Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (November 26 – December 3 , 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week IDF operations focused on northern Gaza, the Rafah area in the south and the Netzarim Corridor in the center of the Strip. IDF forces attacked dozens of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists from the air and on the ground, including operatives involved in the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre. The forces also located and destroyed large quantities of weapons and other terrorist facilities. Two IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting in northern Gaza (IDF spokesperson, November 26 to December 3, 2024).
• The northern Gaza Strip: IDF forces continued extensive operations in the Jebalya refugee camp and Beit Lahia, eliminating terrorist operatives and attacking weapons storehouses, structures used for military purposes and important Hamas terrorist facilities. They eliminated a Hamas operative about to fire rockets at Israeli territory from a building near a weapons storehouse in the Jebalya refugee camp as well as other terrorists who had barricaded themselves inside. They also facilitated the safe movement of thousands of Palestinian residents southward. Many terrorist operatives were detained during security checks and taken for questioning (IDF spokesperson, November 26 to December 3, 2024).

   
Right: Rockets ready for firing. Left: A terrorist operative aims a rocket
(IDF spokesperson, November 28, 2024)

• Palestinian media claimed IDF operations had caused extensive damage and seriously harmed the population, alleging that the forces were no longer focusing on targeting terrorist operatives but were striking any location where movement was detected, without prior warning (al-Ayyam, December 1, 2024; Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram Channel, November 30, 2024). On November 29, 2024, it was reported that at least 75 people were killed in an explosion at a residential building in the Beit Lahia project area (Anadolu Agency, November 29, 2024; al-Ayyam, December 1, 2024).
• Hamas also accused Israel of deliberately targeting the healthcare system and preventing the transfer of medical aid. Marwan al-Homs, Hamas director of hospitals in Gaza, claimed the health situation in the Strip was “catastrophic” and that hospitals faced a severe shortage of medicines (al-Jazeera, November 28, 2024).
• The central Gaza Strip: IDF forces continued raiding Hamas terrorist facilities and military positions, destroying weapons and eliminating numerous terrorist operatives, including at least seven Hamas operatives involved in the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, December 3, 2024).
• On November 26, 2024, Palestinian media reported that 11 people were killed and thirty injured in an Israeli airstrike on the al-Hurriya School, which sheltered refugees in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City (Safa, November 26, 2024). On November 29, 2024, it was reported that IDF tanks raided the al-Nuseirat refugee camp and withdrew after several hours, leaving extensive destruction. Rescue teams reportedly retrieved the bodies of 19 Palestinians after IDF forces withdrew from the northern areas of the camp (Anadolu Agency, November 29, 2024; Reuters, November 29, 2024).

