Spotlight on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (June 17 – 24, 2025)

IDF activity

• This past week, IDF forces continued aerial and ground operations in the Gaza Strip, including, for the first time, in the village of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip. The forces attacked hundreds of terrorist targets, mainly those of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), some of whose operatives attacked from civilian buildings. The targets included terrorist operatives, one of whom was in charge of the Hamas military wing’s finances, and a commander in the Mujahideen Brigades. Also attacked were weapons depots, booby-trapped buildings, tunnels, weapons manufacturing sites and rocket launchers. The forces retrieved the bodies of two Israeli civilians and an IDF soldier who were murdered and abducted to the Gaza Strip during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. An IDF soldier was killed in fighting in the south of the Strip (IDF spokesperson, June 17-24, 2025).

• “Palestinian sources” claimed that the Israeli Air Force attacked many civilian areas, including the al-Tuffah and al-Zeitoun neighborhoods, Deir al-Balah, Jabalia, and Khan Yunis. Meanwhile, Israeli artillery and tanks reportedly attacked east Gaza, the eastern part of the al-Bureij camp, east Khan Yunis, and northern areas. UAVs and helicopters allegedly attacked Gazans in residential neighborhoods, including Yaffa Street, the al-Shakoush area, and the Sheikh Radwan cemetery (activist Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, June 18-21, 2025).
• The Hamas military wing claimed responsibility for a series of attacks carried out in cooperation with the PIJ’s military wing. Two Israeli APCs were allegedly destroyed with Shoat explosive devices in Abasan al-Kabira east of Khan Yunis. According to reports from Hamas, IDF Merkava tanks were allegedly destroyed in the Jabalia area, a Tandum missile hit an IDF D9 bulldozer, and mortar fire was directed at IDF forces in the Qizan al-Najjar area in the southern Gaza Strip. Pictures were also published of the ambush of an IDF supply convoy in the al-Zana area east of Khan Yunis, part of actions carried out in the so-called Stone of David^[1] operations (Hamas Telegram channel, June 17-21, 2025).

Rocket fire

• Four rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip at the Israeli communities near the border. They fell in open areas; no casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson, June 17-24, 2025). The Hamas military wing claimed responsibility for rocket fire targeting Kibbutz Nirim and Kibbutz Ein Hashlosha (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, June 20, 2025).

• “Sources in the Hamas leadership inside and outside the Gaza Strip” said negotiations with Israel were ongoing but no real breakthrough had been made despite reports in Israeli media. They claimed the progress referred to the “positive response” conveyed by the mediators to Hamas regarding the possibility of reaching an agreement with Israel for a 60-day ceasefire, as proposed by United States envoy Steve Witkoff, and for the release of the hostages in “phases.” They said Hamas demanded guarantees for serious negotiations for a comprehensive agreement to end the war, but claimed Israel was still being evasive. They added that despite the mediators’ promises to resolve humanitarian aspects, Hamas had doubts regarding Israel’s intentions and claimed that the Netanyahu government’s statements to the media were “evasions” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 17, 2025).
• Palestinian-American mediator Bishara Bahbah stated that efforts to find a solution for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip were ongoing regardless of the Israel-Iran War. He added that progress had been made in the ceasefire discussions with the help of Egyptian and Qatari mediators, and told the Gazans to “never lose hope” (Bishara Bahbah’s Facebook page, June 17, 2025).
• Hamas figure Sami Abu Zuhri claimed Hamas was prepared to release all the Israeli “captives” held in its “custody” in a single deal, provided that genuine international guarantees for a comprehensive ceasefire and end of fighting in the Gaza Strip were secured. He added that Hamas did not condition the release of the “captives” on a long-term political agreement or strategic achievements, but regarded it as a “humanitarian” measure which could be implemented if an immediate end to Israeli attacks and the removal of the ongoing threat to civilian lives in the Strip were guaranteed. He claimed Hamas was telling the international community that the key to releasing the “captives” was in its hands and only it could stop the “bloodshed and systematic war of killing the civilian population” in the Strip (al-Masirah, June 19, 2025).
• A “well-informed source” said that a Hamas delegation arrived in Egypt on June 21, 2025, to negotiate a hostage release deal (The Jerusalem Post, June 21, 2025). “Two Egyptian sources” confirmed that a Hamas delegation had arrived in Cairo and met with Egyptian officials after Hamas agreed to a two-month ceasefire (Chinese News Agency in Arabic, June 21, 2025). In response, “sources in Hamas leadership” denied that any delegation from the movement was in Cairo and said reports of progress in negotiations were inaccurate (al-Quds X account, June 22, 2025).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• The Gaza municipality announced that eight central markets in the city had been severely damaged or completely destroyed since the start of the fighting on October 7, 2023, including the market in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, the Yarmouk market, the al-Shati market and the fish market. According to the municipality, the markets needed immediate extensive repairs to restore economic and social activity to the area. The total cost is estimated at $17.5 million, with an urgent need of $2.5 million by the end of 2025 (Sama, June 18, 2025).
• The Palestinian Red Crescent in the Strip announced the opening of its field hospital in the al-Muazi area in western Khan Yunis. The hospital, which has 60 beds and two operating rooms, will provide displaced persons with emergency medical services (Palestinian Red Crescent in Gaza Facebook page, June 18, 2025).

