Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (June 25 – July 2 , 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week IDF activity focused on the Shejaiya neighborhood in Gaza City, the Rafah area in the south and in the central Gaza Strip. Ground and air forces attacked terrorist operatives, destroyed terrorist facilities and rocket launchers and located large numbers of tunnels and quantities of weapons. Six IDF soldiers were killed in five different incidents.
• The Shejaiya neighborhood: On June 27, 2024, IDF forces began operating in Shejaiya, east of Gaza City. They killed large numbers of terrorist operatives in combat above and below ground and in airstrikes. The forces located large quantities of weapons and tunnel shafts and destroyed terrorist facilities, raided a UN school used to hide weapons and located an operations room inside a clinic, where intelligence documents were found. On June 29, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed in a clash with terrorists; another soldier was killed by sniper fire (IDF spokesperson, June 27 to July 2, 2024).
• Before the start of the operation, the IDF spokesperson in Arabic called on the residents of Shejaiya and the Turkman and Tufah neighborhoods to evacuate south through Salah al-Din Street towards the humanitarian zone (Avichay Adraee’s X account, June 27, 2024). The Palestinian media reported on massive Israeli Air Force airstrikes carried out by fighter jets and helicopter gunships in Shejaiya, and on the entrance of military vehicles accompanied by artillery fire. In addition, there were reports of a mass exodus of residents from the area and residents who remained trapped because of the attacks (Quds Agency Telegram channel, June 27, 2024). The social networks reported on Gazans leaving Shejaiya for the southern Gaza Strip through Salah al-Din Road (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, June 29, 2024).

    
Right: Map of the evacuation zones in Shejaiya (Avichay Adraee’s X account, June 27, 2024). Left: Residents leaving Shejaiya (Shehab Telegram channel, June 27, 2024)

• Rafah: IDF forces killed armed terrorist operatives, located tunnel shafts, including mined shafts in civilian residential buildings, as well as large quantities of explosives. They destroyed terrorist facilities, including a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) site for the manufacture of long-range rockets and located a tunnel in the Tel al-Sultan neighborhood. They also located a game of Snakes and Ladders based on targets for terrorist attacks in Israel. On June 27, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed by sniper fire. On July 1, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed when a mined building exploded (IDF spokesperson, June 25 to July 2, 2024). According to IDF estimates, about 700 of the estimated 3,000 operatives of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade have been killed or injured since the beginning of the operation in Rafah, and the remaining operatives have fled north or remained to fight. Hamas battalions were defeated in the Shaboura, Yibna, Brazil and MPK neighborhoods (Israeli media, June 28, 2024).

    
Right: Snakes and Ladders with targets for terrorist attacks (IDF spokesperson, June 28, 2024). Left: An underground PIJ site for the production of rockets (IDF spokesperson, July 1, 2024)

• The central Gaza Strip: The forces operated on both sides of the Netzarim Corridor the central Gaza Strip. They eliminated dozens of terrorist operatives, located large quantities of weapons and tunnel shafts, and destroyed more than a hundred terrorist facilities, including a kilometer-long, branching tunnel. On July 2, 2024, two IDF soldiers were killed by an IED explosion (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 25 to July 2, 2024).

Evacuating the residents of Khan Yunis

• On the evening July 1, 2024, the Coordinator of Government Operations in the Territories (COGAT) and the IDF spokesperson for the Arab media, Avichay Adraee, called on the residents of the eastern areas of Khan Yunis to evacuate to the humanitarian zone which extends from al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis to the Deir al-Balah area (Avichay Adraee’s X account, July 1, 2024). During the night of July 1, 2024, in response to the firing of rockets at the cities, towns and villages surrounding Gaza, IDF forces attacked targets in the Khan Yunis area, including a weapons warehouse and apartments used by terrorist operatives. The IDF stated precautions had been taken before the attacks, making it been possible to evacuate residents from the area and reduce harm to civilians (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram account, July 2, 2024).
• Following the IDF’s calls for evacuation, Gazans left the eastern regions of Khan Yunis (Anadolu Agency X account, July 1, 2024). The European Hospital in al-Fakhari in eastern Khan Yunis also evacuated its patients and equipment, transferring them to Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 1, 2024). The COGAT reported that the evacuation instructions did not include the European Hospital (COGAT X account, July 2, 2024).