Attacks on Hamas, including in civilian facilities

• IDF forces continued operations against terrorist operatives and infrastructures utilizing civilian facilities in the Gaza Strip:^[2]
  • On November 27, 2024, IDF forces raided a structure formerly used as the Awni al-Harthani School in the Beit Lahia project area. The forces eliminated armed terrorists through from the air and in clashes. During the operation, an anti-tank missile was fired at the forces from the nearby Indonesian Hospital, causing no casualties (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024). According to reports, IDF forces surrounded the school and instructed the displaced persons sheltering there to evacuate westward toward Gaza City. several men were detained during the evacuation (QudsN Telegram Channel, November 27, 2024). On November 29, 2024, it was reported that IDF forces placed explosive barrels near the school and detonated them, causing extensive damage to the school and nearby buildings (al-Shamal Online Telegram Channel, November 30, 2024; Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram Channel, November 30, 2024).
  • On November 27, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft eliminated Mua’man al-Jaabari, a sniper from the Hamas Gaza City Brigade, who was operating from a room in a building formerly used as the al-Tabeen School. According to the IDF, he had stored large quantities of weapons in the room (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024). According to reports, the IDF strike hit the third and fourth floors of the building, killing 12 people, including two sons of senior Hamas figure Fawzi Barhoum (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram Channel, November 27, 2024; alresala.net, November 27, 2024).
  • On November 30, 2024, the Israeli Air Force targeted a vehicle in Khan Yunis, one of whose passengers was Ahed Azmi Qadih, a Hamas terrorist operative who participated in October 7, 2023, attack and massacre. The IDF spokesperson reported that Qadih was employed by the World Central Kitchen (WCK). Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) representatives demanded clarifications and an urgent inquiry from international community leaders and WCK figures regarding the employment of terrorists who had participated in the October 7 massacre and other terrorist activities against Israel (IDF spokesperson, November 30, 2024). Palestinian media reported that two other local WCK workers were killed with Qadih (QudsN Telegram Channel, November 30, 2024; al-Ayyam, December 1, 2024). WCK claimed to be unaware of any connection between the passengers and the Hamas attack. Following the attack, the organization announced a suspension of its activities in the Gaza Strip (World Central Kitchen X account, November 30, 2024).
  • On November 30, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft destroyed a rocket launch site located in the humanitarian zone of Deir al-Balah and prepared to fire at southern Israel. After the attack, rockets were launched from the site but did not cross into Israeli territory (IDF spokesperson, November 30, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• On December 2, 2024, the Israeli Air Force intercepted a rocket launched from the Khan Yunis area at the western Negev (IDF spokesperson, December 2, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for the rocket fire (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Telegram Channel, December 2, 2024).

