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Spotlight on Global Jihad (December 23-17, 2014)

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The Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) area, near the Syrian-Turkish border, the scene of battles between ISIS and the Kurdish militias (Google maps, google.com)

The Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) area, near the Syrian-Turkish border, the scene of battles between ISIS and the Kurdish militias (Google maps, google.com)

ISIS operative firing at Kurdish forces in Kobani (YouTube, December 2014)

ISIS operative firing at Kurdish forces in Kobani (YouTube, December 2014)

The destruction caused by air strikes in the city of Al-Raqqah (from a video distributed by ISIS, December 20, 2014).

The destruction caused by air strikes in the city of Al-Raqqah (from a video distributed by ISIS, December 20, 2014).

The villages of Wadi al-Deif and al-Hamidiya, near the Damascus-Homs-Hama-Aleppo route (GOOGLE EARTH website)

The villages of Wadi al-Deif and al-Hamidiya, near the Damascus-Homs-Hama-Aleppo route (GOOGLE EARTH website)

Foreign suicide bombers deployed in the city of Ramadi during the fighting.

Foreign suicide bombers deployed in the city of Ramadi during the fighting.

Foreign suicide bombers deployed in the city of Ramadi during the fighting.

Foreign suicide bombers deployed in the city of Ramadi during the fighting.

ISIS’s new Penal Code, published in the province of Aleppo (Twitter account associated with ISIS, December 19, 2014).

ISIS’s new Penal Code, published in the province of Aleppo (Twitter account associated with ISIS, December 19, 2014).

Photo of the boy standing in front of the ISIS insignia and holding a weapon, posted by Umm Khattab on her Twitter account

Photo of the boy standing in front of the ISIS insignia and holding a weapon, posted by Umm Khattab on her Twitter account

Abd al-Halim the Chechen as he appeared in a video, calling on Muslims living in Western countries to carry out attacks in their countries

Abd al-Halim the Chechen as he appeared in a video, calling on Muslims living in Western countries to carry out attacks in their countries

Photo of a Chinese prisoner who fought in the ranks of ISIS (Facebook page of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, September 1, 2014)

Photo of a Chinese prisoner who fought in the ranks of ISIS (Facebook page of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, September 1, 2014)


Main events of the week[1]
  • In Syria and Iraq, ISIS continued fighting in the various battle zones. In Iraq, ISIS recorded successes in areas north of Baghdad (the oil city of Baiji, areas south of the city of Samarra) and in the Sunni province of Al-Anbar (in the city of Ramadi, the provincial capital). In Syria, theKurds were successful in battles in the city of Kobani, and ISIS made another unsuccessful attempt to take over the military airfield in the province of Deir al-Zor. On the other hand, ISIS’s rival, the Al-Nusra Front, was successful in the province of Idlib, in western Syria (occupying two large Syrian Army bases) and consolidated its influence in this province. In southern Syria, violent conflicts continued between the rebel groups. These conflicts are exploited by ISIS in an attempt to establish a foothold in this area, where the Al-Nusra Front is the dominant organization.
  • This week, in France, there was a shooting attack (at a Jewish synagogue in Paris) and stabbing and vehicular attacks. The circumstances of each of these attacks and their connection to terrorism are still unclear and are under investigation. The French authorities claim that at least in the two vehicular attacks, any connection with terrorism has been ruled out. However, in the ITIC’s assessment, some of the incidents in France (the stabbing attack, for example) may be a response by local Muslims to repeated calls by ISIS to harm French as well as other Western civilians. The ITIC believes that the incidents in France are part of a wave of attacks carried out in recent months by local Muslims (individuals, in most cases) who were inspired by ISIS to launch attacks in Australia, Canada and other Western countries that have joined the campaign against ISIS.
The international campaign against ISIS
Attacks by the US and the coalition in Syria and Iraq
  • The Central Command of the US Army (CENTCOM) reported that during the week, the coalition forces led by the US carried out a few dozen attacks in Syria and Iraq.
  • In Syria, air strikes were centered on Kobani, Al-Raqqah and Abu Kamal. ISIS operatives, buildings, logistics facilities, battle positions and vehicles were attacked in the air strikes. In Iraq, dozens of attacks were carried out in western and northern provinces to assist the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish forces. The attacks, carried out in areas of Mosul, Tal Afar, Sinjar, Fallujah, Al-Qaim and Ramadi, destroyed bridges, vehicles, heavy machinery, battle positions, warehouses and equipment belonging to ISIS.
  • A spokesman for the US Department of Defense announced that 1,300 American soldiers will be deployed throughout Iraq by the end of January 2015, to train, advise and assist the Iraqi security forces. This is in accordance with the approval granted by President Obama on November 7, 2014, to send 1,500 more US troops to Iraq.

ISIS operatives in Kobani (Ayn al-Arab), one of combat zones in northern Syria, examining the remains of a missile. According ISIS, this is a missile launched by the US and the coalition (from a Twitter account associated with ISIS, December 21, 2014)
ISIS operatives in Kobani (Ayn al-Arab), one of combat zones in northern Syria, examining the remains of a missile. According ISIS, this is a missile launched by the US and the coalition (from a Twitter account associated with ISIS, December 21, 2014)

The killing of senior ISIS commanders in air strikes
  • According to Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, attacks by the coalition in Iraq led to the deaths of three senior ISIS operatives. According to him, this has impaired the command and control capabilities of ISIS in Iraq. Dempsey said that in early December 2014,Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, AKA Haji Mutazz, was killed. He was the deputy and right hand man of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the military commander in the Islamic State. Also killed was Abd al-Basit, head of ISIS military operations in Iraq. Another attack, which took place at the end of November 2014, killed Radwan Taleb al-Hamdouni, who served as ISIS’s governor in Mosul (abcnews.go.com, December 18, 2014).
Main developments in Syria

Map of Syria (GOOGLE EARTH website)
Map of Syria (GOOGLE EARTH website)

Kobani (Ayn al-Arab)
  • The principal conflict arena between ISIS and the Kurdish militias is still the city of Kobani and the Kurdish region that surrounds it. During the week, heavy battles continued between Kurdish forces and ISIS. Nawaf Khalil, spokesman for the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, said that on December 20, 2014, Kurdish fighters managed to take over six neighborhoods in the city of Kobani (Fox News, December 20, 2014). It was reported that ISIS forces lost several dozen operatives during the fighting.

At the end of July 2012, the YPG’s Kurdish militias took over Kobani, which the Kurds consider part of Syrian Kurdistan. ISIS, however, strives to impose its control over the Kurdish region surrounding Kobani and control the border area between Syria and Turkey. The battles in Kobani are still ongoing.

 

Deir al-Zor
  • This week as well, ISIS continued its efforts to take over the military airfield in the province of Deir al-Zor, the major stronghold of the Syrian Army in the east of the country. At this point, the battles are still ongoing. According to reports, several dozen ISIS operatives, including operatives from Morocco, were killed this week in the area of the airfield. Five of them were killed in an attack on a house located in the southeast of the airfield and 11 were killed in air strikes by the Syrian Army. In addition, eight Syrian Army soldiers were killed in the fighting, including the commander of the airfield. It was reported that Iran has airlifted military supplies to the Syrian Army in the area, and that the Iranian aircraft landed at the airfield at night for fear of becoming a target for ISIS operatives (Syriahr.com, December 22, 2014).
Al-Raqqah
  • Syrian Army, along with the US and the coalition forces, carried out air strikes this week against ISIS’s infrastructure in the “capital city” of Al-Raqqah, in northern Syria (Facebook page of the province of Al-Raqqah of the Islamic State, December 20, 2014).
  • At the same time, ISIS is making effortsto establish the rule of the Islamic State in the city of Al-Raqqah and the entire Al-Raqqah province. ISIS propaganda office in the province of Al-Raqqah posted a video detailing the activities of the office of public services in the province of Al-Raqqah in the Islamic State. The video reported, among other things, on the following:
  • Production and distribution of some 14 tons of flour.
  • Operation of a telephone switchboard in the post office building in the city of Al-Raqqah.
  • Supervision of the electricity grid in the city, including making improvements and repairs.
  • Operation of cleaning services and public transportation in the city.

ISIS was able to establish a governmental center in the city of Al-Raqqah. ISIS provides the residents of Al-Raqqah with most of the services that enable them to maintain the routine of daily life (water, electricity, fuel, education). It controls prices, regulates commercial activity and enforces Islamic law (Sharia) with an iron fist and in brutal ways. The ITIC assesses that, at this stage, air strikes havefailed to undermine ISIS’s control of the city of Al-Raqqah and the province as a whole.

 

The province of Idlib
  • After months of fierce battles, the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, captured two large Syrian Army bases near the villages of Wadi al-Deif and al-Hamidiya, in the province of Idlib in northwest Syria. Operatives of the Al-Nusra Front, in collaboration with other rebel groups (including Ahrar al-Sham), managed to take control of the two bases, causing many losses to the Syrian Army. Around 100 Syrian soldiers were taken prisoner in the fighting.
  • During the fighting in Wadi al-Deif, a large quantity of fuel that was at the base (about 35 tanks) fell into the hands of the Al-Nusra Front, along with 20 armored vehicles equipped with ammunition and 1,500 tank shells (News.xinhuanet.com, December 20, 2014).
  • By capturing these two bases, the Al-Nusra Front and its allies took over areas close to the main route between Damascus-Homs-Hama-Aleppo. This enables the Al-Nusra Front and its partners to disrupt the traffic on this important route and possibly cut it off. In addition, capturing these bases establishes the status of the Al-Nusra Front and other rebel groups in the rural area of the province of Idlib, from where they can threaten the cities of Idlib in the west and Hama in the south.
  • Abu Bader, a spokesman for the Ahrar al-Sham rebel organization, a key partner of the Al-Nusra Front in taking over the bases, said that the takeover of the Syrian Army’s Wadi al-Deif and al-Hamidiya army camps is of great strategic importance. He said that this is because these camps are spread out over large areas, from where the rebels could take over additional areas. He said that the Ahrar al-Sham organization initially decided to participate in the fighting alone, but some 10 days ago, representatives of the Al-Nusra Front came to the battle zone, asked to join them, and they accepted the offer (Al-Jazeera, December 15, 2014).

Ahrar al-Sham is a framework the size of a brigade, made up of Islamic units which joined forces to fight against the Assad regime. This is one of the largest units after the Free Syrian Army, fighting against the Syrian regime. According to US open-source intelligence, this framework includes several Al-Qaeda members who were released from prison by the Syrian government, some of whom hold senior positions in it.

