israeli Arabs, there are dozens of Gazans whose number has risen sharply, and several score from Lebanon and Syria (especially from the Eyn al-Hilweh refugee camp in south Lebanon), and a few individual fighters from Judea and Samaria. Among the fighters from Jordan, those of Palestinian extraction are prominent. Most of the Palestinian fighters join the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations.

An American fighter calling himself Abu Dujana al-Amriki, killed in the fighting in Syria. He appears in an Islamic State video; behind him is the Al-Qaeda flag. He says that "…this is a message for the people of the West from the jihad fighters in Syria. We have come from all nationalities to defend our land, this Islamic land, to spread the Sharia of Allah on the face of the earth and to sacrifice our lives and souls for jihad. We have come to kill all those who stand in our way. This flag [of Al-Qaeda] will yet wave over the capitals of [all] the countries in the world]. With this simple weapon [pointing to the rifle he carries] we will liberate our lands and our people and bring Islamic law [the Sharia] to rule over the entire earth…" (Weaselzippers.us website

The Potential Danger of Foreign Fighters

6. The foreign fighters in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and Islamic State are a potential threat to international security. Some of them, having gained military experience and skills, and undergone Islamic jihadization and radicalization, are liable continue their terrorist and subversive activities when they return to their countries of origin. In addition, some of them may join already extant terrorist networks and become a catalyst for Islamic radicalization. Upon return they may be handled by Al-Qaeda and global jihad organizations, exploiting the personal relationships formed in Syria with other fighters. However, it is possible that only a small number of the returning foreign fighters will be enlisted into the ranks of the global jihad and will attempt to promote terrorism and subversion in their countries of origin. However, in our assessment, it is sufficient for Al-Qaeda and global jihad organizations to create a network of skilled manpower in order to carry out terrorist attacks, as happened after the war in Afghanistan.

7. Analysis of the foreign fighters indicates that the potential level of danger is higher for Western European countries (especially those with large communities of Muslim immigrants). That is because of the following factors: the relatively large number of fighters from Western Europe; their hostility to the West and its values they absorb while in Syria (often intensifying their own feelings of deprivation and frustration); Syria's geographical proximity to Western Europe; the relative logistic and operational ease of maintaining contact between the leadership of Al-Qaeda and global jihad organizations in Syria and the terrorist and subversive networks in Europe; and the legal, political and societal difficulties encountered when combating Islamic terrorism on European soil. Moreover Al-Qaeda and the global jihad are liable to activate the veterans of the war in Syria for terrorist acts not only in Europe itself but in other Western countries as well, such as the United States (as they were activated in the United States during the events of September 11, 2001).

8. Another potential threat is that returning foreign fighters will be employed for terrorist and subversive purposes in Arab or Muslim countries (especially in the Middle East and Central Asia). Some groups of foreign fighters have already finished their fighting ours in Syria and returned to their countries of origin. The countries involved would include Arab countries not yet affected by the regional upheaval (such Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Persian Gulf) but which support the rebels; Arab countries that have been affected but which were not taken over by Islamist organizations and which lack an effective central administration (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia); and countries and areas where the embers of Islamist jihad still smolder (Chechnya and various Muslim communities under Russian rule).

9. The State of Israel is also liable to be exposed to such threats, even if not necessarily in the near future (since the first priority of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad organizations is to overthrow the Assad regime). That is the result of the fact that a limited number of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria have joined the fighting. Fighters who fought in Syria may endanger Israel in the following ways: Israeli Arabs, veterans of the war in Syria, may be handled for espionage, subversion and terrorism; Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria may undertake subversive and terrorist missions (jihadists returning to the Gaza Strip may endanger both the de-facto Hamas administration and Egypt); and their presence of veterans of the Syrian war may increase the operational capabilities of Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist networks along Israel's borders (Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip).

10. Thus the issue of foreign fighters has become a global problem shared by the West, Israel and the Arab-Muslim world. Western countries which in the past underwent the trauma of the "Afghanistan alumni" exploited by Al-Qaeda for terrorist purposes are aware of the dangers, but so far they have not developed effective methods to deal with them (in the fields of monitoring, prevention, legislation and punishment). The returning foreign fighters are a ticking time bomb which can only be defused by international cooperation and joint systems to neutralize their terrorist-subversive potential.

Methodological Remarks

11. This study is a comprehensive examinationof the foreign fighters in Syria, and is based on an analysis and the cross-referencing of a large amount of information from various Arabic and Western open sources. Some of the sources dealt with the Syrian civil war in general, and some related to the specific details of each of individual countries involved. In our study we used publications issued by think tanks and experts in Western countries, mainly the United States and Great Britain. Especially helpful were the articles written by Aaron Y. Zelin from the Washington Institute, who monitors the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria and runs the "Jihadology" website. We found useful information on websites reporting on foreign fighters killed in Syria, especially those sites affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. The analysis of the foreign fighters killed in Syria also provided valuable information about the live foreign fighters.

12. There were, however, many difficulties in analyzing the phenomenon of foreign fighters:

1) Dynamics: The Syrian civil war is far from over and the numbers of foreign fighters are not static. During the second half of 2013 there was a significant increase in the number of foreign fighters who joined the rebels. On the other hand, groups of foreigners finished their fighting tours, returned to their home countries and were replaced by new groups, while other fighters were killed, wounded or captured.

2) Monitoring: The authorities in the countries of origin, mainly Western countries, are faced with many difficulties in monitoring the passage of the fighters to and from Syria (related to monitoring, legal, political and societal issues). On occasion information arrives only after the foreign fighters have been killed.

3) Secrecy: The foreign fighters and the networks supporting them usually try to hide the fact that they have gone to Syria, especially to fight in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and other organizations affiliated with the global jihad. The Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations are usually careful not to reveal the true identities of the fighters and in most cases they use either nicknames or false names. In many instances the fighters do not tell their families why they are really leaving the country, either for personal reasons or reasons of security (in some cases the family only finds out that the fighter has gone to Syria or after he dies in the fighting and information about him is posted on the Internet).

4) Distribution of fighters among the various units: Generally speaking the fighters are spread among many different military units operating in various geographical areas. One exceptional example was the concentration of foreign fighter in an organic unit of several hundred commanded by a Chechen jihadist (Abu Omar the Chechen), most of whose members were Chechen or other foreign fighters.^[4] Many units have fighters from many different countries together with local Syrian fighters.

