Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (July 9 – 16, 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week IDF activity focused on the Rafah region in the southern Gaza Strip, while activity ended in the Shejaiya neighborhood in Gaza City. Ground and air forces attacked terrorist operatives, destroyed terrorist facilities and rocket launchers and located several tunnels and large quantities of weapons. Four IDF soldiers were killed.
• Rafah: IDF forces killed dozens of armed terrorist operatives in clashes and airstrikes, eliminated squads which placed IEDs and attacked the forces, located tunnel shafts and large quantities of weapons, and destroyed terrorist facilities. A warehouse belonging to the Hamas aerial force was attacked; it contained paragliders which were used in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre in the communities surrounding Gaza (IDF spokesperson, July 9-16, 2024). Ahmed al-Soufi, mayor of Rafah, claimed that more than 50,000 residents were trapped in the city without basic services. He added that the emergency committees and municipal services could not meet the resident’s fundamental needs and that ambulance and civil defense crews could not enter most of the areas (Rafah Municipality Facebook page, July 15, 2024).
• Shejaiya: On July 10, 2024, IDF forces completed the operational activities in the Shejaiya neighborhood in eastern Gaza City which began on June 27, 2024. During the operation the forces killed more than 150 terrorist operatives, located large quantities of weapons and destroyed eight tunnels in addition to combat complexes and mined structures (IDF spokesperson, July 10, 2024). Mahmoud Bassal, spokesman for civil defense in the Gaza Strip, claimed the IDF had destroyed infrastructure and residential areas in the neighborhood and the neighborhood had become a “ghost city” (Akhbar Palestine Telegram channel, July 10, 2024).

   
Right: IDF forces in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, July 14, 2024). Left: Route of a tunnel destroyed in Shejaiya (IDF spokesperson, July 10, 2024)

Attacks on Hamas in Gaza City, including in UNRWA facilities

•  On July 12, 2024, the IDF forces completed their operational activity at UNRWA headquarters in the al-Sabra neighborhood in Gaza City. During the operation the forces clashed with and killed terrorist operatives, and found parts for assembling a UAV and large quantities of weapons, including drones, rockets, mortar shells and IEDs. Terrorist operatives who tried to flee were detained. The raid began on the night of July 7, 2024, after information had been received of the presence of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist facilities at the site (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 12, 2024)

   
Right: UAV parts discovered at UNRWA headquarters. Left: Weapons found at the headquarters (IDF spokesperson, July 12, 2024)

• On July 14, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked a number of terrorist operatives whose presence had been identified at UNRWA’s Abu-Irban school in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp. The terrorists used the building as a hideout and as a point of departure for terrorist operations against IDF forces in the Gaza Strip. According to reports, prior to the attack steps were taken to minimize harm to civilians, including the use of precision weaponry (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, July 14, 2024). The Hamas government information office claimed that 15 people had been killed and 80 injured in the attack, and accused Israel of carrying out a “horrific massacre of displaced persons” at the school (Filastin al-Yawm Telegram channel, July 14, 2024).
• On the evening of July 9, 2024, an attack was reported on the al-Awda school in the town of Abasan, east of Khan Yunis. The ministry of health in Gaza reported 27 dead and 53 wounded (Telegram channel of al-Aqsa TV, July 9, 2024; ministry of health in Gaza Telegram channel, July 10, 2024). Hamas claimed that the alleged “massacre” at the al-Awda school broadened the “war of extermination and massacre of our people,” and called for “anger marches” in all the cities of the world (Hamas’ Telegram channel, July 9, 2024). The IDF reported that a fighter jet using precision weaponry attacked an operative belonging to Hamas military wing who had participated in the attack and massacre of October 7, 2023. The IDF said that reports of damage to civilians near the al-Awda school in Abasan, which is near the location of the attack, were being examined and that the incident was under investigation (IDF spokesperson, July 10, 2024).

