Summary of Terrorist Events, November 2024

First launch of Fadi-6 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 13, 2024)

First launch of Fadi-6 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 13, 2024)

Fateh-110 missile before launch (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 6, 2024).

Fateh-110 missile before launch (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 6, 2024).

Selection of Hezbollah mourning notices (Right: November 13, 2024. Left: November 26, 2024, QalaatM X account)

Selection of Hezbollah mourning notices (Right: November 13, 2024. Left: November 26, 2024, QalaatM X account)

Hezbollah mourning notice for the death of Muhammad Afif (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 17, 2024).

Hezbollah mourning notice for the death of Muhammad Afif (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 17, 2024).

Jaafar Khader Fa'our's

Jaafar Khader Fa'our's "ID" (IDF spokesperson, November 2, 2024)

Senior figures in Hezbollah's aerial unit who were eliminated (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)

Senior figures in Hezbollah's aerial unit who were eliminated (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)

Three Amal operatives killed during November 2024 (Amal Telegram channel, November 24 and 29, 2024)

Three Amal operatives killed during November 2024 (Amal Telegram channel, November 24 and 29, 2024)

Izz al-Din Kassab's

Izz al-Din Kassab's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, November 1, 2024)

Muhammad Abu Sukheil's

Muhammad Abu Sukheil's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, November 10, 2024)

Weapons smuggled to Judea and Samaria from Iran (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)

Weapons smuggled to Judea and Samaria from Iran (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)

Weapons smuggled to Judea and Samaria from Iran (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)

Weapons smuggled to Judea and Samaria from Iran (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)

Launching drones into Israeli territory (Telegram channel of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, November 10, 2024)

Launching drones into Israeli territory (Telegram channel of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, November 10, 2024)

Launching a drone into the Eilat area (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, November 19, 2024)

Launching a drone into the Eilat area (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, November 19, 2024)

  • During November 2024, fighting continued in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and south Lebanon, as did attacks on Israel from pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Yemen. On November 27 a ceasefire in the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect.
  • Lebanon: The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah continued until the ceasefire went effect. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 682 attacks on IDF forces maneuvering in south Lebanon and on military, security and civilian targets in Israel, extending as far as the Greater Tel Aviv area, compared to 806 attacks in the previous month. In November Hezbollah used new weapons, including precision missiles. Hezbollah continued to conceal the names of senior figures and operatives killed, announcing only the deaths of the organization’s spokesperson, Muhammad Afif, and four members of its media network.
  • The Gaza Strip: Eleven rockets were launched at Israeli territory, compared to 28 rockets in the previous month. Targeted killings of senior and prominent terrorist operatives in Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) continued, including Izz al-Din Kassab, a member of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and terrorist operatives who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre.
  • Israel, Judea and Samaria: Four terrorist attacks were carried out in Judea and Samaria, with no fatalities, compared to nine attacks the previous month. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations, focusing on northern Samaria. Terror operatives were eliminated in exchanges of fire and airstrikes, including commanders of terrorist organizations in Tulkarm, Nablus, Jenin and Qabatiya. A large shipment of Iranian weapons destined for terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria was intercepted.
  • Shi’ite militias: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq issued 69 claims of responsibility for attacks on 55 targets in Israeli territory, compared to 72 claims for 76 attacks the previous month. The Saraya Awliyaa al-Dam militia issued seven claims of responsibility for attacks on 11 targets in Israel, compared to 17 claims the previous month. On November 24 the militias ceased issuing claims of responsibility because of pressure from the Iraqi government and fear of an Israeli strike. Most of the launches by Iraqi militias lacked actual verification; some were intercepted, and others landed in Israeli territory without causing casualties. The Houthis claimed responsibility for five attacks on Israeli targets, compared to eight the previous month.
  • Terrorist attacks on Israelis abroad: A Chabad emissary in the UAE was kidnapped and murdered. Three suspects, citizens of Uzbekistan, were arrested.
Hezbollah attacks
  • During November 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 682 attacks on military, security and civilian targets in Israel, compared to 806 attacks the previous month. On November 24, Hezbollah issued claims of responsibility for 51 attacks, the highest daily number since the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023. The attacks involved rockets and missiles of various types, UAVs, explosive drones and anti-tank missiles. Hezbollah also claimed to have used explosive devices to attack IDF forces in Lebanese territory, and launched anti-aircraft missiles to intercept two Israeli Air Force UAVs. On November 27, 2024, at 4:00 a.m., a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 1-30, 2024). According to IDF data, at least 2,400 rockets and more than 60 UAVs were launched into Israeli territory. Thirteen IDF soldiers were killed in fighting in south Lebanon, one IDF soldier and five civilians were killed in Hezbollah attacks on Israel, and extensive property damage was caused (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, November 1-30, 2024).

