Summary of the Most Recent Round of Escalation in the Gaza Strip

Overview

Before dawn on November 12, 2019, the IDF carried out the targeted killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta, commander of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) north Gaza Strip brigade. In the meantime an attack was carried out in the al-Mazzeh neighborhood of Damascus, in which the son of Akram al-Ajouri, a senior PIJ figure, was killed. Israel did not claim responsibility for the attack in Damascus, but the PIJ linked it to the killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta in the Gaza Strip. In response the PIJ fired about 560 rockets and mortar shells at Israel’s south and center. The IDF responded by attacking PIJ targets. The round of escalation lasted for two days (November 12 and 13, 2019).

• Before dawn on November 14, 2019, a ceasefire was reached, mediated by Egypt and accepted by Israeli and the PIJ.^[1] However, the ceasefire notwithstanding, sporadic PIJ rocket fire from the Gaza Strip continued (although it was far less intense than previously). In addition, on November 16, 2019, Hamas fired two rockets at Beersheba (the first Hamas rocket fire of the most recent escalation). The IDF responded by attacking PIJ targets (November 14, 2019), and for the first time during the escalation, Hamas targets were also attacked (November 16, 2019).
• During the round of escalation the IDF attacked PIJ military compounds, below-ground infrastructures and a number of naval targets near the shore. In addition, the IDF prevented terrorist squads from firing rockets. The Palestinians reported 34 killed^[2] and more than 100 wounded. An examination of the names of the fatalities revealed that most of them were operatives of the PIJ and other terrorist networks. A house mistakenly assessed as a terrorist target was destroyed, killing a family of Palestinians (the IDF is investigating the incident). No Israelis were killed. Several dozen Israelis incurred minor injuries and there was property damage.
• The IDF spokesman reported that during the two days of fighting all IDF objectives had been fully achieved. The spokesman said that the IDF’s objectives were: the targeted killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta, who was a ticking bomb planning terrorist attacks in the coming days; creating a division between Hamas and the PIJ; and continuing the process of shaping and stabilizing the situation in the Gaza Strip. According to the IDF spokesman, the IDF dealt a heavy blow to the PIJ’s military capabilities, especially by eliminating terrorist operatives and by attacking the PIJ’s infrastructure (IDF spokesman, November 14, 2019).
• However, senior PIJ figures, among them its leader, Ziyad al-Nakhalah, represented the round of escalation and the ceasefire as great achievements for the PIJ. They claimed their main success paralyzing daily life in Israel’s center and south. They also boasted that they had prevented Israel from returning to its policy of targeted killing and had secured the safety of the participants of the return marches by preventing Israel from shooting at them. The PIJ stressed that the ceasefire is temporary and that the organization will respond to any Israeli violation of it. Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, also said that the most recent round of escalation was not the last and that accounts with Israel (“the enemy”) had not yet been fully settled.

Summary of the Rocket Fire at Israel

• During the most recent round of escalation 562 rocket and mortar shells were fired from the Gaza Strip at populated areas. Most of them were short-range rockets attacking Israel’s south, the city of Sderot and the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip. Some of the rockets were fired at the cities of Netivot, Ashqelon and Ashdod. At the beginning of the round rockets were fired at Israel’s center. According to the IDF spokesman, more than 90% of the rockets were intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. About 60% fell in open spaces. Sporadic rocket fire continued after the ceasefire was accepted, but it was less intense.
• The number of rockets fired on the days of the escalation were the following:
• On November 12, 2019, immediately after the killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta, operatives of the PIJ’s military wing fired barrages of rockets at Israel. Initially the rockets were fired at the south and a short time later the range was increased to include central Israel. The barrages continued throughout the day. About 250 rockets were fired.
• On November 13, 2019, rocket fire peaked with about 290 rockets fired during the day. Most of the attacks targeted the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip. In the evening the range was extended to the regions of Ashqelon, Ashdod, Rehovot and Yavneh.
• On November 14, 2019, even after a ceasefire had been accepted, sporadic rocket fire continued, with more than 20 rockets fired during the day, most of them at the communities near the Gaza Strip.
• On the night of November 16, 2019, two rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at Beersheba. They were intercepted by the Iron Dome. Apparently Hamas operatives were behind the rocket fire, after avoiding participation during the round of escalation itself.