The attack on Muhammad Deif

• On July 13, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked a compound in Khan Yunis where Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing, and Rafe’ Salama, the commander of the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades’ Khan Yunis Brigade, were hiding. The IDF stated that the two hid in a park-like area bounded on both sides with civilian structures (IDF spokesperson, July 13, 2024). According to reports, Deif and Salama were in a building near displaced persons’ tents, there were no Israeli hostages nearby, and many Hamas operatives who guarded the two were also injured in the attack (Israeli media, July 13, 2024). On July 14, 2024, the IDF confirmed that Salama had been killed in an attack. He joined Hamas in the 1990s, was involved in the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit and helped plan the October 7 attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, July 14, 2024). It is believed that Deif was also killed in the attack, but that has not yet been verified (Israeli media, July 15, 2024).

    
Right: The site of the attack in al-Mawasi, Khan Yunis (IDF spokesperson, July 13, 2024). Left: Salama’s “ID card” (IDF spokesperson, July 14, 2024)

• Palestinian media and social networks reported that around 10:30 a.m. on July 13, 2024, a series of airstrikes were carried out in the western areas of Khan Yunis, focusing on the area of ​​al-Aqsa University and al-Mawasi. The attacks allegedly damaged the tents of displaced people in al-Mawasi and the Israeli aircraft also allegedly prevented emergency crews from approaching the area. The ministry of health in Gaza claimed that 90 people were killed, half of them [allegedly] women and children, and 300 were injured (Shehab agency Telegram channel, July 13, 2024; ministry of health in Gaza Telegram channel, July 13, 2024).
• Hamas denied the death of Muhammad Deif. Khalil al-Haya, a senior Hamas figure, said that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had hoped to declare victory and Deif’s death, but he had failed and that “Deif himself was listening and laughing at the empty claims” (al-Jazeera, July 13, 2024). Senior Hamas figure Muhammad Mardawi claimed that Deif was fine and “listening to the occupation’s claims about his death” (al-Arabi TV, July 14, 2024). A senior Hamas figure claimed that Deif was “fine” and continued to directly supervise the activities of Hamas military wing (Agence France-Presse, July 14, 2024). “Informed sources” in Hamas confirmed that Rafe’ Salama had been killed. His body was recovered from the scene of the attack and buried immediately (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 14, 2024).