Hezbollah Attacks November 2024

Terrorist Attacks According to Organization 2024

  • Main Hezbollah activities, November 2024:
    • Attacks deep inside Israel: During November 2024 and until the ceasefire, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for attacks on a series of targets within Israel extending as far as the Greater Tel Aviv area. In some cases, there was no verification of the attacks. The targets were military bases and defense industry installations.
    • Attacks on IDF forces participating in ground maneuvers: Hezbollah claimed responsibility for attacks on Israeli forces operating in south Lebanon and on assembly areas near the northern border, using rockets, UAVs, anti-tank missiles and explosive devices. Many of the organization’s statements included false claims about “successes” on the ground and allegations that Israel was concealing the truth. Hezbollah claimed the attacks killed dozens of IDF soldiers and destroyed dozens of tanks.
    • The series of Khaybar[2] operations: During November 2024 until the ceasefire, Hezbollah continued its Khaybar operations, responding to the call “At your command, Nasrallah!” Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 57 attacks on various targets deep inside Israel, including military bases and security facilities.
    • Use of new weapons: On November 6, 2024, Hezbollah announced the first launch of Iranian Fateh-110 surface-to-surface missiles at a military base.[3] On November 9 Hezbollah revealed the first use of a domestically produced short-range rocket, launched on November 8, 2024 at an Israeli community near the northern border. On November 11, 2024 Hezbollah announced the first use of a Malak-2 rocket against Haifa area. No details were provided about the rocket’s specifications. On November 12, 2024 Hezbollah announced the first use of a heavy rocket, the Fadi-6, to attack an IDF Air Force base.[4] On November 16, 2024 Hezbollah announced the first use of a Fajr-5 rocket to attack IDF bases in the Haifa area.[5] On November 18, 2024 Hezbollah announced the first use of a heavy rocket, the Fajr-3, in an attack carried out on November 16, 2024.[6] On November 21, 2024 Hezbollah announced the first use of cruise missiles to attack an IDF Air Force base.[7]
First launch of Fadi-6 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 13, 2024)     Fateh-110 missile before launch (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 6, 2024).
Right: Fateh-110 missile before launch (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 6, 2024). Left: First launch of Fadi-6 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 13, 2024)
Hezbollah casualties
  • During November 2024, including after the ceasefire went into effect, Hezbollah continued to conceal the names of senior figures and terrorist operatives killed in IDF strikes. In all probability the motive was to conceal the high number of casualties caused after Israeli escalated its operations in September 2024 and as an attempt to prevent further deterioration of morale after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures. However, on social media accounts, including unofficial accounts affiliated with Hezbollah, approximately 600 images of commanders at various levels and operatives, including combat commanders from the Radwan Force, appeared during November 2024 (QalaatM X account, November 1-30, 2024).
Selection of Hezbollah mourning notices (Right: November 13, 2024. Left: November 26, 2024, QalaatM X account)      Selection of Hezbollah mourning notices (Right: November 13, 2024. Left: November 26, 2024, QalaatM X account)
Selection of Hezbollah mourning notices
(Right: November 13, 2024. Left: November 26, 2024, QalaatM X account)
    • The only official mourning notice of the death of a senior Hezbollah member was issued on November 17, when the organization confirmed the death of its media officer, al-Hajj Muhammad Afif al-Nabulsi, who was killed in a “criminal and aggressive Zionist attack.” Hezbollah claimed that Afif “did not fear the enemy’s threats of death; he faced them with great courage” and that he was known for his famous saying: “The bombing did not scare us, so how can the threats scare us?” The notice also described Afif, referred to as “the lion of the media [battle]field,” as someone who “crafted the letters of glory and victories and spread terror in the souls of the enemy,” adding that “his words were a gun that killed them, and the sound of his sword shattered their tyranny” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 17, 2024). Afif was killed in an Israeli strike on the Baath Party building in Lebanon, in the Ras al-Nabaa area of Beirut, outside the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia (al-Mayadeen, November 17, 2024). The IDF spokesperson confirmed that Muhammad Afif, Hezbollah’s spokesperson and head of the organization’s propaganda unit, was killed in an airstrike in Beirut. According to the IDF statement, Afif joined Hezbollah in the 1980s and influenced the organization’s military activity. He instructed Hezbollah operatives on the front lines to document their activities in the field and received directives from senior military officials regarding the publication of claims of responsibility. The notice also stated that he was responsible for Hezbollah’s messaging in the Lebanese media, enhancing Hezbollah’s image and promoting psychological terrorism (IDF spokesperson, November 17, 2024).
    • Another mourning notice was issued on November 18, when Hezbollah officially reported the deaths of four “knights of the resistance’s media and its loyal fighters” who were killed in the same strike as Afif. They were al-Hajj Musa Haidar, born in 1969, from the town of Markaba; al-Hajj Mahmoud al-Sharqawi, born in 1970, from the town of Irzay; Hilal Turmus, born in 1988, from the town of Tallousa. Hussein Ramadhan, born in 1992, from the town of Aramta. Reportedly, they carried “the banner of truth and the word of resistance” and were “soldiers on the media [battle]field so that the truth about “Zionist terror” would reach every home on earth.” Hezbollah added that the “resistance” media would remain “a strong fortress against aggression” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 18, 2024).
Hezbollah mourning notice for the four media wing operatives killed alongside Afif (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 18, 2024)    Hezbollah mourning notice for the death of Muhammad Afif (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 17, 2024).
Right: Hezbollah mourning notice for the death of Muhammad Afif (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 17, 2024). Left: Hezbollah mourning notice for the four media wing operatives killed alongside Afif (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 18, 2024)
  • During November 2024, the IDF eliminated Hezbollah terrorist commanders at various levels and other senior operatives (IDF spokesperson, November 27-1, 2024):
    • Jaafar Khader Fa’our, the commander of the missile and rocket array of the Nasser Unit, responsible for attacks from the eastern sector in Lebanon. He was responsible for the rocket fire which killed two Israeli civilians from Kibbutz Ortal (July 9, 2024), the attack on Majdal Shams which killed 12 children and teenagers (July 27, 2024), and the rocket fire on Metula which killed five civilians (October 31, 2024).
Jaafar Khader Fa'our's "ID" (IDF spokesperson, November 2, 2024)
Jaafar Khader Fa’our’s “ID” (IDF spokesperson, November 2, 2024)
    • Mu’een Musa Izz al-Din, commander of the coastal sector, and Hassan Majid Dhiyab, commander of artillery in the coastal sector. The two were responsible for over 400 launches at Israeli territory during October 2024.
    • Ali Barakat, a key operative in Hezbollah’s aerial Unit 127 for over a decade. He planned and executed dozens of UAV launches into Israeli territory and worked on the development of cruise missiles and UAVs.
    • Abu Ali Ridha, commander of the Baraachit facility.
    • Riyadh Ridha Ghazawi, a commander in the anti-tank array of the Radwan Force in the al-Sultania area.
    • Hussein Abd al-Halim Harb, battalion commander in the al-Khiyam sector.
    • Farouq Amin al-Ashi, commander of the al-Khiyam facility and a commander in the Radwan Force in the al-Khiyam area.
    • Salim Ayyash, senior Hezbollah terrorist convicted by a special international tribunal for involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005 (al-Arabiya, November 10, 2024).