• Given the ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah fighting in Lebanon, which disrupted the “unity of fronts” concept promoted by the “resistance axis,”^[3] senior Hamas figures expressed their desire for a similar agreement, which would include an end to the war in Gaza and a “prisoner exchange.” However, they claimed that Israel was delaying the completion of negotiations:
  • Immediately after the ceasefire in Lebanon went into effect on November 27, 2024, a senior Hamas figure stated that the movement was prepared for a ceasefire. He claimed Hamas had informed mediators from Egypt, Qatar and Turkey of its willingness to reach an agreement and sign a “serious deal” for a prisoner exchange. However, he blamed Israel for delaying the agreement (AFP, November 27, 2024).
  • Senior Hamas figure Sami Abu Zuhri said that the movement respected Lebanon and Hezbollah’s right to reach a ceasefire to protect Lebanese residents, and said he hoped the agreement would pave the way for similar one to end the war in Gaza. He claimed Hamas had shown “great flexibility” and remained committed to reaching an agreement to end the war, but accused Prime Minister Netanyahu of avoiding agreements (Reuters, November 27, 2024). On another occasion, Abu Zuhri said Hamas maintained its military strength and “resistance” activities despite harsh conditions and was prepared to consider signing a ceasefire agreement which included ending the fighting and rebuilding Gaza. He claimed that international mediators, such as Qatar and Egypt, had been unsuccessful due to Israel’s “uncompromising stance” (al-Alam, November 29, 2024).
  • Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, Hamas representative in Lebanon, said the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon could pave the way for a similar agreement in Gaza (al-Jazeera, November 28, 2024).
  • Mohammad al-Hindi, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) deputy secretary general, stated that by agreeing to a deal, Prime Minister Netanyahu would endanger his coalition. He added that Palestinian organizations were ready for a “prisoner exchange” deal if Israel’s “aggression” ended and IDF forces withdrew from Gaza (al-Jazeera, November 29, 2024).
• According to reports, Egypt proposed a new framework for negotiations to Israel and Hamas, involving a 45 to 60-day ceasefire. During that time, IDF forces would begin a gradual withdrawal, while the Rafah Crossing would open for large-scale humanitarian aid deliveries. Hamas would provide lists of the hostages held by the movement and other organizations, and the release process would start about a week after the ceasefire began (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 28, 2024; Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2024). According to reports, Israel might sign an interim agreement allowing temporary humanitarian aid and a redeployment of IDF forces without a full withdrawal from Gaza, refraining from military actions during the ceasefire unless attacked. “Egyptian figures” estimated that initial understandings could be finalized within days, with continued coordination involving the United States, Turkey and Qatar (al-Akhbar, December 2, 2024).
• Meanwhile, it was reported that Hamas was prepared for concessions in the negotiations, including relinquishing control of the Rafah crossing and agreeing to a gradual Israeli withdrawal from Gaza:
  • “American officials” noted that Hamas faced increasing isolation following the ceasefire in Lebanon, which weakened Hezbollah. According to the sources, after the death of Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and significant losses during the fighting, the movement, under pressure from countries like Qatar and Turkey, was considering a “more flexible approach” to a ceasefire agreement. However, Hamas remains divided over its future in Gaza and the concessions required for an agreement with Israel, as the Israeli government continues to maintain its firm stance, waiting for political changes in the United States (The New York Times, November 29, 2024).
  • “Exclusive sources” claimed that Hamas had shown “great flexibility” under the influence of Egypt and other regional actors. The movement reportedly agreed to relinquish its control of the Rafah Crossing and an armed presence there, committing not to interfere with operations during the proposed transitional period promoted by Cairo (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 28, 2024).
  • “Palestinian sources” claimed that Hamas was “more open than ever” to a ceasefire, and was willing to agree to a gradual arrangement similar to the one reached with Lebanon, in which Israel would withdraw gradually from Gaza rather than immediately, as Hamas had previously demanded. The sources added that the agreement should allow residents of northern Gaza to return to their homes, and in return, the movement would agree to the PA oversight of the Rafah Crossing during the period (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 1, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that since the beginning of the war, 448,502 Palestinians had been killed and 105,454 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, December 3, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• On December 1, 2024, Philippe Lazzarini, the UNRWA commissioner general, announced the cessation of aid transfers through the Kerem Shalom Crossing, the main channel for humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, because “armed militants” [Hamas terrorist operatives] were seizing food trucks. He described this as a difficult decision, made while hunger was worsening rapidly in Gaza, and accused the “siege” and delays imposed by Israeli authorities of rendering humanitarian operations impossible (Philippe Lazzarini’s X account, December 1, 2024). In response, the COGAT stated that UNRWA had coordinated only 7% of all aid entering Gaza in November 2024 and that dozens of other aid organizations continued delivering humanitarian aid to those in need through the Kerem Shalom and four other Crossings (COGAT’s X account, December 1, 2024).
• The COGAT reported that on December 2, 2024, 138 aid trucks entered Gaza carrying food, medical supplies, flour and equipment for displaced persons’ shelters, along with six tankers of cooking gas; five ambulances donated by the UAE were delivered to international organizations operating in the Strip (COGAT’s X account, December 3, 2024).
• The Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah reported that an agreement had been signed to establish a field hospital to improve medical services for local residents. The hospital’s director, Dr. Raed Hussein, noted the administration’s commitment to expanding and developing medical services and expressed gratitude to those supporting the project for their contribution to improving care in the district (Osama al-Kahlout’s Telegram channel, November 30, 2024).

The bread crisis

• On November 29, 2024, two girls and a woman were killed by pushing in a crowd while trying to obtain bread at the al-Bana Bakery in Deir al-Balah. Following the incident, severe criticism was directed at the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, accusing it of exploiting the public and showing indifference to suffering, with particular focus on the disgraceful situation of women in the Strip who were forced to stand in humiliating bread lines, sometimes risking their lives (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, November 29, 2024).

