Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (October 14 – 29 , 2024)

• According to reports, the Hamas leadership will not appoint a successor to the head of its political bureau, Yahya al-Sinwar (who was killed by IDF forces on October 16, 2024), before elections scheduled for March 2025. Until then, the movement will be managed by the five-member committee appointed after the killing of Isma’il Haniyeh at the end of July 2024. The committee will deal with urgent and critical issues, such as indirect negotiations with Israel for a ceasefire and an exchange of the hostages for Palestinian prisoners, the nature of battles on the ground and the future of Gaza after the current war. The committee includes Khalil al-Haya, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip; Khaled Mashal, head of the “external” Hamas leadership; Zaher Jabarin, Hamas head in Judea and Samaria; Muhammad Darwish, chairman of the Shura Council; and Nizar Awadallah, political bureau secretary. According to reports, the committee authorized Khalil al-Haya to continue handling foreign relations and ceasefire negotiations for Gaza. Al-Sinwar had previously welcomed the committee’s activities, instructing it, in the event of his death, to operate until Hamas elections were held (Agence France-Presse, October 21, 2024; al-Sharq News, October 21, 2024; Arabi21, October 21, 2024; al-Arabiya.net, October 22, 2024).
• Khaled Mashal, head of the “external” Hamas leadership, eulogized al-Sinwar, stating that what he began on October 7, 2023, would continue until the “destruction of the entity” [i.e., Israel] and claiming that he had left behind only a physical void. Mashal said the movement would not abandon its legacy and that its leadership would continue efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza (Hamas Telegram channel, October 21, 2024). On another occasion he said, “The enemy wanted an evil death for al-Sinwar, but Allah chose a death of greatness for him. He lived as a great man and died as one,” and claimed that the initiative of al-Sinwar’s Operation al-Aqsa Flood “shook the entity with an earthquake that will destroy it” (Quds News Agency, October 20, 2024).
• Senior Hamas figure Osama Hamdan complained that Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Mahmoud Abbas had not contacted the movement to express condolences on al-Sinwar’s death. Hamdan noted he himself was not a candidate for leadership due to illness, but there were “brothers more capable than I to lead the movement.” He claimed al-Sinwar showed “great courage” in making crucial decisions (al-Jazeera Mubasher, October 21, 2024).
• Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, eulogized al-Sinwar at a ceremony held by Palestinian “resistance” factions in the Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus. He claimed that al-Sinwar’s “martyrdom” was an important milestone in the Palestinian “struggle” and that al-Sinwar had been not only a leader of Hamas but a symbol for the entire Palestinian people. He said “resistance” would remain Hamas’ “strategic choice,” declaring that it was both a right and an obligation (Hamas Telegram channel, October 23, 2024).

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• During the past two weeks, IDF activities focused on the northern Gaza Strip, the Rafah area in the southern Gaza Strip and the Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza. The forces eliminated dozens of terrorists from the air and on the ground, additionally finding and destroying large quantities of weapons and terrorist facilities. Twelve IDF soldiers, including an officer, were killed in the fighting in the northern Gaza Strip, and another soldier was killed in the south. One IDF soldier was killed in an operational accident in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, October 14-29, 2024).
• Northern Gaza Strip: IDF forces continued the operations which began on October 6, 2024, focusing on the Jebalya refugee camp and the Beit Lahia area. The forces killed more than 200 terrorists in airstrikes and in clashes on the ground, destroyed terrorist compounds, and located large quantities of weapons, some of which were hidden in civilian sites, such as schools.^[3] The IDF operated after the safe evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians from the area to minimize harm to the civilian population (IDF spokesperson, October 14-29, 2024):
  • On October 15, 2024, the IDF raided an UNRWA regional clinic in the Jebalya refugee camp, following information indicating that terrorists had seized the facility and converted it into a weapons depot and hideout. The forces found explosives and other weapons in the clinic (IDF spokesperson, October 15, 2024).
  • On October 17, 2024, the IDF attacked Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operatives in a command and control center situated in the area which had previously been the Abu Hussein schoolyard in the Jebalya refugee camp. At least 18 terrorists involved in firing rockets at Israeli territory and attacking IDF forces were killed (IDF spokesperson, October 17 and October 22, 2024). Palestinian media reported that at least 24 people had been killed in the attack on the school (Quds Agency, October 17, 2024).