• The Palestinian communications company reported that its teams had restored internet and landlines after more than 50 hours without service but noted that the network was particularly fragile and any further attack could lead to its complete collapse. The company said that the extensive damage to the infrastructure made it very difficult to provide alternative solutions (al-Risala Telegram channel, June 21, 2025).
• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip warned of the imminent collapse of laboratory services and blood banks in the wake of a severe shortage of equipment and essential testing materials, with about 49% of its stock expected to run out in less than a month. The ministry claimed the crisis threatened to paralyze diagnostic and blood transfer capabilities amid a wave of wounded Gazans. The ministry accused Israel of deliberately destroying medical equipment, leading to the shutdown of 514 devices and damage to 50% of hospital labs and 60% of primary care labs (Quds News network Telegram channel, June 22, 2025).

Humanitarian aid activity

• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories reported that during the week ending June 21, 2025, 430 trucks of humanitarian aid, including flour and food, entered north Gaza via the Zikim Crossing and south Gaza via the Kerem Shalom Crossing. On June 23, 2025, 240 tons of baby food were delivered for UNICEF (the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories’ X account, June 17-24, 2025).
• The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) announced that “despite regional circumstances and direct threats to our workers,” it had operated three distribution centers daily (except for one day) over the past week in three locations: the Saudi neighborhood in Rafah, Khan Yunis and Wadi Gaza. The activity peaks last week were on June 19, with about 2.8 million food portions distributed, and on June 23, with about 2 million portions delivered (GHF Facebook page, June 17-24, 2025).
• Hamas-affiliated mechanisms and media in the Gaza Strip continued to accuse IDF forces and the GHF’s American security company of attacking and shooting at “hungry civilians” at the distribution centers. The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that since the centers opened on May 27, 2025, 467 Palestinians waiting for aid had been killed and more than 3,600 injured (Hamas ministry of health Telegram channel and the Quds news agency, June 23, 2025). Hamas figure Sami Abu Zuhri described the food distribution areas as “death traps” and accused Israel and the United States of “killing civilians” under humanitarian cover (Telegram channel of journalist Muthanna al-Najjar, June 20, 2025). The “security wing” of the “resistance”^[2] also issued a “serious security warning” regarding alleged abduction attempts near humanitarian aid distribution points, and Gazans were warned to stay away from those places in order to force Israel to return to distributing aid through transparent and safe international channels (Local Front – Gaza Strip Telegram, June 23, 2025).
• Abu Bilal al-Aklouk, a member of the leadership of the national gathering of clans, tribes and families in the Gaza Strip, said an agreement had been reached between the clans and international institutions regarding the mechanism for humanitarian aid distribution in the Strip. He said the objective of the agreement was to ensure that the aid reached the eligible recipients fairly and transparently, focusing on the groups most affected by the catastrophic conditions facing the Gazans (alresala.net, June 17, 2025).
• On June 21, 2025, the World Central Kitchen (WCK) reported that its aid trucks had reached teams in the Gaza Strip for the first time in more than 12 weeks and that the teams resumed cooking at selected kitchens, focusing on preparing nutritious, hot, carbohydrate-rich meals. Reportedly nearly ten thousand meals were cooked on the first day of renewed activity (WCK website, June 21, 2025). Amjad al-Shawa, director general of the NGO network in the Gaza Strip, said the activity of World Central Kitchen in the Strip would be partial and very limited, and was expected to provide only about ten thousand meals a day, focusing mainly on meeting the needs of several hospitals and a limited number of displaced persons camps, compared to the one million meals a day it supplied before the ceasefire agreement in January 2025 (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 22, 2025).