Daily distribution of rocket fire during the escalation

• Senior PIJ figure Khader Habib reported that the PIJ had fired about 500 rockets at Israel (Safa, November 15, 2019). Abu Hamza, spokesman for the PIJ’s military wing, boasted that during the round of escalation the PIJ fired rockets called “Burak 120,” which were manufactured completely by the organization (website of the PIJ’s military wing, November 14, 2019). He said they had a range of 120 kilometers (about 75 miles) and carried a powerful warhead, which contributed to the “balance of power” with Israel (al-Mayadeen, November 15, 2019).

Pictures from a video of the PIJ displaying its new “Burak 120” rocket, which were fired in the most recent round of escalation, allegedly at the central Israeli city of Hader^[3] (Jerusalem Brigades website, November 14, 2019).

• The PIJ was joined by a number of small, insignificant terrorist networks. The Palestinian media published claims of responsibility issued by the military wings of organizations and networks of operatives who splintered from Fatah, such as the military wing of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the military wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), global jihad networks and others. Despite Hamas’ public declarations of praise for the “resistance” [i.e., terrorist] actions, Hamas operatives did not participate in the rocket fire, with the exception of two rockets fired on November 16, 2019, after the ceasefire. The rocket fire targeting Beersheba marked the end of the most recent round of escalation. It was intended, in ITIC assessment, to send the message that Hamas did not separate itself from the PIJ (a message publicly reiterated by Hamas leaders). The rocket fire at Beersheba might have been the result of pressure exerted on Hamas for not joining the round of escalation (see below).

    
Right: The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ Nidal al-Amoudi brigade launches rockets (YouTube, November 15, 2019). Left: The DFLP’s military wing launches rockets (YouTube account of the National Resistance Brigades/Battalions, November 13, 2019).

IDF Attacks

• In response to the rocket fire the IDF attacked dozens of targets in the Gaza Strip, most of them belonging to the PIJ’s military infrastructure. At the same time Israeli Navy vessels attacked targets of the PIJ’s naval force. Among the targets attacked were rocket launching squads before and after rockets were fired; rocket launching sites; weapons storehouses; a workshop for the manufacture of long-range rockets; training compounds; posts; operations rooms; observation posts and underground infrastructures.
• The IDF spokesman reported that among the targets attacked was an important workshop in the southern Gaza Strip where warheads for long-range rockets were manufactured. Also attacked were the headquarters of the Khan Yunis brigade and a weapons storehouse situated in the home of an operative in the PIJ’s rocket unit. Israeli naval vessels attacked boats belonging to the PIJ’s naval force which were used for training in preparation for terrorist attacks. Also attacked was a naval force training compound which also served as a weapons storehouse.
• In response to the sporadic rocket fire after the ceasefire (November 14, 2019) the Israeli Air Force attacked PIJ targets. After the rocket fire at Beersheba, the Israeli Air Force attacked, for the first time since the beginning of the round of escalation, Hamas targets. Among the targets were a military camp and a military compound used by Hamas’ naval force. An underground infrastructure was also attacked (IDF spokesman, November 15, 2019).

Casualties

Israelis injured

• No Israelis were killed during the round of escalation, despite the large number of rockets directly targeting populated areas in southern and central Israel. Several dozen Israelis incurred minor injuries, especially while running to bomb shelters. Several also had to be treated for shock. Property was damaged, including several houses and factories that took direct hits.

Palestinians killed and injured

• The Palestinian ministry of health reported that 34 Palestinians had been killed and 111 had incurred various degrees of injury. An ITIC analysis of the names of the Palestinians killed indicates that most of them were PIJ operatives. Operatives from other terrorist networks involved in the rocket fire were also hit (further details will appear in a future bulletin). According to the ministry of health’s spokesman, eight family members were killed in an IDF attack on Deir al-Balah. The house was attacked because it was mistakenly considered a terrorist target. The IDF is investigating the incident.