5) Transfer between military units: Some of the foreign fighters join the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front or other Salafist-jihadi organizations. In other instances they join the Free Syrian Army and other nationalist Syrian organizations, but transfer from one to another. Many of them, for a variety of reasons (a more attractive extremist ideology, better conditions, higher motivation and morale), eventually find themselves in organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad for a variety of reasons: more attractive, extremist ideology; better conditions (including pay); better military capabilities in comparison with other rebel organizations; the influence of veterans of other Islamic combat zones; and higher motivation and morale.

6) Large number of countries: The foreign fighters come from scores of countries (We have counted almost fifty but according to another estimate there are more than seventy.). However, the hard core comes from the Arab-Muslim world with others from Muslim communities in Western European and other countries around the globe. Sometimes there are only isolated foreign fighters from each country and sometimes several hundred, and in certain instances more than a thousand.

Terminology

13. Generally speaking, the Western media refer to the young men who join the ranks of the rebels as foreign fighters or jihad fighters, or sometimes jihad volunteers. Most of them go to Syria because of religious, sectarian or jihadist ideological motivation. Thus they are not mercenaries in the classical sense, since they are not paid or receive extraordinary benefits.

14. However, the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations use their own complimentary terminology rooted in the early days of Islam.

1) Al-ghurabaa: Literally, foreigners (singular al-gharib). The term comes from the oral Islamic tradition of Muhammad (the hadiths), according to which "Islam began as an alien growth within a non-Muslim space and it will again be an alien growth [to break forth again]. Blessed be the foreigners." Thus, as the first Muslims were a tiny minority, aliens among masses of non-Muslims, in the fullness of time their numbers grew, and so Islam will break forth again after it is again an alien growth among masses of non-Muslims. According to the hadith, "blessed be the foreigners [al-ghurabaa]," hinting that paradise will be their reward. According to Islamic exegesis, the renewal of Islam is one of the signs that the end of days is approaching, when heresy becomes prevalent and as a result Islam rises again. Thus the term ghurabaa refers to the fighters in Syria as the vanguard of the renewed Islam. The analogy is made between the first Muslims and the foreigners fighting in Syria to glorify the foreign fighters as pioneering the renewal of Islam (Ar.islamway.net website).

2) Al-muhajirun/muhajirin: Literally, immigrants. The term refers to the first small group of Muslim believers who supported the prophet Muhammad and migrated with him from Mecca to Al-Madinah, and were the nucleus of the Islamic nation. Currently, in the wake of the influence of the jihadist ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who was executed in Egypt in 1966, the term has acquired the secondary meaning of Islamists who leave Muslim society to found a new nation, on the grounds of the claim that other Muslims are not sufficiently orthodox in their beliefs are in effect like infidels. By implication and analogy, the foreigners fighting in Syria are like the first Muslims who pioneered the spread of Islam.

3) Al-ansar: Literally, supporters. The term refers to those who supported Muhammad in Al-Madinah and stood by him when he emigrated from Mecca. They are counted among the first converts to Islam and were instrumental in spreading Islam. In the Syrian context al-ansar refers to the vanguard helping to spread Islam in Syria and beyond.

The Structure of The Study

15. This study contains the following sections:

1) The appearance of foreign fighters in Islamic arenas of confrontation

2) The estimated number of foreign fighters

i) Overall estimate

ii) Estimates provided by Western think tanks and experts

iii) Monitoring fatalities

3) Overall profile of the foreign fighters

i) Overview

ii) Motivation

iii) Preparing for jihad in Syria

iv) Military capabilities

v) Suicide bombers

vi) Countries of origin

vii Center vs. outlying districts

viii) Age

ix) Religion

x) Education

4) Arrival in Syria

i) Recruitment

ii) Journey

iii) Length of stay

iv) Distribution of foreign fighters to various units

v) Return to country of origin

vi) Difficulties in monitoring and oversight

16. In this section of the study we have collated the overall findings of research done on foreign fighters. The individual studies of foreign fighters in their countries of origin are in preparation and will be issued in four aspects in the near future:

1) Western countries

2) The Arab world

3) Muslim and non-Muslim countries in Asia

4) Israeli Arabs and Palestinians

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^[1]For a comprehensive analysis of the organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad participating in fighting the regime in Syria, see the September 19, 2013 bulletin 'The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) is an Al-Qaeda Salafist-jihadi network, prominent in the rebel organizations in Syria."
^[2]We have identified almost 50 countries from which the foreign fighters come. According to the updated estimate of Aaron Y. Zelin (December 17, 2013), they come from 74 different countries.
^[3]According to other estimates, the number of European fighters in Syria is between 1,500 and 2,000, in our assessment, an exaggeration.
^[4]Such a unit was called katibat al-muhajirin (battalion of immigrants, that is, foreign fighters). As the unit increased in number it was called kataib al-muhajirin (immigrant battalions) and eventually jaish al-muhajirin wal-ansar (army of immigrants and supporters). In this study they will be called the immigrant unit. According to Aaron Y, Zelin, this military unit is linked to the Islamic State, but in our assessment is also affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front.

The Al-Nusra Front played a major role in the rebel takeover of a large Syrian army arsenal southeast of Homs.

Published: 14/11/2013

Some of the crates of weapons and ammunition seized; the black flag belongs to the Al-Nusra Front (Jalnosra.com website)

Anti-aircraft weapons seized in Mahin (Jalnosra.com website), apparently Soviet Shilka ZSU-23-4 system.

Konkurs anti-tank missiles

Crates of weapons and ammunition. Mortar shells can be seen in the open box in the center (Jalnosra.com website)

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The weapons may contribute to the organization's military capabilities and be transferred to regional Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations.

Overview

1. On November 5, 2013, organizations of Syrian rebels, including the Free Syrian Army and the Al-Nusra Front took control of a Syrian army precinct in the village of Mahin, southeast of the city of Homs. They took over an arsenal considered one of the largest in Syria. The takeover occurred during a large rebel military operation called the "The doors of Allah which are not slammed shut." The Al-Nusra Front, which glorified its role, issued photographs of scores if not hundreds of crates of weapons seized in the operation (See below).