• “Sources” said that Hamas was investigating suspicions of an internal leak which led to the attack on Khan Yunis. The sources added that Hamas had received warnings Israel was planning an operation against one of its leaders and that Muhammad Deif and a number of other leaders had moved more than once during the past few weeks to prevent them from being tracked. They also said Israel had obtained information from operatives it had detained and interrogated about the movements of Hamas leaders between Rafah and Gaza City (al-Hadath, July 13, 2024).
• According to an article in the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, which is affiliated with the “resistance axis,”^[2] the Palestinian organizations’ military wings hide information about their dead, commanders and operatives, because of how Israel [allegedly] treats their families, as it seeks to “take revenge and harm them.” The article also claimed that Hamas’ military wing was based on the principle of “flexibility and redesign” which allowed it to continue the “military effort” as if no one was killed, despite the targeted attacks. Therefore, the article concluded, whether Deif is dead or alive, the attack will only raise Israeli morale, while the other side [i.e., Hamas] understands that its commanders can be killed at any moment (al-Akhbar, July 15, 2024).
• The reports of hundreds of casualties in the attack on senior operatives of the Hamas military wing in the al-Mawasi area of ​​Khan Yunis provoked condemnations in the Palestinian and international arenas:
  • The Hamas movement accused Israel of a “heinous crime,” claiming the Israeli statements that the attack targeted senior Hamas figures were “false” and it was not the first time that Israel had attacked humanitarian areas under the pretext of attacking senior “figures” (Hamas Telegram channel, July 13, 2024).
  • The PIJ claimed the attack was a “massacre, the continuation of the war of extermination,” and blamed the American administration for the continuation of the war and the “massacres” (PIJ Telegram channel, July 13, 2024).
  • Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas, claimed the attack was “a continuation of the genocidal war to which our nation has been exposed since the beginning of Israeli aggression against our land.” He accused Israel of violating international and humanitarian laws and placed responsibility for the “massacre” on the American administration because of its continued support for Israel. He also called on the UN Security Council and the international community to intervene to stop the [alleged] “massacres” (Wafa, July 13, 2024).
  • Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee, said the silence of the international community was no longer acceptable after the “horrible crime” in al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis, which was a continuation of the [alleged] “aggression and bloodshed of the Palestinians while the world looked on” (Wafa, July 13, 2024).
  • Egypt’s foreign ministry condemned the attack and called on Israel to “stop [allegedly] disregarding the lives of innocent civilians,” adding that “there is no justification whatsoever for such crimes ” (al-Qahera al-Ikhabariya Telegram channel, July 13, 2024).
  • The Jordanian foreign ministry called on the international community to act immediately to provide international protection for the Palestinian people, hospitals and the organizations in the Gaza Strip (Jordanian News Agency, July 13, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• This week rocket launches continued from the Gaza Strip to the area surrounding Gaza:
  • July 11, 2024 (morning): Five rockets were fired from the Rafah region at the cities, towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip; all were intercepted. The Israeli Air Force attacked and killed the operatives who fired the rockets (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 11, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets at the settlements of Yatted and Avshalom near the Gaza Strip (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, July 11, 2024).
  • July 11, 2024 (noon): Three rockets fired from Beit Hanoun fell in open areas (IDF spokesperson, July 12, 2024; Israeli media, July 11, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades claimed responsibility for firing a barrage of rockets at Ashdod, Ashkelon, Sderot and the towns and villages surrounding the Gaza Strip (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel , July 11, 2024).
  • July 16, 2024 (morning): Three rockets were fired at the Sderot region. One was intercepted and two fell in open areas. No casualties or damage were reported (Israeli media, July 16, 2024).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• The negotiations for a ceasefire and the release of the hostages may have been influenced by the attempted targeted killing of Muhammad Deif in Khan Yunis and Hamas’ accusations that Israel was “massacring” Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, Hamas spokesmen said the movement did not intend to stop the negotiations and blamed Israel for the lack of progress:
  • Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, held talks with the mediators, Egypt and Qatar, as well as with Turkey and Oman following the attack in Khan Yunis. According to Haniyeh, while Hamas presented a “positive and responsible response” to the proposal with the objective of reaching an agreement, the Israeli position made that impossible. Netanyahu, claimed Haniyeh, imposed new conditions which had not been mentioned in the negotiation proposal in addition to the “horrific massacres carried out by the occupation in the Gaza Strip today.” Haniyeh called on the mediators “to do what is necessary with the American government to stop the massacres of our people, and to take action to end the ongoing aggression against our people” (Hamas Telegram channel, July 13, 2024).
  • Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, denied reports that the movement had decided to stop the negotiations in response to the attack in al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis. He claimed the attack was an Israeli attempt to “cut off the road to an agreement which would stop the aggression against our people” (Izzat al-Rishq’s Telegram channel, July 14, 2024).
  • A “senior source” in Hamas said that the movement was dissatisfied “with Israel’s procrastination, whose objective is to sabotage the negotiations.” He added that Hamas told the mediators that the negotiations “could collapse at any moment” (al-Mayadeen , July 14, 2024).
  • Sources in Hamas said that the negotiations continued despite the “massacre” so that Israel could not blame Hamas for their failure. They said an indirect round of negotiations was expected to take place in Qatar in the coming days (al-Akhbar, July 15, 2024).
• David Ignatius, the associate editor of The Washington Post, quoted an American official who said there was agreement regarding the basic outline of a deal for a ceasefire and the release of the hostages. The first phase will consist of a six-week ceasefire, during which Hamas will release 33 hostages, including all the women, men over the age of 50 and all the wounded. In return, Israel will release hundreds of terrorists from prison, the IDF will withdraw from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip, humanitarian aid will be delivered to the Gaza Strip and the repair of hospitals will begin. According to the report, Hamas waived the demand for written guarantees regarding the end of the war and agreed to the American position according to which if the negotiations continued beyond six weeks, the ceasefire would be extended as long as the talks continued. According to The Washington Post, Israel and Hamas were “prepared to relinquish authority to the interim governance arrangement” and security would be provided by a force drawn from a core group of about 2,500 PA supporters in Gaza who had been vetted by Israel and would be trained by the United States (The Washington Post, July 10, 2024). A Hamas source said Ignatius’ article was untrue and based on rumors, adding that Hamas had said in the past that it would agree without issue to whomever the Palestinian people chose (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 11, 2024).
• Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said the movement had proposed that a government acting in accordance with the national interest “and without party affiliation” would control the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria after the war. He added that management of the Strip after the war was an internal Palestinian matter and Hamas would not discuss the issue with any external party (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, July 12, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 2:00 p.m., July 16, 2024, that since the beginning of the war, 38,713 Palestinians had been killed and 89,166 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, July 16, 2024).
• Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked terrorist operatives:
  • According to reports, on July 11, 2024, Hassan Abu Kwaik, the head of security operations division in the central Gaza Strip refugee camp district of the Hamas internal security force, was killed in an airstrike in the center of the Gaza Strip. He was an operative in the Hamas emergency committee and was involved in many terrorist attacks. Nasser Muhanna, who served as a team leader in Hamas’ military intelligence, was also killed (IDF spokesperson, July 11, 2024). According to reports, Abu Kwaik was killed on July 8, 2024 in an attack on a structure in the al-Bureij refugee camp market (TahrourWail@X account, July 8, 2024; QudsN X account, July 8, 2024).
  • According to reports, on July 12, 2024, Ayman Shweidah, deputy commander of Hamas’ Shejaiya Battalion, was killed in an airstrike. He was involved in directing the attack and massacre on October 7, 2023 and then participated in the fighting against the IDF forces as an operative in the Shejaiya Battalion. Abada Abu Hein, a long-time Shejaiya Battalion terrorist, was also killed (IDF Spokesman, July 12, 2024). According to reports, Ayman Shweidah, aka Abu Ahmed, was the son of Dr. Ahmed Shweidah, the former minister of justice in the Hamas government. Ayman Shweidah was the commander of Hamas’ operations headquarters, which planned the October 7 attack and massacre, and became the acting commander of the Shejaiya Battalion after its commander was killed in combat (Muhammad al-Najjar’s X account, July 11, 2024; Uday Mahmoud Ja’ar’s Facebook page, July 12, 2024). According to reports, Abada Abu Hein, aka Abu Yahya, participated in the October 7 terrorist attack and massacre, invading Israeli territory in a hang glider. He was also the imam of the Ahmed Yassin Mosque (of Abu Muhammad Eid’s X account, July 11, 2024; Adham Abu Salmiya’s X account, July 12, 2024; Palinfo, July 13, 2024).