 

A posting on a Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front showing fighters at rest “after the liberation of the Wadi al-Deif camp”
A posting on a Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front showing fighters at rest “after the liberation of the Wadi al-Deif camp”

Southern Syria
Growing influence of ISIS in southern Syria, taking advantage of conflicts between rebel groups
  • The violent conflicts among the rebel groups in southern Syria are continuing and reaching the point of violent incidents. The key issue is the rivalry between the Al-Nusra Front and Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk (i.e., Al-Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade). On December 19, 2014, Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk operatives attempted to assassinate one of the commanders of the Al-Nusra Front in the Daraa province by means of an IED attached to his car. The commander and his son were injured in the explosion of the IED (Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front, December 19, 2014).
  • Against the background of these conflicts, ISIS joined forces with Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk and persuaded the organization to pledge allegiance to ISIS’s leader. Thus ISIS managed to gain a foothold in southern Syria, an area where the Al-Nusra Front is the dominant rebel organization.
Use of UN vehicles to carry out terror attacks
  • This week, the fighting continued between the rebel groups and Syrian Army forces in the southern Syrian Golan Heights. The Al-Nusra Front carried out a suicide bombing attack using a car bomb against Syrian Army soldiers in Sheikh Maskin. Photos of the vehicle used by the Al-Nusra Front’s operatives to carry out the suicide bombing attack, uploaded to Twitter,indicate that is a vehicle of the type used by the UN forces that operated in the Golan Heights (Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front, December 7, 2014).

Left: A vehicle used by the Al-Nusra Front in the suicide bombing attack against soldiers of the Assad regime in Sheikh Maskin. The United Nations insignia is clearly visible on the vehicle on the left (Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front, December 7, 2014). Right: The vehicle after the attack (Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front, December 19, 2014).
Left: A vehicle used by the Al-Nusra Front in the suicide bombing attack against soldiers of the Assad regime in Sheikh Maskin. The United Nations insignia is clearly visible on the vehicle on the left (Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front, December 7, 2014).  Right: The vehicle after the attack (Twitter account associated with the Al-Nusra Front, December 19, 2014).

UN vehicles have been captured in the past by the Al-Nusra Front, which uses them in operations against the Syrian regime (utilizing them for suicide bombings). It is possible that in the future, UN vehicles will be used for attacks against Israel as well.

 

Main developments in Iraq

Map of Iraq (GOOGLE EARTH website)
Map of Iraq (GOOGLE EARTH website)

The city of Baiji
  • On December 18, 2014, it was reported that ISIS operatives took over the city of Baiji, north of Baghdad, after the Iraqi Army had ordered its soldiers to withdraw from the city and secure only the area of the refineries. The city of Baiji was taken over again approximately a month later, when the Iraqi Army and tribal militias managed to regain control of the city.

Left: Fighting in Baiji (from a Twitter account associated with ISIS, December 21, 2014) Right: ISIS Operatives on an Iraqi tank in Baiji (YouTube, December 18, 2014).
Left: Fighting in Baiji (from a Twitter account associated with ISIS, December 21, 2014) Right: ISIS Operatives on an Iraqi tank in Baiji (YouTube, December 18, 2014).

The city of Samarra (north of Baghdad)
  • This week, ISIS’s efforts to cleanse the pockets of resistance in areas north and west of Baghdad continued. One battle zone was the Shiite city of Samarra, north of Baghdad, which is defended by the Iraqi Army and Shiite militias. It was reported that ISIS managed to take over areas south of the city of Samarra (Al-Jazeera, December 21, 2014).
The city of Ramadi, capital of the province of Al-Anbar (western Iraq)
  • ISIS posted photos of the recent fighting in Ramadi, the capital of the Sunni province of Al-Anbar. The photos uploaded to Twitter show two foreign suicide bombers, one Tunisian and the other Saudi (Abu Abdallah al-Tunisi and Abu Farhan al-Jazrawi). The attacks in the city of Ramadi resumed on November 21, 2014, after ISIS managed to take over most of the area of the city. In the city, ISIS operatives attacked mainly police stations and government buildings (Al-Jazeera, December 21, 2014).

Deploying suicide bombers in Iraq and Syria is a pattern of operation that has become a trademark of ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. ISIS uses suicide bombings along with ground fighting to increase its effectiveness in both the military level and its battle for hearts and minds. Most of the suicide bombers are foreigners, mainly from the Arab world.

 

The Mosul area
  • On December 17, 2014, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, joined by Yazidi operatives, commenced a campaign to regain control of the area of Sinjar, west of Mosul, which is controlled by ISIS. The ground operation by the Peshmerga forces, which attacked in two locations, was accompanied by coalition forces air strikes. The Kurdish forces managed to regain control of a number of neighborhoods and villages east of the city of Sinjar. According to the Kurds, most of the area of Sinjar is now under their control (Reuters, December 21, 2014).

Left: Posting from a Twitter account associated with ISIS from December 21, 2014, claiming that the whole city of Sinjar is in ISIS’s hands. Right: Kurdish takeover of various places in the area of Sinjar (Facebook page of the Kurdish Peshmerga Forces, December 21, 2014).
Left: Posting from a Twitter account associated with ISIS from December 21, 2014, claiming that the whole city of Sinjar is in ISIS’s hands. Right: Kurdish takeover of various places in the area of Sinjar (Facebook page of the Kurdish Peshmerga Forces, December 21, 2014).

Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and Israeli Arabs
Attempted attack on the French Cultural Center in Gaza
  • On the evening of December 12, 2014, an IED was detonated at the French Cultural Center in Gaza City. On December 18, 2014, a Salafist-jihadi network in the Gaza Strip by the name of Jund Ansar Allah published a video claiming responsibility for the explosion at the French Cultural Center. According to the video, the attack was in response to the operations against ISIS by the coalition, in which France is also a key partner. The video emphasized that the attack was carried out despite the fact that the area where the Cultural Center is located is surrounded by headquarters of the Hamas security forces.

On August 14, 2009, Hamas used military force to suppress the Jund Ansar Allah (Army of Allah's Supporters) network, which is affiliated with the global jihad. In clashes that took place in the mosque of Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah in Rafah and nearby, 24 people were killed, around 130 were injured and a few hundred suspects were arrested, including Salafist-jihadi operatives. The dead included Sheikh Abu Nur al-Maqdisi (a religious-ideological authority of the Salafist-jihadi networks)[2] and Khaled Banat, AKA Abu Abdallah al-Suri (the military leader of Jund Ansar Allah). During the clashes, Hamas forces did not hesitate to shoot at a mosque bearing the name of Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah, a prominent Islamic icon, causing significant damage.[3]

Palestinian from the Gaza Strip killed in the fighting in Iraq
  • On December 20, 2014, a Hamas forum reported the death in Iraq of Mumtaz al-Wahidi, 27, from the town of Al-Zahra, south of Gaza City, after he had joined the ranks of ISIS (Hamas forum, December 20, 2014). It was reported that he was killed during an attack by ISIS against an Iraqi military position in the northern part of the Nineveh province (Sama, December 20, 2014).
Establishing the administration in the Islamic State
Establishing the administration of the Islamic State in the province of Aleppo
  • As part of its efforts to consolidate its rule in the province of Aleppo, ISIS has publisheda new penal code. The penalties include: flogging of 80 lashes for drinking alcoholic beverages; the death penalty for collaborators; the death penalty for prostitution and homosexual activity; the death penalty for abandoning the Muslim faith (Twitter account associated with ISIS, December 19, 2014).
  • It was also reported that ISIS ordered businessmen and factory owners in the Aleppo area to pay 2.5% of their profits as zakat (one of the main precepts of Islam requires every Muslim to donate part of his money to charity). The payment will be transferred to the zakat office of the Islamic State, which will be responsible for the distribution of charity to the needy (syriahr.com, December 21, 2014).

ISIS is making an effort to establish the administration of the Islamic State in the areas that it has captured in Syria and Iraq. In these areas, ISIS has established a governmental infrastructure and is meeting the day-to-day needs of the residents. At the same time, it is brutally imposing Islamic religious law on the local population

 

The battle for hearts and minds conducted by ISIS
Use of children for propaganda purposes
  • An 18-year-old British citizen, apparently from London, known as Umm Khattab, the widow of an ISIS operative who fought in Syria, posted a photo on Twitter of a young boy armed with a toy gun standing in front of an ISIS flag with the inscription “the next generation”. ISIS and its supporters around the world publish photos of children carrying weapons against the background of ISIS flags, to emphasize their determination to fight and their patience.
ISIS’s attempt to prevent the disclosure of crimes carried out in the areas under its control
  • A group by the name of “Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently” operates on social networks in order to expose the crimes committed by ISIS in the city of Al-Raqqah in Syria. The group publishes information in English and Arabic,and recently exposed a cyber-attack by elements affiliated with ISIS. It was reported that an organization by the name of The Citizen Lab, which deals with cyber security, has found malware intended to harm the group. In the ITIC’s assessment, the cyber-attack, assuming it was carried out by ISIS or its supporters, may be an indication of ISIS’s efforts to prevent the exposure of crimes carried out in the areas under its control.

Exposing ISIS’s brutal conduct. Left: ISIS’s female modesty guard, which operates against women who do not follow the rules of Sharia. Middle: An old man who was executed by ISIS for “engaging in witchcraft.” Right: The legs of a man who sold cigarettes in the city and was punished for doing so by ISIS operatives (Twitter, December 20, 2014)
Exposing ISIS’s brutal conduct. Left: ISIS’s female modesty guard, which operates against women who do not follow the rules of Sharia. Middle: An old man who was executed by ISIS for “engaging in witchcraft.” Right: The legs of a man who sold cigarettes in the city and was punished for doing so by ISIS operatives (Twitter, December 20, 2014)

Expressions of support and sympathy in the West
Vehicular, stabbing and shooting incidents in France
  • On December 20, 2014, a man carrying a knife broke into the police station in Joué-lès-Tours (a suburb of the city of Tours, in central France), shouted "Allahu Akbar" and attacked the police. Three policemen were injured. The attacker was shot and killed. The attacker was Bertrand Nzohabonayo, 20, a native of Burundi, known to the police because of minor crimes that he committed. His brother is known to the security services as holding extremist Islamic views and as having considered going to fight in Syria. Around two days before carrying out the attack, the attacker uploaded an ISIS flag on Facebook. On the other hand, it was reported that the attacker was a member of a social network that has come out against ISIS (Rawstory.com, December 21, 2014).
  • On December 21, 2014, aman in Dijon (eastern France) ran over 11 policemen, critically injuring two of them. The man shouted “Allahu Akbar” when he hit the policemen. Immediately after the attack, the driver was arrested, but two passengers who were with him in the vehicle managed to escape. According to media reports, the detainee was born in 1974 and is apparently deranged (Al-Jazeera, December 21, 2014). One day later, on December 22, a driver charged into a crowded Christmas market in the city of Nantes, in western France. At least 17 people were run over and one of them died of his injuries. On the night of December 22, 2014, shots were fired at the David Ben Ichay Synagogue in Paris’s 19th Arrondissement.
  • According to the French authorities, there is no connection between these incidents and at least with regard to the vehicular attacks, any affiliation with terrorism has been ruled out. On the other hand, terrorism is suspected with regard to the stabbing.