• Following the incident, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced the suspension of all bakery operations in the central Gaza Strip camps due to shortages of flour and other essential supplies. The agency stated that the incident occurred “in a moment of despair” as residents struggled to access food amidst shortages caused by a combination of permit denials and escalating violence on the ground. The WFP also urged authorities to provide the necessary safe conditions for humanitarian operations (WFP website, November 30, 2024).
• On December 3, 2024, a video was released showing residents expressing satisfaction with the resolution of the bakery waiting-line crisis in Gaza, which had been was achieved by altering the distribution method for WFP and UNRWA flour sacks, which currently relies on personal collection from warehouses instead of pita distribution at bakeries, coordinated in advance via text messages (Omar Tabash’s Instagram, December 3, 2024). The COGAT reported that on December 1, 2024, 40 WFP trucks carrying over 600 tons of flour entered southern Gaza. It was also noted that the WFP had collected 52 food trucks from the Erez Crossing for northern Gaza (COGAT’s X account, December 2, 2024).
• Hamas authorities in Gaza accused the World Food Programme of collaborating with Israel to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. The Hamas Government Media Office accused the agency of intentionally refusing to distribute flour to bakeries and of “severe failure” and alignment with “the occupation.” The Hamas interior ministry Sahem (Arrow) Unit claimed the food program was aiding Israel in “starving our people” and released footage allegedly showing WFP warehouses in Deir al-Balah filled with food not distributed to residents (Sahem – Special Operations Unit 103 Telegram channel, November 30, 2024).

Anti-crime activities

• The Sahem Unit in Gaza reported that its personnel were taking action against lawbreakers in Deir al-Balah and the al-Nuseirat refugee camp, targeting individuals involved in weapons theft, property theft and drug trafficking. The unit released videos showing its operatives publicly shooting and beating residents accused of burglarizing houses, and stated that it would not compromise with those violating the law and threatening public security and order, vowing to act harshly against anyone endangering society (Sahem – Special Operations Telegram channel, November 28, 2024).
• The Sahem Unit announced that the names of thieves and robbers who stole from homes would be published, adding that they faced severe punishment and security monitoring. Merchants were also warned that harsh measures would be taken against anyone exploiting the situation by selling at inflated prices, with threats that “their legs would be broken in the middle of the market and their goods confiscated” (Sahem – Special Forces Telegram channel, December 1, 2024).

• On November 30, 2024, delegations from Hamas, Fatah and the PIJ arrived in Cairo for talks led by senior officials from Egyptian General Intelligence, with the objective of resolving disputes regarding the establishment of a joint committee to manage Gaza after the war (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 30, 2024). Arab media reported that Hamas and Fatah representatives agreed to form a “community support committee” under the authority of the PA government to implement unity between Gaza and the other Palestinian territories. The main points of the draft document on the committee’s establishment are the following (al-Mayadeen, December 2, 2024; al-Araby al-Jadeed, December 3, 2024; al-Arabiya, December 3, 2024):
  • The committee will be established based on national consensus and begin its operations after a meeting of all Palestinian factions in Cairo to finalize its formation. The Palestinian Authority “president” [i.e., chairman] will issue a “presidential” decree appointing the committee, which will operate according to the laws of the “State of Palestine.”
  • The committee will consist of between 10 and 15 members described as “national figures of integrity, experience, and transparency,” with diverse expertise and capabilities for managing public affairs across all sectors.
  • The committee will provide essential services and basic needs to Gaza residents, addressing the consequences of the war and reconstruction efforts, in coordination with local and external entities.
  • The committee will oversee all civil activities, including health, economy, education, agriculture, public services and other vital facilities.
  • Operations at Gaza’s seaports will be conducted in coordination with Israel, adhering to the mechanism in place before the October 7, 2023 attack. The Rafah Crossing will operate under the 2005 agreement, which places responsibility on the PA.

Terrorist attacks

Shooting near Ariel

• On November 29, 2024, a Palestinian gunman opened fire on an Israeli bus at the Gitai Avishar Junction near Ariel, injuring nine people, including four IDF soldiers. Israeli security forces eliminated the terrorist (IDF spokesperson, November 29, 2024). The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, claimed responsibility for the attack, identifying the terrorist as Samer Muhammad Ahmad Hussein, 46 years old, from the village of Einabus in the Nablus district (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 29, 2024). “Sources” in Einabus reported that Hussein had been the mosque’s imam, was known as a Hamas operative, and had previously been detained by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Nablus News Telegram channel, November 29, 2024).

