Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (December 3 – 10 , 2024)

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip

• This past week, IDF operations continued in the northern Gaza Strip, the Rafah area in the southern Strip and in the Netzarim Corridor in the central Strip. IDF forces attacked dozens of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operatives from the air and on the ground, including operatives who participated in the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre. The forces located and destroyed large quantities of weapons and various terrorist facilities. Three IDF soldiers were killed in fighting in the northern Strip and an IDF officer was killed in fighting in the southern Strip (IDF spokesperson, December 3-10, 2024).
• The northern Gaza Strip: IDF operations continued in the Jebalya refugee camp and Beit Lahia. The forces attacked terrorist operatives from the air and on the ground, located and destroyed terrorist facilities and seized weapons. They exposed and destroyed a tunnel which had living quarters and rocket launchers, and located an explosives laboratory inside a residential home (IDF spokesperson, December 3 to 10, 2024).

   
Right: Weapons laboratory inside a residential home in Jebalya (IDF spokesperson, December 4, 2024). Left: The tunnel exposed in Jebalya (IDF spokesperson, December 8, 2024)

• According to claims, on December 4, 2024, IDF forces surrounded the Abu Tamam School in Beit Lahia, which was a refuge for displaced persons, and [allegedly] used “coercion and threats” to force them to leave the area. According to eyewitnesses, “thousands” of displaced persons evacuated the site under the threat of Israeli bombings (al-Jazeera, December 4, 2024; Anadolu Agency, December 5, 2024). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that over 5,500 people had been displaced from the northern Gaza Strip to Gaza City on December 4, 2024, after Israeli forces surrounded schools and nearby homes in Beit Lahia. According to the agency, about 8,000 people have been displaced from the northern Gaza Strip to Gaza City since November 28, 2024 (UN News in Arabic, December 6, 2024).
• Husam Abu Safia, director of the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahia, claimed there had been many casualties, including four medical staff deaths, after IDF forces allegedly attacked the hospital and ordered all patients, residents and staff to evacuate to the hospital courtyard (Sunud Agency Telegram channel, December 6, 2024). Hamas condemned the “military invasion” of the hospital and called on the World Health Organization and international institutions to investigate the [alleged] “crimes” and take action to stop them (Hamas Telegram channel, December 6, 2024).
• According to reports, most residents of the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in southern Gaza City were displaced to neighborhoods in central Gaza City, following the activities of IDF forces in al-Zeitoun, which have been ongoing for more than 100 days. According to the report, al-Zeitoun is subjected to daily artillery shelling and “intense bombings,” with IDF forces from the adjacent Netzarim Corridor on the southern side of the neighborhood demolishing residential complexes which are still standing in the northern part of the neighborhood (al-Ayyam, December 8, 2024).
• The central Gaza Strip: According to reports, on December 4, 2024, an IDF special unit detained two brothers from the Abu Huwaishal clan near the al-Salam flour mill east of Deir al-Balah. One was a released prisoner and an officer in Hamas’ internal security force. Following the detentions, the unit withdrew from the area under air cover (Telegram channel of journalist Safinaz al-Louh, Gaza, December 4, 2024).
• The southern Gaza Strip: On December 4, 2024, an airstrike targeted senior Hamas operatives operating in the humanitarian zone in Khan Yunis. Secondary explosions were observed after the strike, indicating the presence of weapons (IDF spokesperson, December 4, 2024). Palestinian media reported more than 20 fatalities in the strike (Quds News Agency, December 4, 2024).