Hamas governance

• According to reports, the Hamas Sahm unit executed two drug dealers in central Gaza and wounded two others (Amsak Amil’s Telegram channel, June 20, 2025). It was also reported that Hamas security forces carried out the immediate execution of two collaborators described as “Israeli undercover agents” in east Gaza (al-Ziyad Telegram channel, June 21, 2025).
• The Abu Amra clan announced the establishment of Force A170 to secure aid trucks entering the Gaza Strip. Reportedly, the force is taking action to reduce prices in the markets. Members of the force called on residents not to risk their lives and to refrain from attempting to loot the trucks secured by the new unit (Abu Amra clan Facebook page, June 22, 2025).

• “Security sources in the Gaza Strip” reported the exposure of local collaborators who allegedly operated in cooperation with Israeli special forces in al-Shejaya. According to the sources, the head of the cell was Rami Halas, a former employee of the Palestinian Authority security forces, while Muhammad Khalil (Abu Haitham), who served as a recruitment officer for agents, worked in PA intelligence. Another detainee, Muhammad Karim, allegedly admitted that he was recruited by Khalil. According to reports, the collaborators will be executed as an “inevitable punishment” (al-Ziyad Telegram channel, June 23, 2025).

• “Palestinian sources” claimed that the Israeli Mossad, in cooperation with the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) and with the backing of the Israeli government, formulated a detailed plan to eliminate Hamas leaders and their supporters. According to the report, Hamas received “verified and detailed” information about Israel’s intentions to target its top leadership and has begun taking unusual precautions, especially in areas where senior figures live. The sources said Israel had a list of targets prepared in advance by the Mossad which included the names of prominent figures, such as Hamas “external” leader Khaled Mashal, head of Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip Khalil al-Haya, Hamas head in Judea and Samaria Zaher Jabarin, and other senior officials including Mousa Abu Marzouq, Izzat al-Rishq, Maher Salah and Ghazi Hamad. Hamas reportedly received the warning from “friendly official elements” and is preparing for targeted attacks, particularly in Lebanon. Israel allegedly holds highly sensitive information which could serve as a basis for actual action, causing growing concern among the movement’s leaders (al-Quds al-Arabi, June 16, 2025).
• “Sources in Hamas in the Gaza Strip” said the Hamas military wing was currently operating without a central command in the Strip after the elimination of its leaders Muhammad Deif and Yahya al-Sinwar. They said that after al-Sinwar’s elimination on May 13, 2025, the leadership of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades decided not to appoint a new general commander to make critical decisions, especially regarding a ceasefire and the hostages held by the military wing, until the end of the war and the reorganization of Hamas political and military leadership in the Gaza Strip. It was also decided to allow each brigade commander to manage his brigade’s activity according to circumstances, especially regarding operations which could be carried out against Israeli forces on the ground, and consultations would be held among the brigade commanders regarding any decision related to the fate of the hostages or a ceasefire. The sources noted that the elimination of most of the commanders in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ military council had led the Hamas leadership, in consultation with the remaining commanders, to agree to the new decision. According to the report, Gaza City brigade commander Izz al-Din al-Haddad is the only member of the previous military council confirmed alive, while the fate of Rafah brigade commander Muhammad Shabaneh remains unclear, despite confirmations that he was killed with al-Sinwar. Al-Haddad is expected to be appointed commander of Hamas military wing at the end of the war or if there is a ceasefire (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 20, 2025).
• Following the elimination of Saeed Izadi, head of the Palestine branch in Iran’s Qods Force, who served as the main liaison between the Iranian regime and Hamas,^[3] in an Israeli attack in Iran on the night of June 20, 2025, “sources in Hamas leadership” said Izadi had played a central role in rebuilding Hamas’ ties with Iran and was in direct contact with senior movement figures, including former political bureau head Yahya al-Sinwar, but denied the IDF’s claim that Izadi knew in advance about the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Regarding the elimination of Behnam Shahriyari, commander of Qods Force Unit 190, the unit responsible for transferring Iranian weapons to proxy organizations in the Middle East, he allegedly had an important role but was known only to a few in the Palestinian factions. The sources noted that while Iranian support was important, Hamas was not dependent on it alone and had succeeded in building independent military and economic capabilities over the years (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 23, 2025).
• “Sources in the PIJ” said that the movement was suffering from severe financial distress, both inside and outside the Gaza Strip, especially in Syria. They said it worsened following the Israel-Iran War, since Iran was the PIJ’s primary financial supporter. Sources testified that the movement struggled to pay its operatives’ salaries regularly, with payments sometimes delayed 70-100 days, and the amount itself had dropped from 50-60% of their former salaries (about $300) to just 45%, with some operatives receiving only $150. It was also reported that the PIJ’s economic problem in the Gaza Strip was partly the result of difficulties of liquidity and the limited ability to transfer funds into the Strip. However, the PIJ emphasized that its current situation did not reflect a complete collapse and that funds still existed, but logistical and security barriers delayed access and transfer, especially into the Strip (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 16, 2025).

