Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (June 17 – 25, 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week IDF activity focused on the central Gaza Strip and the Rafah region in the south. Ground and air forces attacked terrorist operatives, destroyed terrorist facilities and rocket launchers, and located large numbers of tunnels and weapons. Three IDF soldiers were killed in two incidents.
• The central Gaza Strip: The forces operated on both sides of the Netzarim Corridor running east-west in the central Gaza Strip. They killed dozens of terrorist operatives, located large amounts of IEDs and tunnel shafts and destroyed terrorist facilities. IDF fighters raided a university used as headquarters by Hamas and found IEDs and barrels of explosives. On June 20, 2024, two IDF soldiers were killed by mortar shells (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 17 to 25, 2024).
• Rafah: IDF forces killed armed terrorist operatives, located tunnel shafts, including a shaft under a child’s bed in a home, located large quantities of explosives and destroyed terrorist facilities. The forces destroyed the training post of the Tel al-Sultan Battalion and raided a Hamas terrorist training compound. On June 22, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed in an operational activity in Rafah (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 17-25, 2024).

     
Right: The training compound at the Tel al-Sultan post. Left: Eliminating the compound (IDF spokesperson, June 23, 2024)

IDF attacks

• On June 22, 2024, the IDF spokesperson reported that fighter jets had attacked two military facilities used by Hamas in Gaza City (IDF Telegram channel, June 22, 2024). According to reports, it carried out an attempt to eliminate Ra’ad Saad, the head of Hamas’ operations department, who was one of the founders of Hamas’ military wing and a member of the military council (Israeli media, June 22, 2024; al-Araby TV, June 22, 2024). The Hamas government information office in the Gaza Strip stated that Israel attacked the al-Shati refugee camp and the neighborhoods of al-Tufah, al-Shejaiya and al-Zeitoun. As a result, 38 bodies were brought to al-Mamdani Hospital, 14 Palestinians were missing under the rubble and 50 Palestinians were wounded, some of them seriously (Hamas government information office Telegram channel, June 22, 2024).
• On the night of June 24, 2024, Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked two buildings in the al-Shati refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip and in the al-Daraj and al-Tufah neighborhoods of Gaza City. The buildings were used by Hamas terrorist operatives, some of whom were involved in holding hostages and participated in the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre. The IDF spokesperson noted that precision weaponry was used and aerial observations were carried out to reduce possible harm to uninvolved non-combatants (IDF Telegram channel, June 25, 2024). The Palestinians reported that at least eight people had been killed at the Abd al-Fatah Hamoud school in al-Daraj, and ten more, including children, were killed in an attack on UNRWA’s Asmaa Elementary School in al-Shati (Wafa, June 25, 2024; Palinfo, June 25, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• This past week Palestinian terrorists continued firing rockets at Israeli from the Gaza Strip:
  • June 19, 2024 (afternoon): The operatives of the Shaheed Imad al-Qassem, the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), claimed responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets at south Ashkelon and Netiv HaAsara (DFLP information office Telegram channel, June 19, 2024).
  • June 19, 2024 (evening): The Jerusalem Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets at cities, towns and villages surrounding Gaza (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, June 19, 2024).
  • June 20, 2024: Two rockets launched from the Khan Yunis area fell in an open area. A third rocket hit a kibbutz barn (Israeli media, June 20 and 21, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for launching a barrage of rockets (Hamas Telegram channel, June 20, 2024).
  • June 21, 2024: Three rockets were launched from the Nuseirat refugee camp and exploded in open areas (Israeli media, June 21, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, June 21, 2024).
  • June 22, 2024: The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, June 23, 2024).
  • June 24, 2024 (noon): The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, June 24, 2024).
  • June 24, 2024 (late afternoon): IDF air defense fighters intercepted two rockets launched from the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, June 24, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing announced the launch of rocket barrages towards the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, June 24, 2024).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire since June 2022

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

UAV approaches Israeli airspace

• On June 19, 2024, a suspicious aerial target approached Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip. The air defense units intercepted the aircraft and it crashed at the border. No casualties or damage were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 19, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for launching a Zouari suicide UAV at a concentration of military forces and published pictures of the launch (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, June 20, 2024).