At this stage, the circumstances of these incidents are still unclear, and it is not yet possible to prove a direct link between them and ISIS. However, the ITIC assesses that some of these incidents are cases of Muslims responding to ISIS’s repeated calls to harm French civilians and citizens of other Western countries that are participating in the campaign against ISIS. It should be emphasized that ISIS’s calls to harm Western civilians explicitly mentioned France. A recent example can be found in an ISIS video posted on YouTube on December 19, 2014. The video shows a French speaker (with Arabic subtitles) calling on Muslims in France to attack targets in the country: “To my brothers and sisters in France, as you were called on by the Emir of the Faithful, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to harm the interests of the infidels in their lands […] If the infidels prevent you from emigrating [to the Islamic State], fight them. Today you have a chance to attack them in their homes […]"

 

From the video: The French-speaking masked man in the center, flanked by other ISIS operatives
From the video: The French-speaking masked man in the center, flanked by other ISIS operatives

The attack in Australia – additional information
  • Australian police identified the person who carried out the terrorist attack in the café as Haron Monis, AKA Sheikh Haron, a 50-year-old Iranian who received political asylum in Australia in 1996. He served as a Sunni preacher on behalf of himself and was rejected by the Sunni and Shiite communities in Sydney. He was known to the police after several charges had been filed against him. In 2013, he was charged with murdering his ex-wife, as well as over 40 sexual offenses. He denied the charges against him, claiming that they were filed for political reasons (www.bbc.com, December 16, 2014).
  • On his website (which has been removed from the internet), he wrote a month ago that he had pledged allegiance to ISIS and given up his Shiite heritage. Among other things, he wrote that he had the honor to pledge allegiance to the Imam and the contemporary Caliphate (this is a reference to the Islamic Caliphate established by ISIS). His website was also full of articles against the government of Australia and its involvement in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan (Fox News, December 15, 2014).
Call by a Chechen operative in ISIS to attack targets in the West
  • On December 17, 2014, ISIS’s department of information in the province of Salah al-Din, Iraq, released an Arabic-language video showing a Chechen fighter known as Abd al-Halim the Chechen, calling on all Muslims living in the West, and especially Chechens,, to carry out attacks in their countries. This is in retaliation for the coalition force’s operation against ISIS. Abd al-Halim the Chechen also warned US President Barack Obama that hundreds of Chechens would raid the streets of Western countries (ISIS’s information department in the province of Salah al-Din, December 17, 2014).

There are several hundred Chechen fighters in Syria, some of them affiliated with the Caucasian Emirate, a Caucasian framework that maintains ties with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. They include highly motivated fighters with combat experience who participated in the uprising against Russia in the 1990s. Most of the Chechen operatives joined the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS. Several of them attained senior command ranks and some senior commanders were killed in battle. A large portion of the Chechen operatives fight in a separate military framework by the name of The Army of Emigrants and Supporters. Some of the operatives in that framework, including senior officers, left the Al-Nusra Front following the rift and joined the ranks of ISIS.

 

Chinese separatists in the ranks of ISIS
  • According to Chinese newspaper Global Times, about 300 Chinese are fighting in Iraq and Syria in the ranks of ISIS. In China, this has given rise to fear of the security risk inherent in these operatives after they return to their country. China has expressed concern in view of the threat of those fighters on security in the Xinjiang province (known as East Turkestan) in western China, the residence of the Uyghur minority.

The first report stating that fighters from China had joined the fighting in Syria appeared in the second half of 2013. The report, published in China, stated that Uyghur Muslim separatists have been traveling to Syria since May 2012 in order to join in the fighting alongside global jihad operatives. Like other countries, this phenomenon has grown in the past year in China as well. The Muslim separatists in China belong to the Uyghur people, living in the autonomous region of Xinjiang in northwestern China (sometimes called East Turkestan by the separatists). The Uyghurs, at least in part, strive for independence and in the 1990s their uprising was suppressed by the Chinese authorities. In July 2009, violent riots broke out between the Uyghurs and another ethnic group, the Han people.

 

Counterterrorist activity in Europe
Spain
  • Spain's interior minister announced that counterterrorist activities carried out by the police forces of Spain and Morocco led to the arrest of seven people for allegedly recruiting women to go to Syria and Iraq to support ISIS. The seven were charged with setting up a network for locating, recruiting and sending women to Syria and Iraq (Dailystar.com.lb, December 16, 2014).
Denmark
  • Danish authorities have detained two young men who expressed sympathy and solidarity with ISIS. One of them is a 21-year-old of Syrian descent, who was detained on December 18, 2014, after distributing a video calling for the murder of citizens of the countries taking part in the coalition against ISIS. The other is 26, and has been charged with incitement (to terrorism) (Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, December 20, 2014).

[1]The weekly publication Spotlight on Global Jihad monitors developments among ISIS and global jihad organizations in the Middle East and terrorist activities around the world, directed, supported or inspired by the global jihad organizations in the Middle East.
[2]There are several dozen Salafist-jihadi operatives from the Gaza Strip in Syria, operating as part of an ISIS unit named after Sheikh Abu Nur al-Maqdisi.
[3]For further information, see the ITIC’s Information Bulletin from October 1, 2009: "The struggle between Hamas and the jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip affiliated with the global jihad."

 

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Published:
Announcement on an ISIS-affiliated Facebook page stating that several organizations have pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

Announcement on an ISIS-affiliated Facebook page stating that several organizations have pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

Evacuation of casualties in Al-Raqqah following the Syrian Air Force bombing (YouTube)

Evacuation of casualties in Al-Raqqah following the Syrian Air Force bombing (YouTube)

Iraqi helicopter shot down by ISIS, on fire (distributed on YouTube)

Iraqi helicopter shot down by ISIS, on fire (distributed on YouTube)

Weapons captured by ISIS in the province of Al-Anbar (Al-Anbar unit website, December 13, 2014)

Weapons captured by ISIS in the province of Al-Anbar (Al-Anbar unit website, December 13, 2014)

Weapons captured by ISIS in the province of Al-Anbar (Al-Anbar unit website, December 13, 2014)

Weapons captured by ISIS in the province of Al-Anbar (Al-Anbar unit website, December 13, 2014)

The warning about activity by “the Iranian elements” (ISIS’s ALPLATFORMEDIA forum)

The warning about activity by “the Iranian elements” (ISIS’s ALPLATFORMEDIA forum)

Mehdi Masroor Biswas (http://thelogicalindian.com, December 13, 2014)

Mehdi Masroor Biswas (http://thelogicalindian.com, December 13, 2014)

Ansar al-Sharia’s claim of responsibility for the attack on the airbase in Yemen on its Twitter page (December 11, 2014)

Ansar al-Sharia’s claim of responsibility for the attack on the airbase in Yemen on its Twitter page (December 11, 2014)

Expressions of support for ISIS in Vienna, Austria (YouTube, June 23, 2014)

Expressions of support for ISIS in Vienna, Austria (YouTube, June 23, 2014)


Main events of the week[1]
  • One of the main events of the week was an incident in which an armed man (born in Iran, with a criminal record) took people hostage in a café in Sydney, Australia. The perpetrator and two hostages were killed during the Australian rescue operation. At this stage, the connection between the perpetrator and ISIS is not clear. One of his demands was to bring an ISIS flag to the café, a possible indication that his actions were inspired by ISIS. Online jihadi networks presented the attack as an act of retaliation for Australia’s participation in the US campaign against ISIS.
  • Fighting in Iraq and Syria continued in the major battle zones without significant changes on the ground. Worthy of special attention are ISIS’s efforts to expand its sphere of influence to the rural area south of Damascus and to southern Syria, where the Al-Nusra Front (Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria) is the dominant organization among the rebel groups.

 The international campaign against ISIS
Attacks by the US and the coalition in Syria and Iraq
  • The Central Command of the US Army (CENTCOM) reported that during the week, the coalition forces carried out around 15 attacks in Syria. These attacks were directed at battle positions, fortifications and buildings controlled by ISIS in the cities of Kobani, Aleppo and Al-Qaim (CENTCOM website).
  • In Iraq, the coalition forces carried out around 20 attacks in the area of Sinjar, Ramadi, Rutba, Mosul and Samarra. The attacks in Iraq destroyed vehicles, including heavy machinery, battle positions, warehouses, watchtowers and buildings controlled by ISIS (CENTCOM website).
Statements by senior US officials about the campaign against ISIS
  • In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State John Kerry discussed the campaign in Syria and Iraq against ISIS, among other things. He said that the coalition attacks against ISIS are managing to weaken the leadership of the organization, undermine its propaganda efforts and damage its operational and logistical capabilities. Referring to the US President’s authorization to conduct the campaign, he said that in his opinion, the authorization should remain valid for three years, and that it must provide the US President with the authority and flexibility he needs in order to conduct the campaign. He added that the US operations should not be limited to the territory of Syria and Iraq alone, and stressed that the US does not intend to incorporate ground troops as part of the current campaign (US State Department website, December 9, 2014).
  • Brett McGurk, Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, made it clear at a hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives on December 10, 2014, that the international campaign against ISIS is still in its early stages. He said the efforts to stop the advance of ISIS have succeeded, but efforts to turn the clock back will require more time. According to Ed Royce, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, ISIS is still controlling the same territories that it controlled in the summer of 2014, when the US attacks against it began (www.stripes.com, December 10, 2014).
Cooperation between Britain and Turkey in the campaign against ISIS
  • At a joint press conference held in Britainby the Turkish Prime Minister and his British counterpart, the two countries agreed on close cooperation in order to stop foreign fighters from traveling through Turkey to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. The Turkish Prime Minister promised to tighten the intelligence cooperation, which is essential for the success of their joint efforts (British Foreign Office website, December 10, 2014).
Main developments in Syria
Kobani (Ayn al-Arab)
  • At present, the principal conflict arena between ISIS and the Kurdish militias is still the city of Kobani and the Kurdish region that surrounds it. At the end of July 2012, the YPG’s Kurdish militias took control of Ayn al-Arab (called Kobani by the Kurds). The Kurds consider Kobani part of Syrian Kurdistan, whereas ISIS strives to impose its control over the Kurdish region surrounding Kobani. Against this background, in the summer of 2014, ISIS was involved in clashes with Kurdish militias near the Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn border crossings near Ayn al-Arab. These clashes also spread to the Kobani area and are still ongoing.
  • On December 9, 2014, ISIS published photos that it claimed were taken by an unmanned aircraft from Kobani. The photos show an area in the city of Kobani where, ISIS claims, a suicide bombing attack was carried out. The photos also show ISIS operatives firing at the city (Independent.co.uk, December 11, 2014). ISIS has unmanned aircraft, which the organization uses in intelligence collection missions and for propaganda purposes as well.
Deir al-Zor
  • On December 10, 2014, ISIS distributed a video on Islamic forums detailing the progress of its forces in the province of Deir al-Zor ineastern Syria. ISIS claims that its forces took control of several villages in the area and advanced towards Deir al-Zor’s military airfield (near an area where battles were fought last week). Syrian forces continued to repel ISIS’s attacks on the airfield and attacked an armored vehicle belonging to ISIS which was intended for use as a car bomb.