    • Ali Adel al-Ashmar, formerly one of Hezbollah’s top advisors to the Houthis and a participant in major Houthi battles leading to the capture of extensive areas in Yemen (Adnan al-Jabarni’s X account, November 10, 2024).
    • Ali Musa Daqduq, holder of Hezbollah’s Golan File and deputy commander of the Radwan Force. Killed in an Israeli airstrike in the al-Sayyidah Zaynab area south of Damascus (al-Hadath, November 10, 2024; NBC News, November 22, 2024).[8]
Ali Musa Daqduq (QalaatM X account, November 12, 2024)
Ali Musa Daqduq (QalaatM X account, November 12, 2024)
    • Ayman Muhammad Nabulsi, the commander of the anti-tank array in the Hajir sector of the Nasser Unit.
    • Hajj Ali Yusuf Saleh, responsible for the Tabnit compound.
    • Ahmad Haidar al-Hajj Ali, aka Abu Ali al-Hadi, who held command roles in the 2006 war [the Second Lebanon War] against Israel. He also participated in the wars in Syria and Yemen. It was further reported that he served as an “operations officer” for the Houthis (Muhammad Reza’s X account, November 17, 2024; Sam al-Ghanbari’s X account, November 17, 2024).
Ahmad Haidar al-Hajj Ali (QalaatM X account, November 17, 2024)
Ahmad Haidar al-Hajj Ali (QalaatM X account, November 17, 2024)
    • On November 17, 2024, Israel reportedly attacked an electronics store in the Mar Elias area of Beirut. Two people were killed, including Mahmoud Madi, operations officer for Hezbollah’s southern front (al-Hadath, November 17, 2024).
    • Ali Tawfiq Dweik, the commander of Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket array since September 2024, after replacing the previous commander who was killed in an Israeli strike. Dweik was responsible for over 300 rocket launches at Israeli territory.
    • Khader Hussein al-Zein, bodyguard of former Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and who also participated in the Syrian Civil War (QalaatM X account, November 21, 2024).
    • Ahmed Subhi Hazima, commander of operations for the coastal sector.
      Jaafar Ali Samaha, operations officer of the aerial unit, who oversaw the launch of cruise missiles and UAVs into Israel’s home front.
Senior figures in Hezbollah's aerial unit who were eliminated (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)
Senior figures in Hezbollah’s aerial unit who were eliminated
(IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)
Casualties of other terrorist organizations
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Lebanon and Syria
  • In November 2024 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the deaths of five of its operatives in strikes in Lebanon:
    • Fadi Muhammad Hassan, 33 years old; Ahmad Ayman Ahmad, 18 years old; Mahmoud Saleh al-Masri, 22 years old. The three were operatives of the Shahid Ali al-Aswad Battalion, part of PIJ’s Syria branch, and were killed on the borders of “occupied Palestine” while participating in the confrontation against “aggression” on Lebanon (PIJ combat information Telegram channel, November 3, 2024).
    • Alaa Khalil Abdallah, 33 years old, an operative in the Shaheed Ali al-Aswad Battalion of PIJ’s Syria branch (PIJ combat information Telegram channel, November 7, 2024).
    • The “great mujahid” Ali Yusuff al-Ki, aka Abu Jalal, 59 years old, and Rayan Ali al-Ki, aka Abu Ziyad, 33 years old. Both were operatives in the Shaheed Mahmoud al-Majdhoub Battalion of PIJ’s Lebanon branch and were killed in an Israeli attack on the Rashidieh refugee camp in Lebanon (PIJ combat information Telegram channel, November 27, 2024).
  • On November 14, 2024, the IDF attack several PIJ buildings and headquarters used for military purposes in Syria (IDF spokesperson, November 14, 2024). Initially, the PIJ denied the strike had targeted its buildings, claiming they were “civilian sites and residential homes” (PIJ Telegram channel, November 14, 2024). Two days later, the PIJ confirmed that the strike had targeted the organization’s “civilian offices” and that two senior leaders had been killed, “the great commander” Abd al-Aziz Sa’eed al-Minawi, aka Abu al-Sa’eed, born in 1945, and “the great commander” Rasmi Yousuf Abu Issa, aka Abu Issam, who was in charge of Arab relations (PIJ Telegram channel, November 16, 2024). According to reports, al-Minawi was a member of the PIJ’s political bureau and close to secretary general Ziad al-Nakhalah, while Abu Issa was responsible for the organization’s foreign relations file (al-Quds, November 15, 2024). The PIJ also reported that along with the two senior leaders, seven other operatives had been killed: Wasim Maran Hassan, born in 1985; Mohannad Jamil Mousa, born in 1982; al-Muayad Billah Omar Maw’ed, born in 1998; Dr. Izz al-Din Hisham al-Qutati, born in 2001; Ali Hussein Qabalan, born in 1980; Muhammad Maher Mahmoud al-Dasuqi, born in 1991; Salim Nasser al-Ghouri, born in 1980 (PIJ Telegram channel, November 17, 2024).
Rasmi Yusuf Abu Issa (Arkaan_2 X account, November 19, 2024)     Abd al-Aziz Said al-Minawi.
PIJ mourning notices. Right: Abd al-Aziz Said al-Minawi. Left: Rasmi Yusuf Abu Issa
(Arkaan_2 X account, November 19, 2024)
Amal
  • In November 2024 the Shi’ite Amal Movement announced the deaths of at least 41 of its operatives, including medics and members of its scout movement, who were killed in IDF strikes in Lebanon. Fourteen were described as “jihad fighters” who died “while fulfilling their national duty and jihad in defending Lebanon and the south” (Amal Movement Telegram channel, November 1-30, 2024).
Three Amal operatives killed during November 2024 (Amal Telegram channel, November 24 and 29, 2024)      Three Amal operatives killed during November 2024 (Amal Telegram channel, November 24 and 29, 2024)
Three Amal operatives killed during November 2024
(Amal Telegram channel, November 24 and 29, 2024)
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
  • The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) reported that two “field commanders” from the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, its military wing, Abd al-Hadi Nazih Barish and Muhammad Mahmoud al-Ali, and operative Suleiman Imad Hassan had been killed in south Lebanon “on the way to Jerusalem” (PFLP Telegram channel, October 29 and 31, 2024).
Rocket fire
    • in November 2024, 11 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at Israeli territory, compared to 28 rockets the previous month. No casualties were reported:
    • November 2 (night): Two rockets were launched from northern Gaza toward the Sderot area and fell in open areas. No casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson, November 2, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets at Sderot and other communities (Paltoday Telegram channel, November 2, 2024).
    • November 7 (noon): A rocket was fired from the northern Gaza Strip and intercepted (IDF spokesperson, November 7, 2024). The Omar al-Qassem Forces, the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets in collaboration with the Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini Brigades (DFLP central media Telegram channel, November 7, 2024).
    • November 12 (evening): A rocket fired from northern Gaza was intercepted (IDF spokesperson, November 12, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets at Gaza border communities (Paltoday Telegram, November 12, 2024).
    • November 13 (evening): A rocket fired from northern Gaza fell in an open area (IDF spokesperson, November 13, 2024).
    • November 16 (afternoon): Two rockets fired from the northern Gaza Strip were intercepted (IDF spokesperson, November 16, 2024). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility for firing rockets (Shehab Agency Telegram channel, November 16, 2024).
    • November 21 (morning): A rocket fired from the southern Gaza Strip was intercepted (IDF spokesperson, November 21, 2024).
    • November 23 (afternoon): Two rockets fired from the southern Gaza Strip toward Ein HaShlosha and Kissufim were intercepted (IDF spokesperson, November 23, 2024). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility for firing several short-range Rujoum rockets (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 23, 2024).
    • November 25 (morning): A rocket fired from the Gaza Strip fell in an open area (IDF spokesperson, November 25, 2024).
Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire from June 2022

Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire from June 2022

Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire from 2014
Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire from 2014
* Distribution for 2024 begins in May
Elimination of prominent terrorist operatives
  • During November 2024 Israeli security forces eliminated prominent terrorist operatives in the Gaza Strip, some of whom participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. In some cases, the operatives exploited civilian sites in the Gaza Strip to plan and execute terrorist attacks on IDF forces and the State of Israel. In all instances, precautionary measures were taken to minimize harm to civilians:[9]
    • On November 1, an airstrike in the Khan Yunis area killed Izz al-Din Kassab, a member of Hamas’ political bureau and head of the organization’s national relations bureau. He was responsible for Hamas’ strategic and military ties with other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip and was involved in terrorist activities against Israel. His aide, Ayman Ayesh, was eliminated in the same strike (IDF spokesperson and Shin Bet spokesperson, November 1, 2024).
    • The Popular Resistance Committees stated that Dr. Izz al-Din Kassab was a senior member of Hamas’ national relations bureau and that Ayman Ayesh was a member of the monitoring committee of National and Islamic Forces in Gaza. The announcement claimed the killings would not weaken the spirit of Palestinian “resistance”, but would increase their determination to continue the “struggle” for the liberation of “Palestine” and al-Aqsa Mosque (Shehab Agency Telegram channel, November 1, 2024).
Izz al-Din Kassab's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, November 1, 2024)
Izz al-Din Kassab’s “ID card” (IDF spokesperson, November 1, 2024)
    • On November 3, Raafat Ibrahim Mahmoud Qadih, a nukhba terrorist operative who participated in the raid on Kibbutz Nir Oz on October 7, 2023, was killed in an airstrike. He was an assistant to the nukhba commander of the PIJ-affiliated Khan Yunis Brigade (IDF spokesperson, November 3, 2024).
    • On November 4, Ahmad al-Dalu, an operative in the PIJ’s military intelligence in Gaza, who participated in the raid and massacre at Kfar Aza on October 7, 2023, was killed in an airstrike. During the war, al-Dalu was involved in planning and executing terrorist activities against Israeli civilians (IDF spokesperson, November 4, 2024).
    • During IDF operations to locate tunnels in the southern Gaza Strip, two terrorists who participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre were eliminated. They were the nukhba commander of the Shaboura Battalion, Bahaa Abu Qarshin, and Muhammad Ibrahim Satari (IDF spokesperson, November 7, 2024).
    • On November 9, 2024, Muhammad Abu Sukheil, the PIJ operations officer in the Gaza Strip, was killed in an airstrike targeting a site used by terrorists in a complex that previously served as the Fahd al-Sabah School in northern Gaza. He was involved in planning and executing terrorist activities against Israeli civilians and IDF forces operating in Gaza (IDF spokesperson, November 10, 2024).
Muhammad Abu Sukheil's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, November 10, 2024)
Muhammad Abu Sukheil’s “ID card” (IDF spokesperson, November 10, 2024)
    • On November 13, an airstrike targeted a terrorist squad in the al-Shejaiya neighborhood of the Gaza Strip. Among the fatalities was Yasser Ghandi, a military operative who participated in the terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023 (IDF spokesperson, November 13, 2024).
    • On November 15, Luqman Abd al-Salam Khalil Anbar, responsible for rocket fire support in the Gaza City Brigade and for PIJ’s rocket-launch array, was killed in an airstrike, as were other PIJ terrorist operatives involved in rocket fire against Israel and IDF forces (IDF spokesperson, November 15, 2024).
    • On November 20, five Hamas operatives were killed in an airstrike in Beit Lahiya: Jihad Mahmoud Yahya Kahloot and Muhammad Riyadh Ali Awqal company commanders in Hamas who directed the killings and kidnappings at the Mefalsim Junction on October 7, 2023. Also killed were Anas Jalal Muhammad Abu Shkiyan, a commander in the East Jabalia Battalion; Nour al-Din Muhammad Yahya Abu Jadyan; and Suheib Hassan Ali Matar Adaeem, operatives in Hamas’ military wing from the East Jabalia Battalion who were involved in fighting against IDF forces (IDF spokesperson and Shin Bet, November 22, 2024).
    • On November 20, 2024, Khaled Abu-Daqa, the commander of the PIJ’s rocket unit, was killed while operating in the humanitarian area of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. Abu-Daqa was involved in numerous terrorist operations, including rocket fire on Israeli communities near the Gaza border since October 7, 2023. He was considered a key figure in planning and commanding terrorist activities targeting Israeli civilians and IDF forces (IDF spokesperson and Shin Bet, November 22, 2024).
    • On November 22, 2024, Murad Awad al-Rajoub, a prisoner released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal in 2011 and deported to Gaza, was killed in an airstrike in western Gaza City. Originally from the town of al-Koum in southern Hebron, he was an operative in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. He had been sentenced to 38 years in prison for involvement in an attack in Beersheba but was released after serving only ten years (Palinfo, November 22, 2024).