   
Right: Ayman Shweidah’s “ID card” (IDF spokesperson, July 12, 2024). Left: Abada Abu Hein (Palinfo, July 13, 2024)

•  According to reports, on July 13, 2024, Husam Mansour, head of a department in Hamas’ internal security forces, was killed in an airstrike. He was an operative in Hamas’ military wing and involved in activities to preserve Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip. Mansour was one of the managers of the al-Khair Foundation, which transferred terrorist funds under the guise of humanitarian activity (IDF spokesperson, July 13, 2024). According to reports, he was killed in an attack in ​​Khan Yunis on July 12, 2024. The British al-Khair Foundation confirmed he had been its coordinator of operations in the Gaza Strip and said he had killed in an attack on one of its warehouses in the southern Gaza Strip (al-Khair Foundation Middle East office Facebook page, July 12, 2024; Palinfo X account, July 12, 2024; X account of photojournalist Husam Salem, July 12, 2024).

   
Right: Husam Mansour’s “ID card” (IDF spokesperson, July 13, 2024); Left: al-Khair Foundation notice of Mansour’s death (al-Khair Foundation Middle East office Facebook page, July 12, 2024)

• On July 13, 2024, Palestinian media reported on an Israeli attack [allegedly] targeting worshipers in mosque built on the ruins of the White Mosque in the al-Shati refugee camp in western Gaza City. According to the reports, 20 people were killed (al-Aqsa TV, July 13, 2024; Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, July 13, 2024). According to reports, among the dead were Nimr Hamida, 49 years old, from the village of al-Mazra’a al-Sharqiya in the Ramallah district, who was deported to the Gaza Strip as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal in 2011 after being sentenced in 2005 to six life sentences for involvement in a fatal shooting attack (Sama, July 13, 2024); Izz al-Din Zaki Akeila, aka Abu Muhammad, a member of the military council of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and commander of the Gaza Brigade was also killed (elaqsa_1965, Telegram channel of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, July 14, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

•  The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that since the beginning of the war, about 42,000 trucks carrying humanitarian aid with a total weight of more than 790,000 tons had entered the Gaza Strip. According to the data, more than 611 thousand tons of food, more than 25 thousand tons of medical equipment and 423 fuel tankers entered the Gaza Strip (COGAT X account, July 15, 2024).

• The United Nations Environment Program estimated that so far the war has left about 40 million tons of rubble in the Gaza Strip and its removal is expected to take at least 15 years. According to the estimate, 137,297 buildings were damaged, about a quarter of them completely destroyed, about a tenth very severely damaged, and about a third moderately damaged (The British Guardian, July 15, 2024).
• The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that al-Mamdani Hospital (al-Ahli) and al-Khidma al-‘Aama Hospital in Gaza City partially renewed their activities on July 11, 2024 after they had been forced to temporarily suspend them because of evacuation orders issued by the IDF on July 7 and 8, 2024. Therefore Kamal Adwan Hospital and the Indonesian Hospital in northern Gaza continued to admit a large number of patients while dealing with severe shortages of fuel, beds and necessary medical supplies (OCHA website, July 12, 2024).
• The spokeswoman for the United States Department of Defense reported that the conditions of the sea prevented the reinstallation of the American Army’s floating pier on the Gaza coast, and that the field command had not yet decided if and when to reposition it. She added that the shipments of humanitarian aid in Cyprus and destined for the Gaza Strip would be transferred to the floating pier if it were reinstalled, or would arrive at the port of Ashdod and from there be transported by trucks (United States Department of Defense website, July 15, 2024).
• On July 15, 2024, the UAE announced that a memorandum of understanding had been signed with the Khan Yunis municipality to repair water pipes and carry out emergency maintenance of the water system in various areas of the city. According to the UAE announcement, it will provide funding which will enable the reactivation of the city’s wells and reservoirs, after 70% of the water system was destroyed in the war (UAE news agency, July 15, 2024).

Haniyeh speaks to the new Iranian president-elect

• On July 14, 2024, Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, spoke with Masoud Pezeshkian, the president-elect of Iran. They discussed the latest developments in the war in the Gaza Strip, and Haniyeh claimed that the “massacres” in the Gaza Strip had been carried out despite Hamas’ “positive position” in the negotiations. He accused Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu of imposing new conditions, which showed he did not want to reach an agreement. Pezeshkian condemned the Israeli attack on the Khan Yunis area and said “Iran will not leave the Palestinian people alone under such circumstances” (Hamas Telegram channel, July 14, 2024).

Argentina designates Hamas as a terrorist organization

• On July 13, 2024, the Argentine government announced the inclusion of Hamas in the Ministry of Justice list of terrorist organizations and ordered the freezing of the movement’s financial assets. President Javier Milei cited Hamas’ responsibility for the attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 and its ties to Iran as factors which justified the decision (Clarin, July 13, 2024). Hamas condemned the decision and stated that it was a clear attempt to “justify the [alleged] crime of genocide and ethnic cleansing” in the Gaza Strip. Hamas said in a statement that the designation was “an unjust and wrong decision,” and called on the Argentine government to reverse it (Hamas Telegram channel, July 14, 2024).