The elimination of senior terrorist operatives

• IDF forces continued targeting senior terrorist operatives in the Gaza Strip, including those involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre:
  • On December 3, 2024, Nidal al-Najjar, head of Hamas’ aerial array in Gaza City and responsible for Hamas’ aerial defense system in Gaza, was eliminated. He was one of the planners of the airborne raid on Israel on October 7, 2023, and a leader in offensive activities against Israel and IDF forces in Gaza, including explosive drone and UAV attacks (IDF spokesperson, December 6, 2024).
  • On December 5, 2024, Israeli Air Force fighter jets eliminated several Hamas operatives in the humanitarian zone in Khan Yunis. Among the dead was Osama Ghanem, a senior operative in Hamas’ internal security force. Reportedly, he was involved in the violent interrogations of Gaza residents, severe human rights violations, suppression of Hamas opponents and persecution of the LGBTQ community in Gaza (IDF spokesperson, December 5, 2024).
  • On December 6, 2024, Israeli Air Force fighter jets eliminated several senior Hamas operatives of Hamas’ al-Shati Battalion, including Majdi Aqilan, deputy commander of the battalion and one of the commanders of the massacre at Kibbutz Nahal Oz on October 7, 2023. Also killed in the strike were Mamdouh Muhanna, a senior figure in the tunnel unit of Hamas’ Gaza Brigade who participated in the raid on Kibbutz Nahal Oz on October 7, 2023, and Ahmed Suwidan, a company commander in the al-Shati Battalion who participated in the kidnapping of Israeli civilians and their transfer to Gaza during the Hamas attack (IDF spokesperson, December 6, 2024).
  • On December 8, 2024, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) announced the deaths of Jihad Zakariya Shahada, in charge of the organization’s “military intelligence portfolio” and a member of the AAMB military council, who was killed in an IDF strike in northern Gaza; and Saleh Muhammad Razeq, a field commander in the Northern Gaza Brigade, who was killed while carrying out a “jihad mission” in the northern Gaza Strip (AAMB Telegram channel, December 8, 2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• On the evening of December 3, 2024, a rocket fired from the northern Gaza Strip was intercepted in the western Negev (IDF spokesperson, December 3, 2024).

• This past week, there were reports of progress in negotiations for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip War and the partial release of hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners:
  • According to “Palestinian sources,” Hamas is gathering data on the number of Israeli hostages still alive as part of preparations for a prisoner exchange deal. Efforts are also being made to locate the bodies of hostages allegedly killed in Israeli strikes, with Hamas claiming the need for a ceasefire to facilitate the search. Other “sources” claimed that Hamas was primarily holding Israeli soldiers and officers, whose release depended on the various criteria for the release of Palestinian prisoners serving long sentences (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 6, 2024). A “Hamas figure” said that if IDF forces did not withdraw and if free movement between the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip was not established, it would be difficult to reach all the groups holding hostages to collect information about them. He said that if Israel wanted to free the hostages, the solution was a serious and fair exchange deal and an end to the war, not continued aggression (Agence France-Presse, December 8, 2024).
  • Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the prime minister and foreign minister of Qatar, confirmed that Qatar had resumed its role as a mediator, after identifying “new momentum” following Trump’s election as United States president (al-Jazeera, December 7, 2024).
  • According to a “senior Hamas figure,” the movement held several meetings with senior Qatari and Turkish officials regarding the negotiations (al-Araby al-Jadeed, December 8, 2024). Hamas also reported that a delegation led by Khalil al-Haya, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, had left Cairo after meeting with Hassan Mahmoud Rashad, head of Egyptian General Intelligence (Hamas Telegram channel, December 8, 2024).
  • An “authorized source” reported that the negotiations had reached an advanced stage, showing “unprecedented seriousness” from the involved parties. According to the report, the discussions focused on exchanging the names of prisoners to be included in the deal under the mediation and supervision of Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the United States. It was also reported that the Hamas delegation visiting Cairo submitted a list of elderly and sick Israeli “prisoners” to be included in the exchange deal, along with four Israeli hostages with American citizenship, despite not meeting the “initial release conditions.” It was also reported that Hamas had agreed to a 60-day transitional period during which food, medicine and fuel would be delivered (al-Araby al-Jadeed, December 9, 2024).
  • A “source familiar with the details” stated that the first phase of the deal would include the release of elderly, sick and female hostages. However, the names of the Palestinian prisoners to be released have not yet been submitted. According to the “source,” the second phase, in which soldiers and officers would be released, had not yet been discussed, as the first phase has not been fully agreed upon, and Hamas wants to monitor Israel’s seriousness and American credibility. The “source” reiterated Hamas’ refusal to compromise on its main demands: a full ceasefire, withdrawal from Gaza, reconstruction of the Strip and the entry of aid, while Israel sought to narrow the discussion to the issue of prisoners only (Telegram channel of journalist Mahmoud al-Louh, Gaza, December 10, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported that since the beginning of the war, 44,786 Palestinians had been killed and 106,188 injured (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, December 10, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• On December 5, 2024, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) released humanitarian aid data for November 2024. According to the data, 53,916 tons of aid were delivered in 2,323 trucks, an increase compared to 33,844 tons in 1,789 trucks in October 2024. It was reported noted that 65% of the aid was food and the remained included medical supplies, equipment for sheltered individuals, fuel and cooking gas (COGAT X account, December 5, 2024).
• On December 5, 2024, the World Central Kitchen announced that it had resumed its operations in the southern and central Gaza Strip (World Central Kitchen website, December 5, 2024). The organization had halted its activities on November 30, 2024, after the IDF targeted a vehicle belonging to the organization, one of whose passengers was a World Central Kitchen employee who was a Hamas terrorist operative and had participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre.
• According to reports, the World Central Kitchen dismissed 62 of its employees in the Gaza Strip after the organization submitted its full employee list for an Israeli security review, and the individuals were identified as security risks. The organization stated that anyone designated by Israel as a security risk was considered a danger not only to themselves but to the entire team (Sawa Agency, December 9, 2024; Bloomberg Agency, December 10, 2024).