     
Right: Map of the evacuation areas in Khan Yunis (Avichay Adraee’s X account, July 1, 2024). Left: Residents leave Khan Yunis (al-Nuseirat refugee camp Telegram channel, July 2, 2024)

The first use of a Chinese anti-tank missile

• The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, announced the first use of a Red Arrow anti-tank guided missile, which was launched at an IDF engineering vehicle in the Rafah area. According to reports, the Red Arrow is a second generation anti-tank missile developed by China in the early 1980s in cooperation with Pakistan. The missile weighs 25 kgs (55 lbs) and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of three to four kilometers (1.9 to 2.5 miles) (Palestinian Media Center, June 25, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• This past week terrorist operatives continued firing rockets at the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip:
  • June 26, 2024: One rocket fired from the central Gaza Strip was intercepted. No casualties or damage were reported (Israeli media, June 26, 2024). The Mujahedeen Brigades claimed responsibility for launching rocket barrages (Mujahedeen Brigades Telegram channel, June 26 and 27, 2024).
  • June 28, 2024: Two rockets were fired at Sderot, one was intercepted, and the other fell in an open area. No casualties or damage were reported (Israeli media, June 28, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, claimed responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, June 28, 2024).
  • June 29, 2024: Two rockets were launched and fell in an open area. There were no casualties or damage (Israeli media, June 29, 2024). The Shaheed Omar al-Qassem Forces, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s military wing, claimed responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets (DFLP central information office in Damascus X account, June 29, 2024).
  • June 30, 2024: One rocket fell in an open area in the western Negev. No casualties or damage were reported (Israeli media, June 30, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for launching a barrage of 107 mm rockets (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, June 30, 2024). The Mujahedeen Brigades also claimed responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets (Mujahedeen Brigades Telegram channel, June 30, 2024).
  • July 1, 2024: About twenty rockets were launched from Khan Yunis. Some were intercepted and most of them fell in open areas. No casualties or damage were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 1, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for launching rocket barrages (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, July 1, 2024).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• This past week no progress was made in the efforts for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages. Senior Hamas members continued to blame Israel for the stalemate:
  • Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed the movement had demonstrated “all possible flexibility and agreed without hesitation to all the proposals made” to end the “crimes” and the “aggression” and to achieve a complete withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip. He added that Hamas would unconditionally reject any agreement which did not guarantee a ceasefire and an end to the fighting. He called on the international community to stop the “aggression” and provide “the necessities of life for the Palestinian people” (al-Risalah Telegram channel, June 25, 2024). Haniyeh held talks with Abbas Kamel, the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence, and with Ibrahim Kalin, the head of Turkish intelligence, regarding the negotiations for a ceasefire (Hamas Telegram channel, June 29, 2024).
  • Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed that the demands of the movement’s negotiating delegation were “the just demands of our people” and not of Hamas alone. He added that Hamas had acted “positively and with great flexibility” and that Israel was lying when it claimed that Hamas delayed reaching an agreement. He added that the updates provided by the negotiating delegation came only after consultation and coordination with the movement’s leadership in the Gaza Strip, and that they absolutely refused to discuss the day after the war throughout all stages of the negotiations (Qudsna YouTube channel, June 29, 2024).
  • Senior Hamas member Osama Hamdan said there was nothing new in the negotiations for a ceasefire. He added that the American attempts to blame Hamas for the lack of progress were intended to put pressure on the movement to agree to the Israeli proposal as presented by United States President Joe Biden, even though Hamas had [allegedly] welcomed the proposal. He accused the government of Israel of trying to avoid concluding an agreement, and of refusing to agree to a permanent ceasefire and to a complete withdrawal from the Strip (Quds Agency, June 29, 2024).
  • Zaher Jabarin, responsible for the prisoners’ file and acting head of the Hamas office in Judea and Samaria, said Hamas’ flexibility was right for the sake of ending the war, but Israel was not prepared to end it. He added that talks had been held with Egypt, Turkey and Qatar as part of efforts to reach an agreement.
  • Ali Abu Shahin, a member of the PIJ’s political bureau, said the organization wanted to complete the exchange deal on the basis of the “four demands” designated by the resistance. He added that the military wings of the PIJ and Hamas were waging a war, while Israel had begun to think about a way to leave the Strip Gaza (al-Jazeera, July 1, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 2:00 p.m., July 2, 2024, that since the beginning of the war, 37,925 Palestinians had been killed and 87,141 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, July 2, 2024).
• Israeli Air Force aircraft carried out targeted attacks on terrorist operatives:
  • On June 25, 2024, Wissam Abu Ishaq, who in recent years had been in charge of smuggling ammunition for Hamas through the Rafah Crossing and through underground tunnels, was attacked in the southern Gaza Strip (IDF Telegram channel, June 26, 2024). According to Palestinian reports, he was killed in an attack on a house and a photography studio in the center of Khan Yunis (journalist Wa’el al-Halabi’s X account, June 25, 2024; al-Mezan Center for Human Rights website, June 27, 2024). The Palestinian social networks issued a mourning notice for Wissam Musa Abu Ishaq, aka Abu Munib. He was reportedly the director of the Masar photography studio in Khan Yunis (X account of @PSLK1155, June 25, 2024. Abdallah Abu Ishaq’s Facebook page, June 25, 2024).