2. According to statements issued by the rebels, they seized large quantities of anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers and Grad rockets. In addition large quantities of light arms and ammunition were also seized. The Free Syrian Army forum listed the weapons as follows: 10,000 Grad rockets, 10,000 107mm rockets, more than 20,000 120mm mortar shells, more than 10,000 anti-tank shells, thousands of Kornet anti-tank missiles, thousands of RPG launchers, thousands of hand grenades and mines, thousands of Kalashnikov assault rifles and machines guns, and large quantities of ammunition (Syrianfreearmy.com, November 9, 2013). On YouTube, one of the rebel leaders said that "the next stage will be to move the weapons to a secure area and then to distribute them to all fronts."^[1]

3. The takeover of the Syrian army arsenal provided the Al-Nusra Front with an important source of weapons. One of the organization's senior commanders previously said that they did not lack weapons because in one of the raids on a Syrian army base they acquired more weapons than they could have gotten from sources outside Syria.^[2] During 2012 and 2013 the Al-Nusra Front has displayed a variety of weapons, including anti-tank missiles that fell into their hands during fighting (See Appendix). However, compared to the past, the weapons seized in Mahin were exceptional, both in quantity and apparently in quality.

4. The takeover of the Mahin arsenal was a success for the rebel forces in general and the Al-Nusra Front in particular. It demonstrated the Al-Nusra Front's dominance among the rebel forces and its ability to collaborate with other rebel organizations (much more than its Al-Qaeda-affiliated rival, the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria).

5. In our assessment, the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations will try to take over other Syrian arsenals, including those with advanced weapons which will be used against the Syrian regime. Moreover, some of the seized weapons may be transferred to global jihad-affiliated terrorist organizations in other arenas, especially weapons found attractive, such as rockets and anti-tank missiles (similar to the Libyan model after the fall of the Gadhafi regime, when Libya became a source of weapons for global jihad organizations throughout the entire region.). Possible arenas include Lebanon, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, where Al-Qaeda- and global jihad-affiliated terrorist networks operate.

Description of the Takeover of the Syrian Arsenal According to the Al-Nusra Front

6. According to the (slanted) version of the arsenal takeover issued by the Al-Nusra Front, it began on October 21, 2013. Two two suicide bombers drove vehicles loaded with explosives (a modus operandi characteristic of the Al-Nusra Front). The vehicles were driven to Syrian army bases in the town of Sadad, just to the northwest of Mahin They blew themselves up, killing an estimated one hundred Syrian soldiers. A battle followed, ending with the Al-Nusra Front takeover of the bases. Reinforced by other Islamist organizations, the Al-Nusra Front attacked the arsenal in Mahin.

7. The last stage of the fighting at Mahin lasted from November 2 to 5, 2013, ending when Al-Nusra Front operatives, with assistance from the other organizations, took control of the arsenal. Several Syrian officers were killed during the fighting. The statement issued by the Al-Nusra Front ended with its hope that the weapons and ammunition would "fuel the break of the siege on Homs and the eastern environs [of Damascus]" (Jalnosra.com website).

Part of the statement issued by the Al-Nusra Front about "The doors of Allah which are not slammed shut" (Jalnosra.com website). It glorifies the part played by the Al-Nusra Front in taking over the arsenal at Mahin.

8. The Free Syrian Army and other rebel organizations also participated in the takeover of the Mahin arsenal. Al-Marsad Al-Souri, a Syrian human rights organization that monitors the events in the country, reported that the Al-Nusra Front was assisted by other organizations in the takeover, among them the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq) and the Al-Khadraa' Brigade, which belongs to a jihadist organization called the Harakat Ahrar al-Sham (the Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant) (Aawsat.com website).

Pictures of the Arsenal Issued by the Al-Nusra Front

Crates of weapons and ammunition draped with the Al-Nusra Front flag (Jalnosra.com website)

A rebel commander from an organization that participated in the takeover with the Al-Nusra Front reports that the storerooms held anti-tank missiles and Grad rockets. He added that the next stage would be to transfer the weapons to a secure area and from there to distribute them to all the fronts.

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^[1]Note: On November 15, 2013, (after this bulletin was issued) Syrian media affiliated with the regime reported that the Syrian army had succeeded in retaking the arsenal. It can be assumed that during the period between the time the rebels took over the arsenal and the time it was retaken by the Syrian army, and assuming that the report of the retaking was accurate, the Al-Nusra Front and its allies managed to remove at least some of the arms and transfer them to other locations.

^[2]For further information see the September 17, 2013 bulletin “The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) is an Al-Qaeda Salafist-jihadi network, prominent in the rebel organizations in Syria.”

Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Al-Qaeda, urges jihadist forces fighting the Assad regime in Syria to unite in a common struggle to establish an Islamic Caliphate.

Published: 16/10/2013

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Al-Qaeda leader Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri (Connectionivoirienne.net website, October 11, 2013)

Overview

1. On October 11, 2013, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda, issued a new audio message disseminated by the Islamist websites. He gave his evaluation of the recent events in the Middle East, focusing on Syria and Egypt. Regarding Syria, he urged the Islamists fighting there to unite in a common struggle against the Syrian regime and to stop collaborating with secular forces. In our assessment, he was referring to the dispute between the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq) and the Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra, the branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria directly subordinate to Ayman al-Zawahiri). Thereby he urged the two rival organizations to end their dispute and unite (For the dispute between them and its roots, see the Appendix).

2. Al-Zawahiri stated that all Muslims had to unite to overthrow the Syrian regime and establish a jihadist Islamic country in Syria. That, he said, would open the way to the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate and the "liberation of Jerusalem." He said, among other things, the following:

1) "I urge the brothers, the jihad fighters in blessed Syria [Al-Sham], to unite and come together and agree that soon, in Greater Syria [Al-Sham], if Allah so wishes, an Islamic state will arise that will be governed by the Sharia [Islamic religious law]."

2) "Lions of Al-Sham [Syria], unite for the sake of this noble cause, rise above the divisions between the various organizations and splintered groups and with mutual agreement, good will and desire in your souls, establish a strong Islamic state."

3) "Our brothers in Syria of the jihad and the ribat [frontier],^[1] keep yourselves from entering into an agreement with those [factions which] are secular, with those who want to be like the Americans and atheists at the expense of the sovereignty of the Sharia and the laws of Islam."

3. On the ground, reports continue of acts of violence and cruelty perpetrated by both organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda. On October 11, 2013, a Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report accusing the Islamist rebels in Syria, among them operatives of the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, of war crimes. According to the report, some of the rebel organizations fighting in the rural areas around Latakia executed innocent civilians and carried out war crimes and crimes against humanity targeting Alawite women, children and the aged. The report also stated that in an attack occurring on August 4, 2013, at least 190 civilians were killed, 67 of them killed execution-style. In addition, more than 200 civilians were taken hostage (HRW website, October 11, 2013).

