Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (April 9-16, 2024)

IDF activities in the Gaza Strip

• The activity of IDF forces in the Gaza Strip continued, focusing on attacking terrorist targets and rocket launchers with airstrikes and tank fire, with targeted attacks in the central Gaza Strip and eastern Gaza City (IDF spokesperson, April 10-15, 2024). The Palestinian media continued detailed reporting of IDF attacks while emphasizing casualties and damage (Wafa YouTube channel, April 10, 14, 2024).

     
Right: Israeli Air Force strikes in Jebalya (Wafa YouTube channel, April 13, 2024). Left: Israeli Air Force strikes in west Khan Yuni (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, April 10, 2024)

•   The central Gaza Strip: On the night of April 10, 2024, with aerial assistance, the IDF began a targeted ground operation in the central Gaza Strip, with an emphasis on al-Nuseirat refugee camp. The operation began after intelligence was received of the presence of large numbers of terrorist operatives and equipment in the area. The forces searched buildings where terrorist facilities and launchers were located and conducted face-to-face battles with terrorists (IDF spokesperson, April 11, 2024). The IDF forces entered the Ibrahim al-Maqadmeh school, where they found a combat simulator and an observation post, as well as heavy IEDs ready for detonation in classrooms and the schoolyard (IDF website, April 12, 2024).

• An al-Jazeera correspondent in Rafah reported massive IDF attacks in the al-Nuseirat area and exchanges of fire between IDF forces and “resistance [terrorist] operatives” (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, April 11, 2024).

    
Right: An al-Jazeera TV presenter explains the IDF’s activities in the central Gaza Strip (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, April 10, 2024). Left: Israeli Air Force strikes in the refugee camp

• The Sheja’iya neighborhood: IDF forces carried out a targeted operation in the al-Sheja’iya neighborhood, in the east of Gaza City, raiding a Hamas training complex. After the forces withdrew the Air Force destroyed the site (IDF spokesperson, April 11,2024).

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip

• During the past week several rockets were launched from the Gaza Strip at the cities, towns and villages surrounding Gaza. No injuries or damage were reported:
  • On the night of April 12, 2024, rockets were fired at Sderot, Ivim and Nir Am (Israeli media, April 13, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ military-terrorist wing, claimed its operatives had launched a barrage of rockets in cooperation with the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades, the Shaheed Omar al-Qassem forces (Paltoday Telegram channel, April 13, 2024). In response, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked terrorist targets, including three rocket launchers with 20 rockets prepared for firing at the center of the country (Israeli media, April 13, 2024).
  • On April 10, 2024, four rockets were fired from the center of the Gaza Strip at the cities, towns and villages surrounding Gaza; they fell inside the Gaza Strip (Israeli media, April 10, 2024).

The hostages and a ceasefire agreement

• On April 13, 2024, Hamas announced that it had given the mediators in Egypt and Qatar its answer to the proposal it received on April 8. Hamas reiterated its demands for a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of the IDF from the entire Gaza Strip, the return of the Gazans to their previous places of residence, an increase in the rate of aid deliveries and the beginning of the reconstruction of the Strip. Hamas also claimed it was willing to conclude a “serious and genuine” exchange deal (the Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, April 13, 2024).
• “Sources” gave the al-Jazeera network the details of Hamas’ response to the mediators: Hamas adhered to its demand for a ceasefire in three six-week installments, conditioning the agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces beyond the border fence. Hamas also demanded freedom of movement in the northern Gaza Strip and the return of the displaced persons, and in the second phase of the agreement a permanent ceasefire before the beginning of the return of the hostages. According to al-Jazeera, Hamas demanded that in the second phase all Israeli forces leave the Strip. Regarding the hostage deal, Hamas proposed that for every “civilian hostage” 30 Palestinian prisoners would be released and that for every female soldier 50 Palestinian prisoners would be released, including 30 prisoners serving life sentences. Hamas also demanded that the third stage include a commitment to “end the siege” and begin the reconstruction of the Strip (al-Jazeera, April 14, 2024).
• Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ “political” bureau, claimed the [alleged] ongoing “genocide” in the Gaza Strip required an approach “different” from that of the last six months, and said they insisted on the need for a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. He claimed Israel’s image has been “shattered” and the hostages would only be returned through a “respectable” deal which met Hamas’ conditions, including the reconstruction of and aid for the Gaza Strip (al-Mayadeen, April 13, 2024).
• Musa Abu Marzouq, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said that Hamas’ answer was no different from the answer it had already given on March 14, 2024, regarding a ceasefire and the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of Gazans to the north and the provision of various services, including public health, welfare, water and electricity. Only then, he claimed, would Hamas discuss the return of the hostages (al-Araby TV YouTube, April 14, 2024).
• Osama Hamdan, a senior Hamas member, claimed the proposal they received was neither serious nor intended to reach a ceasefire or a cessation of the “aggression,” but rather it included a series of ideas for a hiatus in the “aggression” for a period of six weeks. He added that the proposal included the unchanged presence of the IDF forces, a ban on the return of Gazans to their previous places of residence, transferring them to areas decided on and controlled by the IDF, similar to detention camps. He said that after internal and inter-organizational consultations, it had been decided that Hamas would answer that any proposal which did not explicitly and definitely meet the Palestinian demands would be unacceptable and could not possibly lead to an exchange deal. He claimed they did not reject the proposal but reiterated, yet again, their adherence to their proposal of mid-March. He claimed they had presented their ideas for an “appropriate, fair,” three-stage exchange deal. He added that the mediators would convey their answer to Israel and Hamas would wait for Israel’s response, stressing there would be no understandings if its five demands were not fully met (al-Araby TV YouTube channel, April 13, 2024).