• • On June 25, 2025, Fadi Jihad Muhammad al-Wadia, a PIJ operative involved in the development and promotion of the organization’s missile capabilities, was attacked in Gaza City (IDF spokesperson, June 25, 2024). The ministry of health in Gaza claimed he was a physical therapist who worked for Doctors Without Borders and was killed in an attack on a “group of civilians” near the organization’s medical center in central Gaza (ministry of health in Gaza Telegram channel, June 25, 2024). Doctors Without Borders reported that al-Wadia, 33 years old, joined the organization in 2018 and was its sixth employee killed since the beginning of the war (Doctors Without Borders Arabic Facebook page, June 25, 2024). In response, the IDF spokesperson in Arabic, Avichay Adraee, showed photographs of al-Wadia wearing a uniform during PIJ activities. Along with his activities in Doctors Without Borders, for 15 years al-Wadia had worked in the PIJ’s production system and was considered a leading expert in the fields of electronics and chemistry. Adraee also said that al-Wadia had tried to go to Iran with two other terrorist operatives to undergo terrorist training (Avichay Adraee’s X account, June 26, 2024).

    
Right: Fadi al-Wadia (Doctors Without Borders Arabic Facebook page, June 25, 2024). Left: Al-Wadia in the uniform of a PIJ terrorist operative (Avichay Adraee’s X account, June 26, 2024)

• On June 30, 2024, the al-Amoudi Battalion of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Fatah’s military wing, announced the death of Ahmed Ibrahim Abu Sharia, who commanded the Battalion’s operations in eastern Gaza City. According to the announcement, he was hit by an Israeli airstrike (Wafa, June 30, 2024).

Additional Gazan casualty

• On July 1, 2024, Hamas’ government information office announced the death of Muhammad Mahmoud Abu Sharia, who worked as a correspondent for the Shams news agency. According to Hamas, he was the 153^rd media person killed in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the war (Hamas government information office Telegram channel, July 1, 2024). He reportedly died two days after he was hit by an Israeli attack at the entrance to his home in the al-Sabra neighborhood in south Gaza City (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, July 1, 2024).

The humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip

• The COGAT reported that between March and June 2024, the delivery of approximately nine million liters of fuel to the Gaza Strip was coordinated, and more than 400 tankers had delivered fuel to international organizations in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the war for the operation of hospitals, shelters and essential facilities such as garbage collection. The COGAT stated that the UN aid agencies had to coordinate the transfer of fuel to the Gaza Strip with the IDF (COGAT X account, July 1, 2024).