Assessment

4. There has been an ongoing dispute between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. It came to a head in June 2013 when Ayman al-Zawahiri recognized the Al-Nusra Front as an independent branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria, not subordinate to the Iraqi branch. His ruling, however, did not settle the dispute, but rather worsened it and widened the split between the sides. Thus the split was translated into the establishment of two organizations with separate military, logistic and propaganda systems. It also led to several violent clashes between the two.

5. In our assessment, it is doubtful whether al-Zawahiri's open appeal will in fact mend the rift between the two branches of Al-Qaeda. However, it may, at least in the short run, lessen the friction and competition between them and lead to greater cooperation in fighting their common enemy, the Syrian regime. On the other hand, al-Zawahiri's warning against collaboration with secular and pro-American organizations may deepen the fundamental hostility between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria on the one hand, and the Free Syrian Army, the network representing most of the rebel groups in Syria on the other.

Appendix

The roots of the split between the jihadist organizations fighting in Syria^{^[2]}

1. The Iraqi and Syrian branches of Al-Qaeda in Syria are divided, operating as competing and sometimes hostile organizations. The Al-Nusra Front was established in Syria by Al-Qaeda's Iraqi branch, which ran it. Initially its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, apparently took orders from the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who in effect controlled the Al-Nusra Front. Later on, apparently because of disputes between the leaders of the organizations, on April 9, 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi issued an audiotape announcing the unification of the organizations in Iraq and Syria into the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (Al-Sham) (YouTube.com).

2. The following day, April 10, 2013, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of Al-Qaeda's branch in Syria, swore allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri, who was forced to take a stand in the power struggle between the two branches, on June 10, 2013, announced the dissolution of the union between the Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq. In a letter sent to Al-Nusra Front operatives in Syria, al-Zawahiri said that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had been in error when he announced the union "without our approval, without consulted with us and without informing us." Accordingly, al-Zawahiri called on the two branches to cooperate with each other "and stop verbally or physically attacking each other" (Annahar, June 10, 2013, quoting a letter obtained by Al-Jazeera TV from "reliable sources in Syria).

3. That signaled al-Zawahiri's recognition of the Al-Nusra Front as Al-Qaeda's branch in Syria and not subordinate to the Iraqi branch, which should have ended the dispute. However, instead of ending it, his declaration exacerbated the disputes between the supporters of Al-Julani and those of Al-Baghdadi, causing them to drift further apart and weakening them both (at least temporarily). The disputes were also a challenge to Al-Zawahiri's command, because the leadership of the Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq commanded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi publicly refused to obey Al-Zawahiri’s orders. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi rejected Al-Zawahiri’s ruling, questioned its authenticity and insisted that the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria should continue to exist as an autonomous political entity reflecting common efforts of jihad in Iraq and Syria.^[3]

4. Ayman al-Zawahiri was again challenged by a statement made by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, the official spokesman of the Islamic State in Iraq. On June 19, 2013, al-Shami posted a video on YouTube expressing his annoyance with al-Zawahiri's decision to dissolve the union between the two Al-Qaeda branches, saying that the Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq was determined to continue operating in Syria at the side of the Al-Nusra Front. He added that the split between jihad fighters in Syria resulting from al-Zawahiri's remarks had harmed the unity and morale of the jihad fighters, some of whom had returned to Iraq, or stayed at home to avoid a civil war or joined other rebel groups. For the time being, however, it appears that the initial shock has passed and both Al-Qaeda branches have entrenched themselves as independent organizations in the Syrian theatre of operations.

5. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani relied on Islamist ideology to explain the refusal of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda branch to follow Al-Zawahiri’s orders. He said that Islam did not recognize the artificial borders determined by the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916). Therefore, dividing the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria into two organizations, one Iraqi and the other Syrian, “contradicts our view and our faith.” Al-Adnani concluded by saying that “no one will prevent us from helping our brothers in Syria, fighting the Nusayris [i.e., Alawites], and waging jihad; no one will prevent us from staying in Syria. The lands of Syria and Iraq will remain one arena, one front with no boundaries to separate them” (YouTube, June 19, 2013).

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^[1]The term ribat refers to the outposts of Islam in the frontier where Muslims are liable to fight against their enemies.
^[2]For further information see the September 17, 2013 bulletin “The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) is an Al-Qaeda Salafist-jihadi network, prominent in the rebel organizations in Syria. It seeks to overthrow the Assad regime and establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, a center for regional and international terrorism and subversion.”
^[3]See Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi’s article for Syria Comment (July 13, 2013), "Where does Jabhat al-Nusra end and the Islamic State of Iran and ash-Sham begin?" Also see MEMRI Report No. 983, June 18, 2013, "Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda in Iraq squabble over leadership of jihad in Syria."

The Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) is an Al-Qaeda Salafist-jihadi network, prominent in the rebel organizations in Syria.

Published: 17/09/2013

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It seeks to overthrow the Assad regime and establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, a center for regional and international terrorism and subversion.

The insignia of the Al-Nusra Front (whose full name is the Front for Assistance to the Residents of Greater Syria). It shows the map of Syria, the Islamic crescent and the silhouette of a jihad fighter (Almadenahnews.com website)

Overview

Al-Qaeda Entrenchment in Syria

1. During the Syrian civil war two branches of Al-Qaeda established themselves among the rebel organizations fighting to overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad. The most prominent is the Al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), directly subordinate to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The other is The Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, subordinate to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. In addition, other Salafist-jihadi military organizations not necessarily affiliated with Al-Qaeda operate in Syria. The two Al-Qaeda branches have an estimated 6,000-7,000 operatives, and in our assessment the number is growing.

2. This study deals mainly with the Al-Nusra Front,^[1] an organization established at the end of January 2012, ten months after the outbreak of the Syrian uprising. Initially it operated as a branch of the Islamic State in Iraq, a Salafist-jihadi umbrella network affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq. To make its status official, in April 2012 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, announced the union of the two organizations, to be called "The Islamic State in Iraq and in Al-Sham (Greater Syria)." However, the union was not honored by the Al-Nusra Front and was annulled by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in June 2013, who said the Front was the official Al-Qaeda branch in Syria. That resulted in a split between the two branches of Al-Qaeda in Syria and today they are antagonistic toward both each other and rivals.

3. The Al-Nusra Front identifies with Al-Qaeda's Salafist-jihadi ideology. It seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, which includes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which will be ruled by religious Islamic law (the Shari’ah). The Al-Nusra Front is hostile to Israel and the West, rejects Western values (among them democracy, pluralism and freedom of worship) and objects to all Western intervention in the Syrian civil war. It is also hostile to Syria's minority sects and religions, especially the Alawites and the Shi'ites, whom it regards as infidels. The path of jihad is its proclaimed strategy for toppling the Syrian regime and realizing its other far-reaching objectives, and it regards jihad as the personal duty of every Muslim (following the teachings of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's ideological mentor).