Palestinian casualties

• The Hamas-controlled ministry of health in the Gaza Strip reported at 12:20 p.m., on April 15, 2024, that since the beginning of the war in Gaza (October 7, 2023) 33,797 Palestinians had been killed and 76,465 wounded (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, April 15, 2024).
• On the evening of April 10, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked a car in the Shati refugee camp in Gaza, three of the passengers were sons of Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau. The three were killed along with other passengers. According to reports the three were operatives of Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, and one of them was involved in holding Israeli hostages (Israeli media, IDF spokesperson, April 10, 2024). Palestinian media reported that the attack killed Hazem, Amir and Muhammad Haniyeh, three of Isma’il Haniyeh’s sons, and four of his grandchildren (Shehab, April 10, 2024).
• Hamas said in a statement that the attack would not harm the movement or strengthen Israel’s negotiating power, on the contrary, blood spilled would be an incentive for the “resistance” [terrorist organizations] and “jihad fighters” [terrorist operatives] (Hamas Telegram channel, April 10, 2024). Ismail Haniyeh said killing his family members would only stiffen his negotiating position. He claimed that since the beginning of the war 60 members of his family had been killed in the Gaza Strip (al-Jazeera, April 10, 2024).
• On April 11, 2024, Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas “political” bureau in the Gaza Strip, sent Isma’il Haniyeh a letter of condolence on behalf of himself and Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military-terrorist wing (al-Aqsa Telegram channel, April 14, 2024). It was the first official public letter written by al-Sinwar since the beginning of the war. Isma’il Haniyeh received many calls and letters of condolences, some of them from senior officials from the Gulf countries, Turkey, Lebanon and Iran. Mahmoud Abbas also called to offer his condolences. Haniyeh told them that his family members who had been killed were “shaheeds on the way to al-Aqsa and Jerusalem” (RT in Arabic April 10, 2024).

    
Right: Hazem, Amir and Muhammad Haniyeh (al-Quds, April 11, 2024). Left: The vehicle after the attack (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, April 10, 2024)

• On April 11, 2024, Colonel Radwan Muhammad Abdullah Radwan was killed in an Israeli Air Force attack. He was in charge of internal security in Jebalya and an operative in Hamas’ military-terrorist wing. He was involved in several incidents of armed terrorist operatives taking control of humanitarian aid trucks in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, April 12, 2024). According to Palestinian reports, Radwan Radwan was the commander of the police station of Jebalya al-Nazlah and the head of committee for securing humanitarian aid in the northern Gaza Strip. He was killed in an attack on his home on the evening of April 11, 2024 (Shehab Telegram channel, April 11, 2024; al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, April 11, 2024).