   
Right: The Abu Hussein schoolyard (IDF spokesperson, October 17, 2024). Left: Terrorist operatives killed in the attack (IDF spokesperson, October 22, 2024)

• • On October 17, 2024, IDF forces eliminated dozens of terrorists during operations in a Hamas compound in the Jebalya refugee camp, which was situated within a civilian population area (IDF spokesperson, October 17, 2024).

   
Right: Weapons found in a school in Jebalya. Left: A blackboard used by the terrorists to praise the October 7, 2023 massacre (IDF spokesperson, October 17, 2024)

• • Between October 24 and 26, 2024, the IDF and the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) conducted extensive operations at Kamal Adwan Hospital in the Jebalya refugee camp where a Hamas command center was located. The forces evacuated civilians and individuals sheltering at the hospital. A large number of terrorists who had barricaded themselves in the hospital were detained, including those involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. The forces found weapons (including a car bomb), funds for financing terrorism and documents (IDF spokesperson, October 25 and October 28, 2024). The hospital’s director accused the IDF of imposing a siege on the hospital and detaining most of the medical staff, claiming the strikes had damaged hospital wards (Quds Agency, October 26, 2024). The head of Gaza hospitals for the Hamas ministry of health claimed that Israeli forces had “destroyed medications: in the hospital (Sawa Telegram channel, October 26, 2024).
• The Gaza Strip civil defense claimed it was completely unable to function because of the ongoing Israeli strikes in the northern Gaza Strip. Civil defense personnel claimed they could not respond to numerous calls and requests for assistance from homes hit by Israeli strikes in Jebalya and the al-Nazle neighborhood in the northern Gaza Strip (Shehab Agency, October 26, 2024).

Eliminating terrorist operatives

• The IDF continued targeted attacks on prominent terrorists:
  • On October 16, 2024, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, commander of Hamas’ UAV division in the northern Gaza Strip, was killed in an airstrike (IDF spokesperson, October 16, 2024).
  • On October 23, 2024, according to reports, Mazen al-Kahlout, municipal police chief in the northern Gaza Strip, was killed in an airstrike near al-Iman al-Saeed Hospital in the Jabalia refugee camp (Palestine Post Telegram channel, October 23, 2024).
  • On October 24, 2024, Mohammed Abu Atiwi, commander of the elite nukhba force in the al-Bureij Battalion of the Hamas Central Camps Brigade, was killed in an airstrike. On October 7, 2023, he led the attack on a shelter on Route 232 near Re’im and subsequently orchestrated attacks on IDF forces in the Gaza Strip. Since Abu Atiwi was an UNRWA employee, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) demanded clarification from senior officials in the international community and the UN (IDF spokesperson, October 24, 2024).
  • The IDF announced that Samer Abu-Daqqa, head of Hamas aerial operations, was killed in an airstrike in the al-Mawasi area. He led Hamas’s aerial infiltration of Israel on October 7, 2023, using paragliders and UAVs (IDF spokesperson, October 14, 2024).

Attacks on Hamas, including facilities situated in civilian environments

• On October 23, 2024, an IDF airstrike targeted a Hamas command and control complex situated in what had previously been the al-Zahraa School in Gaza City (IDF spokesperson, October 23, 2024). Palestinian media reported three deaths and several injuries (Quds Agency, October 23, 2024).
• On October 24, 2024, a command and control complex was attacked in what had previously been the al-Nuseirat Shahada School in the Nuseirat refugee camp (IDF spokesperson, October 24, 2024). According to reports, at least 18 people were killed and more than 40 were injured (Sama News Agency, October 24, 2024).
• On October 27, 2024, Hamas operatives were attacked in a command and control complex established in what had previously been the Salah al-Din School in Gaza City (IDF spokesperson, October 27, 2024). Palestinians claimed one person was killed (Quds Agency, October 27, 2024).
• On October 27, 2024, according to reports, four Palestinian journalists were killed in an airstrike on UNRWA’s Asmaa School in the al-Shati refugee camp in western Gaza City, which shelters displaced persons. It was the second attack on the school in several days; the first was on October 19 (al-Jazeera, October 27, 2024; Palinfo, October 27, 2024). The IDF spokesperson in Arabic stated that the attack targeted Hamas operatives working in the complex, including a Hamas military wing squad commander and three other Hamas terrorist operatives. According to reports, some of the journalists were associated with the Hamas propaganda machine, although they were not the target of the attack (Avichay Adraee’s Telegram channel, October 28, 2024).