4. Both the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria seek to promote long-term strategies: the first stage is to gain a hold over the rebel groups and establish a strong foundation in Syria for jihad, which will support the overthrow of the Assad regime. That will be done through collaboration (even if only partial and temporary) with other groups of rebels, especially those with Islamic affiliation. The second stage will be to take over the new Syrian regime formed by the union of all the Salafist-jihadi forces operating in Damascus, or at least to gain significant influence in it. The third stage will be for the jihadist regime established in Damascus (or for any other regime with a jihadist orientation) to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, serving as the front line for Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in the heart of the Middle East. It will wage a terrorist campaign against Israel from the Golan Heights, export terrorism to the West and other countries around the world and be a center for Islamic subversion and terrorism against the pro-Western Arab and Islamic countries.

Assessment of the Al-Nusra Front's Military Capabilities

5. The Al-Nusra Front isthe most prominent Salafist-jihadi organization fighting in the Syrian civil war and is headed by a leader called an Amir ("leader," a common title in contemporary jihadist organizations). It refers to a leader with both political and religious authority, as was set down at the dawn of Islam. Subordinate to him are local leaders (u'maraa) in Syria's cities and governorates (sometimes there is more than one amir in a governorate). The highest body in the Al-Nusra Front Is the Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen (the Consulting Council of the Jihad Fighters). Within the leadership there are designated staff and operatives dealing with military operations, fund raising, acquiring weapons and smuggling them into Syria, religious affairs, information and public relations. The Al-Nusra Front operates military units in the various governorates. They are usually called battalions or companies. They are accompanied by governance, religious and information networks, whose objective is to strengthen the Al-Nusra Front's influence among the people, gain their trust and fill the void created by the collapse of Syrian administration in broad areas of Syria.

6. The Al-Nusra Front leader on the ground goes by the name of Abu Muhammad al-Julani (there are contradicting, unverified versions of his real name). He is apparently a Syrian, possibly from the Golan Heights, who gained operational experience in Iraq fighting the United States and its allies. In the past, he was a follower of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led the jihad fighters sent to Iraq by Al-Qaeda after the American invasion in March 2003. After the outbreak of the uprising in Syria, Abu Muhammad al-Julani was sent there by Al-Qaeda in Iraq to establish the Al-Nusra Front. Other Al-Qaeda operatives who gained experience in Iraq are also prominent in the Al-Nusra Front command, while the rank and file is made up of Syrian operatives and thousands of jihad fighters from the Arab-Muslim world (particularly Libya, Tunisia, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and many hundreds from the West (prominent among whom are 500-600 volunteers from Europe, mainly France and the UK).Those who survive are expected to return to their home countries when the fighting in Syria is over and spread jihad to their native countries (there are an estimated 5,000 foreign nationals fighting in Syria today, most of them in the Al-Nusra Front).

7. The Al-Nusra Front has issued claims of responsibility for hundreds of attacks. Its operations, and those of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, focus on Damascus and its environs, and areas in northern and eastern Syria (Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Idlib and Deir ez-Zor). The Al-Nusra Front also conducts intensive military activities in the region of Daraa, in southwestern Syria, where the uprising against the Assad regime began. In several governorates in northern and eastern Syria the Al-Nusra Front enjoys considerable power and influence over the local population (in collaboration with other Islamic organizations). Along the coast, however, where the Alawite population lives (Tartus and Latakia regions), or in the Al-Suwayda Governorate in southern Syria, where the Druze population is dominant, the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations do not have a significant military presence or civil administration. The Al-Nusra Front is also trying to obtain a foothold in the Golan Heights. In our assessment, it does not yet have a significant military foothold, although in one instance it carried out a suicide bombing attack in the village of Sasa, harming an important symbol of the Syrian regime. (The attack destroyed military intelligence headquarters of the Quneitra Governorate).

8. In the governorates noted above the Al-Nusra Front wages a guerilla-terrorist campaign against bases, facilities and individuals affiliated with the Syrian army and regime (especially the army and security forces, and government institutions). Its objectives are to create chaos for the regime and its supporters and to sever connections between the various governmental regions, disrupt their ability to govern, and to give the Al-Nusra Front (and other rebel groups) control over large territories, especially in northern and eastern Syria. To that end the Al-Nusra Front employs a variety of combat tactics: car bombs detonated by suicide bombers or remote control; suicide bombing attacks using explosive belts; attacking bases, facilities and airfields with light arms and mortars; detonating IEDs along main roads (the organization's operatives gained experience in using IEDs in Iraq); and attacking army and security force roadblocks.

9. Suicide bombing attacks are the signature brand of the Al-Nusra Front (the organization has claimed responsibility for most of those carried out in Syria). Suicide bombing attacks, especially those attacking Syrian regime centers in Damascus and Aleppo, have given the Al-Nusra Front an operational bonus painful to the Syrian regime, but successful attacks create a negative image. The West and Arab-Muslim countries have become increasingly worried about the infiltration of Al-Qaeda elements into the ranks of the rebels and in consequence are less willing to support the opponents of the Syrian regime. In addition, the suicide bombing attacks alienate some of the Syrian public because they are sometimes carried out indiscriminately, killing innocent civilians who were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Apparently, the use of suicide bombings was inspired by Iraq, where for many years Al-Qaeda organizations have carried out mass-casualty attacks which kill and maim many civilians.

10. The Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations collaborate with Islamic rebel groups that do not necessarily share Al-Qaeda's ideology. There is also ad-hoc collaboration between them and the Free Syrian Army, the organization leading the fighting against the Syrian regime, which is Syrian nationalist and secular in character (although many of its fighters clearly have an Islamic affiliation). In several areas there is military collaboration between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, despite their rivalry. On the other hand, there is tension between on the one hand the Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations, and on the other the Free Syrian Army, which in some instances deteriorated into violent confrontations. There are also tensions within the Salafist-jihadi organizations. At this point, as long as fighting the Syrian army, their common enemy, continues, they are willing to contain their basic differences to prevent deterioration to a general confrontation. However, the morning after, and perhaps before, a violent struggle is liable to break out to determine the nature and image of the future Syrian regime, in which the Al-Nusra Front is expected to play an important role.