• Hamed Muhammad Ali Ahmed was killed in an Israeli Air Force attack. He was a commander in Hamas’ military-terrorist wing and head of operations in the internal security force in Jebalya. Another Hamas operative from the Jebalya Battalion was killed along with him (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, April 12, 2024).
• Naser Yaqoub Jaber Naser, a money changer and operative in Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, was killed in an attack in Rafah. He was involved in financing the terrorist activity in Rafah, and in December 2023 transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars for the activity (IDF Telegram channel, April 11, 2024). According to Palestinian reports, Nasser Yaqoub Nasr, aka Abu Bassel, was killed in an attack on his home in Rafah on April 4, 2024 and was the owner of the Ibn Khaldun currency exchange office in Rafah (Jõjõ Mãrwãñ’s Facebook page, April 4, 2024; al-Ghraib al-Thawbati’s Facebook page, April 4, 2024).

Aid for the Gaza Strip

• The World Food Program (WFP) reported that its employees were using a new coordinated route to deliver aid to northern Gaza, adding that the agency had delivered more than 1,300 tons of food packages and flour in nine convoys. The organization’s spokesman said that on April 13, 2024, they were able to supply fuel for four to five days and flour to a bakery in Gaza City to produce 14,000 bags of pita bread daily. He said they planned to open three more bakeries in Gaza City^[2] (swissinfo website, April 15, 2024).
• The IDF spokesperson told foreign media that the IDF’s plan to expand humanitarian aid to the residents of the Gaza Strip, including increasing the number of trucks entering the Gaza Strip from 350 to 500 per day. He said that since October 7, 2023, 22,205 aid trucks had entered the Gaza Strip, 11,390 through the Rafah Crossing and 10,248 through the Kerem Shalom Crossing; a total of 417,231 tons of humanitarian aid were brought into the Strip (IDF spokesperson, April 11, 2024). On April 11, 2024, several aid trucks entered through a crossing in the northern Gaza Strip after passing a security check at the Kerem Shalom Crossing. The aid is supposed to reach the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, April 12, 2024).

The situation in the Gaza Strip

• Wafa TV reported that many displaced persons had used the coastal road (the western traffic axis of the Strip connecting the north to the south) and gone from the southern Gaza Strip to the al-Sheikh Ajlin neighborhood in southern Gaza City, to return to their homes in Gaza City and northern Gaza Strip. They began moving after rumors spread that Israel was allowing their return. According to the displaced persons, IDF forces, using live fire, forced them to retrace their steps. Five deaths were reported from IDF fire (Wafa YouTube channel, April 14, 2024).
• Meanwhile, reports continue about residents living in tent camps near the Rafah-Egypt border. They continue to complain about difficult living conditions due to poor sanitation (Wafa YouTube channel, April 11, 2024).

     
Right: Residents trying to return to their homes in Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip. Left: The evacuated residents retrace their steps after IDF forces prevented them from reaching the north (Wafa YouTube channel, April 14, 2024)

• Several attempts to return to normal were reported:
• A bakery in Gaza City is back in business for the first time in six months with the help of the WFP^[3] (swissinfo website, April 15, 2024). The owners of the bakery said they were working 24 hours a day to satisfy the needs of their customers. Reportedly, people waited for hours for a bag of pita bread (al-Jazeera Mubasher, April 15, 2024).

     
Gazans gather in front of a bakery which has resumed operations (ilke Agency X account, April 14, 2024)

• The Palestinian Red Crescent announced that al-Amal Hospital in Khan Yunis was partially operational. According to the organization, work at the hospital is limited to admissions and the ER, as other departments were too damaged to be functional (Arab World Press News Agency, April 15, 2024).
• In the Khan Yunis district, the local municipalities began to clear the rubble and repair infrastructure after the departure of the IDF forces (Shehab Telegram channel, April 10, 2024), (RamallahNews Facebook page, April 15, 2024).