• On June 28, 2024, Sabrina Singh, the deputy Pentagon press secretary in the Department of Defense, announced that the floating pier constructed by the United States military off the coast of Gaza would be dismantled and moved to Ashdod because of the forecast for high waves. She said that during the fourth week of June 2024 more than 4,500 tons of aid had been brought to the unloading area, and more than 8,831 tons has been transferred since the pier began operations on May 17, 2024. However, she stated that the land routes were the most efficient for the transfer of aid. She also claimed it would not be possible to install the pier again until all the aid from the unloading area had been distributed to the Gazans (United States Department of Defense website, June 28, 2024).
• The UN reported that humanitarian aid personnel had begun to transfer tons of aid accumulated in the floating pier’s unloading area to warehouses in the Gaza Strip. However, it was not clear when the aid would actually reach Gazans. It was the first time trucks had transferred aid from the dock since the UN’s World Food Program suspended its activities on June 9, 2024, because of security concerns (Ma’an Agency, June 30, 2024).
• Official IDF data, based on digital aerial mapping, showed that from the beginning of the war on October 7, 2023 until May 21, 2024, 16% of all permanent buildings in the Gaza Strip (35,952 buildings) had been destroyed, in addition to 36% of all temporary buildings (84,276), including sheds, sheep pens, encampments and agricultural positions that were used for terrorist activities. UN reports claim that more than 50% of all permanent buildings in the Gaza Strip have been destroyed, while reports in the foreign media claim the figure is about 70% (Israeli media, June 27, 2024).
• A new report was issued by the Famine Review Committee (FRC), a UN committee of experts which classifies the state of hunger and food security (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, IPC) based on a combination of data from the field. According to the report, there is currently no evidence of hunger in the Gaza Strip, in contrast to the committee’s previous report from March 2024, according to which there was a high probability of an outbreak of famine. According to the experts, between March and July 2024 there was an increase in the amount of food and additional non-food aid brought into the northern Gaza Strip, and there was also an improvement in nutrition, sanitation and hygiene. However, the report warned that the situation remained serious (Reliefweb, June 2024).
• On July 2, 2024, a document was published showing the employees of the Gaza Strip electric company fixing electric poles on Salah al-Din Street in Deir al-Balah. According to reports, it was the first time high voltage line Number 11 had been repaired since the beginning of the war in October 2023, to connect the water desalination and sewage disposal facility in western Deir al-Balah to the Israeli electricity grid (Palestine Online, July 2, 2024).

• On June 27, 2024, 68 sick and wounded children from the Gaza Strip, along with their escorts, were transported through the Kerem Shalom Crossing to Egypt for medical treatment. The operation was coordinated with Egyptian figures in the American government and the international community (COGAT Arabic Facebook page, June 27, 2024). The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in Gaza reported that 21 children with cancer had left the Gaza Strip (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, June 27, 2024).

• Six trucks with medical supplies from Morocco entered the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. The Palestinian Red Crescent stated that the aid would be transferred to hospitals suffering from a severe shortage of medical supplies (Palestinian Red Crescent X account, June 26, 2024).

• Maher Shamia, aide to the secretary of the ministry of health in Gaza, announced an Arab medical delegation specializing in pediatric surgery had arrived at Kamal Adwan Hospital in the northern Gaza Strip. He said that the delegation would work in the children’s surgical clinic at the hospital.
• The Khan Yunis municipality announced a gradual return to activity of the Israeli Mekorot water line, which supplies water to the eastern parts of the region, a large part of the Salah al-Din route and its surroundings and the Mawasi area of Khan Yunis. The municipality stated that it had been made possible by the efforts of the water authority to repair the water line, in cooperation with teams of regional municipalities (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 25, 2024). The municipality’s crews also carried out maintenance work on the damaged sewage systems in the city’s southwest and southeast neighborhoods (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page June 27 and July 1, 2024). Crews also worked to widen the city’s main streets to facilitate the movement of ambulances, civil defense teams and civilians (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 29, 2024).

    
Right: Widening a central street in Khan Yunis (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 29, 2024). Left: Working on the sewage system of Khan Yunis (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 27, 2024)

Sanctions imposed on senior terrorist enablers

• The EU has imposed sanctions on six individuals connected to financing Hamas and the PIJ or who have helped them carry out terrorist acts. The list includes Jamil Aliyan, who holds PIJ’s shaheeds, prisoners and wounded file and is the CEO of the Muhjat al-Quds institution for shaheeds, prisoners and wounded; Ahmed Odeh, a Jordanian who managed Hamas’ foreign investment portfolio; Ali Morshed Shirazi, a senior officer in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force who heads the Palestinian sector and operates from Lebanon; Zuheir Shamalakh, who is considered Hamas’ main currency exchanger of Hamas; Maher Obeid, who is considered in charge of the Hamas’ headquarters in Judea and Samaria. Sanctions were also imposed on three companies in Sudan and Spain that belong to Abdelbasit Hamza Elhassan Mohamed Kheir, a Sudanese businessman who is considered a leading Hamas financier and is on the sanctions list (European Commission website, June 28, 2024).