     
Pictures of the suicide UAV launch (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, June 20, 2024)

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• During the past week no progress was made towards a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages. Senior Hamas and PIJ officials continued to defend their joint position in the negotiations and blame Israel for the stalemate:
  • Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed the movement was prepared to deal with any proposal that met its “basic demands” for a ceasefire. He said the main points of the ceasefire proposal presented by United States President Biden on May 31, 2024 did not appear in the Israeli negotiation document. He claimed their top priority was to halt the war, while taking into account the common interests of the “resistance axis.”^[2] He accused Israel of trying to lay a political trap by setting specific conditions which the “resistance” rejected (Hamas website, June 21, 2024).
  • A spokesman for Hamas reiterated that its proposals focused on a “prisoner exchange deal” and the demand for a total ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, a complete withdrawal and the return of residents to the northern Gaza Strip. He said the ball was currently in Israel’s court, claiming Hamas was prepared to sign any agreement that fully met its conditions (Sky News Arabia, June 21, 2024).
  • Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed the Israeli government did not want to reach an agreement and was determined to continue fighting, while Hamas showed “positivity.” He reiterated Hamas’ position of a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphia Axis and the Rafah crossing and accused that the United States of not being an honest broker, but rather attempting to promote an agreement which considered [only] Israel’s interests (al-Jazeera Mubasher Telegram channel, June 19, 2024).
  • Muhammad al-Hindi, deputy PIJ secretary general, said that the “resistance” conditioned any agreement on the cessation of “aggression” and Israel’s complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and that the Israeli “captives” would not return without the assurance that the conditions would be met. He claimed the American administration was unable to exert genuine pressure on Israel to stop the war, adding that Israeli statements about creating alternatives in the Gaza Strip were are nothing but dreams (Filastin al-Yawm, June 23, 2024).
• On June 23, 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he was prepared for a partial deal which would return some of the hostages without ending the war and that Israel would continue military control of the Gaza Strip.^[3] Hamas responded as follows:
  • Hamas stated that Netanyahu’s remarks proved Israel’s blatant disregard for the UN Security Council resolution and President Biden’s proposals, contrary to the American administration’s claims about Israel’s consent. Hamas reiterated yet again its demands for an unequivocal commitment to a permanent ceasefire and a full Israeli withdrawal, and called on the international community to exert pressure on Israel to stop the war (Hamas website, June 24, 2024).
  • Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, claimed Netanyahu had rejected and sabotaged President Biden’s announcement and the Security Council resolution. He added that the ball was in Netanyahu’s court, and the American administration had to exert pressure on him and his government to stop the “aggression.” He reiterated yet again the positive position of the movement regarding the mediation efforts of Qatar and Egypt for reaching an agreement (al-Ghad TV website, June 24, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 2:00 p.m., June 25, 2024, that since the beginning of the war, 37,658 Palestinians had been killed and 86,237 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page,
• Israeli Air Force aircraft carried out targeted attacks on Hamas terrorist operatives:
  • On June 23, 2024, Muhammad Salah, who was working on projects for the Hamas production headquarters, was killed. He had participated in a project to develop strategic weapons for Hamas and commanded several terrorist squads which were involved in the development of anti-aircraft weapons (IDF spokesperson, June 24, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that two ministry of health in Gaza workers were killed in an Israeli attack on the al-Daraj clinic in the al-Sahaba area of ​​Gaza City. They were Muhammad Sayid Salah and Hani al-Jaafrawi, who was head of the ambulance and emergency department (al-Risalah Telegram channel, June 23, 2024). Mourning notices were published on social media for the death of the engineer Muhammad Said Salah, aka Abu Usama (Zuhir Said Salah’s Facebook page, June 24, 2024; Mu’tassem Sayid Salah’s Facebook page, June 24, 2024)

• • Ahmed Hassan Salmi al-Sawarka, commander of a nukhba squad, was killed in an attack in Beit Hanoun. He participated in the October 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attack and massacre. He also led sniper attacks against the IDF forces in Beit Hanoun and was involved in killing three IDF soldiers. The IDF spokesperson stated that action was taken to prevent harm to civilians during the attack (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 20, 2024). According to Palestinian reports, al-Sawarka was killed on June 16 by a missile launched from a UAV while he was on the roof of a school in Beit Hanoun (Hosam al-Athamna’s X account, June 16, 2024; @quds_feed X account, June 17, 2024).