Mourning notice issued for Murad Awad al-Rajoub (Hamas Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 22, 2024)
Mourning notice issued for Murad Awad al-Rajoub
(Hamas Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 22, 2024)
    • On November 25, Ahmad Abd al-Halim Abu Hussein, responsible for rocket fire in Hamas’ East Jabalia Battalion, was killed. He oversaw numerous rocket and mortar shell attacks on Israel’s home front and IDF forces operating in Gaza. Several other terrorists were killed in the same attack, including Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Mahmoud Zaqout October, who participated in the 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, November 25, 2024).
    • On November 27, Mu’min al-Ja’abari, a leading operative in sniper array of Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade, was killed in an airstrike on a building previously used as the al-Tabe’in School. He orchestrated terrorist activities against IDF forces in Gaza and stored numerous weapons in the school complex (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024). strike targeted the third and fourth floors of the building, reportedly killing about ten people, including the sons of senior Hamas figure Fawzi Barhoum, journalist Alaa al-Din Barhoum and his brother Baha al-Din Barhoum (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, November 27, 2024; al-Resalah.net, November 27, 2024).
  • On November 30, 2024, Ahed Azmi Qdeih, a Hamas operative who participated in the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre at Kibbutz Nir Oz, was killed in an airstrike on his vehicle. Following the incident, representatives of the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) demanded urgent clarifications from senior international officials and the head of the World Central Kitchen (WCK) regarding the employment of organization staff who had participated in the October 7, 2023 massacre and terrorist attack on Israel (IDF spokesperson, November 30, 2024). The strike reportedly also killed two local employees of the aid organization traveling with Qdeih (Quds Telegram channel, November 30, 2024; al-Ayyam, December 1, 2024). WCK stated that it had no knowledge of any passengers in the vehicle being allegedly linked to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 (WCK X account, November 30, 2024).
Terrorist attacks
  • During November 2024, four attacks were carried out, compared to nine in the previous month.[10] All attacks occurred in Judea and Samaria, with no fatalities:
    • Vehicle attack and stabbing at the entrance to Shiloh: On November 6, a Palestinian driver rammed his car into two Israelis at the entrance to the community of Shiloh, north of Ramallah, and then stabbed them. An armed resident shot and killed the terrorist (Israeli media, November 6, 2024). He was Hareth Abdallah Jbara from the village of Deir al-Ghusoun. Hamas praised the attack, calling it a “natural response” to IDF operations in Judea and Samaria and the treatment of Palestinian female prisoners (Quds Agency, November 6, 2024).
Mourning notice issued by Hamas for Hareth Abdallah Jbara (Hamas Telegram channel, November 6, 2024)
Mourning notice issued by Hamas for Hareth Abdallah Jbara
(Hamas Telegram channel, November 6, 2024)
    • Attempted stabbing near Nablus: On November 12, a Palestinian armed with a knife arrived at the Deir Sharaf Junction near Nablus and tried to stab IDF soldiers; he was killed and no injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson, November 12, 2024). The terrorist was identified by his family as Walid Ashraf al-Bayaa, a student at al–Najah University in Nablus and a resident of Deir Sharaf. According to the family, he carried out the stabbing attack after returning from a university exam (Quds Agency, Telegram channel November 12, 2024).
    • Vehicle attack in the Ramallah area: On November 13, a Palestinian rammed his car into a military checkpoint at the entrance to the village of Deir Qaddis and fled the scene; two female IDF soldiers were injured. A search of the village was initiated and the terrorist was detained (IDF spokesperson, November 13, 2024). Hamas called the attack “a clear message that the strikes of the resistance continue and escalate” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 13, 2024).
    • Shooting attack at the Gitai Avishar Junction: On November 29, a Palestinian terrorist shot at an Israeli bus at the Gitai Avishar Junction, at the entrance to Ariel. Nine Israelis were injured, including four IDF soldiers. The attacker was shot and killed (IDF spokesperson, November 29, 2024). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, claimed responsibility for the shooting attack. They identified the assailant as Samer Muhammad Ahmad Hussein, 46 years old, from the village of Einabus in the Nablus district. They threatened to continue targeting soldiers and settlers in response to Israeli government decisions in Judea and Samaria (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 29, 2024). “Sources” in the village reported that the terrorist had served as the imam of the mosque in Einabus, was known as a Hamas operative and had been previously detained by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Nablus News Telegram channel, November 29, 2024).
Mourning notice issued by Hamas for Samer Muhammad Ahmad Hussein (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 29, 2024)
Mourning notice issued by Hamas for Samer Muhammad Ahmad Hussein
(Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 29, 2024)
Critical terrorist attacks, 2024[11]