Journalist arrested on suspicion of espionage

• On December 6, 2024, a Hamas security force “officer” reported that a displaced person from the southern Gaza Strip, who had previously worked as a journalist for a local news agency, was arrested on suspicion of spying for Israel. According to the officer, the alleged spy exploited his position as a journalist to gather information and interrogate civilians, which had led to targeted actions, particularly in schools used as shelters. According to claims, the suspect sent photographs of people and locations to his handlers before the attacks. Hamas’ security force praised the civilian who reported the suspect and called on the public to immediately report any suspicious activity (Shehab, December 6, 2024).

Social network influencer who criticized Hamas dies

• According to reports, Hamas operatives killed Ziad Abu Haya, a Gaza-based social media influencer who, in September 2024, published a video criticizing Hamas.^[2] According to the report, he was killed while in a tent where he lived with his family in Khan Yunis (al-Arabiya, December 6, 2024).
• Another report suggested that Abu Haya was killed by his Hamas-affiliated cousin. However, it remains unclear whether the killing was prompted by political motives or a family dispute. “Sources” within Hamas claimed there were no directives to kill Abu Haya or any other individual opposing the movement, stating that orders were only given to kill collaborators with Israel whose investigations had conclusively proven their involvement in the killing of Palestinians (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 6, 2024).
• The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB), Fatah’s military wing, sent its condolences on the death of “commander” Ziad Abu Haya, claiming he was killed by IDF fire in Bani Suheila, east of Khan Yunis (al-Jazeera, December 6, 2024). An announcement regarding Abu Haya’s death “by treacherous bullets” was also posted to the AAMB Telegram channel but was later deleted.

Sahem Unit activities

• On December 7, 2024, operatives from the Sahem Unit of the Hamas ministry of the interior reported that they had killed at least 15 “dangerous lawbreakers” in an ambush in eastern Rafah. The Unit said thieves would be eliminated with “an iron fist and determination” (Sahem Unit Telegram channel, December 7, 2024).
• On December 8, 2024, the Sahem Unit called on the public to prevent the exploitation of beef intended for distribution to victims and displaced persons which was being sold in markets at inflated prices. The Unit urged action against traders exploiting the situation by confiscating the meat and distributing it to victims for free. It was also reported that the price of beef in the market had reached 85 shekels a kilo (about $12 a pound), with a recommendation to set a maximum price of 15 shekels a kilo (about $2 a pound) (Sahem Unit Telegram channel, December 8, 2024).

• On December 6, 2024, a Hamas delegation led by Muhammad Darwish, head of the Hamas Shura Council and Leadership Council, met in Doha with Hakan Fidan, the Turkish foreign minister, and Ibrahim Kalin, the Turkish minister of intelligence. They discussed the war in the Gaza Strip, the humanitarian crisis in northern Gaza and efforts for a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange deal. According to reports, the parties emphasized Turkey’s support for the Palestinian cause and efforts to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people (Hamas Telegram channel, December 6, 2024).

• On December 6, 2024, a Hamas delegation led by Musa Abu Marzouq met in Qatar with Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian deputy foreign minister. They discussed [alleged] “Israeli crimes” in the Gaza Strip, including genocide and forced displacement, and explored ways to achieve a permanent ceasefire. According to reports, they discussed the importance of national unity, the issue of Palestinian prisoners and the need for international action to stop [alleged] “Israeli violations.” Bogdanov reiterated Russia’s support for Palestinian rights and called for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip (Hamas website, December 6, 2024).
• On December 7, 2024, a Hamas delegation led by Muhammad Darwish met in Qatar with Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister. They discussed the war in the Gaza Strip and its regional and international implications and consequences. According to reports, senior Hamas figures reiterated tales of the extensive destruction and suffering inflicted on the Palestinian people and the movement’s commitment to agreements which would end the war and support the Palestinians. The Iranian foreign minister expressed support for the Palestinian struggle, praised their steadfast “resistance,” and reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to continue assisting the Palestinian people in their fight against the “occupation” (Hamas website, December 7, 2024).