Al-Jazeera correspondents exposed as terrorist operatives

• Hamas and PIJ documents discovered in Gaza revealed that six al-Jazeera correspondents were Hamas and PIJ terrorist operatives. According to the documents, Anas al-Sharif, Ala’a Salama, Hussam Shabat, Ashraf al-Saraj, Isma’il Abu Omar and Talal al-Arouqi had undergone military training and functioned as terrorist operatives as well as working for al-Jazeera in Gaza (IDF spokesperson, October 24, 2024).
• Other documents found in Gaza showed cooperation between Hamas and al-Jazeera. Hamas prohibited the channel from publishing criticism and established a secure line for classified communications with the channel. In a document from 2022, Hamas instructed al-Jazeera on how to cover a failed PIJ rocket launch which resulted in the deaths of Palestinian civilians in Jebalya, advising al-Jazeera not to use the word “massacre.” Another document contained guidelines for emphasizing support for the “resistance” in Gaza and preventing criticism of the PIJ’s capabilities after numerous failed rocket launches (IDF spokesperson in Arabic, October 24, 2024).
• Hamas claimed the accusations were false, calling them incitement aimed at legitimizing harm against journalists, intimidating them and preventing them from fulfilling their mission (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 24, 2024).

   
Right: The six al-Jazeera journalists exposed as Hamas and PIJ military operatives (IDF spokesperson, October 23, 2024). Left: Information about Anas Jamal Mahmoud al-Sharif in the list of Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson, October 23, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• During the past two weeks, five rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip at the Sderot area and surrounding communities. All rockets were intercepted and there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 16 and 21, 2024). The military wings of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the PIJ claimed responsibility for the launches (Telegram channels of the military wings, October 16, 2024).

• According to reports, in discussions between Ronen Bar, head of the Shin Bet, and Major General Hassan Rashad, head of Egyptian General Intelligence, Egypt proposed a plan for releasing Israeli hostages in exchange for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip over an extended period (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 22, 2024). In response, senior Hamas figure Sami Abu Zuhri said that any agreement had rocket include a complete end to attacks on Palestinians and a full withdrawal from Gaza, otherwise, Hamas would not consider it seriously. He accused all “occupation proposals” of being manipulative or only aiming to release the [hostages]” (al-Jazeera, October 22, 2024).
• On October 24, 2024, a Hamas delegation led Khalil al-Haya, responsible for negotiations, arrived in Egypt to meet with senior security officials, including the Egyptian minister of intelligence. According to reports, discussed were American and Egyptian proposals related to negotiations and Hamas representatives said they wanted an immediate halt to the “genocide” taking place in northern Gaza before moving to any negotiations (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 25, 2024).
• On October 27, 2024, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi presented a new initiative for a two-day ceasefire in Gaza, during which four Israeli hostages would be released in exchange for several Palestinian prisoners. The ceasefire would be followed by ten-day negotiation period to reach a comprehensive ceasefire for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza (Sama News, October 27, 2024). Responses from Hamas included the following:
  • “Hamas sources” stated that the movement had received the Egyptian proposal and requested further clarifications, but would only agree to it if the proposal served as a bridge to implement the American proposal of July 2, 2024. The sources claimed Hamas was open to any proposal that led to an end of the war, an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and a serious prisoner exchange deal. The sources told the mediators that killing Yahya al-Sinwar would not lead to “a retreat from the movement’s positions regarding any agreement” (October 28, 2024).
  • “Hamas sources” claimed that the movement promised the mediators it would demonstrate the flexibility necessary to end the war and secure a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. However, it was still too early to say whether the Egyptian president’s initiative would be approved or rejected. The sources said it was possible Hamas might propose releasing two Israeli civilians and two bodies in exchange for a 48-hour ceasefire and possibly extending the truce to a week in return for “an additional prisoner and body.” “Sources in the Palestinian factions” added demands for guarantees of a complete end to the war, which had to be explicitly included in any agreement (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 29, 2024).
• During a visit to Moscow, senior Hamas figure Musa Abu Marzouq said that at Russia’s request, the movement was willing to give priority to releasing two hostages with Russian citizenship as part of a broader deal. He said that Russia had previously requested Hamas release the four “prisoners” with Russian citizenship, but so far only two had been released, while two others remained since they were “Israeli soldiers” (RIA Novosti, October 24, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that since the beginning of the war, 43,061 Palestinians had been killed and 101,223 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, October 29, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• According to reports, in preparation for the winter and to improve sanitation in Gaza, 233 trucks delivered more than 3,000 tons of personal hygiene products, in addition to 15 Dumpsters. The equipment was brought in through the Kerem Shalom Crossing by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In addition, the first sewage pumping truck was introduced into the Strip from the Red Cross, which would assist in improving the sewage system. The actions were coordinated with the IDF’s Coordinator of Government Activities Unit and the international community, which continues to facilitate the import of humanitarian aid to Gaza in preparation for the winter (al-Munassiq Facebook page, October 20, 2024).
• October 26, 2024: The IDF announced the expansion of the humanitarian area in al-Mawasi, where field hospitals, tents, materials for protection from the elements, and supplies of food, water, medicine and medical equipment have been delivered in coordination with the international community (al-Munassiq Facebook page, October 26, 2024).