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities
  • During November 2024, Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria, focusing on the northern Samaria towns of Tulkarm, Nablus and Jenin. The operations included security force entries into Palestinian towns and refugee camps to locate wanted individuals involved in terrorist activities and dismantle terrorist infrastructures. The soldiers uncovered explosive devices, weapons manufacturing laboratories and lathes, and funds for financing terrorism. Terrorist operatives were attacked from the air:
    • On November 1, during an operation to dismantle terrorist facilities in the Nur Shams refugee camp, an Israeli Air Force UAV eliminated Abd al-Aziz Abu Saman and Ahmad Issam Fahmawi, two armed terrorists who shot at the forces. According to reports, both were involved in shooting incidents and planting explosive devices. The forces engaged other terrorists in direct encounters and neutralized several explosive devices planted under roads. During the operation, an Israeli Air Force UAV identified terrorists using a hospital complex in Tulkarm to transport weapons (IDF spokesperson, November 1, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing stated that Abu Saman and Fahmawi were operatives in the Tulkarm Brigades of the Jerusalem Brigades (PIJ in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 2, 2024). Palestinian sources reported that Mu’tasim Saleh Aisha, 32 years old, was also killed in the operation (Wafa, October 31, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades confirmed that Mu’tasim Abu Aisha was one of their operatives in the Nur Shams refugee camp (al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades Telegram channel, November 3, 2024).
    • On November 5, 2024, Israeli security forces announced the detention of more than 60 PFLP operatives in Judea and Samaria, and closed offices and businesses affiliated with the PFLP. Among the detainees were Abla Saadat Abd al-Rasoul, the wife of PFLP secretary general Ahmad Saadat, who is serving a life sentence in Israel, and a senior figure in the PFLP Women’s Committees Union; Tahrir Jaber, head of the Women’s Committees Union; Bilal Kaid, a senior PFLP operative in Judea and Samaria; and Kamal Zarifa, head of the PFLP in the Nablus-Baqa’a region (IDF spokesperson, December 5, 2024).
Senior PFLP terrorists detained in Judea and Samaria (IDF spokesperson, November 5, 2024)
Senior PFLP terrorists detained in Judea and Samaria (IDF spokesperson, November 5, 2024)
    • On November 7, 2024, Israeli security forces completed a three-day counterterrorism operation in Jenin, Tulkarm, the Nur Shams refugee camp, Qabatiya and other villages. Seven terrorist operatives were killed in airstrikes and direct encounters, two bomb-making laboratories and dozens of roadside explosive devices planted to target security forces were destroyed, and wanted individuals were arrested along with the confiscation of weapons (IDF spokesperson, November 7, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing announced that two operatives from the Qabatiya squads of the Jenin Battalion, Majdi Hamza Sabaaneh (Abu Shqira) and Omar Mustafa Sabaaneh, were killed in a vehicle strike in Qabatiya (PIJ in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 8, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades reported that two of their operatives, Nasser Kamil Abu Khmeira and Abdallah Abu Zeid, were killed in Qabatiya (al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades Telegram channel, November 6 and 8, 2024). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades announced the death of “the fighter martyr” Hareth Muhammad al-Awfi, an operative from the Qassam Brigades in the Tulkarm refugee camp (al-Aqsa TV, November 7, 2024). According to reports, Abdallah Muhammad al-Saadi, an officer in Palestinian General Intelligence, was killed (Wafa, November 6, 2024; al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 7, 2024).
    • On November 9, it was reported that released prisoner Tareq Zaidan died from injuries sustained in an explosive device detonation near his home in Tulkarm the previous day (Hebron News Agency Telegram channel, November 9, 2024). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades issued a mourning notice for “the commander and military engineer” Tareq Ghanem Zaidan, claiming he was killed in an Israeli attack on Tulkarm. Zaidan was reportedly a leader in Hamas’ military production sector (Hamas Telegram channel, November 12, 2024).
Hamas mourning notice for Tareq Ghanem Zaidan (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 12, 2024)
Hamas mourning notice for Tareq Ghanem Zaidan
(Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 12, 2024)
    • On November 10, Israeli security forces prevented the smuggling of 13 M16 rifles and weapon parts near the village of al-Auja. Two Palestinian suspects were detained (IDF spokesperson, November 10, 2024).
    • On November 13, 2024, during an operation to detain wanted individuals in the village of Dhannaba, a neighborhood in Tulkarm, an armed wanted terrorist tried to escape with another wanted operative. The IDF forces killed both and a terrorist operative who headed a local terrorist organization and was involved in planning attacks and recruiting operatives (IDF spokesperson, November 14, 2024).
    • Palestinian sources identified the deceased as Thaer Amara, commander of the Tulkarm Camp Battalion, and Ma’moun Shreim, commander of the Raed al-Karmi Battalion (Telegram channel of the Jenin Refugee Camp 24 Hours, November 13, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades stated that both were prominent commanders in the Tulkarm organization (Telegram channel of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, November 13, 2024).
Thaer Amara (AAMB Telegram channel, November 14, 2024)    Mamoun Shreim.
Right: Mamoun Shreim. Left: Thaer Amara (AAMB Telegram channel, November 14, 2024)
    • On November 20, Israeli security forces completed a 48-hour counterterrorism operation in Jenin and Qabatiya, eliminating nine terrorist operatives in ground and air strikes, some of whom were involved in shooting attacks. Dozens of explosive devices and four bomb-making laboratories were destroyed, weapons and ammunition were uncovered, and several wanted Palestinians were detained (IDF spokesperson, November 19 to 21, 2024). The governor of the Jenin district, Kamal Abu al-Rub, reported that eight Palestinians had been killed during the Israeli security force operation, 19 were injured and significant damage was caused in Jenin and its refugee camp (Wafa, November 20, 2024). Hamas announced that two of its military wing operatives, Ahmed Muhammad Abed and Qusay Farahat, were killed in the town of Kafr Dan, west of Jenin. Another operative from Hamas’ military wing, Rami Muhammad al-Hazhouzi, was killed in Jenin (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 20 to 22, 2024).
mourning notice issued by Hamas for Ahmed Muhammad 'Abed (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 21, 2024)
mourning notice issued by Hamas for Ahmed Muhammad ‘Abed
(Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 21, 2024)
    • On November 21, 2024, Jihad al-Qatouni, from the al-Ein refugee camp, was killed during an IDF operation in the camp (Nablus News Telegram channel, November 21, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing stated that he was an operative in the Nablus Battalion of the Jerusalem Brigades (PIJ in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, November 21, 2024).
    • On November 24, Israeli security forces operated in the village of Ya’bad, near Jenin. During the operation, two terrorists threw explosive devices at the forces, who responded with gunfire, killing both. There were no casualties to the security forces (IDF spokesperson, November 25, 2024). Palestinian sources identified two as Muhammad Hamarsha and Ahmad Zeid (Palestine Post Telegram channel, November 25, 2024).
    • On November 27, it was reported that Israeli security forces had intercepted a shipment of weapons originating from Iran which were intended for terrorist operatives in the Jenin area. The forces also uncovered the storage site for most of the shipment, which included weapons which would force the IDF to change its tactics, such as rockets, approximately 70 powerful Claymore mines (some equipped with remote activation systems), explosive devices, mortar launchers, RPG launchers, sniper riflesand additional weapons (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024).[12]
Weapons smuggled to Judea and Samaria from Iran (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)     Weapons smuggled to Judea and Samaria from Iran (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)
Weapons smuggled to Judea and Samaria from Iran (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)
Anti-Israel activities
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq
  • In November 2024, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq issued 69 announcements claiming responsibility for attacks against 55 targets in Israeli territory using drones, compared to 72 announcements of 76 attacks in the previous month.[13] As of November 24, 2024, the militias stopped issuing claims of responsibility amid pressure from the Iraqi government due to threats of an Israeli attack. The militias’ claims of the attacks have not been verified, except in cases where the IDF Spokesperson confirmed that there had been interceptions or that there had been hits in Israeli territory. There were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, November 1—30, 2024). The following is a breakdown of the attacks, according to the dates of the claims of responsibility (Telegram channel of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, November 1—30, 2024):
    • November 1 – A “vital” target in southern Israel (radar site in Dimona, according to a video released) by drones.
    • November 1 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone launched from the east in Syria before it penetrated Israeli territory.
    • November 1 – A “vital” target in southern Israel (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 1 – A “vital” target in southern Israel (for the third time) using drones.
    • November 1 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 1 – A “vital” target in central Israel (Tel Aviv) using drones.
    • November 2 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 2 – Four “vital” targets in Eilat in four separate operations using several drones; Three drones launched from the east were intercepted over the Red Sea before penetrating Israeli territory.