Mutual recriminations following the attempted killing of Muhammad Deif

• After the Israeli Air Force attack on Muhammad Deif and Rafe’ Salama in Khan Yunis, senior figures in the PA and Fatah accused Hamas of being responsible for killing Palestinian civilians because of the continuation of the war and Hamas figures hiding within the civilian population:
  • Senior Fatah figure Munir al-Jaghoub accused Israel of committing war crimes, but added that it was “Hamas leaders hiding among civilians” that caused Israel to carry out the [alleged] “massacre.” He said “the citizens of Gaza must be protected from being killed, and senior Hamas figures must not be hidden among them” (al-Hadath, July 13, 2024).
  • Mahmoud Abbas said in a statement that the PA considered Hamas a partner in the legal, moral and political responsibility for the continuation of the Israeli “genocidal” war in the Gaza Strip, because of its “evading national unity and providing the occupation with justification.” The statement also included a call to Hamas to give priority to national interests and to stop the “justifications it gave the occupation “in order to stop the “massacre” of the Palestinians (Wafa, July 13, 2024).
  • Mahmoud Abbas’ advisor Mahmoud al-Habash accused the Hamas leadership of “not caring about the victims of the attack.” He added that the Hamas leadership put its interests before the security and well-being of the Palestinian people, and that it was “miserable and committing the crime of treason against loyalty and responsibility.” Al-Habash also said that “dozens of Palestinians are killed every day in exchange for a faction’s political achievement ” (al-Arabiya, July 15, 2024).
• Munir al-Jaghoub’s accusations provoked harsh criticism from Hamas. Hamas spokesman Jihad Taha claimed the accusations promoted the “false narratives of the occupation” and that a senior Fatah figure had provided the occupation with a “free service” and had dealt a blow to “national and moral principles.” He called on Fatah to condemn such “unpatriotic” statements (Hamas Telegram channel, July 13, 2024). The Hamas government information office called al-Jaghoub’s statement “shameful and unacceptable” and called on him to “condemn the massacres and apologize to the Palestinian people” (Quds Agency Telegram account, July 13, 2024).

The internal Palestinian dialogue

• “Senior sources” in Hamas and Fatah said that senior figures of both movements would hold reconciliation talks in China in the week starting July 20, 2024. According to reports, the Hamas delegation will be headed by Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, and the Fatah delegation by Mahmoud al-‘Alul, the movement’s deputy chairman. Azzam al-Ahmed, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, said that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was expected to meet with the two delegations on July 21 and 23, and the delegations would also hold separate bilateral meetings (The New York Times , July 15, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

Vehicle ramming attack at the Nir Zvi Junction

• On July 14, 2024, a terrorist from east Jerusalem carried out a double vehicle ramming attack at the Nir Zvi Junction, near the Tzrifin camp. He rammed into a group of people at a bus stop, and then drove to another bus stop and repeated the attack. Four soldiers were injured, one of them critically. Border Police fighters present at the scene shot and killed him. According to reports, he was Muhammad Shehab, 27 years old, from Kafr ‘Aqab in east Jerusalem, who held an Israeli ID card (Israel Police Force X account and Israeli media, July 14, 2024). The Mujahideen Brigades claimed “full responsibility” for the attack. According to reports, Muhammad Shehab lived in Kfar ‘Aqab and was part of the Dahem Unit, which consists of terrorist operatives living inside Israel. It was also reported that “the action is part of the natural response to the massacres and the crimes of the enemy everywhere, especially in the Gaza Strip” (Mujahideen Brigades Telegram channel, July 14, 2024). Hamas praised the attack and called it “a natural response to the brutal war of extermination, the horrific massacres being carried out against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the campaigns of harassment, oppression and terrorism” in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. Hamas also called on young people in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem to “continue on the path of victory” (Hamas Telegram channel, July 14, 2024). The PIJ also welcomed the attack and stated that “it is a natural response to the ongoing crime against our people” (PIJ Telegram channel, July 14, 2024).