• • Muhammad Abu Taha, who directed drones in the Hamas air force, was killed in an airstrike. During the war he participated in attacks on IDF forces (IDF Telegram channel, June 21, 2024).

Casualties in other attacks

• • On the morning of June 25, 2024, the Palestinians reported an Israeli aircraft had attacked the family home of Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, in the al-Shati refugee camp. According to the reports, 14 members of the Haniyeh family were killed in the attack, including his sister, her son and his wife, and their children (Palinfo, June 25, 2024; Shehab Telegram channel, June 25, 2024). Haniyeh’s office said that his sister, Zaher Abd al-Salam Haniyeh, had been killed along with nine members of her family (spokesman of Haniyeh’s office, June 25, 2024).

• • On June 20, 2024, Salim al-Sharafa, aka Abu Obeida, was killed in an Israeli attack in western Gaza City. He presented programs and was a media person for the Hamas-affiliated al-Aqsa satellite channel (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, June 20, 2024). He was also a volunteer preacher at the ministry of Muslim endowments in the Hamas government (Salim al-Sharafa’s Facebook page, June 20, 2024). According to Hamas’ government information office, he was the 152nd journalist killed in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the war (Hamas government information office Telegram channel, June 20, 2024).

    
Right: Salim al-Sharafa as a journalist (al-Hadath website X account, June 20, 2024). Left: Al-Sharafa giving a sermon (Salim al-Sharafa’s Facebook page, September 22, 2023)

• • The Palestinian al-Akhrar Movement announced that its spokesman, Yasser Khalaf, aka Abu Khaled, died of wounds incurred two weeks previously in an Israeli attack on a residential area (Palestinian Media Center, June 18, 2024).

Aid for the Gaza Strip

• Last week the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported the entry of hundreds of additional humanitarian aid trucks into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom, Erez and Erez-West Crossings, and through the naval pier constructed by the United States Army off the Gaza coast. According to reports, on June 24, 2024, 299 trucks entered the Gaza Strip, and on June 18, 2024, 305 trucks (COGAT X account, June 18 to 25, 2024). He reported that the contents of 1,200 trucks were waiting on the Gazan side of the Kerem Shalom Crossing to be collected by the UN aid agencies, and that thousands of pallets of humanitarian aid were waiting in the pier’s unloading area (COGAT X account, June 21, 2024).
• On June 19, 2024, United States Army Central Command (CENTCOM) personnel reinstalled the floating naval pier off the Gaza coast after it had been dismantled due to rough seas. According to CENTCOM on June 21, 2024, 720 tons of humanitarian aid were moved through the dock; the total amount, since the pier began operating on May 17, 2024, was more than 6,206 tons of humanitarian aid (CENTCOM X account, June 21 and 24, 2024).

• On June 24, 2024, the ministry of health in Gaza announced that with the assistance of the World Health Organization, six children with cancer had been transferred from al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza to Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis in preparation for their departure through the Kerem Shalom crossing to Egypt for medical treatment, for the first time since the IDF forces took over the Rafah Crossing (ministry of health in Gaza Telegram channel, June 24, 2024). Military officials confirmed it was an initial move to allow Palestinian patients to leave the Strip for treatment; people with humanitarian needs and the necessary permits also left (al-Qahera al-Akhbariya Telegram channel, June 24, 2024).
• A “high-level Egyptian source” said that Egypt coordinated with the UN to bring aid into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing temporarily, until use of the Rafah Crossing had been restored. According to the report, Egyptian humanitarian aid agencies brought in 2,722 aid trucks in the last three weeks. According to the source, Egypt still opposed using the Rafah Crossing as long as IDF forces were present (al-Qahera al-Akhbariya Telegram channel, June 24, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• Photographs were published on social media documenting the start of renovations at Shifa Hospital in Gaza, the largest in the Gaza Strip, for the first time since the end of the IDF operation on April 1, 2024. Web surfers expressed satisfaction and defined the work as an “unbelievable historical scene” and as “sights which shocked Israel” (al-Jazeera, June 22, 2024).