Statements from Khaled Mashal and a rebuttal from Fatah

• At a seminar held by the Zeitouna Center for Research and Consulting, a Lebanese research institute, Khaled Mashal, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, gave a speech entitled, “Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its consequences for the settlement of the Palestinian political house” (Hamas’ Telegram channel, June 26, 2024):
  • The war in the Gaza Strip once again put the Palestinian issue at the top of the international agenda and made people around the world realize that Israel could be defeated.
  • The price of “resistance” [attacking Israel] is high and the Gaza Strip has been destroyed, but there is no other path to “liberation” besides “resistance” since it creates opportunities and opens horizons.
  • One of the consequences of Operation al-Aqsa Flood is the end of the Oslo Accords, and therefore an agreement has to be reached among all Palestinian organizations regarding the Palestinian national project and ways to achieve it.
  • A national consensus government should be established, after the war the situation in the Gaza Strip should be managed [by the government], and the leadership should introduce figures who represent influential social sectors in the Palestinian arena in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and the organizations that support them.
• Senior members of the Fatah movement responded to Mashal’s speech:
  • Fatah’s spokesman Jamal Nazzal said that the Palestinians were paying the price for Hamas’s policies and that Hamas’ actions and policies were based on destroying any opportunity to establish a Palestinian state. He added that everything that happened in the Gaza Strip after 2007, when Hamas took power, had nothing to do with the Oslo Accords because that was when the PA security presence in the Strip ended. He also said that Hamas had no real achievement to present to the Palestinians (Sky News Arabia, June 27, 2024). In another interview, he asked how Mashal could talk about the Palestinian issue when he had visited “Palestine” only once, and added that Hamas was the last movement which could talk about elections (al-Hadath, June 27, 2024).
  • Mahmoud al-Habash, advisor to Mahmoud Abbas for religious affairs and Islamic relations, and supreme judge of the PA Sharia courts, said Hamas wanted to institutionalize the schism of the Palestinian people and was prepared to sacrifice the Palestinian people to implement its policy. He accused Hamas of carrying out a coup and preventing national unity (al-Arabiya, June 26, 2024).
  • Senior Fatah figure Bassem al-Tamimi said that Mashal’s speech had negated the efforts to establish Palestinian national unity (Aman News, June 27, 2024).

Other statements regarding “the day after”

• Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said the “resistance” would not allow anyone to dictate anything to it related to the “internal arrangement of the Palestinian homeland,” adding that Hamas wanted to discuss the overall Palestinian situation after the war. He claimed Hamas wanted to establish a temporary national consensus government until elections were held, while it was Mahmoud Abbas who rejected and delayed the proposal. He added that nothing could be organized in the Palestinian arena without Hamas’ presence and influence, and that no party had the right to pose conditions for Hamas to join the PLO. He also said that the PA government was unable to fulfill its role in Judea, Samaria or the Gaza Strip (Qudsna YouTube channel, June 29, 2024).
• PIJ spokesman Muhammad al-Hajj Musa said that “the day after” in the Gaza Strip would be Palestinian, and that the “resistance” refused to discuss the issue with the mediators and the Israelis. He claimed that all Israel’s leaders had confirmed that the idea of ​​eliminating the “resistance” was not feasible and could not be achieved, and they realized that the “resistance” was rooted in the Gaza Strip and will remain present (al-Alam, June 27, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

• No terrorist attacks were reported between June 25 and July 2, 2024.^[2]

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024^[3]