• A “senior Palestinian figure” reported that the PA received had received from the UAE, via the Americans, a plan for Gaza after the war, but Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, meeting with Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, said that the PA had rejected the proposal. According to the report, the UAE’s plan includes preconditions such as reforms in the PA and a demonstration of transparency and accountability in order to regain the trust of the Palestinian people and international partners. Only then would the PA be recognized as the sole legitimate body in Gaza. The source added that another condition was that Israel make concessions, as the plan was contingent on progress toward a two-state solution. The plan also includes the presence of Arab security forces and military contractors, although the PA would not be involved in security aspects in the initial phase. The source stated that the PA told the United States that an alternative to the UAE’s plan was to unify the Palestinian territories, Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem, under the rule of a “State of Palestine,” with the PLO as the sole legal representative, making “the day after” an exclusively internal Palestinian matter (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 25, 2024).
• A “senior PA figure” said the UAE would not have a role the Gaza Strip after the war ended. He said that Mahmoud Abbas, the PA chairman, had refused to meet with Barbara Leaf because there were no “political innovations” (al-Shaheed, October 26, 2024).
• Mundir al-Hayek, Fatah spokesman in Gaza, called for national unity to end the internal Palestinian schism and transfer the Gaza Strip to PA control. He said it was a response to the Israeli plan to impose its full control and management of the Gaza Strip (Sawt Filastin Telegram channel, October 21, 2024).
• According to reports, Fatah’s Central Committee and Hamas discussed the possibility of managing Gaza through a “special committee.” According to the report, one idea was to establish a committee of the “factions” subordinate to the Palestinian government, which would manage the Strip (Sky News Arabic, October 22, 2024).

• On October 23, 2024, a Hamas delegation led by Musa Abu Marzouq, a member of the Hamas political bureau, met in Moscow with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. According to reports, they discussed the [alleged] “Zionist crimes” against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, especially in the north. Abu Marzouq claimed that the [alleged] “crimes of genocide” were intended to uproot the Palestinian population. Bogdanov expressed Russia’s support for an immediate ceasefire, Palestinian rights, the need to provide the Gazans with humanitarian aid and the goal of reaching a “prisoner” exchange deal, especially for the Russian citizens still held in Gaza (Hamas Telegram channel, October 24, 2024).
• On October 18, 2024, a Hamas delegation led by Muhammad Darwish, head of the movement’s Shura Council, with political bureau members including Khalil al-Haya, Zaher Jabarin and Musa Abu Marzouq, visited Turkey. They met with Hakan Fidan, the Turkish foreign minister and other senior figures. Meeting with Fidan, they discussed the humanitarian situation in Gaza, especially in the north, recent developments in the ceasefire negotiations and the internal Palestinian reconciliation. Fidan offered his condolences on the death of Yahya al-Sinwar (Shabab Press Telegram channel and Turkish foreign ministry website, October 18, 2024). A “regional diplomatic source” said that according to Fidan, al-Sinwar’s death should be an incentive to end the war (LBCI Lebanon, October 18, 2024).
• While in Turkey, the Hamas delegation also met with Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister. According to reports, Darwish thanked Iran for its support and said al-Sinwar’s death would increase the resolve of the Palestinian people to “resist the enemy.” Araghchi promised that Iran would continue to provide “the resistance in Palestine and Lebanon” with “all types of support ” (Mehr News Agency, October 20, 2024).