     
The renovations at Shifa Hospital (Right: al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, June 22, 2024. Left: Usama Damour’s X account, June 19, 2024)

• The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that efforts were underway to restore public health services in the northern Gaza Strip, as the health system was having difficulty coping with rising needs because there were no field hospitals in the area. There are seven functioning hospitals in the central Gaza Strip and in the south, all of them only partially functional, in addition to eight field hospitals whose total capacity is 630 beds (OCHA website, June 21, 2024).
• Suhaib al-Homs, the director of the Kuwaiti field hospital in Mawasi, west of Khan Yunis, announced the hospital’s main generator was no longer operational because of a lack of fuel. He called on international human rights organizations and the World Health Organization to help, since it was the only hospital in the Mawasi region (journalist Ma’ad al-Homs’ Telegram channel, June 23, 2024).
• Khan Yunis municipality crews have begun work to reopen and widen al-Bahr Street to facilitate the movement of ambulances, civil defense teams and civilians and to strengthen the municipality’s ability to provide services to residents (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 23, 2024). The municipality also issued tenders for the temporary employment of 150 cleaners and another 150 cleaners who had wagons which could be used to collect and clear the waste in the streets (Khan Yunis municipality Facebook page, June 22, 2024).

The Hamas leadership may move to Iraq

• “Sources” said the Hamas leadership planned to leave Qatar and move to Iraq because of the pressure exerted by Qatar and the United States on the movement to be flexible in the negotiations for a ceasefire agreement and the release of the hostages. According to “the sources,” the Iraqi government already approved the move in May 2024, and after the transition, Iran will be responsible for the security of Hamas leaders, the movement’s ministries and staff members (The National, June 24, 2024). Izzat al-Rishq, a senior Hamas member, claimed the report was baseless (Izzat al-Rishq’s Telegram channel, June 24, 2024). Hamas recently opened its first “information” office in Baghdad.

Haniyeh meets with the acting Iranian foreign minister

• On June 19, 2024, Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, met in Doha with an Iranian delegation headed by Ali Bakri Khani, Iran’s acting foreign minister. Haniyeh expressed Hamas’s gratitude for Iran’s support and said that the Palestinians continued to stand against Israeli “aggression” despite the [alleged] “brutal crimes and genocide.” He also claimed that the IDF had not achieved any of its goals in the past nine months, and added that the demonstrations against Israel in the United States and the West and the successes of the “resistance front” in Lebanon and Yemen showed it would be impossible to return to the era before Operation al-Aqsa Flood [the Hamas October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre]. Khani praised the “heroic resistance” against Israel and noted that one should not be satisfied with “armed resistance,” but also with legal, political and diplomatic resistance outside of “Palestine” (Tasnim, June 20, 2024).

Senior Hamas member visits Russia

• Musa Abu Marzouq, head of Hamas’ bureau of international relations, met in Moscow with Mikhail Bogdanov, Russian deputy foreign minister and envoy to the Middle East. Abu Marzouk reiterated yet again that Hamas’ position was aligned with the principles contained in the Security Council’s resolution for a ceasefire, i.e., a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, a permanent ceasefire, the provision of urgent humanitarian aid, the return of the displaced to their previous places of residence, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and a prisoner exchange deal. He also expressed his appreciation for Russian efforts to increase Middle Eastern stability. Bogdanov stated that his country supported the rights of the Palestinian people and that they were making efforts with various parties to end the war in the Gaza Strip (al-Aqsa TV, June 24, 2024).