Assisting the Syrian Population

11. Many areas in northern and eastern Syria which fell under the influence of the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel groups have turned into what are known as "liberated zones." For the Al-Nusra Front it is particularly important to provide local Syrian residents with support and assistance and to establish an alternative rule in areas where the Syrian regime is no longer sovereign. To that end the Al-Nusra Front has set up designated bodies in the various zones. They distribute food, clothing, blankets and other necessary items and operate legal, policing, educational and health systems. Western correspondents who visited the liberated zones reported in most cases that the local residents were satisfied with their lives, which had returned to normal after the collapse of local Syrian governance. However, in some places, complaints were heard, especially about the strict code of behavior that had been enforced (the insistence on "modest" dress for women, for example) and acts of cruelty (takeover of resources, execution of prisoners, maltreatment of minority sects).

12. In northern Syria the Al-Nusra Front and its allies successfully took over vital governmental facilities, among them oil and gas fields and pipelines, dams, power plants and grain silos. They and other rebel groups operate the facilities, sometimes in tacit agreement with the Syrian regime (delivering oil and gas to the regime they are fighting in return for payment). The profits (especially from the oil fields) provide the Al-Nusra Front with a high monthly income enabling it to pay its operatives' salaries, purchase weapons and assist the population.

Evaluation of Risks for Israel, the West and the Pro-Western Arab-Muslim Countries

13. The civil war turned Syria into a magnet for Al-Qaeda and global jihad operatives, and they continue to arrive in large numbers. Jihadist fighters who came to Syria from Iraq, other Arab-Muslim countries and the West joined the local Syrian operatives and established jihadist organizations which include the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. Some of the volunteers joined the Free Syrian Army and other Islamic military organizations not affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. Some of them moved from one organization to another and wound up in jihadist organizations with upgraded military capabilities and strong ideological attraction. However, at this point it is difficult to predict how the civil war will end, what the relative power of the Al-Nusra Front and the other jihadist organizations will be, what the balance of power will be between the various organizations affiliated with the global jihad and the national Syrian organizations or the Islamic Syrian organizations, and how the events of the second wave of regional upheaval in Egypt will influence the power of the various organizations and further developments.

14. In any event, at this time (summer 2013), the Al-Nusra Front, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and a number of European countries, is one of the prominent organizations among the rebels. That is because of its operational capabilities and influence among the population. Its top priority is currently fighting the Syrian regime to topple it, not, at this time, to impose Islamic religious law in Syria or promote an agenda of regional or global jihadist terrorism. To that end the organization often tries to behave pragmatically, joining with other rebel organizations (including those which have reservations about Al-Qaeda). It generally does not enforce its radical ideology on the Syrian population in the regions it controls, and invests a great deal of effort in assisting the local population and filling the administrative vacuum in the "liberated zones."

15. However, in our assessment, for the medium- and long-term future, the Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations can be expected to make an attempt to take control of the Syrian uprising (if it succeeds) and realize their vision of an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria. In our assessment, they will face many difficulties in attaining their goal, caused by Syria's political and social character as a state with many ethnic groups and religions and with a governmental and ideological tradition of secular Arab nationalism. In addition, there are many differences between the Islamic organizations operating in Syria, even those affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Thus it can be assumed that the Al-Nusra Front's chances of taking control of the Syrian revolution and establishing a Syrian regime affiliated with Al-Qaeda are low. Nevertheless, in our assessment the Al-Nusra Front has the ability to become more powerful and may be the dominant player among the rebels, even the morning after. Such a force will have to be recognized and may be difficult to suppress.

16. Today the Al-Nusra Front is prominent among the rebel organizations because of its military and financial capabilities, its effective chain of command and control, and the deep ideological commitment of its operatives. Even if it does not take control of the Syrian revolution, in our assessment it will be an important factor in shaping its religious-sectarian character, will destabilize Syria and make it difficult for any Syrian regime to govern (whether a weakened Assad regime or one that is propped up by a flimsy coalition of rebel organizations). In the likely scenario of long-term, unstable governance by an administrative center in Damascus, the Al-Nusra Front might emerge as stronger and influence events in Syria. It will try to exploit its status to promote its (and Al-Qaeda's) end goal of turning Syria into Al-Qaeda's front-line base in the heart of the Middle East, in close geographical proximity to Israel, Europe and the pro-Western Arab-Muslim states.

17. The Al-Nusra Front's strengthening in Syria (even without taking control of it) has the potential to be regionally and internationally threatening:

1) Turning Syria into a center for the global jihad of anti-Israeli terrorism:

A. Ideologically, for the Al-Nusra Front and other Salafist-jihadi organizations operating in Syria, the State of Israel should be annihilated. The Islamic Caliphate that will arise in Greater Syria will include Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and "Palestine." The first video issued by the Front after its foundation shows a picture of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem flying the flags of the Al-Nusra Front and the global jihad. On February 12, 2012, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri said that after the fall of the Syrian regime Syria would become a base for jihad warfare whose objective would be "to found a country to defend Muslim lands, liberate the Golan and pursue jihad until the flags of victory fly over the hills of occupied Jerusalem." Other Al-Nusra Front operatives made similar declarations.

B. Practically, the Al-Nusra Front can be expected to establish an operative terrorist infrastructure in the Golan Heights, a continuation of the military infrastructure it is currently constructing in Daraa in southwestern Syria. In our assessment, Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations may integrate themselves into terrorist attacks from the Golan Heights, despite the fundamental ideological differences between them, the Al-Nusra Front and other global jihad organizations. In addition, in our assessment the Al-Nusra Front will also try to join jihadist networks and organizations in the territories bordering on Israel to attack it (such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades in Lebanon, and the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem in the Gaza Strip) .

Ayman al-Zawahiri in a video posted on February 12, 2012, calling for the establishment of a state in Syria which would "liberate" the Golan Heights and wage a jihad against Israel "until the flags of victory fly over the hills of occupied Jerusalem" (YouTube 2013)

2) Taking control of advanced weapons belonging to the Syrian regime, including chemical weapons: The Al-Nusra Front and the other global jihad organizations make an ongoing effort to take over the Syrian regime's weapons depots. As the central government loses its power and ability to rule, there is an increasing danger that the weapons of the Syrian army, including advanced systems, may fall into jihadist hands. They may also be able to acquire weapons supplied to the Free Syrian Army and other organizations with ties to the West.^[2] In addition, as the Syrian regime weakens, the Syrian army's chemical and biological weapons may fall into the hands of the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations. They may use them for terrorist attacks in the absence of the considerations of restraint that influence other terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations. In addition, weapons from Syria may be transferred to other arenas of terrorist activity, as happened in Libya (weapons looted from the Libyan regime arsenals found their way to terrorist hotspots, including the Gaza Strip).