Shooting in Samaria

• On the morning of July 16, 2024, Palestinians opened fire on an Israeli vehicle near the Ramin Junction, west of Shavei Shomron, wounding three Israeli civilians. IDF forces initiated a pursuit of the attackers (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 16, 2024). Hamas praised the terrorists and called the attack a “natural response to [Israel’s] brutal crimes and massacres.” Hamas also called on the residents of Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem to continue “on the path of resistance” (Hamas Telegram channel, July 16, 2024).

Attempted stabbing at the Cave of the Patriarchs

•  On July 14, 2024, the Israeli security forces detained a Palestinian woman armed with a knife at the entrance to the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron. She came with her two children and refused the demand to search her bag; a search was conducted and revealed a knife hidden inside a shirt. The 37-year-old suspect was detained with one of her sons, and admitted she was married to a Hamas operative who is in an Israeli prison and that she planned to stab a specific Israeli security guard at the Cave of the Patriarchs (Account X of the Israel Police, July 14, 2024).

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024^[3]

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 4,150 wanted Palestinians have been detained, of whom more than 1,750 are Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson, July 9-16, 2024):
  • On the night of July 15, 2024, the Israeli security forces operated in al-Bireh, during which a terrorist operative armed with a knife stabbed a Border Police fighter in the arm. The terrorist, a 19 year-old from Gaza, was shot and killed (Israel Police, July 16, 2024). Palestinian media reported he was Ahmed Ramzi Abd Sultan, 20 years old, shot in al-Balu’ Square, in the northern part of al-Bireh, during a clash with Israeli forces. He was reportedly from Gaza with no relatives in the Ramallah area (Wafa, July 16, 2024; Telegram account of journalist Yassin Qudih, July 16, 2024).
  • Operating in Judea and Samaria on July 10, 2024, the Israeli security forces seized more than 150 sacks of materials for the manufacture IEDs, and six shop owners who sold the materials were detained (IDF spokesperson, July 10, 2024). According to reports, the forces raided a nursery in the town of Surda in the Ramallah region, seized fertilizer and agricultural materials and detained the owner. In Tulkarm, the forces raided a store selling agricultural materials and fertilizer in the suburb of Dhinnaba. They also raided two shops for the sale of agricultural materials at the Atil-Ilar Junction north of Tulkarm, confiscating fertilizer and detaining their owners. In Salfit, they seized fertilizer and agricultural materials in a store in the west of the city and detained the owner. In the town of Bidu, northwest of Jerusalem, the forces raided the veterinary and agricultural center and seized fertilizer. In the Ain al-Sultan camp in Jericho, the security forces raided a shop selling agricultural materials. They pasted notices on the stores and nurseries warning farmers and merchants not to use or sell “illegal” fertilizer (Wafa, July 10, 2024; al-Araby al-Jadeed, July 10, 2024).
  • On July 9, 2024, the Israeli security forces finished a 15-hour operational activity in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm. They destroyed dozens of IEDs planted in the streets and two operations rooms used by local terrorist organizations. A wanted Palestinian was detained and a vehicle in which IEDs were found was destroyed (IDF spokesperson, July 9, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, claimed operatives of its Tulkarm Battalion had exchanged fire with IDF forces as part of a “deadly mirage” battle, during which they attacked the forces looking for IEDs planted by the battalion’s operatives. The PIJ said the soldiers had come to kill the battalion’s operatives but having failed, they destroyed houses, property and roads in an attempt to exact a price for supporting the “resistance” (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel,  July 9, 2024).