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, focusing on Tulkarm and Jenin. Since the beginning of the war approximately 4,150 wanted persons have been arrested, of whom more than 1,750 have been Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson, June 6 to 9, 2024):
  • On the night of June 26, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp. During the activity, an IED buried in the ground was detonated to attack an armored vehicle. Another IED buried deep in the ground was detonated to attack a military force that came to help. As a result, an IDF soldier was killed and 16 others were injured (IDF spokesperson and the Israeli media, June 27, 2024). The Jenin Battalion of the PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for detonating explosive devices to attack “occupation” vehicles (Jenin Battalion Telegram channel, June 27, 2024). Abu Hamza, spokesman for the PIJ’s military wing, claimed that the Jenin Battalion had detonated more than six IEDs and clashed with the Israeli forces for more than eight hours as part of Operation Bass Jenin 2 (Abu Hamza’s Telegram channel, June 27, 2024).
  • On June 30, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked an apartment in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm, where Sa’id Jaber was located. He was a terrorist operative who was involved in shooting attacks, detonating IEDs to attack civilians and the Israeli security forces in the Tulkarm region, and in the establishment of terrorist facilities. Also located in the apartment were several wanted Palestinians who had been involved in shooting attacks and placing IEDs near the border between Israel and the PA. According to reports, the wanted Palestinians also had links to the terrorist operatives who carried out the shooting attack in Qalqilya on June 22, 2024, in which an Israeli citizen was murdered (IDF spokesperson, June 30, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that an Israeli drone attacked a house in the al-Manshiya neighborhood in Nur Shams. The ministry of health in Ramallah announced that Sa’id Izzat Jaber, 24 years old, had been killed and five other Palestinians injured (Wafa, June 30, 2024). The Tulkarm Battalion of the PIJ’s military wing issued a mourning notice stating that Jaber had been a founder of the Tulkarm Battalion and one of its prominent commanders (Tulkarm Battalion Telegram channel, June 30, 2024). According to the mourning notice, Jaber had previously escaped a number of attempts to eliminate him (PIJ media information office Telegram channel, June 30, 2024). Hamas expressed its condolences for the death of Sa’id Jaber and claimed that Israeli activity “will not succeed in deterring the resistance or stopping the escalation march” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, June 30, 2024).

• • On the morning of July 1, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm to prevent terrorist activity. An IED was detonated to attack an armored military vehicle, resulting in the death of an IDF soldier and wounding of an officer (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 1, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades’ Tulkarm Battalion announced that its engineering unit had detonated a “Sa’id IED” (named for Sa’id Jaber who was killed in the airstrike a day earlier) to attack a military vehicle on the main street of the Nur Shams refugee camp. The Tulkarm Battalion also published a video documenting the moment of the explosion (Tulkarm Battalion Telegram channel, July 1, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility for detonating two IEDs to attack a military vehicle on Nur Shams Street. According to the claim, they then detonated an IED to attack a military rescue force near the police station in the camp (elaqsa_1965 Telegram channel of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, July 1, 2024).
  • On July 1, 2024, Israeli security forces prevented the smuggling of more than 75 guns and dozens of weapon parts in the Jordan Valley. The forces detained three suspects who were identified while crossing the border fence and searches were conducted for additional suspects. According to reports, it was the largest attempted smuggling of weapons since the start of the war in the Gaza Strip in October 2023 (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 1, 2024).

• • It was reported on June 26, 2024, that on June 5, 2024, the Israeli security forces had detained Amer Nasr Allah, from the Tulkarm refugee camp, on suspicion of involvement in shooting at the community of Bat Hefer at the end of May 2024. He admitted he was a member of a terrorist squad which shot at Israeli communities near the border security fence (IDF spokesperson, June 26, 2024)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades terrorist operative killed in IED explosion

• On June 28, 2024, Fatah’s military wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Battalions (AAMB), announced the death of Mu’awiyah Mufaq Daraghma, 25 years old, one of its operatives in Tubas, after he was injured on June 20, 2024, when an IED he was trying to place to attack IDF forces exploded. According to the AAMB, the IED exploded because of a “disturbance” activated by the IDF (Paltoday website X account, June 28, 2024; elaqsa_1965, the AAMB Telegram channel, June 28, 2024). A Fatah-affiliated web surfer wrote that Daraghma was an operative of the PA security forces (Hani al-Hassan’s X account, June 28, 2024). The Fatah branch in the Tubas District announced a day of mourning and a general strike on June 28 following Daraghma’s death (Fatah branch in the Tubas district and the northern valleys Facebook page, June 28, 2024).