3) Exporting terrorism to the West: After gaining operational experience and skills fighting in Syria, jihadist operatives may establish terrorist infrastructures to carry out terrorist attacks in their countries of origin. They may do so on their own initiative or following directions from the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations (a kind of return to the model of Afghanistan in the 1980s and 90s). Bashar Assad, interviewed by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on June 17, 2013, warned the EU that "If the Europeans supply weapons [to the rebels], Europe's backyard would become a terrorist haven, and Europe would pay a price for this."

4) Emerging as a regional center for terrorism and subversion: A jihadist center in Syria will be a danger to the pro-Western Arab-Muslim countries. Countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, which, one way or another, support the anti-Assad uprising, may find themselves, on the morning after, as targets for subversion and terrorism originating in Syria. Global jihad operatives in Syria may collaborate with Salafist-jihadi organizations in Arab-Muslim countries to subvert their regimes. The strengthening of the Al-Nusra Front and the other jihadist organizations in Syria, and their radical Sunni Muslim nature, have already made themselves felt in Lebanon and have led to tension and violent confrontations between Sunnis and Shi'ites throughout the Arab-Muslim world.

18. The United States is aware of the potential dangers inherent in the Syrian crisis. On August 6, 2013, Michael Morell, deputy director of the CIA, was interviewed by the Wall Street Journal. He called the crisis in Syria the "top threat" facing the United States today, and warned that the fall of the Syrian regime, which possessed chemical and other advanced weapons, might turn Syria into Al-Qaeda's new haven replacing Pakistan. He added that the violence in Syria could leak into its neighbors, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Wall Street Journal website, August 6, 2013).

The Methodology Used in This Study

19. The main methodological difficulty in preparing this study was the lack of historical perspective on the Syrian civil war. The study was finished in the summer of 2013 at a time when the war was still being fought in all its fury and far from being decided. A more thorough examination of the Al-Nusra Front, its capabilities, intentions, place in Syria the morning after and its influence on Israel, the Arab-Muslim world and the West, will have to be carried out in the future in light of the results of the war and regional and international developments. However, even now it is possible to describe the nature of the organization, its operational methods and to make an attempt to evaluate the variety of potential dangers it poses for the Middle East and the world at large.

20. Another difficulty was the lack of reliable, detailed information about the organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad operating in Syria alongside the rebel organizations. The rival sides (the supporters and opponents of the regime) customarily issue biased, manipulative reports whose sole objective is to further their own interests. (Each side claims to be winning and each side slanders the other.) Another difficulty was the nature of the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. They are both closed, decentralized organizations with many rivals and which are careful to preserve their secrecy and do not reveal, even to their own operatives, information about their leaders or about how they operate.

21. The study focuses on the Al-Nusra Front, the most significant organization among the jihadist organizations operating in Syria, which has an important role among the rebels. However, to complete the picture the study also relates to the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria and other Salafist-jihadi organizations, although with less detail.

22. The study is based on the analysis and cross referencing of information from open sources, especially information from sources affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front (videos, announcements, claims of responsibility, interviews with organization operatives). In addition, use was made of information posted on the Internet and in the various Syrian, Arab and Western media (note should be made of Syria Comment, which posts important articles about the Syrian civil war and the role the jihadist organizations play in it). Helpful information was found in reports filed by Western and occasionally Arabic correspondents who visited the regions under Al-Nusra Front control in northern and eastern Syria. Correspondents reported from the field about the governance activities of the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel organizations, and about the mood of the local population, despite the limitations placed on reporting.[3]

23. This study also used a number of reports published in 2012-2013 by Western research institutes specializing in Al-Qaeda and radical Islam:

1) The Quilliam Foundation, a London-based think tank, issued a report, apparently in the middle of 2012, entitled "Jabhat al-Nusra: Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad, A Strategic Briefing" (without date or author's name).

2) The International Crisis Group, an international,organization committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict, issued a study on October 12, 2012 entitled "Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition" (no author's name given).

3) The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), a British think tank based in King's College, London, whose article by Aaron Y. Zelin on foreign fighters in Syria was particularly helpful.

The Structure of the Study

Overview

1.Al-Qaeda entrenchment in Syria

2. Assessment of the Al-Nusra Front's military capabilities

3. Assisting the Syrian population

4. Evaluation of risks for Israel, the West and the Pro-Western Arab-Muslim Countries

5. The methodology used in this study

Section One: The Founding of the Al-Nusra Front and its Collaboration with Other Rebel Organizations

1. General description of the civil war in Syria

2. Entrenchment of Al-Qaeda operatives in Syria before the establishment of the Al-Nusra Front

3. Declaration of the founding of the Al-Nusra Front (January 24, 2012)

4. The split of the Al-Qaeda branches in Syria and Iraq

5. The emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria as a competitor for the Al-Nusra Front

6. Collaboration between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic rebel organizations:

1) Overview

2) Prominent Islamic organizations that collaborate with the Al-Nusra Front

3) Founding joint military frameworks of the Al-Nusra Front and other Islamic organizations

7. The relationship between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria

8. The Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria's connections with the Free Syrian Army

9. The confrontation between the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria on the one hand and the Kurds on the other

Section Two: The Al-Nusra Front's Ideology

1. Overview

2. The Al-Nusra Front's ideological identification with Al-Qaeda

3. The Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria's ideological affiliation with Al-Qaeda

4. The meaning of the term "Al-Nusra Front"

5. Greater Syria as an arena for Islam's historical struggle

6. The Al-Nusra Front's overall goal

7. The Al-Nusra Front's anti-West orientation

8. Hostility to Israel

9. The concept of jihad

10. The Al-Nusra Front's worldview of takfir and its implementation

1) Overview

2) Hostility to Shi'ites and Alawites

3) Attacks on Christians and other sects and religions, destruction of statues and attacks on religious facilities and symbols