   
Right: The Hamas delegation meets with the Turkish foreign minister (Hamas website, October 19, 2024). Left: The delegation meets with the Iranian foreign minister (Abbas Araghchi’s Telegram channel, October 19, 2024).

• On October 15, 2024, a Hamas delegation led by Mousa Abu Marzouq ended a four-day visit to Algeria, during which they participated in an event marking the anniversary of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. The delegation met with Salah Goudjil, speaker of the Algerian Council of the Nation, and other senior Algerian political figures. Hamas noted the importance of Algeria’s adopting the “resistance” and called for continued international support for the Palestinian issue (Hamas Telegram channel, October 15, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

• During the past two weeks there were five terrorist attacks in which a police officer and civilian were killed. The attacks were carried out by Palestinians, Israeli Arabs and Jordanians who infiltrated Israeli territory:
  • Shooting on Route 4: On October 15, 2024, there was a shooting on Route 4 near Yavne. A Palestinian terrorist fired a handgun at vehicles, killing a police officer and injuring four other people. Armed civilians shot and killed him (Israel Police Force spokesperson’s unit, October 15, 2024). The terrorist was Muhammad Bassam Khalil Dardona, 28, from Jebalya in the Gaza Strip, who was in Israel illegally with permits obtained before the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, October 15, 2024).

• • Shooting in Neot HaKikar: On October 18, 2024, two Jordanians infiltrated Israeli territory and attempted to enter the Neot HaKikar, a moshav south of the Dead Sea. They shot at an IDF force which arrived at the scene; the soldiers shot and killed the two terrorists. An IDF soldier and a reservist were injured (IDF spokesperson, October 18, 2024). The attackers were identified as Amer Qawas and Hussam Abu Ghazaleh, Jordanians who said in their final videoed statements that they wanted to support the Gazans (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, October 18, 2024). The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan claimed them both as members (Agence France-Presse, October 18, 2024).
  • Vehicle ramming near Ofra: On October 19, 2024, a Palestinian driver sped towards a police vehicle at the entrance to the community of Ofra. The driver, Yusuf Ahmed Adnan Taha, 27 years old, from Nablus, was killed in the collision. No other injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 19, 2024).
  • Vehicle ramming near an IDF base north of Tel Aviv:^[4] On October 27, 2024, Rami Nator, an Arab-Israeli truck driver from Qalansuwa, sped toward a bus that was unloading passengers near the base. Armed civilians shot and killed him. One Israeli civilian was killed and 36 others were injured (Israel Police Force spokesperson’s unit and Israeli media, October 27, 2024).
  • Vehicle ramming and stabbing at the Hizma roadblock: On October 27, 2024, a Palestinian driver sped toward an IDF force near the Hizma roadblock, south of Jerusalem. He then pulled out a knife and attempted to stab the soldiers; he was shot and killed (IDF spokesperson, October 27, 2024). He was identified as Sami al-‘Amoudi, from the Shuafat refugee camp (Shehab News Agency, October 27, 2024).

Other terrorist attacks prevented

• On October 18, 2024, Ibrahim al-Ramadi, 22 years old, from Sheikh Jarrah in east Jerusalem, was detained on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack at the hostage families’ protest demonstration in Tel Aviv. According to the investigation conducted by the Israeli security forces, he had written a last will and testament, created a communication group called “Soldiers of God” in which he incited terrorism, and expressed support for Hamas on several occasions on social media (Ministry of Justice spokesperson’s unit, Israel Police Force spokesperson’s unit, and the Shin Bet, October 18, 2024).
• On October 24, 2024, IDF forces located two explosive devices hidden in a well near the community of Avnei Hefetz in northern Samaria. Both devices were destroyed without causing injury (IDF spokesperson, October 24, 2024).

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining wanted Palestinians and those suspected of terrorist activities, and locating weapons:
  • On October 14, 2024, Israeli security forces conducted a counterterrorism operation in the Jenin area, surrounding a building where wanted Palestinians were hiding. During an exchange of fire one armed terrorist was killed and three suspects were detained. In another incident, security forces killed a PIJ terrorist operative in a clash in Qabatiya (IDF spokesperson, October 15, 2024). During the IDF operation in Jenin, senior PIJ terrorist operative Mahmoud Abu al-Rabb (Abu Hamza) was killed. The PIJ military wing confirmed that Mahmoud Ma’mun Abu al-Rabb commanded the Qabatiya squads in the Jerusalem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion (Jerusalem Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 15, 2024).