• Hamas and Fatah continue to disagree over the establishment of a “community support committee” to manage the Gaza Strip after the war, despite reports on December 2, 2024, of a preliminary agreement during talks in Egypt. Hamas has expressed support for the committee while Fatah opposes it, arguing that it would create a division between Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, has yet to sign the decree for establishing the committee:
  • Senior Hamas figure Mahmoud Mardawi, who participated in the Cairo talks, stated that the movement approved the text for the formation of an expert committee to manage the Gaza Strip, as drafted by Egyptian officials based on agreements between Hamas and Fatah, and that Hamas was waiting for Abbas’ response (al-Quds al-Arabi, December 4, 2024). Suheil al-Hindi, a member of the Hamas political bureau, called the discussions with Fatah “positive” and said that Gaza’s management should be a Palestinian responsibility, regardless of Hamas participation (Hamas’ al-Aqsa TV, December 7, 2024).
  • Jibril Rajoub, secretary of Fatah’s Central Committee, opposed the formation of the committee, claiming it would perpetuate the division between Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and the Palestinian government should assume control over Gaza. He stressed the need to preserve three fundamental principles: the unity of the Palestinian political system, the unity of services for the Palestinian people and the unity of the “struggle,” stating that “it would be a mistake to discuss anything besides those principles” (al-Quds al-Arabi, December 3, 2024).
  • The PLO Executive Committee discussed the Egyptian proposal for forming the “community support committee” but did not take a clear stand. A “Palestinian figure” said that discussing the formation of committees was unnecessary, since a Palestinian government was capable of performing all required tasks, including in Gaza, adding that the concern was that the committee would perpetuate Palestinian division (al-Ayyam, December 5, 2024).
  • On December 7, 2024, the PLO Executive Committee held another meeting to discuss the formation of a “community support committee.” A “source” in the Executive Committee reported that most members did not support the proposal because the committee would be administratively subordinate to the current government led by Muhammad Mustafa, and it would be better for the government itself to be directly responsible for Gaza. They also proposed a government reorganization, provided that the unity of governance for Judea, Samaria and Gaza was maintained within a vision for a comprehensive solution. However, according to reports, the Executive Committee did not definitively reject the proposal (QudsN, December 7, 2024).
  • Senior Fatah figure Abdallah Abdallah reported that after discussion the movement had decided to reject the proposal to establish the committee and had officially informed Egypt of its opposition, claiming that the proposal would perpetuate the division between the two parts of the “homeland” (SND website, December 8, 2024). Ramzi Rabah, a PLO Executive Committee member from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), stated that the committee had held a meeting, which he himself did not attend, where members voted against the committee’s formation (alresala.net, December 8, 2024).
  • Given Fatah’s opposition, it was reported that senior officials in Egyptian General Intelligence were increasing their efforts to persuade Abbas and other senior Fatah figures to agree to the Egyptian initiative for forming the “community support committee” (al-Araby al-Jadeed, December 9, 2024).
  • Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, said Fatah’s opposition to the agreement disappointed him. He claimed that Fatah was trying to impose the government of Muhammad Mustafa, which he argued was not acceptable to “Palestine” or the international arena. He added that Hamas was working to reach an agreement with Fatah and other Palestinian “factions,” according to which “the day after” would be distinctly Palestinian (alresala.net, December 9, 2024; al-Aqsa TV Telegram, December 9, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

Vehicle ramming

• On December 7, 2024, there was a vehicle ramming at the al-Fawwar Junction near Hebron. An IDF soldier was seriously injured and an Israeli civilian was superficially wounded. IDF forces initiated a pursuit of the terrorist, who had fled the scene, and imposed a closure on the city of Hebron. Several hours later the terrorist was detained; he came from the town of Dura (IDF spokesperson and Israel Police X account, December 7, 2024). Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) praised the attack and called for such attacks to escalate (Hamas in Judea and Samaria and PIJ Telegram channels, December 7, 2024).

Stabbing prevented

• On December 7, 2024, a Palestinian attacked IDF forces at the Qalandiya Crossing by shooting fireworks at them; the forces shot and killed him. A knife and an ISIS shirt were found on his body (Israel Police Force spokesperson’s unit, December 7, 2024). The terrorist was Tareq Amjad Musa Ghazauneh, 27 years old, from the town of al-Ram (PA Jerusalem District Facebook page, December 7, 2024; Palestine Breaking News 24 Telegram channel, December 7, 2024).