Left: Documentation of the destruction in al-Masmaka (video distributed by ISIS on Islamic forums, December 10, 2014) Right: Arrival at the walls of the military airfield in Deir al-Zor.
Left: Documentation of the destruction in al-Masmaka (video distributed by ISIS on Islamic forums, December 10, 2014) Right: Arrival at the walls of the military airfield in Deir al-Zor. 

The rural area south of Damascus
  • ISIS announced that as part of the expansion of the Islamic Caliphate, it is establishing an Islamic emirate in the Hajar Aswad neighborhood south of Damascus. This step was taken after a number of groups of combatants announced that they were pledging allegiance to ISIS (Al-Akhbar, December 10, 2014). According to the ISIS Facebook page, on December 14, 2014, several rebel organizations in the province of Damascus pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Southern Syria
  • ISIS has announced the expansion of its influence into southern Syria.The organization posted photos of its fighters on Twitter, saying that they are in the town of Bir Qassab, in the northeastern part of the province of As-Suwayda (southern Syria, in the proximity of the province of Daraa). The Twitter page shows photos of military vehicles carrying machine guns, stating that they are in the area of Bir Qassab. It also claimed that ISIS is no more than five kilometers away from Druze villages that are loyal to the Syrian regime (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 10, 2014). In addition, a posting on Facebook stated that a number of Salafist-jihadi groups operating in the Syrian Golan Heights have pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi.
  • The center of gravity of ISIS’s control is northern and eastern Syria. However, until recently ISIS had no significant presence in southern Syria and the Syrian Golan Heights. The dominant power in these areas is the rival jihadi organization, the Al-Nusra Front, which was driven by ISIS from the north and west into southern Syria and the Syrian Golan Heights (where it is a central organization among the rebel groups). Information on ISIS’s attempts to increase its influence in southern Syria may indicate the beginning of a change in the balance of power among the rebel groups. Such a change may create a dynamic that will make the Syrian Golan Heights an active arena of terrorism against Israel. 
Al-Raqqah
  • The US and the coalition are continuing their efforts to target ISIS infrastructures in the “capital city” of Al-Raqqah, in northern Syria. This week it was reported that on December 12, 2014, the Syrian Army fired a rocket at ISIS troops in Al-Raqqah. As a result of the explosion, several dozen ISIS operatives were killed. The area hit was in the industrial zone in the city center (Sama channel, December 14, 2014). A posting on Twitter by sources affiliated with ISIS also reported on Syrian Air Force attacks on Al-Raqqah. ISIS also posted a video on YouTube showing destroyed buildings and casualties from the bombings in Al-Raqqah.
The province of Idlib 
  • Al-Nusra Front forces in cooperation with other jihadi groups took control of the Syrian Army base in Wadi al-Deif, in the province of Idlib (northwestern Syria). Control of the area is important because it is close to the main road from Aleppo to Damascus (syriahr.com, December 14, 15, 2014).

Videos distributed on YouTube by the Al-Nusra Front about the takeover of Wadi al-Deif. Left: captured Syrian Army tank (YouTube, December 15, 2014) Right: armored vehicle belonging to the Al-Nusra Front near a Syrian Army headquarters building
Videos distributed on YouTube by the Al-Nusra Front about the takeover of Wadi al-Deif. Left: captured Syrian Army tank (YouTube, December 15, 2014) Right: armored vehicle belonging to the Al-Nusra Front near a Syrian Army headquarters building

Main developments in Iraq
The Samarra area (north of Baghdad)
  • This week ISIS’s efforts to cleanse the pockets of resistance in areas north and west of Baghdad continued. One battle zone was the Shiite city of Samarra, which is defended by the Iraqi Army and Shiite militias. The battles were accompanied by a series of suicide bombing attacks carried out by ISIS foreign fighters from France, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The foreign fighters who carried out the suicide bombing attacks were Abu Anas, a Frenchman who blew himself up in a car bomb attack targeting Shiite militiamen; Abu Naif from Saudi Arabia, who blew himself up against a similar target; and Abu Umar from Syria, who blew himself up against Iraqi military personnel (Longwarjournal.org, December 11, 2014).

Suicide bombing attacks in Syria and Iraq, carried out during military clashes, are a modus operandi that ISIS specializes in. To carry out suicide bombing attacks, ISIS usually utilizes foreign fighters, both Arabs/Muslims and Westerners. The preference for using foreign fighters stems from the ideological fervor that some of them possess and possibly also from their lack of skill in military combat. All of the above makes them suitable candidates for suicide bombing attacks.


The foreign fighters from France, Saudi Arabia and Syria who carried out the suicide bombing attacks (Photos via the SITE Intelligence Group) 
The foreign fighters from France, Saudi Arabia and Syria who carried out the suicide bombing attacks (Photos via the SITE Intelligence Group)

  • On December 13, 2014, Iraqi military sources revealed to CNN that on the day before (December 12, 2014), ISIS managed to shoot down an Iraqi helicopter in a village near the city of Samarra. Eyewitnesses confirmed the report. In the assessment of the Iraqi Army, a Strela missile was apparently fired at the helicopter. ISIS has portable shoulder-fired missiles, including SA-7 (Strela) missiles, which were used to shoot down an Iraqi helicopter near the city of Baiji.
The province of Al-Diyala (northwest of Baghdad)
  • On December 12, 2014, ISIS operatives attacked a Kurdish government building in a town in the northern part of the province of Al-Diyala. According to ISIS, three suicide bombers were sent to carry out the mission: a German, a Saudi Arabian and a Turk. In total, 28 people were killed in the suicide bombing attack, including Kurdish fighters and civilians. More than 90 people were wounded.
The province of Al-Anbar (western Iraq)
  • This week as well, ISIS continued to cleanse pockets of resistance in the Sunni province of Al-Anbar. Fighting in the province has been underway for several months and is still ongoing. On December 12, 2014, ISIS operatives executed 21 Iraqi military men captured two days earlier at the Al-Assad airfield. ISIS’s Al-Anbar unit published photos of the dead soldiers and seized weapons. The Arab media reported that most of the province of Al-Anbar is under the control of ISIS, except the provincial capital of Ramadi and the city of Haditha, which are in the hands of the Iraqi Army, local Sunni tribal fighters and Shiite militias supported by Iran (Al-Jazeera, December 13, 2014).
The area of Tikrit (north of Baghdad)
  • On December 14, 2014, it was reported that the Iraqi Army had begun to concentrate its forces in the Tikrit area in preparation for cleansing the city of ISIS forces (ISW, December 14, 2014). In addition, an Iraqi Army force came from Baghdad to the city of Balad (south of Tikrit) to cleanse ISIS pockets in the area. In the city of Tikrit, there were clashes between ISIS and the Iraqi Army and Sunni and Shiite militias in the region.
Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and Israeli Arabs
Detonation of an IED on the French Cultural Center in Gaza
  • On the evening of December 12, 2014, an IED was detonated at the French Cultural Center in Gaza City. The exterior wall of the center was damaged. Two Salafist-jihadi organizations claimed responsibility for the attack. The Hamas Interior Ministry announced that it had mounted an investigation to determine the circumstances of the explosion. Preliminary findings indicated that the IED was activated remotely by a cellphone. Two policemen were slightly injured. Two months ago, a similar explosion occurred at the same Cultural Center (Ma’an News Agency, December 13, 2014). In recent years, there have been several cases of harassment against Western institutions and individuals in the Gaza Strip by Salafist-jihadi elements, presenting a challenge to Hamas’s control. 

Left: Hamas security forces at the scene (Al-Watan channel, December 13, 2014) Right: The French Cultural Center in Gaza (Ma’an News Agency, December 13, 2014)
Left: Hamas security forces at the scene (Al-Watan channel, December 13, 2014) Right: The French Cultural Center in Gaza (Ma’an News Agency, December 13, 2014)

Operatives from the Gaza Strip killed in the ranks of ISIS
  • The Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center (ITMC), which is used by the Salafist-jihadi networks in the Gaza Strip, recently published posters in memory of four of its operatives, residents of the Gaza Strip, who were killed in Iraq while fighting there in the ranks of ISIS (Twitter page of the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, October 28 and November 17, 2014).

Top: Death notice of Nour Zuheir Abu Issa (Abu Bakr). Bottom: Death notice of Shadi Mutleq al-Dahoudi (Abu Anas), who was killed in the province of Al-Diyala in Iraq, the site of recent fighting between ISIS and its opponents (Twitter page of the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, November 17, 2014).
Top: Death notice of Nour Zuheir Abu Issa (Abu Bakr). Bottom: Death notice of Shadi Mutleq al-Dahoudi (Abu Anas), who was killed in the province of Al-Diyala in Iraq, the site of recent fighting between ISIS and its opponents (Twitter page of the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, November 17, 2014).

Top: Death notice of Mohammad Samir Abu Awn (Abu Anas), who was killed in the province of Al-Diyala in Iraq. Bottom: Death notice of ISIS operative Moussa Hassan Jihadi (Abu Mou‘men), who was killed in the city of Fallujah in Iraq (Twitter page of the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, October 28, 2014)
Top: Death notice of Mohammad Samir Abu Awn (Abu Anas), who was killed in the province of Al-Diyala in Iraq. Bottom: Death notice of ISIS operative Moussa Hassan Jihadi (Abu Mou‘men), who was killed in the city of Fallujah in Iraq (Twitter page of the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center, October 28, 2014)

In the Gaza Strip, there are expressions of support for ISIS on the part of Salafist-jihadi elements influenced by the organization’s achievements in Syria and Iraq. These elements once held a rally in support of ISIS in Rafah and distributed a video on YouTube supporting the organization. There are also several dozen Palestinian operatives in Syria, some of whom probably operate within a separate unit in ISIS named after Sheikh Abu Nour al-Maqdisi (a Salafist-jihadi sheikh in the Gaza Strip who was killed in 2009 by Hamas following his announcement of the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Palestine).