• A Hamas delegation led by political bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouq met in Moscow with Russian deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov. During the meeting, Hamas representatives accused Israel of committing “war crimes” in the Gaza Strip, highlighting the “killing of civilians, the hunger of the population and the prevention of the delivery of humanitarian aid.” The delegation members also expressed support for Iran and its legitimate right to defend itself against Israeli attacks. Bogdanov said Russia supported the rights of the Palestinian people and discussed Russia’s efforts to promote a ceasefire, open the crossings and bring humanitarian aid into the Strip (Hamas Telegram channel, June 17, 2025).
• Despite reports that the Hamas military wing had no commander following the elimination of Muhammad al-Sinwar, a letter was published, claimed to have been sent by the head of the Hamas military wing, whose name was not specified, to Houthi chief of staff Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari on June 19, 2025. In the letter the Hamas military chief reportedly expressed appreciation for the Houthis’ attacks on Israel and their support for the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian people, and personally thanked Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. He stated that the Houthis’ “heroic stance” shoulder-to-shoulder with the Palestinian people strengthened the “resistance” and the Palestinian people’s struggle, and was “destined to be recorded in history books” (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, June 21, 2025).

• A delegation from the leadership of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), headed by its secretary general Fahd Suleiman, and including central committee members Samir Abu Madalla and Ramzi Rabah, who is also a member of the PLO executive committee, met in Cairo with Egyptian intelligence minister General Hassan Mahmoud Rashad. Both sides reportedly related to the need for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the immediate provision of living, health and aid support for the Palestinians in the Strip through an administrative committee which would manage all aspects of Gaza’s affairs, ensure the “unity of the institutions and lands of the Palestinian state” and immediately begin the reconstruction plan. Also noted was the necessity for elections to the national council, legislative council and presidency within a year, and for confirming the unity of the Palestinians within their official institutions, under the auspices of the PLO, “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians” (DFLP central media Telegram channel, June 17 and 19, 2025).

Terrorist attacks

• There were no attacks this past week.