   
Israeli security forces in the Nur Shams refugee camp (Right: IDF spokesperson, July 9, 2024. Left: Quds Agency, July 9, 2024)

Activities of the Palestinian security forces

• “Exclusive” Palestinian sources reported that the “resistance activists” in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus rejected the proposal of Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, to integrate into the Palestinian security forces and receive a monthly salary in exchange for handing over their weapons and stopping their activities in the camp. According to the sources, Mustafa hinted that Israel intended to launch a military operation in the camp, similar to the activity in other refugee camps in Judea and Samaria (al-Araby al-Jadeed, July 14, 2024). Mustafa’s office denied the report and said that he had not met with anyone or discussed such issues. According to reports, he feels the refugee camps are very important and in all his visits to the camps and meetings with residents he emphasizes the support of their “firm stance” (PA prime minister’s office Facebook page, July 14, 2024).
• According to reports, on July 14, 2024, the PA security forces operating in the Jenin refugee camp detained Mahmoud al-Aboushi, who is wanted by Israel for terrorist activities, and Abdallah al-Hajj Ahmed, who accompanied him. In response, “resistance operatives” shot at the PA security force headquarters in Jenin (al-Shahed website, July 14, 2024; QudsN X account, July 14, 2024).
• According to reports, on July 13, 2024, the PA security forces pursued two wanted operatives from the Jerusalem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion. One of the operatives was wounded and went with a friend to Ibn Sina Hospital, where they exchanged fire with the PA security force operatives, killing a Palestinian passerby. The PA security force operatives searched the hospital but were unable to detain the two wanted Palestinians. A source in the security forces in Jenin said that two young men hospitalized with gunshot wounds were in stable condition after an exchange of fire resulting from “a conflict.” According to the source, the security forces received information that “people” were planning to kill them, and therefore large forces immediately went to hospital to keep the situation from deteriorating and to detain those involved (Ma’an, July 13, 2024; Hurriya News, July 13, 2024).

The British foreign minister visits the PA

• On July 14, 2024, Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, met in Ramallah with David Lammy, the new British foreign minister. Mustafa said that efforts to stop the [alleged] “war of extermination” of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip should be promoted and the delivery of humanitarian aid should be increased, along with the cessation of “occupation and settler” attacks and the expansion of settlements in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. He said the PA had not left the Gaza Strip and would do everything in its power to help the Palestinian residents. Lammy noted his country’s commitment to the two-state solution and to investing efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement (Wafa, July 14, 2024).
• Lammy also met with Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the PLO’s Executive Committee; Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas; Majdi al-Khaldi, diplomatic advisor to Mahmoud Abbas; and Farsin Shaheen, the foreign minister. Hussein al-Sheikh called for action to stop the “aggression” against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and to restore PA control over the Gaza Strip. He also called on the new British government to recognize a Palestinian state (Wafa, July 14, 2024).

Mustafa meets with American assistant secretary of state

•  On July 13, 2024, Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, met with Barbara Leaf, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs. They discussed the latest regional developments, and efforts to end the war in the Gaza Strip and increase the amount humanitarian aid delivered to the Gaza Strip. Mustafa claimed that since its establishment the PA had provided the Gaza Strip with all basic services, including health, education, water and electricity [sic], and was therefore the only legitimate body capable of managing the Gaza Strip, “which is an integral part of the Palestinian state.” He added that it was not possible to discuss a transition period without a political and security solution, because it would be a “waste of time and effort” (Wafa, July 13, 2024).

Mustafa visits Nablus

• On July 13, 2024, Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, visited Nablus and the Balata refugee camp, accompanied by a number of government ministers and Mahmoud al-‘Alul, the deputy chairman of the Fatah Movement. Mustafa said times were very difficult, but added they hoped the coming days would be “better.” He said the PA was working to achieve “all of our legitimate goals for ending the occupation and establishing our own independent state” (Wafa,  July 13, 2024).

Restoring the Nur Shams refugee camp

• Nihad al-Shawish, head of the popular committee for services in the Nur Shams refugee camp, said that in accordance with orders from Mahmoud Abbas and Muhammad Mustafa, the committee’s teams were working to “bring life back” to the refugee camp by restoring sewage, water, electricity and roads. He said the committee would rent 300 houses for a period of three months to residents whose houses had been completely demolished and were unfit for habitation. He also claimed that 70 to 80 houses had been demolished during the Israeli security forces’ most recent operation in the camp, and that 1,600 houses had been partially damaged as a result of the repeated actions of the security forces in the refugee camp (al-Fajar TV, July 10, 2024)