• • On October 15, 2024, a suspect was identified outside the community of Reihan, near the fence separating Israel from northern Samaria. An IDF force military force arriving at the scene found a Palestinian armed with a handgun and an M-16 rifle. He was detained and taken for questioning (IDF and Shin Bet spokespersons, October 15, 2024).
  • On October 15, 2024, Israeli security forces, operating in the Jenin refugee camp, eliminated Karim Jabarin, a wanted, armed Palestinian terrorist who was planning an attack in the immediate future (IDF, Israel Police Force and Israeli Security Agency spokespersons, October 15, 2024). The Hamas military wing and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades issued mourning notices for him (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel and al-Mayadeen, October 16-17, 2024).
  • On October 26, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in Tulkarm eliminated Islam Oudeh, a Hamas operative suspected of planning attacks in the near future. The forces surrounded the building where Oudeh hid and exchanged gunfire for seven hours. Explosives and equipment for assembling bombs were found in his vehicle (IDF spokesperson, October 26, 2024). A mourning notice was issued by the Hamas military wing for Islam Jamil Oudeh, referring to him as “the commander” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 26, 2024).

Investigation and resolution of the suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv

• On October 15, 2024, it was revealed that the suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv on August 18, 2024 (in which the Palestinian terrorist Jaafar Mana was killed and an Israeli civilian was injured) was directed by the Hamas command center in Turkey. The Israeli security force investigation exposed a Hamas terrorist network in Nablus. Its operatives were in contact with senior members of the Hamas command in Turkey, including Abada Bilal, who was deported in 2011 in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal. The network received funds from Turkey for terrorist activities, including financing the explosive used in the attack. The Israeli security forces detained eight Palestinians suspected of involvement in planning and carrying out the attack (Shin Bet and Israel Police Force spokespersons, October 15, 2024).

Activities of the Palestinian security forces

• According to reports, on October 19, 2024, PA security forces arrested Bakr al-Abbas and Abada al-Masri, operatives of the Tubas Battalion of the PIJ’s Jerusalem Brigades, after surrounding a house in Tubas where the two were staying, followed by an exchange of gunfire. The two reportedly agreed to surrender after pressure from their families (al-Araby al-Jadeed, October 19, 2024). Hamas issued a statement strongly condemning the continued PA security force “persecution” of “resistance fighters” wanted by the “occupation” (Hamas website, October 19, 2024).
• On October 22, 2024, during an attempted arrest by PA security forces in Tulkarm, a Palestinian police officer was injured by gunfire (Tulkarm News Telegram channel, October 22, 2024). Later the PA security forces issued a mourning notice, stating that Lieutenant Muhammad Sadaqa a Palestinian police officer, had been killed in a clash with armed operatives in Tulkarm (Palestinian Media Center, October 22, 2024).

• According to reports, PA security forces arrested Ihab Awad Shuli, a former prisoner, from Asira al-Shamaliya, north of Nablus. In Tulkarm, PA security forces arrested Zakaria Saeedi, whose brother Mahmoud was already detained by Israel (Quds News Agency, October 27, 2024).
• According to reports, PA security personnel removed a poster in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus, displaying images of Yahya al-Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-‘Arouri, all Hamas leaders who were killed. In response, a group of young Palestinians set tires on fire to protest the removal of the poster (WAFA, October 28, 2024).