    
Right: Mourning notice issued by the AAMB on the death of Daraghma (elaqsa_1965, the AAMB Telegram channel, June 28, 2024). Left: Daraghma training with the PA security forces (Hani al-Hassan’s X account, June 28, 2024)

New PIJ terrorist network

• On June 25, 2024, the Tammun Squads of the PIJ’s military wing announced the start of their “jihadi” activity, and that their first action was shooting and using IEDs to attack the Israeli security forces operating in the town of Tammun, near Tubas (Telegram channel of the Jerusalem Brigades’ Tubas Battalion, June 25, 2024). The IDF spokesperson reported that on the night of June 24, 2024, Israeli security forces detained 24 wanted Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, including three wanted Palestinians from Tammun in the Tubas District (IDF Telegram channel, June 25, 2024).

Palestinian Authority security forces’ activities

• Local sources in Tubas reported that PA security forces collided with the vehicles of Palestinians wanted by Israel and confiscated their weapons (al-Shahed website, June 26, 2024). According to reports on social media, the PA security forces attacked vehicles of “resistance operatives” in the town of Aqaba, south of Tubas, and confiscated three weapons and twenty ammunition magazines, including the weapons of a Jenin battalion commander (Alaa Suleiman’s X account, June 26, 2024; @jeniincamp Telegram channel, June 26, 2024).

• According to reports, on June 29, 2024, the PA security forces operated in the town of Qabatya and exchanged fire with “resistance operatives” (al-Shahed website, June 29, 2024; Yassin Izz al-Din’s X account, June 29, 2024).
• On June 30, 2024, an exchange of gunfire was reported in the Tulkarm refugee camp between PA security forces and “resistance operatives” who tried to prevent a raid on the house of one of their comrades. Three casualties were reported as resulting from security force fire (al-Shahed website, June 30, 2024; Yassin Izz al-Din’s X account, June 30, 2024). The Tulkarm refugee camp battalion published a statement condemning the security force raid, carried out “in the manner of the Israeli special units.” They warned that the next time the battalion’s operatives would return fire “in self-defense” and would not allow themselves or the houses in the camp to be attacked (@a7rartullkarm Telegram channel, June 30, 2024).

Senior PA figures meet with members of the international community

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, met with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. He said implementing the latest UN Security Council resolution, which expressed support for President Biden’s proposal for a ceasefire and a deal to release the hostages, was a good start towards reaching a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and delivering aid to the Strip in the first phase. He said the PA government had “never left” the Strip Gaza and was responsible for providing all of its services (Wafa, June 25, 2024).

• Muhammad Mustafa also met with Helene Le Gal, director general for the Middle East and North Africa of the EU’s external action service. He noted the need for joint efforts to end the war in the Gaza Strip and to strengthen aid efforts and the supply of basic necessities. He presented the government’s efforts to launch economic development initiatives and improve the quality of services, unite institutions between Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and to restore basic and governmental services immediately after the end of the war. Le Gal confirmed the continuation of the EU’s political and financial support (Wafa, June 27, 2024).
• Muhammad Mustafa met in Saudi Arabia with Hussein Ibrahim Taha, the secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. They discussed the war in the Gaza Strip and the developments in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem and the PA’s economic situation. Mustafa presented the priorities of the PA government regarding emergency aid to the Gaza Strip and its reconstruction. He noted the importance of joint efforts to ensure that the international community met its responsibility to end the war and ensure sustainable humanitarian aid to all parts of the Strip (Wafa, July 1, 2024).
• Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, met with the prime minister of Qatar, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani. They discussed the latest regional developments, the internal Palestinian reconciliation, Israel’s latest steps and the need for action to end the war and promote a political horizon for a comprehensive solution (Hussein al-Sheikh’s X account, July 1, 2024).
• Hussein al-Sheikh and Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, met with Phil Gordon, the national security adviser to the United States vice president. Al-Sheikh said they discussed the “continued aggression” in the Gaza Strip, the need to stop the war and the Israeli measures in Judea and Samaria. He claimed they agreed that the solution which guaranteed security, stability and peace was “the end of the occupation and the implementation of international legitimacy” (Hussein al-Sheikh’s X account, June 25, 2024).