Counterterrorism activity

• Israeli security forces continued Operation Iron Wall to counter and prevent terrorism in northern Samaria and expanded it to the Balata refugee camp in Nablus and the village of Mithlon in the Jenin area, in addition to ongoing activity in other areas of Judea and Samaria. The forces detained wanted individuals and terrorist operatives, some of whom planned to carry out attacks, seized weapons and funds used for terrorist activity, and destroyed weapons- and explosives-manufacturing workshops. The forces also demolished the homes of two terrorists who carried out attacks. During the activity in the village of al-Walaja, IDF soldiers killed an armed terrorist who tried to stab them and seize their weapons (IDF spokesperson, June 17-24, 2025).
• “Palestinian sources” claimed that as part of Operation Iron Wall, which has lasted for about five month, Israeli security forces escalated their activity in Tulkarm and in the Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps, systematically destroying residential buildings, imposing a siege, and taking over streets and residential buildings to establish military bases. They claimed that 106 buildings had been destroyed in the refugee camps under the pretext of opening roads and changing the geographical characteristics of the camps. They also claimed that the forces denied residents access to their homes and carried out raids in surrounding villages. According to the sources, at least 13 civilians were killed, including women and children, dozens were wounded, and more than 25,000 civilians were displaced from their homes, causing severe damage to daily life (Wafa, June 20, 2025).

Friction between Jewish settlers and Palestinians

• This past week, several incidents of violent clashes between Jewish settlers and Palestinian residents in Judea and Samaria were reported:
  • On June 20, 2025, the funeral of Muhammad Ahmad Mahmoud al-Hour, 48, was held in Surif. According to “Palestinian sources,” he was killed the day before in clashes with residents of the settlement of Bat Ayin. The sources said that al-Hour and eight others were shot, including his brother, while trying to extinguish a fire allegedly set by Jewish settlers on village lands. The mayor of Surif accused the settlers of deliberate action carried out under the cover of the “occupation forces” to “uproot” residents from their lands for the expansion of the settlements (Wafa, June 20, 2025).
  • During clashes between Palestinians and Jewish settlers near the town of Beita, three Palestinian civilians were wounded by gunfire and another was injured by shrapnel (Wafa, June 20, 2025).
  • According to reports, Jewish settlers set fire to several agricultural structures between the villages of al-Mughayyir and Abu Falah in northern Ramallah, causing extensive damage to equipment and agricultural produce. At the Marj Sia Junction, a young Palestinian was injured by a rock thrown at his head by a Jewish settler. In the town of Deir Jarir, clashes broke out between Palestinian residents and Jewish settlers, during which IDF forces intervened using riot dispersal means. According to “local sources,” some of the Jewish settlers acted as an organized group, masked and accompanied by armed security guards (Sama, June 21, 2025).
  • “Palestinian sources” reported that a group of Jewish settlers infiltrated the village of Khirbet Tana near Beit Furik, east of Nablus, set fire to a local mosque and burned copies of the Quran. Local residents reported that the settlers broke doors, caused property damage, and then set fire to the prayer hall. Inside the building charred remains of copies of the Quran and prayer rugs were found. The incident sparked widespread outrage among Palestinians and angry responses from Hamas figures and religious figures in Judea and Samaria, who described the act as a “religious hate crime aimed at igniting clashes and attacking the sanctity of religious sites” (Sama news agency, June 21, 2025).

Political activity

• On June 20, 2025, PA prime minister Muhammad Mustafa and Greek foreign minister Georgios Gerapetritis discussed the regional escalation and efforts to stop “Israeli aggression” in the Gaza Strip, resume humanitarian aid delivery, and halt the “worsening hunger.” Mustafa noted the importance of keeping global attention focused on the Gaza Strip and “Palestine” and the ongoing damage to the PA’s functioning caused by Israel’s delay in transferring funds. He also called to accelerate the convening an international peace conference and promote a serious political process which would include the establishment of a Palestinian state as the basis for regional stability and security (Wafa, June 20, 2025).

Lawsuits against the PA because of terrorist attacks

• The United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld the legality of a 2019 Congressional law intended to make it easier for American citizens to file compensation claims against the PA and the PLO for attacks that occurred in Israel, Judea and Samaria years ago, arguing that they bore responsibility. The law states that certain activity by the PA or PLO in the United States or payments to suspects in attacks against Americans will be considered as consent to United States jurisdiction. The decision overturned a previous ruling by a federal court in New York in 2020 that the law was unconstitutional because it violated the right to due process (Reuters and Munir al-Jaghoub’s Facebook page, June 20, 2025).