    • November 3 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
    • November 3 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley using drones.
    • November 3 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 4 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 4 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 5 – A “vital” target in the port of Haifa using drones (the Haifa oil terminal on November 4, according to the video).
    • November 5 – A “vital” target in Haifa (for the second time) using drones (the Tamar gas rig on November 4, according to the video).
    • November 5 – A “vital” target in Haifa (for the third time) using drones.
    • November 5 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (Safed, according to the video) using drones.
    • November 5 – A “military” target in northern Israel (Safed, according to the video) using drones.
    • November 5 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 5 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones.
    • November 6 – A “vital” target in Haifa using drones (carried out on November 5, according to the video).
    • November 6 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones (carried out on November 5, according to the video).
    • November 6 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones; A drone was intercepted from the east before it penetrated Israeli territory.
    • November 6 – A “military” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
    • November 6 – A “military” target in the Jordan Valley using drones.
    • November 7 – A “military” target in Israel using drones.
    • November 8 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 8 – A “military” target in northern Israel (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 8 – A “military” target in northern Israel (for the third time) using drones.
    • November 8 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 8 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone arriving from the east in the southern Golan Heights before it crossed into Israeli territory.
    • November 9 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 9 – A “military” target in northern Israel (Tirat HaCarmel) using drones.
    • November 9 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 10 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone launched from the east. The drone did not penetrate Israeli territory. Parts of it fell in an open area in the Golan Heights.
    • November 10 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted two drones that approached Israel in the Dead Sea area before they penetrated Israeli territory.
Launching drones into Israeli territory (Telegram channel of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, November 10, 2024)
Launching drones into Israeli territory
(Telegram channel of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, November 10, 2024)
    • November 11 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 11 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 11 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 11 – A “military” target in southern Israel (for the second time) using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted four drones launched from the east, two of which were intercepted before they penetrated Israeli territory.
    • November 11 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 11 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 12 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone that crossed into Israeli territory in the Arava region.
    • November 12 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone that penetrated the southern Golan Heights.
    • November 12 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 13 – A target in central Israel using drones.
    • November 13 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone in the southern Golan Heights. It was launched from the east and did not cross into Israeli territory.
    • November 13 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones; An Israeli Navy ship in the Eilat area intercepted a drone launched from the east.
    • November 13 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone launched from the east in Syrian airspace before it crossed into Israeli territory.
    • November 14 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone launched from the east in Syrian airspace before it crossed into Israeli territory.
    • November 14 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 14 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (for the third time) with drones.
    • November 14 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (for the fourth time) using drones.
    • November 14 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (for the fifth time) using drones.
    • November 16 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones; A launch that did not cross into Israeli territory was identified in the Eilat area.
    • November 16 – A “vital” target in Eilat (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 16 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones.
    • November 16 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 16 – A “military” target in southern Israel (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 16 – A “military” target in northern Israel (for the second time) using drones.
    • November 16 – A “military” target in northern Israel (for the third time) using drones.
    • November 18 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones; The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone approaching Israel from the east.
    • November 19 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 20 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones (the attack was carried out on November 19, according to the video).
    • November 20 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 21 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones; A drone crossed into Israeli territory and fell. There were no casualties.
    • November 24 – A “military” target in southern Israel using drones.
    • November 24 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones.
Saraya Awliya al-Dam
  • The Saraya Awliya al-Dam militia issued seven separate claims of responsibility for attacks on 11 targets in Israel, all using drones, compared to 17 in the previous month (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, November 1—30, 2024).[14] Their claims have not been verified. The details are as follows:
    • November 4 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using a drone.
    • November 4 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
    • November 4 – A “vital” target in Haifa using drones.
    • November 4 – A “vital” target in Haifa using drones.
    • November 10 – Three “vital” targets in Israel using swarms of drones.
    • November 17 – Three “vital” targets in Eilat using swarms of drones.
    • November 19 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones.
Launching a drone into the Eilat area (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, November 19, 2024)
Launching a drone into the Eilat area
(Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, November 19, 2024)
Houthi attacks against Israel
  • In November 2024, the Houthis’ military spokesman claimed responsibility for five attacks on targets in Israel using drones and ballistic missiles, compared to eight attacks in the previous month. The following is a breakdown of the attacks (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, November 1—30, 2024):
    • November 8 – An attack on the Nevatim Base using a Palestine-2 hypersonic ballistic missile. There were no reports of hits on the target, but according to Saria, the missile “reached its target.” The IDF Spokesperson said that a missile launched from Yemen at the Dead Sea and the Arava region was intercepted by IDF forces (IDF Spokesperson, November 8, 2024).
    • November 11 – An attack against the Nahal Soreq IDF base, southeast of Jaffa (Tel Aviv), using a Palestine-2 hypersonic ballistic missile. According to Saria, the missile hit its target and caused a fire near the base. According to the IDF Spokesperson, the Israeli Air Force intercepted one launch from Yemen before it penetrated Israeli territory (IDF Spokesperson, November 11, 2024).
    • November 16 – An attack on an “important target” in Eilat with several drones. According to Saria, the attack was successful and achieved its objectives. The IDF Spokesperson said that one missile had been fired from the east at the Eilat region, that it had not crossed into Israeli territory, and that there were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, November 16, 2024).
    • November 17 – An attack on several “military and important” targets in the cities of Jaffa (Tel Aviv) and Ashkelon using several drones. According to Saria, the attacks achieved their objective. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone that had penetrated Israeli territory from the east was intercepted by the Israeli Air Force in the Shephelah region (IDF Spokesperson, November 17, 2024).
    • November 22 – An attack on the Israeli Air Force Nevatim Base using a Palestine-2 hypersonic ballistic missile. According to Saria, the attack achieved its objective. The IDF Spokesperson said the Israeli Air Force had intercepted a launch from Yemen into Judea and the Dead Sea before it crossed into Israeli territory (IDF Spokesperson, November 21, 2024).
The Islamic Resistance from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques
  • In November 2023, the “Islamic Resistance from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques [i.e., in Mecca and Medina]” (Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Bilad al-Haramayn), a pro-Iranian militia that claims to operate from Saudi territory, issued four statements claiming responsibility for attacks against Israel, all using drones (Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Bilad al-Haramayn, November 1–30, 2024). The claims have not been verified:
    • November 9 – A target in the Jordan Valley.
    • November 10 – A target in the Jordan Valley.
    • November 12 – a target in Eilat.
    • November 17 – a target in Jaffa.
  • According to a report by a research institute in Washington, the militia is a fictitious name for the militias of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Based on the report, the launches for which the militia claimed responsibility were apparently carried out from Iraqi territory by Kata’ib Hezbollah or by Houthi elements (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 19, 2024).