Section Three:The Al-Nusra Front's Structure, Leadership and Functioning

1. The Al-Nusra Front's strength and areas of deployment

2. The Al-Nusra Front's structure

3. The Al-Nusra Front leadership

4. Security and intelligence

5. Fundraising

6. Acquiring weapons and smuggling them into Syria

Section Four: The Human Composition of the Al-Nusra Front

1. An overall description of foreign volunteers

2. The approximate number of foreign volunteers

3. Foreign operatives killed in Syria

4. Operatives from the Arab-Muslim world

5. Volunteers from the West

6. Al-Nusra Front recruitment and training

7. Indoctrination/Brainwashing and military training for children and adolescents

Section Five: Description of the Al-Nusra Front's Military Activity

1. General description of the fighting

2. Car bombs detonated by suicide bombers

3. Car bombs detonated by remote control

4. Motorcycle bombs

5. Attacks on airfields

6. Attacks on Syrian military bases in rural areas

7. Use of IEDs

8. Attacks on border crossings

9. Rocket fire

10. Attacks on roadblocks

11. Al-Nusra Front activity in southern Syria

1) The environs of Daraa

2) The Golan Heights

12. Execution of captives

13. The Al-Nusra Front response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime

Section Six: Filling the Governmental Vacuum by the Al-Nusra Front and Other Jihadist Organizations

1. Overview

2. The Al-Nusra Front's civil governance of various regions

1) The Al-Raqqa Governorate

2) The Aleppo Governorate

3) The Deir ez-Zor Governorate

4) The Idlib Governorate

5) The Al-Hasakah Governorate

6) The Daraa Governorate

7) The Al-Suwayda Governorate

3. Managing the oil and gas fields in northern and eastern Syria

Section Seven: The Al-Nusra Front's Battle for Hearts and Minds

1. Overview

2. The Al-Nusra Front's media

1) "The White Minaret" (al-manara al-baydhaa')

2) Websites

3. Conduct of the Al-Nusra Front media

1) Overview

2) Preaching in the mosques

3) Distribution of CDs

Full document in PDF format

^[1]The full name of the organization is Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham, ("the front for the assistance of the residents of Greater Syria"). The term al-Sham may be translated as both Syria and "Greater Syria." However, because of the global Islamic concept of the Al-Nusra Front and its goals, which go beyond the state of Syria, it should be translated as "Greater Syria." The organization is generally called the Al-Nusra Front, and that is the name that will be used in this study.
^[2]Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov raised the concern that weapons sent to Syria would fall into the hands of the Al-Nusra Front. He said that "Jabhat al-Nusra is the most effective functioning structure of the armed opposition, and I have no doubt that the overwhelming majority of weapons that have already ended up in Syria, as well as those [weapons] that will end up in Syria, will be distributed via that structure” (http://eaworldview.com/2013/06/syria-today-the-war-on-the-economy). Despite his clear bias (an echo of the Syrian regime's tactic to exaggerate the jihadist threat), his statement apparently reflects a genuine concern that is not baseless (because of the presence of a Chechen military unit fighting in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front, among other things).
^[3]Nevertheless, it can be assumed that Western and Arab correspondents visiting the areas of jihadist control are limited in what they can report and sometimes are in personal danger. An article was published in the New York Times on August 22, 2013 about an American photographer who was captured by the Al-Nusra Front. He was tortured but managed to escape after about seven months. According to the article, during 2013 there were 17 foreign nationals in Syria who were abducted or disappeared.

Overview

Al-Qaeda’s announcement regarding its repudiation of the Islamic State

Initial reactions to Al-Zawahiri’s announcement

The background of Al-Zawahiri’s announcement

Related Articles

The suicide bomber known as Abu Usama al-Australi (aka Abu Usama al-Muhajir) reads his will standing on the roof of the truck he used in his suicide bombing attack.

Scent of the Attack (January 2, 2014) (Alhayat.com, January 4, 2014)

Scent of the Attack (January 2, 2014) (Yemeneconomist.com)

The gas station in Hermel near the site of the suicide bombing attack (Aleqt.com)

Sandbags protect the entrance to a store in the southern suburb of Beirut (Bintjbeil.org)

Using Suicide Bombers in Syria and Lebanon

Methodological Notes

Results of the Analysis of Suicide Bombing Attacks in Syria in 2013

Foreign Fighters in Suicide Bombing Attacks

The Large Number of Saudi Arabian Suicide Bombers

Hezbollah in the Crosshairs: Suicide Bombing Attacks Seep from Syria into Lebanon

Overview

Short Descriptions of the Suicide Bombing Attacks

(Yemeneconomist.com) (Alhayat.com, January 4, 2014)

Hezbollah's Response

Conclusion

Related Articles

Foreign fighters join the ranks of the jihad in Syria (Nl.media.rbth.ru website)

An American fighter calling himself Abu Dujana al-Amriki, killed in the fighting in Syria.

The unit of immigrants composed mainly of Chechens (Channel4.com, June 14, 2013). Fighters from Arab and other Muslim countries also serve in the unit.

The pictures of 32 foreign fighters killed in fighting the Syrian regime, documented on the dedicated Facebook page (Rightsidenews.com website, April 24 2013). In our assessment most of them belonged to jihadist networks affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

Foreign fighters in Syria (SANA, June 19, 2013)

Number of Foreign Fighters

The Potential Danger of Foreign Fighters

Methodological Remarks

Terminology

The Structure of The Study

Related Articles

Some of the crates of weapons and ammunition seized; the black flag belongs to the Al-Nusra Front (Jalnosra.com website)

Anti-aircraft weapons seized in Mahin (Jalnosra.com website), apparently Soviet Shilka ZSU-23-4 system.

Konkurs anti-tank missiles

Crates of weapons and ammunition. Mortar shells can be seen in the open box in the center (Jalnosra.com website)

The weapons may contribute to the organization's military capabilities and be transferred to regional Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations.

Overview

Description of the Takeover of the Syrian Arsenal According to the Al-Nusra Front

Pictures of the Arsenal Issued by the Al-Nusra Front

Related Articles

Overview

Assessment

Appendix

The roots of the split between the jihadist organizations fighting in Syria[2]

Related Articles

It seeks to overthrow the Assad regime and establish an Islamic Caliphate in Greater Syria, a center for regional and international terrorism and subversion.

Overview

Al-Qaeda Entrenchment in Syria

Assisting the Syrian Population

Evaluation of Risks for Israel, the West and the Pro-Western Arab-Muslim Countries

The Methodology Used in This Study

The Structure of the Study

Overview

Section One: The Founding of the Al-Nusra Front and its Collaboration with Other Rebel Organizations

Section Two: The Al-Nusra Front's Ideology

Section Three:The Al-Nusra Front's Structure, Leadership and Functioning

Section Four: The Human Composition of the Al-Nusra Front

Section Five: Description of the Al-Nusra Front's Military Activity

Section Six: Filling the Governmental Vacuum by the Al-Nusra Front and Other Jihadist Organizations

Section Seven: The Al-Nusra Front's Battle for Hearts and Minds

Related Articles

The roots of the split between the jihadist organizations fighting in Syria^{^[2]}