“The day after”

• According to reports, Egypt agreed to temporarily participate in a UN Arab force to control crossings from the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s agreement, which was conditioned on the full withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, was presented during a meeting held in Bahrain, attended by senior military officials from the region, including IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and the commander of the United States Military’s Central Command (CENTCOM) (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 19, 2024). A “senior Egyptian source” denied the reports (al-Qahera al-Akhbariya, June 19, 2024).
• Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, said in an interview with the al-Arabiya network that the United States and Israel had offered to return the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the Rafah Crossing, but they declined. He said the PA’s return to control of the Rafah Crossing would be in agreement with Hamas, adding that the PLO had to return to the Gaza Strip, otherwise there would be a civil war. He added that the PA had reached an agreement with the Arab countries on a unified political vision and that the text had been forwarded to the American administration (al-Arabiya, June 20, 2024).
• Akef al-Masri, commissioner-general of the supreme authority of Palestinian clans in Gaza, said that the Palestinian clans refused to be a substitute for a Palestinian political party which would rule the Strip. He said the clans supported the Palestinian organizations but were not a substitute. He added that the Palestinian people had the sole mandate to determine their fate and choose their representatives to rule the Strip (Shehab agency, June 24, 2024).

Reconciliation meetings cancelled

• On June 21, 2024, “exclusive sources” said that the planned reconciliation talks between Fatah, Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, which were supposed to take place in Beijing on June 24, had been canceled because of Mahmoud Abbas’ refusal to have Fatah participate (Quds Agency X account, June 21, 2024).
• Husam Badran, a senior Hamas member, blamed Mahmoud Abbas for canceling the meeting. He said Hamas had responded to China’s efforts for national unity with “great positivity and responsibility,” but when the preparations for the delegations’ trip began, Mahmoud Abbas told China that he refused to participate in the meeting “for no reason.” He added that Hamas regarded Mahmoud Abbas’s decision as unacceptable and not serving the best interests of the Palestinian people (Shehab Agency, June 24, 2024).
• The Fatah movement expressed its appreciation for China’s efforts in hosting the talks between Fatah and Hamas, and expressed its desire for the success of the Chinese efforts. The movement blamed Hamas for the failure of all past talks and emphasized that Fatah was committed to sitting at the national dialogue table in China (Wafa, June 24, 2024).

Hamas response to ICC request for arrest warrants

• On June 20, 2024, Hamas published a legal memorandum that included its response to the May 20, 2024 request of Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to issue arrest warrants for Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing in addition to Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Israeli Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant:^[4]
  • The plaintiff’s request is full of errors and inaccuracies, and is biased in favor of Israel.
  • The international prosecutor opened his remarks by sympathizing with the Israeli victims and their families, without expressing similar sympathy for the Palestinians.
  • The prosecutor was wrong when he said that Israel had the right to defend itself like the rest of the world. The Palestinians have “every right and duty to resist the occupation by all means.”
  • The prosecutor was wrong when he said that the history of the conflict began on October 7, 2023. According to Hamas, the conflict has existed for over 76 years and Israel has been imposing a siege on the Gaza Strip since 2006.
  • The prosecutor believed the Israeli claims regarding sexual assaults carried out by Hamas operatives, but no proof was presented to him.
  • The prosecutor’s bias in favor of Israel was revealed when he filed an arrest warrant for Haniyeh “who paid a heavy price for all of our people after the occupation killed his sons and grandsons,” while no indictment was filed against the Israeli Chief of Staff.

Terrorist attacks

Israeli civilian murdered in Qalqilya

• According to reports, on the morning of June 22, 2024, an Israeli civilian was shot in his car on a main street in Qalqilya, after which the vehicle was set on fire. The Israeli was transferred to the government hospital in Qalqilya and then taken to the IDF post, where he was pronounced dead. IDF forces then entered Qalqilya, initiated an investigation and searched for suspects. According to reports, it is suspected that the motive was “nationalist,” but no final determination has been made (IDF spokesperson’s website and Israeli media, June 22, 2024). Palestinian eyewitnesses said that the Israeli security forces raided a residential building, interrogated the residents and confiscated security cameras that recorded the area. In addition, the forces blocked the road in and out of the city and examined the identity cards of passers-by (Quds Agency, June 22, 2024). Hamas welcomed the killing of the Israeli civilian, claiming “this is the way to deal with the crimes of the occupation and the settlers against the Palestinian people.” Hamas also called on the residents of Judea and Samaria to confront the security forces using “every popular and armed method” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, June 22, 2024).

Attempted stabbing in Migdal Oz

• On June 18, 2024, a Palestinian approached kibbutz Migdal Oz from the direction of Beit Fajjar. When Migdal Oz civilian security forces came close he took out a knife and ran towards them. The security guards shot and killed him (Israeli media, June 19, 2024). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported he was Bilal Abd al-Fattah Bello, 39 years old (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, June 18, 2024). Hamas issued a mourning notice for Bilal Adel Thawabata (Hamas-affiliated in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, June 19, 2024).