Hamas perceives Salafist-jihadi activity as a potential threat and as a practical and ideological challenge to its rule in the Gaza Strip.At this stage, the Salafist-jihadi infrastructure in the Gaza Strip still does not pose a real threat to the control of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas possesses the tools to suppress any operational or ideological activity that deviates from the rules of the game set by Hamas. Recent expressions of support for ISIS in the Gaza Strip have been dealt with aggressively by Hamas up to now, even though it generally avoids outright confrontation with Salafist-jihadis.[2]

 

Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula
Publication of a warning against Iranian activity
  • Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, a terrorist organization, which has become the Sinai District of the Islamic State, published a warning on December 11, 2014, against attempts by “hostile Shiite Iranian elements” to expand their influence in Greater Jerusalem (i.e., throughout the entire Land of Israel) by means of charities and military operations. The organization said that it would fight these Shiite elements and threatened to continue to harm Iranian interests in the region. The background of the announcement may be the Hamas delegation’s visit to Iran and Hamas’s military wing’s praise of the Iranian aid that it received during Operation Protective Edge.[3]
Appointment of an emir for ISIS’s Sinai District
  • “Jihadi sources” reported to Al-Watan that ISIS has appointed one of its commanders in Iraq to serve as Emir of the Sinai District after Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged allegiance to it. This is contrary to the customary practice whereby the Emir is chosen from among the locals. It was also reported that the Emir came to Sinai with a team of assistants and began to carry out his job. It was also stated that the organization’s operatives who hold foreign citizenship either fly to the airport in Sharm el-Sheikh as tourists and go to northern Sinai to join the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis or travel via the Suez Canal (Al-Watan, December 9, 2014). The ITIC cannot verify this report.
The battle for hearts and minds conducted by ISIS
Detention of an Indian citizen who ran an ISIS English-language Twitter account
  • Indian police detained a suspect a few days after it was revealed by the British Channel 4 that he was in charge of running ISIS’s English-language Twitter account. The detainee is Mehdi Masroor Biswas, a 24-year-old resident of West Bangalore, an engineer by profession. He was detained by the Indian police on December 13, 2014, at his home. Police said he was close to English-speaking ISIS operatives and became a source of information for new foreign fighters who wanted to join the ranks of the organization (Dailymail.com.uk, December 13, 2014). The detainee admitted that he is the one behind the @ShamiWitnwss English-language Twitter account, which is a source of information about ISIS (thelogicalindian.com, December 13, 2014)
Expressions of support and solidarity in the West
Terrorist attack in Australia, possibly inspired by ISIS
  • On December 15, 2014, an armed man took over the Lindt café in the business center of Sydney, Australia, and held some 20 people hostage. He made two demands: to have an ISIS flag brought to the café and to talk with Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott. The hostages were forced to hang a jihadi flag (not an ISIS flag) in the shop window of the café. Videos appeared online, showing the hostages in the café using their cellphones (apparently under duress) to text the Australian and global media. After the armed man held the hostages for over 16 hours, the police stormed the café. The gunman and two of the hostages were killed in the exchange of fire. In addition, four people were injured, one of them a police officer.
  • The gunman was identified Haroun Munis, age 50, born in Iran, with a criminal record. At this stage, the connection between the perpetrator and ISIS is still unclear. The attack may have been inspired by ISIS and designed to express solidarity with ISIS. Another possibility is that the attack was not related to ISIS and the demand for an ISIS flag was made in order to ensure that the attack receives international media attention.
Reactions
  • Many social networks of jihadi organizations expressed satisfaction with the fact that Australia was attacked on its own soil. They noted that the attack was carried out in retaliation for the participation of Australia in the fighting against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. On some networks, it was claimed that the attack was carried out in response to ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s call on Muslims in the West to carry out terrorist attacks against civilians in their native countries.

Comments on Twitter pages affiliated with ISIS.
Comments on Twitter pages affiliated with ISIS. Left: “Today is the day of the hostages. Hostages in Australia, hostages in Belgium and hostages in Riyadh. Allah, add [to everything] and bless [us].” The ISIS insignia is visible on the right. Right: A person calling himself Umar the Iraqi: “Far away from their aircraft that bomb our territory in Iraq – this is the situation of the Muslims in Australia. The sheikhs [i.e., Muslim clerics] who shame [the Islamic nation] are crying about hostage-taking in Sydney.” (Twitter, December 15, 2014)

Australia is one of the countries that have announced that they are joining the coalition led by the US against ISIS. As such, Australia has become a potential target for terrorism for jihadists who support ISIS and are inspired by it. In recent months, Australian authorities have expressed concern about Islamic terror attacks in the country. On September 18, 2014, security forces arrested 15 jihadi operatives in Sydney, in light of information ISIS was planning to carry out mass terror attacks in Australia. The indictment filed against one of the detainees, Omarjan Azari, 22, states that he was involved in a plan to carry out random executions of people to terrorize the Australian public. According to Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, the detainees planned to carry out random public beheadings of passersby in Sydney (AP, September 18, 2014).

 

ISIS video distributed in June 2014 on Islamic forums and on YouTube.
ISIS video distributed in June 2014 on Islamic forums and on YouTube. The video shows an Australian calling himself Abu Yahya al-Shami who was apparently killed recently in Syria. In the video, he called on Muslims to wake up in the face of the humiliation experienced by Muslims in Palestine and in Fallujah, Iraq. The video then shows a masked man known as Abu Nour Al-Iraqi who, according to the video, is also an Australian, who called on Muslims in Australia, Europe and America to join the jihad in Syria.

Recruitment of operatives in Austria
  • An Islamic preacher was recently detained on charges of recruiting operatives in Austria to join ISIS, including young girls. The detainee is Ebu Tejma, who lives in Vienna. According to the Austrian security services, Ebu Tejma’s real name is Mirsad Omerovic. He recruited the young people,was also involved in sending them to fight in Syria and provided them with financing. According to the security services, he is one of the jihadi leaders of the so-called “Bosnian cell,” based in Vienna. According to a newspaper in Bosnia Herzegovina, the cell is one of the main logistical and financial support centers for jihadi activity in Europe (The Daily Mail, December 10, 2014).

On October 30, 2014, a 14-year-old boy was detained on suspicion of planning to plant IEDs in crowded places in Vienna. It was reported that ISIS offered the boy the sum of USD 25,000 to carry out the attacks. According to the Austrian media, the boy is Mertkan G., the son of a Turkish immigrant who has been living in Austria for the past eight years. According to Austrian media reports, he was recruited for his mission via the Internet. Other youngsters were also recruited, and were supposed to carry out similar attacks (according to another version, the boy was a “lone wolf”, acting on his own) (Telegraph, October 30, 2014). One of the sites in Vienna where the IEDs were supposed to be planted was one of the busiest train stations in Austria (Vienna’s Westbanhof Station, which is frequented by 40,000 people every day).

 

Al-Qaeda’s activity in other locations in the Middle East
Jordan
  • According to reports, large numbers of civilians in the city of Maan in southern Jordan have joined the ranks of ISIS to fight in Syria. According to Muhammad Al-Shalabi (Abu Sayyaf), a senior Salafi activist in Jordan, following the coalition’s attack against ISIS, the number of supporters of ISIS has surpassed the number of supporters of the Al-Nusra Front. Maan Mayor Majed al-Sharari said that if things continue at this rate, there would be a disaster in Jordan. The Jordanian government, in an attempt to reduce the severity of the phenomenon, claims that it is in control of the situation (Al-Mayadeen Channel, December 8, 2014).

Expressions of support in Jordan for the Salafist-jihadi worldview are not a new phenomenon and date back to the 1990s. Jordan is the birthplace of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq, which later became ISIS. Support in Jordan for the Salafist-jihadi worldview has increased in recent years, in the wake of the civil war in Syria and ISIS’s successes.

The principal centers of support for ISIS today are mainly in outlying cities in Jordan. The most prominent is Maan, in southern Jordan, a longtime center of agitation against the Hashemite regime; other prominent cities are: Al-Salt, Irbid, Russeifa and Zarqa. This support has increased with the return of the “veterans” from the fighting in Syria (in the ITIC’s assessment, more than a thousand Jordanian operatives went to fight in Syria) and in the wake of ISIS’s activities aimed at the Jordanian target audience. Nevertheless, at the moment, ISIS presumably does not have an extensive organized infrastructure of operatives in Jordan, although the potential threat of ISIS gaining in strength remains.

 

Yemen
Report of an attempted attack on an airbase where Western forces were staying
  • On December 11, 2014, Ansar al-Sharia (which is affiliated with Al-Qaeda) reported that it had fired six rockets at an airbase in southern Yemen, where US and European troops were staying. According to the statement, the attack was carried out in response to the (failed) attempted rescue of the American hostage by US Army Special Forces (the American hostage and another hostage from South Africa were killed in the attempted rescue). Military officials in Yemen confirmed that some soldiers were injured, but did not provide more information. Another source claimed that the rockets missed their target (Northafricapost.com, December 12, 2014).
Al-Qaeda’s response to the failed rescue attempt by the US

nAl-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) issued a video addressing the American public, stating that the death of the American hostage, Luke Somers, during the failed rescue attempt last week, was unnecessary. The speaker who appeared in the video added that the organization has the right to seek the release of Sheikh Omar bin Abd al-Rahman (the blind sheikh who is in prison in the US for his involvement in the World Trade Center bombing in New York in 1993) and the release of detainees held in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and elsewhere. He added that the US government continues its fight against the Islamic nation, helping the “Zionist occupiers of Palestine” and violating “the rights of Muslims.” The video ended with the words “Al-Aqsa, we are coming [to you]”.

Left: The video ended with the subtitle: “Al-Aqsa, we are coming [to you]”. Right: A spokesman for AQAP addresses the American public under English subtitles.
Left: The video ended with the subtitle: “Al-Aqsa, we are coming [to you]”. Right: A spokesman for AQAP addresses the American public under English subtitles.

The killing of a senior operative in the Houthi rebel organization by Al-Qaeda
  • According to Yemeni media reports, Salem Ghufayna Raqib, a senior operative in the Shiite Houthi movement, was killed by Islamic operatives from Ansar al-Sharia, an organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda, by means of an IED attached to his car in northern Yemen.