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining wanted Palestinians and those suspected of terrorist activities, and locating weapons and funds for financing terrorist activities (IDF spokesperson, November 26 to December 3, 2024):
  • Israeli security forces seized weapons from Iran which were intended for terrorist operatives in the Jenin area. Another location was discovered where most of the shipment was hidden, including weapons such as rockets, around seventy high-powered explosive devices of various types (some with wireless activation systems), bombs, mortar launchers, RPG launchers and sniper rifles. According to reports, the weapons were sent by Unit 4000, the special operations division of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ intelligence, and by the Qods Force’s special operations unit operating in Syria(IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024).

   
Iranian weapons seized by the Israeli security forces (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024)

• • On November 27, 2024, IDF forces identified a drone crossing the border from Egypt into Israel. The forces intercepted the drone, which was found to be carrying four rifles, five magazines, and hundreds of bullets (IDF spokesperson, November 27, 2024).
  • On December 1, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft eliminated a terrorist squad responsible for several shooting attacks in the Gilboa region in northern Israel. The squad leader, Wael Lahlouh, 31 years old, from Qabatiya, was also involved in the shooting attack at the Mehola Junction on August 11, 2024, which killed an Israeli civilian and injured another. Israeli security forces found three weapons on the bodies of the deceased, along with additional weapon parts, vests and materials for making explosive devices (IDF spokesperson, December 1, 2024). The Qabatiya Brigade of the PIJ’s military wing announced that the four killed in the airstrike were its operatives, including Wael Abu Idris, one of the brigade’s founders (Qabatiya Round-the-Clock Telegram channel, December 1, 2024). Hamas stated that Wael Hassan Lahlouh was one of its operatives and responsible for the Mehola attack (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, December 2, 2024).

   
Weapons belonging to Palestinian terrorist organizations who were eliminated
(IDF spokesperson, December 1, 2024)

• • On December 3, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft targeted a terrorist squad in the Aqaba area in the northern Jordan Valley (IDF spokesperson, December 3, 2024). Palestinian media reported two fatalities in the strike on a vehicle in Aqaba. It was later reported that Israeli security forces raided the Turkish Hospital in Tubas, where the bodies of the deceased and another injured Palestinian had been taken, and detained two doctors. Hamas’ military wing stated that its operatives exchanged fire with the security forces (al-Aqsa Channel and Quds News Agency, December 3, 2024).

Charges brought against an Israeli Arab for membership in ISIS

• An indictment for membership in a terrorist organization, incitement to terrorism and other security offenses was filed against Muhammad Amash, an Israeli citizen from Jisr a-Zarqa, who was detained on suspicion of pledging loyalty to ISIS. According to the investigation, Amash, a student at a college in Beersheba, operated social media profiles where he shared ISIS content and called for carrying out terrorist attacks (Shin Bet and Police spokespersons’ units, November 29, 2024).

Activities of the Palestinian security forces

• On December 3, 2024, “local sources” reported that PA security forces in Jenin had “abducted” released prisoner Imad Abu al-Hija and transferred him to an undisclosed location. Al-Hija was the son of senior Hamas figure Jamal Abu al-Hija, who has been serving a life sentence in Israel since 2002. Two of Imad’s brothers were also imprisoned in Israel, and another brother was killed by Israeli security forces in 2018 (al-Shahed, December 3, 2024; Palestinian media center Telegram channel, December 3, 2024).