IEDs explode near Bat Hefer

• According to reports, on the evening of June 23, 2024, shots were fired at the community of Bat Hefer from the Tulkarm region, after which two IEDs exploded near the wall separating Israel from PA territory (Israeli media, June 23, 2024). The IDF spokesperson stated that an IED was detonated on the Palestinian side of the area, hundreds of meters from the wall, to draw the security forces to the scene. No casualties or damage were reported (IDF spokesperson website, June 24, 2024). The Tulkarm Battalion of the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, claimed its operatives had ambushed IDF forces in Bat Hefer, which is located on the village of Shweike’s lands, and attacked them with IEDs detonated by remote control. The PIJ claimed that attack was carried out in support of the “resistance” in the Gaza Strip and in response to the “crimes” of the IDF in Judea and Samaria, and the IDF counterterrorism activities in Qalqilya (Tulkarm Battalion Telegram channel of the Jerusalem companies, June 24, 2024).

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024^[5]

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, focusing on Surif and Qalqilya. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 4,150 wanted Palestinians have been detained, of whom more than 1,750 have been Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson, June 6 to 9, 2024):
  • On June 20, 2024, the Israeli security forces operated in Surif, 25 kilometers (about 15.5 miles) northwest of Hebron. They detained two Palestinians wanted for terrorist activities and interrogated dozens of suspects. The forces located five weapons in an apartment used by wanted Palestinians and seized ammunition and vehicles. There were no casualties to the Israeli forces (IDF website, June 20, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that a local resident was injured in clashes with the security forces (Quds Agency Telegram channel, June 20, 2024).

• On June 21, 2024, the Israeli security forces operated in Qalqilya to detain two wanted PIJ terrorists, one of whom was planning to carry out an attack. During the operation, shots were fired at the forces, who returned fire and shot and killed the two wanted men. There were no casualties to the Israeli forces (Israel Police Force X account). Palestinian eyewitnesses reported that Israeli forces fired at a vehicle on the city’s main street, killing two Palestinians (Wafa, June 21, 2024). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported the casualties were Mahmoud Abd al-Rahman Ziyad, 28 years old, and Abd al-Karim Abu Hamed, 29 years old (Wafa, June 21, 2024). Hamas issued a mourning notice claiming Mahmoud Hassan Mansour (Ziyad) as an operative in its military wing (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, June 21, 2024). The PIJ also issued a mourning notice, claiming Mansour as one of its operatives (PIJ information office Telegram channel, June 21, 2024). The Fatah branch in Qalqilya and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades stated that Ihab Abu Hamed was one an al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Qalqilya (bawabatqalqilia Telegram channel, June 21, 2024; elaqsa_1965 Telegram channel of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, June 21, 2024). According to reports, Abu Hamed, aka Abu Eliyahu, was a released prisoner who had been wanted in recent months (@jalestinian X account, June 21, 2024). Mahmoud Mardawi, a senior Hamas member, said that killing the two operatives would not stop the escalation of the “resistance” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, June 21, 2014).

PIJ operatives released in Jenin

• On June 23, 2024, Palestinian social media accounts published videos of operatives from the Jenin Battalion of the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ military wing, en route to the Jenin refugee camp after being released from PA prisons (jeninnews1 Telegram channel, June 23, 2024; qudsfeed Telegram channel, June 23, 2024). According to reports, they were released as part of a deal between the Palestinian security forces and the Jenin Battalion, in which the battalion would return the Kalashnikov assault rifles which its operatives took from the Palestinian security forces (@DrEsamBaraka X account, June 23, 2024)