Estimated damage in the Gaza Strip

• The government information office in the Gaza Strip reported that according to an initial estimate, the IDF attacks caused direct damage of $3 million. Five hundred dwelling units were damaged or destroyed, including eight houses and 12 units that were completely destroyed with damages estimated at $2 million. Damages to the infrastructure are estimated at more than $290,000. The total amount of damage to general facilities is estimated at about $87,000. Damages to transportation are estimated at more than $60,000. Partially damaged were government institutions including 15 schools, two educational departments and a security headquarters. The total damage was estimated at about $30,000 (Ma’an, November 15, 2019). The ministry of agriculture in the Gaza Strip said its initial estimate of the damage done to the agricultural sector was more than $600,000 (Amad, November 14, 2019).

Palestinian Authority Reactions to the Round of Escalation

• At a number of locations in Judea and Samaria local demonstrations were held in solidarity with the residents of the Gaza Strip, and “Israel’s aggression” in the Gaza Strip was condemned. The official Fatah Facebook page posted a call to support the Palestinian people and the “resistance” [i.e., terrorist organizations], and to hold marches to the friction points with Israel to protest “Israel’s aggression.” However, there were no significant expressions of solidarity with the Gaza Strip or mass riots.
• PA spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh said that Mahmoud Abbas demanded the international community intervene and exert pressure on Israel to stop its “aggression” and to respect international law (Wafa, November 13, 2019). PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh demanded that Israel immediately end its “aggression” against the Gaza Strip and called on the UN and humanitarian rights institutions to defend the Palestinian people from Israel’s “crimes” (Wafa, November 12, 2019),

Mediation Efforts for a Ceasefire

• From the beginning of the escalation Egypt exerted efforts to reach a ceasefire. However, during the first stage (November 12, 2019) the PIJ refused to agree and made it clear it would not allow Israel to determine when the round would end. The PIJ said it would continue firing rockets until it had completed its response to the killing of Bahaa Abu al-Atta (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 13, 2019).
• On the second day of the escalation (November 13, 2019) contacts for a ceasefire were intensified. PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah was summoned to Cairo to meet with officials of the Egyptian General Intelligence and to discuss conditions for a ceasefire. On the night of November 13, 2019, Ziyad al-Nakhalah was interviewed by Hezbollah-affiliated al-Mayadeen TV. He said the conditions for a ceasefire were an end to the targeted killings in the Gaza Strip and West Bank; an end to Israel’s shooting at return march participants and an Israel commitment to the understandings reached in Cairo regarding the lifting of the “siege” of the Gaza Strip. He claimed that if Israel accepted the conditions there would be a ceasefire (al-Mayadeen, November 13, 2019).
• On the morning of November 14, 2019, Palestinian sources reported that in light of Egypt’s demand, the PIJ and Israel had accepted a ceasefire that would go into effect that morning. However, PIJ operatives continued sporadic rocket fire. Later on, PIJ spokesman Musab al-Brim reported that the PIJ was committed to the ceasefire reached with Israel with Egypt’s assistance. He stressed that they were still examining Israel’s conduct (Dunia al-Watan, November 15, 2019). After the ceasefire went into effect, senior PIJ figure Jamil Alian (who holds the PIJ’s “prisoners portfolio”) said in an interview that the ceasefire would not be long-lasting because they wanted to continue the confrontation with Israel.
• After the ceasefire went into effect the daily routine in the Gaza Strip was restored. On November 16, 2019, the ministry of education in the Gaza Strip announced that the schools and universities would reopen, after having been closed during the escalation (Filastin al-Yawm, November 15, 2019). The currency authority announced that the banks in the Gaza Strip would return to operations (Dunia al-Watan, November 14, 2019).

    
The schools in the Gaza Strip reopen after the ceasefire goes into effect
(Palinfo Twitter account, November 16, 2019).

Main PIJ and Hamas Public Responses after the Ceasefire

The PIJ expressed satisfaction with the results of the round of escalation and the conditions of the ceasefire. The PIJ’s senior figures represented the round of escalation as its victory, which increased its deterrence against Israel. PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah said in an interview that the PIJ could have continued its attacks for many days to come. He said the fact that Israel closed its schools and factories in the cities in the center of Israel was a sign that the message sent by the PIJ’s military wing’s long-range rockets had been received. He also stressed that the Palestinian public had no one to defend it, especially during the return marches [implied criticism of Hamas] and therefore it was the responsibility of the PIJ to respond to any Israeli “aggression” and to protect the safety of the marchers (al-Mayadeen, November 13, 2019).