   
The terrorist’s shirt, with an ISIS patch, and his knife
(Israel Police Force X account in Arabic, December 7, 2024)

Counterterrorism activities

• The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining wanted Palestinians and those suspected of terrorist activities, and locating weapons and funds for funding terrorist activities:
  • On December 4, 2024, Israeli security forces detained Ayman Ghanam at a hospital in Nablus. He was involved in the shooting attack at the Mehola Junction in August 2024 in which an Israeli civilian was killed, and he led a terrorist squad planning an imminent attack. The IDF emphasized that the detention had been carried out while ensuring the safety of the hospital’s patients and staff. It was also reported that on October 9, 2024, Israeli security forces eliminated Abd al-Raouf Masri, who also participated in the Mehola Junction attack (IDF spokesperson, December 4, 2024).
  • On December 6, 2024, the Jerusalem Brigades, PIJ’s military wing, announced the death of Mustafa Mashe, an operative from the Jerusalem Brigades’ Balata Battalion, who was killed in a clash with IDF forces in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus (Jerusalem Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, December 6, 2024).

• • On December 9, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft eliminated two armed terrorists in Tubas during an Israeli security force operation to detain a wanted terrorist and dismantle terrorist facilities. The deceased were found to be in possession of a rifle, two pistols and a fragmentation grenade (IDF spokesperson, December 9, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing stated that the deceased were operatives in the Tubas Battalion (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, December 9, 2024).

Involvement of Israeli Arabs in terrorist activity

• According to reports, on December 7, 2024, Ahmed Wadi, 25 years old, from the northern Israeli city of Shfaram, was detained on suspicion of security crimes. Investigation revealed that he had been in contact with a terrorist operative from the Nur al-Shams Battalion in Tulkarm and discussed his intention to attack the Shfaram police station to avenge the deaths of members of his family. The investigation also revealed he was involved in weapons trafficking, purchasing arms from the PA territories and selling them in Israel for significant profits. Documentation from 2019 was found showing him holding and firing a weapon in the Tulkarm refugee camp (Israel Police Force and Shin Bet spokespersons, December 7, 2024).

Activities of the Palestinian security forces

• This past week clashes between PA security forces and armed “resistance operatives” escalated. The confrontations focused on Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp, involving exchanges of gunfire, explosive devices and car bombs (al-Araby al-Jadeed, Wafa, Wattan and the Quds News Agency, December 5 to 10, 2024):

  • On December 5, 2024, shots were fired at PA security force headquarters in Jenin, while two PA vehicles were stolen by armed “resistance operatives” in Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp. Following the incident, the PA security forces besieged the Jenin refugee camp and clashed with “resistance operatives,” including in the area of the Muqata’a (the administrative center). According to reports, a security operative was injured during the exchanges of fire.

• • On December 9, 2024, after a meeting of security force commanders and senior PA figures in Jenin, the deployment of security forces to the Jenin refugee camp was reinforced. Armored vehicles were brought in and snipers were positioned on rooftops. “Resistance operatives” attacked with explosive devices and exchanged fire with PA security forces. “Palestinian sources” reported that as a result of the clashes, the Jenin government hospital ceased operations and doctors refused to come to work.
  • According to reports, on December 9, 2024, Ribhi Muhammad Ribhi al-Shalabi, 19 years old, died after having been injured during the clashes while working as a delivery boy on a motorcycle near the Jenin camp. Initially, Brigadier General Anwar Rajab, the official PA security force spokesman, blamed “lawbreakers” for the incident and noted that another young man had been injured. However, after videos showed that the shots fired at al-Shalabi had come from a Palestinian security force jeep, Rajab said the matter would be investigated. Hamas expressed sorrow over al-Shalabi’s death and warned that the security forces’ policies jeopardized internal unity.
  • On the night of December 9, 2024, “resistance operatives” reportedly fired at the Muqata’a and the police station in Tulkarm and detonated explosive devices. Roads were reportedly blocked in Nablus and the al-Faraa refugee camp.
  • On December 10, 2024, residents of Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp were called upon to participate in a general strike and focus on nonviolent demonstrations to stop the bloodshed. School administrators were instructed to transition to online learning. In addition, residents in Judea and Samaria were urged to participate in demonstrations supporting Jenin, with the situation on the ground described as “active warfare” (Jenin Refugee Camp 24 Hours’ Telegram channel, December 10, 2024).

International activity

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, held his first conversation with Kaja Kallas, the EU’s new foreign minister. He reiterated the need to unify international efforts toward achieving a two-state solution and establishing a Palestinian state. He noted the importance of the international community’s implementing UN resolutions as the foundation for a just and sustainable solution. He also stressed the need to halt the “aggression,” provide humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and, in coordination with the international community, create suitable conditions for its reconstruction after the war (Wafa, December 5, 2024).