• Hussein al-Sheikh and Nabil Abu Rudeineh met with Hady Amr, the American special representative for Palestinian affairs. Al-Sheikh called on the American government to put pressure on the Israeli government to stop the war in the Gaza Strip and to release the tax funds Israel collects for the PA. According to reports, those present discussed international and inter-Arab efforts to create a road map which would lead to a comprehensive political solution, guaranteeing regional security, stability and peace (Hussein al-Sheikh’ X account, June 26, 2024).
• Hussein al-Sheikh met with Gocha Buachidze, Russia’s ambassador to the PA. They discussed the latest developments in the Palestinian arena, efforts to achieve a reconciliation between the Palestinian organizations and international efforts to stop the war in the Gaza Strip (Hussein al-Sheikh’s X account, June 26, 2024).

PA reactions to the Israeli Cabinet’s decisions regarding Judea and Samaria

• On June 27, 2024, the Israeli Political-Security Cabinet approved the regulation of the status of five outposts in Judea and Samaria, the promotion of construction plans in settlements in Judea and Samaria, and the imposition of sanctions on senior PA figures. The measures were taken in response to the lawfare waged by the PA against Israel in the international arena and the recognition of a Palestinian state by European countries (Israeli media, June 27, 2024). The decision provoked condemnations in the Palestinian and international arenas:
  • Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, said that the decision to regulate settlement outposts in Judea and Samaria and promote plans to build “thousands of new outposts” came as part of the “comprehensive war waged by the Israeli occupation state” against the Palestinian people and their land (Wafa, June 28, 2024).
  • The PLO Executive Committee discussed Cabinet’s decisions. According to reports, the Executive Committee decided to confront and respond to all the measures, and called on all the Palestinian forces and the masses of the Palestinian people to stand together and confront the measures with all comprehensive “popular and political means.” The committee stated that action had to be taken quickly in the international arena, including an appeal to the Security Council and the UN General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (Wafa, June 29, 2024).
  • The PA foreign ministry condemned the Cabinet’s decision, and said in a statement that it regarded as very serious the continuation of the “crimes of settlement expansion” by the Israeli government to close the door to any opportunity for the realization of a Palestinian state. The PA foreign ministry also said that the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria, including east Jerusalem, challenged international decisions, and called for urgent American and international intervention (Wafa, June 28, 2024)
  • Rawhi Fattouh, chairman of the Palestinian National Council, condemned the Cabinet’s decision to “give legitimacy to the settlement outposts” in Judea and Samaria. He called on the international community and international institutions to impose sanctions on the Israeli government to force it to respect international decisions and the decisions of the International Court of Justice (Wafa, June 28, 2024 ).
  • Hamas claimed that the Cabinet decision was intended to advance the plan to annex Judea and Samaria. Hamas said in a statement that the “fascist” measures needed a united Palestinian position to confront them, claiming that the Israeli government was escalating its [alleged] “aggression” against the Palestinian people “through killing, destruction, looting of land and damage to holy places.” Hamas claimed the Israeli plans would fail and Israel would face “the rock of the Palestinian will and the rising wave of resistance” in Judea and Samaria (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, June 28, 2024).
  • The Jordanian foreign ministry condemned the Cabinet decision, calling it a blatant violation of international law and international resolutions. Sufyan Abu al-Qudah, foreign ministry spokesman, noted the need to stop the “escalating settler terrorism” and the “illegal and unilateral” Israeli measures which undermined the chances of achieving a just, sustainable and comprehensive peace based on the two-state solution (Jordanian foreign ministry X account, June 28, 2024).
  • The Saudi Arabian foreign ministry claimed that the Israeli “violations” harmed opportunities for peace and contributed to conflicts and the destabilization and regional and international security (Saudi Arabian foreign ministry X account, June 29, 2024)
  • The EU strongly condemned the Israeli Cabinet’s decision and accused it of deliberately attempting to undermine efforts for peace. It said in a statement that the EU would not recognize changes to the 1967 borders unless both sides agreed, in accordance with its joint position and the resolutions of the UN Security Council (European Commission website, June 29, 2024).