Since 2004, there has been a rebellion against the central Yemeni government in the province of Saada, in northern Yemen, which borders on Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni Army finds it difficult to act and suppress the rebellion. The rebels, numbering several thousand, are members of the Al-Houth clan and belong to the Shiite Zaidi population. According to a large quantity of circumstantial evidence, the Houthi rebellion is receiving military aid from Iran. Yemeni government spokesmen (supported by American sources) have repeatedly accused Iran of supporting the Houthi rebellion

 

 

[1]The weekly publication Spotlight on Global Jihad will monitor developments among ISIS and global jihad organizations and networks in the Middle East. The publication will also deal with global jihad terrorist activities originating in the Middle East.
[2] For details, see the ITIC’s Information Bulletin from July 16, 2014: “Expressions of support in the Gaza Strip for the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), which is affiliated with the global jihad. During Operation Protective Edge, Salafist-jihadi elements who identify with ISIS fired a number of rockets at Israel.”
[3]See the ITIC’s Information Bulletin from December 15, 2014: “News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (December 10-16, 2014).”

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ISIS’s public support for the Egyptian jihadi organization Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, encouraging it to escalate the campaign of terror against the Egyptian regime. In turn, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Published:

Call for aid to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis on the ISIS forum.
Call for aid to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis on the ISIS forum. Photo: Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis operative who blew himself up in the security directorate building in the southern Sinai Peninsula on October 7, 2013. The inscription reads: “Together assisting the heroes of Sinai – we will make the effort to help them, to strengthen their hands, to publish their publications and anything new [about them]; [We] will pray genuine prayers for the sake of those who are not with us [i.e., those who are far from us]" (alplatformmedia.com).

Overview

1.   ISIS recently expressed explicit support for the Egyptian jihadi organization Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (the supporters of Jerusalem), which heads the terrorist campaign being waged against the Egyptian regime. ISIS published a series of strategic and operational "tips" for jihadi operatives in Egypt, encouraging them to escalate the terrorist attack against the Egyptian regime and bring it into the heart of Cairo. This should be done with an emphasis on harming the Egyptian economy, Egyptian security forces, and Egyptian government institutions and officials. ISIS also called Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis to harm Christians and inflame sectarian religious war in Egypt, relying on practices rooted in the conduct of ISIS (and its predecessors) in Iraq.

2.   In turn, on November 10, 2014, the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis organization published an announcement pledging its allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and announcing that it was joining the Islamic State that he heads.

3.   ISIS’s staunch public support of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s pledge of allegianceto the leader of ISIS indicate the start of a new phase of strengthening the ties and cooperation between them. In the ITIC’s assessment, the background for this is the expectation of both terrorist organizations to benefit from increased cooperation:

A.  From ISIS’s perspective, the pledge of allegiance by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is an impressive success, symbolizing the expansion of its influence beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria to a central country in the Middle East. In this context, it was reported recently that global jihad organizations from the Middle East and elsewhere have pledged their allegiance to the leader of ISIS (islamist-movement.com). This increases the prestige of ISIS’s leader Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and strengthens his status vis-à-vis the leadership of Al-Qaeda (which expelled him from its ranks) and vis-à-vis his adversaries in Iraq and Syria, including the Al-Nusra Front (the Al-Qaeda branch in Syria).

B.  From Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s perspective, cooperation with ISIS may guarantee it external support in the terror campaign that it is waging against the Egyptian regime. In the ITIC’s assessment, the preference for ISIS rather than the leadership of Al-Qaeda on the part of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (and other jihadi organizations) is rooted in ISIS’s image as a winning organization with enhanced financial and military capabilities, which is highly attractive to jihadi organizations and operatives and is at the forefront of the fight against the US and the West.

ISIS has expressed support for Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and is instructing it and other jihadi organizations on how to harm the Egyptian regime

4.   The Salafist-jihadi organization Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and other jihadi organizations are waging a campaign of terror against the Egyptian army and the Egyptian regime in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere in Egypt. This campaign culminated in an attack in the Sinai Peninsula, killing 31 Egyptian soldiers (October 24, 2014). In recent months, ISIS embarked on a media campaign, officially and openly promoting the campaign of terror against the Egyptian regime, praising Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, and calling on jihadis around the world to support it. Here are some examples:

5.   In September 2014, ISIS began to encourage Egyptian jihad operatives to attack the Egyptian military. ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani said in a recording uploaded to the Internet that "We praise our brothers in the proud Sinai Peninsula. Continue along your path because it is the true path. Lay mines on their roads, attack their strongholds, assault their houses and behead them […] take them wherever they are. Make their lives a horror and a hell, blow up their houses" (alarabiya.net, September 22, 2014).

6.   On October 31, 2014, ISIS supporters on Twitter launched a hashtag called "Sinai lions' den of believers in the unity of Allah." ISIS supporters called on all jihad supporters to help Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in its war against the Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were also called on to bear arms and to engage in active protest against the Egyptian regime. In addition, the ISIS Twitter account posted a video showing residents of the Sinai Peninsula calling for help after their homes were destroyed and cursing the Egyptian Army and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

7.   At the beginning of November 2014, the official ISIS forum (Al-Minbar al-I’lami al-Jihadi)launched a special section to deal with the Sinai Peninsula. The section posted a number of notices calling on jihad fighters around the globe to support Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the Sinai Peninsula to enable it to fight against the Egyptian security forces.

(alplatformmedia.com).
Left: Graphic design showing a soldier (apparently Egyptian) falling. Above him is a helicopter, and below him the inscription reads “Jihad cavalry, defenders of the honor of the Sinai Peninsula: Allah directs your fire, strengthens you and enables you [to hold] the Jews’ necks and their tails [a hint at the Egyptian regime]. You are the heroes of the jihad, the descendants of the sahaba [the Prophet Muhammad's loyal followers].” (alplatformmedia.com). Right: Poster on the ISIS forum showing operatives late at night, above an inscription that reads: "In Sinai there are men who are heroes, heroes like lions, who are not afraid of any dictator [a hint at the Egyptian president] or any Jew. Allah, help them and let them [have victory], give them reinforcements and enlist what is yours [i.e., enlist faithful Muslims for them]" (alplatformmedia.com).

8.   On November 4, 2014, the ISIS forum posted strategic and operational “tips” for jihad fighters in Egypt on how to conduct a campaign of terror against the Egyptian regime, based primarily on the model of Iraq. The line of reasoning that guided these tips is that jihadi organizations should move the center of gravity of the terrorist campaign from the Sinai Peninsula to “central Cairo” and other large cities in order to hurt the Egyptian regime, inter alia by harming the Egyptian economy (the tips refer to tourism, the Suez Canal, and gas pipelines). Considerable emphasis is also placed on absorbing jihadi foreign fighters and having them carry out terror attacks, exploiting their motivation to carry out suicide bombing attacks.

9.   Following are the principal “tips” given by ISIS operative Abu Musab al-Maqdisi, who may be a liaison between ISIS and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (alplatformmedia.com, November 4, 2014):

Abu Musab al-Maqdisi (twitter.com)
Abu Musab al-Maqdisi (twitter.com)

A.  Harming the “enemy” (the Egyptian regime) in Cairo and large cities: move the battle to “central Cairo” and engage the regime there. Doing so will turn the Sinai Peninsula into an area that infidels (“deserters of religion”)are not allowed to enter and a rear base for continued jihad (against the Egyptian regime). The statement says that one must remember that the Egyptian regime is less affected by Egyptians killed in the Sinai Peninsula than by the attacks on the capital Cairo “and the bodies of its dogs scattered in the city.”

B.  Harming government institutions and officials:carry out operations using silencers, and “cut down” the soldiers of the enemy (the Egyptian government). Hit the hearts of the various governorates and security departments of the Ministry of the Interior, with the goal of “weakening the security grip on the country”. Emulate the example of the severe blows that the Iraqi regime suffered in Baghdad and the other governorates in Iraq. As a result of actions carried out against Iraqi government institutions, Iraqi government officials were prohibited from travelling in their official vehicles and wearing their official attire.

C.  Absorption of foreign fighters ("immigrants"):jihad fighters in Egypt must absorb foreign fighters ("immigrants"), “since a jihadi arena cannot move forward without immigrants”. Their presence will fuel the operations“particularly since they [the foreign fighters] are characterized by a desire to carry out suicide bombings" (istishhad, which means dying the death of a Muslim martyr for the sake of Allah through self-sacrifice on the battlefield against an enemy). Take advantage of the current timing, when it’s easy to enter Egypt, and consider the fact that entering Egypt in the future will require “a tremendous effort”. Jihad fighters in Egypt should absorb the foreign fighters, deploy them in all governorates and send them on operations against Egyptian government institutions.

D.  Fanning the flames of a sectarian religious war: ISIS calls on jihad fighters in Egypt to harm Christians and Shiites (clearly relying on the Iraq and Syria model). This is “because they are [religious] communities that cannot be trusted and it is impossible to reach any agreement with them. They are nothing but booty that Allah will give you…”

E.  Harming Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip:ISIS calls on jihad fighters in the Sinai Peninsula, and in particular Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, to harm trucks carrying weapons, missiles and explosives from the Sinai Palestinian to the Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip. This is because “these weapons hurt Muslims more than Jews, since the Hamas movement and the Hamas government have stolen the weapons of your brethren, the jihad fighters in Gaza”.[1]The Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip “do not guarantee security for the lives of the residents in Gaza, their religion and their jihad, and the saga of their betrayals […] is known to all."

F.  Harming judges:thejihad fighters are called on to harm Egyptian judges, “not to mention the fact that a large percentage of the judges in Egyptare Christians.” These judges have abandoned Islam, tried many young Islamists and sentenced them to death or life imprisonment. “Killing judges is one of the means to serve our prisoners in the jails of the tyrants.”

G.Harming the economy:thejihad fighters are called on to harm the Egyptian economy, “which allows the tyrannical and criminal government to fight against Allah and his messenger.” In addition, “most of the wealthy and decision-makers in the Egyptian economy are also Christians.” According to the announcement, the targets are the tourism industry, the gas pipes to Israel and “to the countries of the tyrants” [i.e., Jordan], the economic institutions of the [Egyptian] army, and the commercial areas in the Suez Canal. The announcement emphasizes harming the Suez Canal since the monies that the regime charges at the crossing are used by El-Sisi “to move missiles and weapons in order to fight our brothers in Syria and to support their tyrant like him.” In addition,“the fire of jihad should reach Sharm el-Sheikh,” and enough with the prostitution and entertainment that Jewish and foreign tourists have enjoyed in this area.”