PLO Executive Committee meeting

• On June 24, 2024, the PLO Executive Committee held a meeting in Ramallah chaired by Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas said that the Palestinian issue faced a “serious threat” from the Israeli “aggression” against the Palestinian people “in all the occupied territories,” especially in the Gaza Strip. He accused Israel of trying to implement a “policy of Palestinian displacement” by demolishing houses, schools, hospitals and houses of worship, with daily shelling and “mass massacres.” On the issue of the funds Israel collects for the PA, he claimed Israel was using “piracy,” trying to dismantle the PA and to re-impose the “occupation.” He praised the recognition of the Palestinian state in the international arena and the role of international institutions in stopping the [alleged] “crimes of the occupation.” According to reports, the participants of the meeting noted the importance of concerted efforts to stop the [alleged] “genocide” of the Palestinians, thanked the demonstrators at the universities for their “support “and praised China for its efforts to “end the schism and restore national unity” (Wafa, June 24, 2024). (Wafa, June 24, 2024).

PA prime minister holds meetings

•  On June 24, 2024, Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, met in Ramallah with Hilda Haraldstad, the Norwegian representative to Palestine, and with Ambassador Wolfgang Amadeus Brülhart, the Swiss special envoy to the Middle East. Mustafa noted the need to continue international pressure on Israel to stop the “aggression and war of extermination of the Palestinian people” and to release the funds Israel collects for the PA. He also claimed that the PA government was the only entity capable of managing the Gaza Strip (Wafa, June 24, 2024).

• On June 22, 2024, Muhammad Mustafa visited Hebron at the head of a government delegation, meeting with the commanders of the district security forces and with local activists. Referring to the PA’s economic situation, he said it several factors had caused it to deteriorate, including the drop in the GDP caused by the ban keeping 200,000 Palestinian from working in Israel and the loss of work for 300,000 workers in the Gaza Strip. During a tour of the Masafer Yatta area, he said the PA was preparing for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the reunification of the Palestinian institutions in Gaza (Wafa, June 22, 2024).
• On June 18, 2024, Muhammad Mustafa met in Tulkarm with the heads of the Palestinian security forces, a meeting attended by the Mustafa Taqatqa, the governor of the Tulkarm district. Mustafa said the objective of the meeting was to express support for the residents of Tulkarm and the security personnel “in view of the comprehensive destruction that the district has recently witnessed” caused by the activities of the Israeli security forces. He claimed the Israeli activity “contributed to the encouragement of crime” and that he had come to deliver the “strong message” that they would not sit idly by in the face of such crimes and actions. He also said the PA had begun to realize its political achievements and international recognition was increasing (Wafa, June 18, 2024).

Armenia recognizes a Palestinian state

• On June 21, 2024, the Armenian foreign ministry officially recognized a Palestinian state in accordance with “commitment to international law and the principles of equality, sovereignty and peaceful coexistence.” The announcement also expressed Armenian opposition to damage to civilian facilities, violence against the civilian population and kidnapping of civilians, and called for the release of all hostages (Armenian foreign ministry website, June 21, 2024).
• Mahmoud Abbas’s office issued a statement welcoming Armenia’s decision, calling it an important step towards strengthening bilateral relations and achieving regional peace and stability. Mahmoud Abbas’ office also called on the countries of the world, and especially the European countries which had not yet recognized a Palestinian state, to do so as soon as possible (Wafa, June 21, 2024).
• Rawhi Fattouh, the chairman of the Palestinian National Council, welcomed Armenian recognition. He said the decision expressed international solidarity with the “Palestinian issue” and revealed the truth about the “racism of the occupation [sic].” Fattouh called on the international community to increase efforts to pursue further recognition of a fully sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital.
• Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, called Armenia’s recognition “a victory of rights, justice, legitimacy and the struggle of our Palestinian people to achieve freedom and independence” (Ramallah al-Akhbari Telegram channel, June 21, 2024).
• The Hamas movement also welcomed the Armenian announcement, calling it an important step on the way to international recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people (Hamas Telegram channel, June 21, 2024).

Cuba joins the ICJ lawsuit against Israel

• On June 22, 2024, Cuba announced that it would join the lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, alleging a violation of the Genocide Convention. The Cuban foreign ministry said the move was in line with Cuba’s “solid and continuous” commitment to provide maximum assistance to international efforts to end the [alleged] “genocide” of the Palestinians. The PA foreign ministry welcomed the decision and called it a testament to the solidarity and historical friendship [sic] between Cuba and “Palestine” (Wafa, June 22, 2024).