Mahmoud Abbas’ activity in the international arena

• Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairmen, led a delegation of senior PA figures to the BRICS summit meeting in Kazan, Russia. He met on the sidelines with various leaders to discuss recent developments in the Palestinian arena (Wafa, September 22-24, 2024):
  • Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Mahmoud Abbas expressed his appreciation for Russia’s position and support of the Palestinian people. He related to the Palestinian leadership’s efforts to halt the war, noting the need for international efforts for a ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the delivery of humanitarian aid. He also related to the PA’s ongoing efforts to gain recognition as a Palestinian state and full UN membership. Putin said Russia had provided significant humanitarian aid to the Palestinians and called on all parties in the conflict to exercise restraint (RIA Novosti, September 24, 2024).
  • Meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Mahmoud Abbas discussed Palestinian and Egyptian efforts for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and agreed to strengthen Egypt-“Palestine” relations. Abbas said the Palestinian leadership would continue its efforts to implement the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Israeli “occupation,” as well as seeking recognition for a Palestinian state. He also claimed Gaza was an integral part of the “State of Palestine” and under its responsibility, and rejected any step separating them.
  • Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Mahmoud Abbas expressed his gratitude for China’s support of the Palestinian people in international forums and for the humanitarian aid China provided to the Palestinian people.
  • Meeting with Turkish President Erdogan, Mahmoud Abbas thanked Turkey for its support of “Palestine” in the international arena, including its support in joining the case at the International Court of Justice against “genocide.” They discussed recent developments and expanding bilateral cooperation, including efforts to end the “occupation’s aggression in Gaza and the genocide in the north of the Strip.”
• Meeting with Antonio Guterres, the UN secretary general, Mahmoud Abbas noted the need to stop “Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people.” He expressed support for a political solution based on recognition of a “State of Palestine” that would make it possible “to end the occupation, achieve stability, and secure Palestinian independence.” Mahmoud Abbas stated that “Palestine” strongly opposed the displacement of any Palestinian residents from Judea, Samaria or Gaza and called for demanding that Israel adhere to international law.

• Mahmoud Abbas gave a speech in which he repeated the litany of ending Israeli “aggression” against the Palestinian people, a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Strip. He urged countries to implement the UN General Assembly resolution requiring Israel to end its “occupation of Palestinian territories” within a year and to impose sanctions on Israel if it failed to meet its obligations. He also condemned Israel’s decision to close UNRWA headquarters in east Jerusalem and expressed the PA’s desire to join BRICS to strengthen partnerships and dialogue with other nations, and to promote solutions to global issues, particularly the Palestinian conflict (Wafa, October 24, 2024).

Other international Palestinian activity

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, held meetings and policy discussions:
  • Meeting with Takeshi Iwaya, the Japanese foreign minister, Mustafa discussed developments in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, alleging “genocide, starvation, and displacement” as well as the “aggression of the occupation and settlers.” They discussed the PA’s efforts to promote the implementation of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and granting the PA full UN membership. Mustafa also asked Japan to recognize the “State of Palestine.” Iwaya said Japan supported efforts for a ceasefire and for rebuilding Gaza after the war (Wafa, October 24, 2024).
  • Meeting with Antonio Tajani, the Italian foreign minister, Mustafa alleged an Israeli “war of genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza,” particularly the intensified attacks in the northern part of the Strip, “hunger, and forced displacement of Gaza residents,” as well as increased IDF and settler attacks in Judea and Samaria, including Jerusalem. Mustafa reviewed the PA government’s efforts to form a national apparatus for reconstructing the Gaza Strip immediately after the “aggression” ended. He also thanked Tajani for Italy’s efforts for a ceasefire, its support of UNRWA and the treatment of Palestinian casualties in Italian hospitals (Wafa, October 21, 2024).
  • In a phone call with Wally Adeyemo, American Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, he related to economic stability in Judea and Samaria. According to reports, the conversation discussed the PA’s efforts to improve its measures to prevent money laundering and end terrorist financing. Adeyemo emphasized the importance of preventing terrorists and other violent extremists from raising, using and transferring funds in Judea and Samaria (United States Treasury Department website, October 22, 2024).
• Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, held policy discussions:
  • Meeting with Barbara Leaf, American Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Hussein al-Sheikh discussed the importance of reopening the crossings to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza. He said he opposed any Israeli attempt to “uproot” people from the northern Gaza Strip and condemned the “series of crimes and massacres” allegedly committed by “Israeli occupation forces.” They also discussed prospects for a ceasefire and the commitment to pursuing a political solution. Leaf affirmed America’s commitment to supporting a political path for regional stability and security which would lead to a two-state solution (Wafa, October 21, 2024).
  • Speaking on the phone with Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, Hussein al-Sheikh discussed recent developments in the Palestinian arena and the importance of a ceasefire in Gaza. He briefed the Qatari prime minister on efforts to achieve an internal Palestinian reconciliation and efforts to secure understandings for Palestinian unity. Al-Thani briefed him on his meeting with United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken (Wafa, October 25, 2024; Hassan Aslih’s Telegram channel, October 25, 2024).
• Speaking with Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, Oman’s foreign minister, Hussein al-Sheikh related to Israeli escalation in Gaza and Lebanon, the issue of Palestinian internal reconciliation and the need to confront “Israeli aggression” and “projects that undermine the Palestinian issue” (Wafa, October 28, 2024).