moud Abbas on the appointment of an acting PA chairman

• On November 27, 2024, Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman issued a declaration stating that in the event of the president’s incapacity and in the absence of a legislative council, the chairman of the Palestinian National Council (currently Rawhi Fattouh) would temporarily assume the role until “presidential” elections were held within 90 days, in accordance with Palestinian election law. If elections could not be held within the period due to “force majeure,” the Palestinian Central Council could extend the mandate once. Abbas emphasized that human rights, the rule of law and the promotion of pluralistic democracy, equality and social justice were “the foundation for the legitimacy of any governing system that leads the nation into the next chapter of our people’s history” (Wafa, November 27, 2024).
• “Sources” reported that Abbas’s decision came after members of Fatah’s Central Committee refused to elect a deputy because of concerns over internal disputes. According to the sources, Abbas proposed that the Central Committee select three members, one of whom would be chosen as deputy chairman, amid American and Arab pressure for reforms in the PA. The objective of the declaration was reportedly top prevent the appointment of Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, as Abbas’ deputy, and to promote a “peaceful and democratic” transition of power (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 29, 2024).
• Abbas’s decision was met with mixed reactions within the PLO. Some figures praised the move as necessary to ensure political stability, while others criticized it as irregular and unconstitutional:
  • Ahmad Majdalani, PLO Executive Committee member and secretary general of the Popular Struggle Front, praised the decision as a “wise and courageous step” to maintain the stability of the Palestinian political system and guarantee a peaceful, democratic transfer of power while safeguarding the “homeland.” He added that Abbas had sent a clear political message and “demonstrated his wisdom in advancing societal stability in line with the constitution and legitimacy” (Wafa, November 27, 2024).
  • Hassan Khreisha, deputy chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council, described the decision as “the best choice from among bad options.” He said the principle should be to elect the “president’s” replacement, rather than appoint him (al-Shahed, November 28, 2024).
  • Jibril Rajoub, secretary of Fatah’s Central Committee, stated that the movement had many questions about the decision to appoint the chairman of the Palestinian National Council as the president’s replacement in case of Abbas’ incapacity. Rajoub argued that it was unacceptable for one individual to hold three or more roles, as was the case during the tenure of the PA’s first chairman, Yasser Arafat (al-Shahed, December 1, 2024).

International activity

• On November 27, 2024, Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, met with Tor Wennesland, special UN envoy to the Middle East peace process, who was concluding his tenure. They discussed developments in Judea and Samaria and efforts to delegation with the consequences of the war in Gaza, Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem. Abbas noted the need to implement Security Council resolutions for a ceasefire, the delivery of humanitarian aid, a full Israeli withdrawal and making it possible for the PA to govern Gaza. He also warned against halting UNRWA operations, describing such a decision as having severe political, legal and humanitarian consequences (Wafa, November 27, 2024).
• On November 27, 2024, Rawhi Fattouh, chairman of the Palestinian National Council, left the Mediterranean Dialogue meeting as a protest against the participation of Israeli Knesset member Yuli Edelstein, arguing he was “unworthy of attendance.” Fattouh submitted a letter of protest to participants and the Italian parliament, accusing Edelstein of land theft and violations of international law, asserting that his place was at the International Criminal Court (Wafa, November 27, 2024).
• On November 28, 2024, Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, met with Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi Arabian foreign minister. According to reports, they discussed the current regional situation and future challenges. Al-Sheikh said they had discussed the need for joint efforts to stop “aggression” against Palestinians, provide urgent aid to Gaza and advance Saudi-led political efforts to secure international recognition of “Palestine” (Hussein al-Sheikh’s X account, November 28, 2024).
• On December 2, 2024, a PA delegation led by PA Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa participated in the Cairo ministerial conference to strengthen the humanitarian response in Gaza. The objective of the conference was to secure commitments for international aid to Gaza and increase international support for humanitarian efforts while planning the Strip’s recovery. Mustafa claimed the events in Gaza constituted a “war crime, a failure of humanity and a violation of international law,” stating that over 80% of the infrastructure had been destroyed. He stressed that the PA government was doing everything possible to assist Palestinians in Gaza and had developed a plan to expand post-war civilian services (Wafa, December 2, 2024).