• Other main responses were the following:
  • PIJ spokesman Musab al-Brim claimed the “resistance” had enforced a “new equation” on Israel. As part of the “equation” there will be a direct response to any “aggression” from Israel. As to the PIJ’s achievements, he claimed the “resistance” had “restrained” Israel and “shattered Israeli deterrence.” He said Egypt had promised to oversee the ceasefire, but the responsibility for restraining Israel on the ground was in the hands of the “resistance” (Filastin al-Yawm, November 14, 2019).
  • PIJ spokesman Da’ud Shehab said that during the round of fighting the PIJ had chalked up a great achievement by preventing a change in the “rules of engagement with Israel.” He claimed Israel had] committed itself not to return to its policy of targeted killings. He said the contacts for a ceasefire had focused on Israel’s not returning to the policy of targeted killings, the end of Israel’s “aggression” against the return marches and the “lifting of the siege [of the Gaza Strip]” (al-Mayadeen, November 14, 2019).
  • Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, spoke with PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah. He said Hamas would continue to support the “resistance” in every situation. The two praised what they called the “depth of the relations” between the PIJ and Hamas and the role of the “resistance” [i.e., the PIJ] in the most recent confrontation (Dunia al-Watan, November 15, 2019).

Criticism of Hamas and Public Tension between the PIJ and Hamas

Many social network users expressed disappointment with the ceasefire. They claimed the PIJ’s achievements were insufficient in the face of the large number of Palestinians killed. After the ceasefire spontaneous protest demonstrations broke out in the Gaza Strip in a number of locations. Demonstrators protested the ceasefire and demanded a “fitting response” for the blood of the shaheeds, which, they claimed, should have been firing rockets at Tel Aviv. During the protest demonstrations criticism was also heard against Hamas, which had not stood side by side with the PIJ (Filastin al-Yawm, November 15, 2019).

   
Demonstrations in several locations in the Gaza Strip to protest the ceasefire
(palsawa Twitter account, November 14, 2019).

    
Demonstration in Jabalia against the crisis
(Usama Wafa Twitter account, November 14, 2019).

• On November 15, 2019, young members of the Abu al-Atta family prevented a delegation of the Hamas leadership led by Mahmoud al-Zahar, a member of Hamas political bureau, from expressing their condolences on the death of Bahaa Abu al-Atta. They were protesting Hamas’ non-involvement in the most recent round of escalation. After the intervention of senior PIJ figures, Mahmoud al-Zahar returned to the mourning tent, but he was again prevented from entering. The delegation’s bodyguards fired their guns into the air to disperse the Palestinians protesting the visit, and the delegation left (Amad, November 15, 2019; UAE24 website, November 15, 2019).

• Following the incident, Bahaa Abu al-Atta’s family issued an apology. A PIJ delegation headed by Khaled al-Batash, a member of the PIJ’s political bureau, and Bahaa Abu al-Atta’s father paid a visit to Mahmoud al-Zahar’s house to apologize to him.
• After the incident Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, paid a condolence call on the Abu al-Atta family, heading a Hamas delegation (November 16, 2019). He stressed that Hamas would remain loyal to the blood of the shaheeds and the blood of Bahaa Abu al-Atta. Isma’il Haniyeh said that fighting and decision-making were part of the [so-called] strategic alliance between Hamas and the PIJ. He stressed that the most recent round of escalation was not the last and that accounts with the “enemy” had not yet been settled (Hamas website, November 16, 2019).

    
Isma’il Haniyeh’s condolence call to the Abu al-Atta family in Gaza
(Hamas website, November 16, 2019).

^[1] For information about the most recent round of escalation and an assessment of future Hamas and PIJ policy, see the November 17, 2019 bulletin, "The Latest Round of Escalation in the Gaza Strip: What Next? (Initial Assessment)." ↑
^[2] An examination of their names is available in Hebrew and an English version will be published shortly. ↑
^[3] No rocket fire hit was identified in or around Hadera. ↑

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