H.  The killing of enemies and spies should be carried out by slaughtering (i.e., beheading) and not shooting. The announcement calls on jihad fighters to slaughter every spy and every representative, if it has been proven that he is part of the Egyptian state security forces or is collaborating with the Egyptian military establishment.[2]

10.       Israel is not mentioned in ISIS’s strategic and operative “tips” for Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. The ITIC believes that this reflects the strategic priorities of ISIS, with its emphasis on fighting against the enemies from within. However, in the wording of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s pledge of allegiance to the leader of ISIS on November 10, 2014 (see below), the war against “the Jews” appears in the beginning of the announcement: “After decades… Allah instructed the banner of jihad to be raised in our country, and granted us the honor of being his [Allah’s] chosen soldiers for the war against the most bitter foes of the nation – the Jews. Indeed, we hurt them greatly in many raids, such as Umm al-Rashrash (i.e., Eilat, Israel’s southernmost city) and other [raids] […] Our swords are still drawn against them, until Allah prevails.” In the ITIC’s assessment, this wording indicates Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s intention to include attacks against Israel in its campaign against the Egyptian regime.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s pledge of allegiance to the leader of ISIS

11.   On November 10, 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis announced on its official Twitter account that it had pledged its allegiance to Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and was joining the Islamic State that he heads. The announcement was preceded by reports on jihadi and Egyptian websites, including a website affiliated with ISIS, whereby the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis had pledged its allegiance to Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State (ISIS).

12.      Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s announcement begins with a description of the current situation of the organization and the Muslim nation in general, and words of praise for the establishment of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Its operative part reads:

"… We declare our pledge of allegiance to the Caliph Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Qurayshi al-Husseini [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s names and titles], to hear and obey, in hardship and ease, and in love and hatred; We are honored to do so and we will not dispute the matter, unless we see among us clear heresy of which we have proof from Allah. We call on Muslims everywhere to pledge allegiance to the Caliph and to help him, as a response to Allah and as the implementation of the “lost obligation” (i.e., the obligation of the current generation)…”

13.       The announcement then calls on jihad fighters on all fronts to assist the Caliph and the Islamic State:

"… After a state for Islam and the Muslims has been established, and a Caliph and Commander of the Faithful has been appointed to rule over that state, you refrain from helping them and do not stand under the flag, at a time when the whole world is attacking it. What is your excuse, O audience of jihad fighters? … So make a decision on a matter concerning you, gather together and help your country, for you are part of it and it is part of you…”

Twitter page of ISIS operative Abu Musab al-Maqdisi, who provided a series of strategic and operational “tips” for Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. The bottom line in blue reads: “Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledges allegiance to the Caliph” (twitter.com, November 10, 2014)
Twitter page of ISIS operative Abu Musab al-Maqdisi, who provided a series of strategic and operational “tips” for Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. The bottom line in blue reads: “Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledges allegiance to the Caliph” (twitter.com, November 10, 2014)

[1] The message refers to the decisive measures taken by the Hamas government against Salafist-jihadi organizations in the Gaza Strip in light of the challenge they may pose to its control.
[2]Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis carries out public beheading like the one carried out by ISIS. On August 28, 2014, the organization distributed a video documenting the beheading of four men who, according to the organization, collaborated with the Israeli Mossad. The operative who read out the written announcement was also the one who executed the four men (alarbiya.net).

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Expressions of support in the Gaza Strip for the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), which is affiliated with the global jihad.

Published:

Armed and masked Salafist-jihadi operatives in the Gaza Strip express their loyalty to ISIS in a video uploaded to websites (Al-Quds, February 12, 2014)
Armed and masked Salafist-jihadi operatives in the Gaza Strip express their loyalty to ISIS in a video uploaded to websites (Al-Quds, February 12, 2014)

Overview

1.      In recent months, expressions of support for the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (hereinafter: ISIS) by Salafist-jihadi operatives in the Gaza Strip have been evident. They are increasing as ISIS amasses victories and achievements in Syria and Iraq. These operatives held a rally in support of ISIS in Rafah and distributed a short support video clip on YouTube. In addition, there are nearly forty operatives in Syria, some of whom probably operate within a separate unit within ISIS named after Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi (a Salafist-jihadi sheikh in the Gaza Strip who was killed in 2009 by Hamas following his announcement of the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Palestine).

2.      During Operation Protective Edge, a number of rockets were fired at Israel by Salafist-jihadi operatives in the Gaza Strip, who identified publicly with ISIS and posted a short video clip showing the Al-Qaeda flag (for documentation of the shooting see below). At least two Salafist-jihadi operatives were killed in IDF attacks. Nevertheless, taking a broad perspective, the weight of Salafist-jihadi military operations carried out during Operation Protective Edge is marginal.

3.      In our assessment, Hamas perceives Salafist-jihadi activity as a potential risk and as a practical and ideological challenge to its rule in the Gaza Strip. However, at this stage, the Salafist-jihadi infrastructure as a whole does not yet pose a real threat to the rule of Hamas, which possesses the capabilities to suppress any operational or ideological challenge that deviates from the policy dictated by Hamas (as in the past). Recent expressions of support for ISIS in the Gaza Strip were dealt with strongly by Hamas, even though it avoids overall confrontation with Salafist-jihadis.

Expressions of support for ISIS in the Gaza Strip

4. Following the successes of ISIS in northern Iraq in the first half of June 2014, Salafist-jihadi operatives held a support rally for ISIS in Palestinian Rafah. During the support rally, held on June 12, 2014, ISIS and Al-Qaeda flags were waved, and slogans were heard in favor of establishing an Islamic caliphate (the Islamic State) and against the Jews. The support rally was dispersed by the Hamas police.

Support rally for ISIS by residents of Palestinian Rafah, which was dispersed by the Hamas police (youtube.com).
Support rally for ISIS by residents of Palestinian Rafah, which was dispersed by the Hamas police (youtube.com).

5.      Four months earlier (February 12, 2014), Salafist-jihadi elements in the Gaza Strip distributed a video clip to websites expressing their loyalty to ISIS, headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The video clip shows 10 armed and masked men, with the ISIS flag in the background (alquds.com, February 12, 2014). The expression of loyalty followed a rift between ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria (for a photo from the video clip, which has since been removed from the Internet, see the cover page).

Hamas’s reactions

6.      Hamas police quickly dispersed the demonstration of support for ISIS held in Rafah on June 12, 2014 (Amad website, June 14 2014). In addition, Hamas launched an online media attack against ISIS. The Hamas forum opened a special online thread, which included strong condemnations against ISIS, for example: “ISIS operatives are not members of the Jihad, but rather agents who kill more Muslims than infidels.” Another comment: “There is no room for takfiri thought in the Gaza Strip… they are Khawarij[1]. The cure for them is the sword of Ali.” Someone else claimed that “ISIS is killing Shi’ites in Iraq. ISIS is killing Shi’ites and Sunnis in Syria” (Hamas online forum, June 14, 2014).

7.      In response to the publication of the video clip supporting ISIS (February 12, 2014), Salah al-Bardawil, a senior Hamas operative in the Gaza Strip, claimed that there are no extremists affiliated with ISIS and Al-Qaeda in the Gaza Strip. He claimed that the online publications were designed to discredit Hamas and label it as a terrorist organization along with Al-Qaeda (Al-Quds, February 12, 2014).

Rocket fire by Salafist-jihadi operatives in the Gaza Strip affiliated with ISIS during Operation Protective Edge

8.      On July 8, 2014, Salafist-jihadi operatives in the Gaza Strip uploaded avideo clip to YouTube documenting several instances of rockets being launched at Israel. The video clip shows at least 10 rockets being launched at Israel in the evening and at night, probably from two or three different sites.

9.      The video clip uploaded to YouTube is entitled: “The Salafist-jihadi [movement] in the Gaza Strip – lovers of the Islamic state [i.e., ISIS] launches rockets at the Jews.” The video clip shows Al-Qaeda flags. Its opening scene reads: “Jihad and shooting – sons of the Islamic State, Bayt al-Maqdis [i.e., Jerusalem].”

[1] Takfiris - those declaring a Muslim person or group of Muslims as infidels, a declaration that means that the blood of individuals and population groups may be spilled. “Takfiris” has become a derogatory name for Al-Qaeda and the global jihad used by their opponents (Iran, Hezbollah).  Khawarij - the first sect in Islam that broke away from the army of Ali bin Abi Talib in the battle of Siffin (in 657 AD) in protest against his agreement to turn to arbitration. “Khawarij” has become a derogatory name for groups that have been expressly excluded from the general framework of Islam.

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The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters from the Arab World in the Syrian Civil War

Published:

A group of foreign fighters from North Africa photographed in the Latakia region of Syria (Magharebia.com, September 5, 2013).
A group of foreign fighters from North Africa photographed in the Latakia region of Syria (Magharebia.com, September 5, 2013).

Overview

1.   This study examines the phenomenon of foreign fighters from the Arab world in the ranks of the rebels in Syria. According to ITIC estimate, there are more than 5,000 foreign fighters from the Arab world among the 7,000-8,000 who have joined the ranks of the Syrian rebels.[2] Most of them belong to the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria(ISIS), two rival organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. A minority of the Arab foreign fighters joined the ranks of the Free Syrian Army and other rebel organizations.

2.   Some of the Arab foreign fighters are young and have no military training or experience. They joined the ranks of the rebels for ideological or religious-sectarian reasons (e.g., participating in jihad, fighting the Shi'ites). Others were motivated by the desire to raise their socio-economic status. Among other reasons were hostility to the Assad regime, the desire for adventure, and identification with the suffering of the Syrian people. Within the Arab foreign fighters there is a hard core of Salafist-jihadi, Al-Qaeda and global jihad operatives, some of them veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other Islamic combat zones. Most of the Arab foreign fighters come from towns and villages, with only a few coming from the main cities.

3.   In our assessment, the Arab foreign fighters form the backbone of the forces fighting in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS.They also have a high casualty rate and many are killed. In addition, among the foreign fighter suicide bombers in Syria from organizations affiliated Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, the number of Arabs is conspicuous, especially those from Saudi Arabia.[3]

4.   Of the Arab countries from which the largest number of foreign fighters come, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt experienced the regional upheaval. Two other countries, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are pro-West, and preserved their stability in the era of regional upheaval, with deeply-rooted radical Islamic elements. Initially those five countries did not attempt to stem the flow of their citizens leaving for Syria, regarding them as part of their support for the campaign to overthrow the Assad regime and to confront Iran and Shi'ite Islam. Only during the past year, when the dangers of terrorism and subversion from the Syrian veterans became apparent as they returned to their countries of origin, did some of the Arab regimes take preventive action. They took legislative steps (Saudi Arabia, for example) and prevented the foreign fighters from leaving for Syria, monitored those who returned, and dealt with the local radical organizations providing them with logistical support. However, it is still unclear to what extent the steps taken have been effective.