Attacks by Shiite militias against Israel - November 2024

Attacks by Shiite militias against Israel in 2024
* The data on the attacks is based on militia announcements.
Houthi attacks in the maritime area
  • In November 2024, the Houthis claimed responsibility for three attacks on military and civilian vessels, compared to nine in the previous month. The following is the breakdown of the attacks (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, November 1—30, 2024):
    • November 12 – An attack on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea using several cruise missiles and drones. It was claimed that the attack was carried out while the aircraft carrier was preparing for attacks against the Houthis and that the attack was successfully completed.
    • November 12 – An attack on two American destroyers in the Red Sea using several ballistic missiles. It was claimed that the attack was carried out eight hours after the first attack and that it successfully achieved its objectives.
    • The US Department of Defense confirmed that the Houthis had launched at least eight drones, five anti-ship ballistic missiles, and three cruise missiles at two US destroyers in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, but all the launches were successfully intercepted and there were no casualties. In addition, the Houthis’ claims of an attack on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln were denied (US Department of Defense website, November 12, 2024).
    • November 17 – An attack on the ship Anadolu S in the Red Sea using several ballistic missiles and “naval missiles”. It was claimed that the hit on the ship was precise. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that on November 17, 2024, a report was received from the ship of a missile landing near it while it was sailing in the Red Sea. The next day, the ship reported that another missile had landed near it in the Gulf of Aden. The ship continued on its way and no casualties were reported (UKMTO X account, November 17–18, 2024). The Turkish Foreign Ministry reported that the ship was owned by Turkey and that it was flying the Panamanian flag when it was attacked (ALYMENET Telegram channel, November 21, 2024).
Terrorism against Israelis Abroad
  • On November 23, 2024, the Israeli Mossad announced that Rabbi Zvi Kogan, a Chabad emissary to the UAE, had been missing for two days and that information had been received that this was a terrorist incident. It was reported that Kogan was suspected of being abducted by a squad of Uzbek nationals who operated under Iranian instructions and who fled to Turkey. On November 24, 2024, the UAE authorities located Kogan’s body. The three suspects, citizens of Uzbekistan, were detained in Turkey and extradited to the UAE (Israeli media, November 23–26, 2024; the UAE News Agency, November 23–26, 2024).
  • The Iranian embassy in the UAE denied any Iranian involvement in the murder of Rabbi Kogan. According to a statement issued by the embassy, the “Zionist regime” and Western media outlets did not miss an opportunity to accuse Iran of being behind the murder without providing evidence and before the UAE authorities opened an investigation (IRNA, November 25, 2024).
  1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.

  2. Khaybar, in Islamic tradition, refers to the massacre of Jews by Muslims in Khaybar (Arabian Peninsula), in 628 CE, and serves as a symbol of Jewish defeat.

  3. According to a Hezbollah video, the missile in question is a surface-to-surface missile weighing 3,450 kilograms, with a length of 8.8 meters, a diameter of 616 mm, a range of 300 kilometers, and a warhead weighing 500 kilograms.

  4. The Fadi-6 is a heavy rocket with a total weight of 650 kilograms, a diameter of 302 mm, a range of 225 kilometers, and a warhead weighing 140 kilograms. Hezbollah has previously used Fadi rockets, including the Fadi-1 and Fadi-2, first launched on September 22, 2024; the Fadi-3, first launched on September 24, 2024; and the Fadi-4, first launched on October 1, 2024.

  5. In a video released by Hezbollah, it was stated that the Fajr-5 is a tactical surface-to-surface missile with a range of 75 kilometers and a warhead weighing 175 kilograms. It was reportedly first used during the Second Lebanon War.

  6. No details were provided, but in a video released by Hezbollah, two different types of cruise missiles were shown.

  7. Since the beginning of the campaign on October 8, 2023, Hezbollah published the names of operatives and senior officials killed in IDF strikes. However, with the onset of the IDF’s offensive operations as part of Operation Northern Arrows on September 23, 2024, Hezbollah ceased publishing the names of operatives and announced only the deaths of senior commanders and leaders.

  8. For further information, see the March 2019 ITIC report, "Ali Mussa Daqduq (Abu Hussein Sajed): portrait of the commander of Hezbollah’s military network in the Syrian Golan Heights (“the Golan Portfolio”)."

  9. For further information, see the weekly ITIC reports "Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" Using civilian facilities such as schools and hospitals for terrorist purposes in violation of international law is characteristic of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, particularly Hamas. The organizations exploit such incidents for propaganda and incitement, exaggerating the number of casualties, claiming widespread civilian harm and concealing the identities of the targeted operatives.

  10. During November the Israeli Security Agency confirmed that another vehicle ramming was a terrorist attack, which was therefore included in the graph.

  11. A critical attack is defined by the ITIC as involving shooting, stabbing, a vehicular attack, the use of IEDs, or a combination of the above. Rocks and Molotov cocktails thrown by Palestinians are not included. Shots fired at IDF forces during counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria are included.

  12. For further information, see the December ITIC report, "Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan."

  13. Some of the targets were allegedly attacked more than once.

  14. The Saraya Awliya al-Dam militia is identified as part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. However, it is possible that this name was chosen to provide a “low profile” for pro-Iranian militias.