5.   Some of the foreign fighters joined the fighting in Syria on an individual basis. However, in certain prominent instances local Salafist-jihadi organizations and activists who preach joining the fighting have given the foreign fighters logistical support and dispatched them to Syria. They include, for example, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Ansar and Sharia and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt, Jam'iyya al-Asala al-Islamiyya in Bahrain, Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, the Salafist movement in Jordan, Jaish al-Ummah and other Salafist-jihadi organizations and networks in the Gaza Strip.

6.   The Arab foreign fighters in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations are a ticking bomb for their countries of origin, especially countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. That is because in Syria the foreign fighters acquire operational experience and combat skills, are inculcated with the ideology of jihad and radical Islam, and form a network of contacts with Salafist-jihadi organizations and operatives throughout the Arab-Muslim world. They are expected to return to their countries of origin (as some of them already have), join local Salafist-jihadi networks or establish new networks for terrorism and subversion. In some cases, in our assessment, the networks will operate in coordination with or be directed by the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS through contacts made in Syria.

 

7.   However, in our assessment, so far the involvement of Syrian veterans in terrorism and subversion in the various Arab countries is still nascent. However, there have been cases which indicate what the future may hold: in Egypt it was reported that jihadist veterans of the Syrian conflict were detained for their involvement in terrorist activities against the Egyptian regime, or were killed during a terrorist attack carried out by the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (which is affiliated with the global jihad).[4] In May 2014 the Saudi Arabian ministry of the interior recently announced the exposure of a terrorist network that was in contact with extremists in Syria and Yemen. In Jordan the ISISencouraged demonstrations and riots in the southern city of Ma'an, a hotbed of anti-regime subversive activity. In Israel, two Israeli Arabs were asked by jihadist organizations to carry out terrorist attacks in Israeli territory after they had returned from Syria. In addition, in December 2013 a jihadist network was exposed in east Jerusalem that had been asked to send one of its operatives to Syria for military training and to coordinate terrorist attacks. In Iraq the ISIS, which is affiliated with the global jihad, holds trans-national military-terrorist-subversive activities. The activities do not distinguish between Iraq and Syria, and many expand to Arab countries, Jordan for example.

Estimates of Arab Foreign Fighters in the Arab World

8.   The countries from which the Arab foreign fighters left for Syria can be divided into four categories, according to the number of fighters from each one:

1) Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia – According to estimates, between several hundred and approximately one thousand fighters.

2) Egypt and Iraq – Hundreds of fighters.

3) Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Qatar, Mauritania and Somalia – Several dozen fighters.

4) Sudan, Yemen and Oman – A few fighters from each country.

9.   The following table summarizes the estimates of Arab foreign fighters from the various countries of origin:[5]

 

No.

Country

Estimated number of foreign fighters

Notes

1

Libya

Several hundred to almost 1000

Libyan foreign fighters were joined by non-Libyans who had fought there in the revolution against Muammar Gaddafi.

2

Morocco

Several dozen

 

3

Tunisia

More than 1000

Some of them fought in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi.

4

Algeria

A few dozen

 

5

Mauritania

A few individuals

 

6

Egypt

Several hundred

 

7

Saudi Arabia

Almost 1000

 

8

Bahrain

Several dozen

 

9

Kuwait

Several dozen

 

10

Qatar

A few individuals

 

11

Lebanon

Many score

Mostly Lebanese Sunnis and Lebanese of Palestinian origin

12

Iraq

Several hundred

 

13

Jordan

More than 1000

 

14

Somalia

Between one and a few individuals

 

15

Gaza Strip[6]

Approximately 30

 

16

Palestinian Authority

A few individuals

 
 

[2]There are higher estimates of the overall number of foreign fighters in Syria. For example, in December 2013 the British-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) estimated that there were 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria from 74 countries, 2,800 of them from Western countries and the other from the Middle East (Icsr.info).
[3]In 2013 the ITIC counted 53 operatives from the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS who carried out suicide bombing attacks against targets affiliated with the Syrian regime. The names of 30 were identified, 23 foreign fighters and seven Syrians. Of the 23 foreigners, 13 were Saudis, four were Jordanians, and three were Iraqis. For further information see the February 11, 2014 bulletin "Using suicide bombers as weapons: The leading modus operandi in the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS' struggle against the Syrian regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon"[4]For further information see the May 5, 2014 bulletin "Involvement of Operatives Who Returned from Syria in the Terrorist Campaign against the Egyptian Regime"
[5]The estimates in this study relate to the overall number of foreign fighters from each country according to categories which cannot always be distinguished between: Arab fighters who are still fighting in Syria (the majority), those who returned to the countries of origin (the minority), and those who were killed in the fighting in Syria or who were taken captive by the Syrian regime.
[6]A report on Palestinian and Israeli Arab foreign fighters was issued on January 19, 2014, therefore Israeli Arabs and Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority are not included in this study.

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Foreign fighters from various countries and regions in Asia, fighting against the Syrian regime, most of them in organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad

Published:

Foreign fighters from the Caucasus (mainly Chechens) in Syria against a background of Al-Qaeda flags (http://fisyria.com, August 3, 2013).
Foreign fighters from the Caucasus (mainly Chechens) in Syria against a background of Al-Qaeda flags (http://fisyria.com, August 3, 2013).

Characteristics and implications

1.   This study examines the foreign fighters from various countries and regions in Asia fighting against the Syrian regime. The study shows that most of the foreign fighters from Asia are fighting in the ranks of organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. A small number fight in the ranks of other rebel organizations. This is a follow-on to the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center’s in-depth study about foreign fighters in Syria from countries and regions in the Middle East, Asia and the West.[1]

 

2.   The number of non-Arab foreign fighters from Muslim countries and regions in Asia, who joined the ranks of the rebels in Syria, is estimated by us at 600-700 (out of about 7,000 to 8,000 foreign fighters fighting against the Syrian regime).   Notable among them are operatives from Chechnya and the North Caucasus and, to a lesser extent, from Pakistan and Turkey.In addition, there are foreign fighters in Syria from Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Indonesia and other Muslim countries, numbering from a few to several dozen. Muslims from non-Muslim countries in Asia, such as China and India, have also joined the rebels, mainly alongside the jihadi organizations.

 

3.   Notable among the foreign fighters from Asia who joined in the fighting in Syria are skilled operatives with military-terrorist experience from two regions:

A.        Chechnya and the Caucasus – there are some 200-250 Chechen fighters in Syria, some of them affiliated with the Caucasian Emirate, a Caucasian network that maintains ties with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad.They include highly motivated fighters with combat experience who participated in the uprising against Russia in the1990s. Most of the Chechen operatives joined the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (hereinafter: “ISIS”). Several of them attained senior command ranks and some senior commanders were killed in battle. A large portion of the Chechen operatives fight in a separate military unit by the name of the Army of Emigrants and Supporters, affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front[2], comprising mainly foreign fighters. Some of the operatives in this unit left following a rift between ISIS and the Al-Nusra, and joined ISIS.

B.        Pakistan– in Syria there are many dozen (up to around 100) Pakistani foreign fighters. Prominent among them are members of the Taliban who joined Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in Syria. Also prominent are operatives of a Pakistani terrorist organization by the name of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (the Army of Jhangvi), a radical Sunni organization that “specializes” in fighting against Shiites. In addition, there are more than 200 Turkish foreign fighters in Syria, some of Kurdish extraction. Most of them join organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad or Kurdish militia separatists in northern Syria fighting for Kurdish autonomy.

4.   The following table summarizes the various estimates of the number of foreign fighters from Muslim countries in Asia:

 

Number

 

 

Country / Region

 

Estimated number of foreign fighters

 

Remarks

 

1

Chechnya (Russia) and North Caucasus

250-200

According to a Russian source and the commander of the Free Syrian Army, among others

2

Azerbaijan

Scores

 

3

Tajikistan

A fewindividuals

 

4

Dagestan

Nearly twenty

 

5

Kyrgyzstan

Nearly twenty

 

6

Kazakhstan

A few dozen

 

7

Pakistan

Between scores and 100

Statements by Taliban leaders that hundreds of Pakistani fighters have been sent to Syria are exaggerated, in our opinion.

8

Afghanistan

A few individuals

In our opinion, statements by spokesmen for the Syrian regime that hundreds of Afghans are fighting in Syria are exaggerated.

9

Indonesia

A few dozen

 

 

 

10

Turkey

More than 200, some of Kurdish extraction

 

 

 

5.   In addition, Muslim foreign fighters from non-Muslim Asian countries have joined the ranks of the rebels: scores (up to 100) of members of the Sunni Muslim minority in China (the Uyghurs); a small number of Muslim foreign fighters from India and one Japanese foreign fighter. Most of these foreign fighters joined organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad.

6.   The foreign fighters from Asian countries, fighting in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadi organizations, constitute a potential risk to their Asian countries of origin, the countries and regions bordering on them, and to Western countries as well. The reason is that these foreign fighters, having acquired operational experience and combat skills and having undergone processes of jihadization and Islamic radicalization during their stay in Syria, are expected to return to their countries of origin and join existing terrorist infrastructures. Some may even set up new terrorism and subversion infrastructures, which will operate locally and internationally, possibly under the guidance of the leadership of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. 

The structure of the study

7.   This study presents the distribution of the Asian foreign fighters by countries and regions, as follows:

A.  Chechnya and the Caucasus

1) Overview

2) The Army of Emigrants and Supporters – the Chechen military unit

3) Portrait of Umar the Chechen, the senior Chechen commander

4) Information about Chechen operatives

5) Photographs of Chechen operatives

6) The position of Russia and the Chechen leadership

B.  Azerbaijan

1)    Overview

2)    Information about Azeri foreign fighters

3)    Photographs of Azeri operatives

C.  Dagestan

D.  Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

1)    Overview

2)    Information about foreign fighters from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

3)    The position of the local authorities

E.  Kazakhstan

F.  Pakistan

1)    Overview

2)    Information about foreign fighters from Pakistan

3)    The position of the local authorities

G.Afghanistan

H.  Indonesia

I.    Turkey

1)    Overview

2)    The city of Adıyaman as a center for recruiting Turkish foreign fighters

3)    Information about Turkish foreign fighters

4)    The position of the local authorities

J.   Foreign fighters from non-Muslim countries

1)    China

a) Overview

b) Information about foreign fighters from China

c)The position of the local authorities

2)    Japan

3)    India

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