    
Right: Employees of the Greater Abasan municipality clear debris from the roads (Shehab Telegram channel, April 10, 2024). Left: Khan Yunis municipality workers clear rubble (RamallahNews Facebook page, April 15, 2024)

Palestinian reactions to the Iranian attack

• Following the Iranian missile and drone attack on the night of April 14, 2024, there were many demonstrations of support in the Palestinian arena. Hamas and the PIJ justified Iran for its response to the elimination of its senior operatives in Damascus. Expressions of joy in the PA territories included chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” and chants praising the leader of Iran:
• Hamas said in a statement that it considered the Iran’s “military operation” against Israel a “natural right” and a fitting response to the “crime” against the Iranian consulate^[4] in Damascus and the killing of several Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commanders. Hamas noted the “natural right” of regional countries and peoples to defend themselves against the Israeli attacks, and called on the Arab and Islamic nation, the “free people of the world” and the regional “resistance forces” to continue their support for Operation al-Aqsa Flood (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, April 14, 2024).
• Mahmoud Mardawi, head of the Hamas “political” department in Judea and Samaria, said the strategic aspects of the attack would determine the rules of the conflict in the region and sent a message to Israel changing the balance of the conflict in the north, especially on the Syrian front, where Israel did as it pleased. He also claimed the attack shattered Israel’s [alleged] dreams of regional expansion. Reducing the American role to defense and the public warning of United States President Joe Biden to Netanyahu not to react were another indication that the region will have a new balance of forces (Mahmoud Mardawi’s X account, April 14, 2024).
• The PIJ published a statement praising the Iranian “military response,” calling it is the “natural response” to the existence of Israel (“the occupying entity”), claiming it was now more necessary in light of the “crimes, violations and assassinations that Israel continues to commit.” The PIJ condemned all those who had defended Israel, especially the countries which “turned themselves into a wall protecting it,” and presented it as an attack while [allegedly] distorting all the facts (PIJ combat information Telegram channel, April 14, 2024).
• Expressions of joy were recorded in Hebron and Nablus, where a convoy of cars drove through the city (al-Mayadeen TV X account, April 14, 2024). In Hebron, young people chanted “Allahu akbar,” “Praise be to Allah,” “Death to America,” “Death to Israel,” and chants praising the leader of Iran (X account of Ramia al-Ibrahim, an al-Mayadeen TV presenter, April 14, 2024).

   
Right: A convoy of vehicles in Nablus in celebration of the Iranian attack (al-Mayadeen TV X account, April 14, 2024). Left: Palestinian cartoon after the Iranian attack (al-Quds al-Arabi, April 14, 2024)

Ziyad al-Nakhalah

• Ziyad al-Nakhalah, PIJ secretary general, was interviewed by the website of Ali Khamenei, the leader of Iran. He related to the following (Ali Khamenei’s website in Arabic, April 13, 2024):
  • Negotiations for a ceasefire: The United States, Israel and the regional countries were finally forced to negotiate with the “resistance,”^[5] and now they were looking for a solution for Israel and not for the Gaza Strip, and were looking for a way for the Israeli forces to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. The “resistance” set basic conditions: first, a withdrawal and secondly, the hostages will not be released without the release of the Palestinian prisoners. That is a basic condition. The Israeli hostages will not be unless the Palestinian prisoners are released from the prisons.
  • The fighting on the ground: After six months, they are in the middle of the campaign and not at the end, and that means they have the ability to continue “resistance” for at least six more months at the present level, and maybe even more. It is possible that when the Israeli forces on the ground are more stationary, the “resistance fighters” [terrorist operatives] will be more effective, because they plan large suicide operations, and it would not be surprising to see “fighters” carrying IEDs and directly confronting Israeli tanks. The large and important part of “resistance capabilities” in the Gaza Strip were received as support from Iran in various ways and means, and even if not a shipment of weapons, they received knowledge and learned how to manufacture rockets, mortar shells and weapons from “the brothers in Iran.”
  • The entry of Israeli forces into Rafah: If Israel enters Rafah, it will face the same resistance it faced in Khan Yunis, in the central Gaza Strip and in the northern Gaza Strip. They are not afraid of Israel’s entering Rafah and the “resistance” is ready for a confrontation.
  • The “resistance” [Palestinian terrorism] in Judea and Samaria: Judea and Samaria is a focal point of the “resistance” and they deal directly with Israel on a daily basis. The capabilities that exist in Judea and Samaria are not such that it is possible to wage a major campaign against Israel, but instead they occupy the deployed forces with attacks and confrontations, and there are always confrontations everywhere.
  • The “unity of the arenas:” The unity of the arenas did not arise suddenly but was prepared over a period of years. Hezbollah always assisted the Palestinian resistance forces, providing expertise, training and knowledge. The “brothers in Yemen” collected donations from people who gave money from their budget for food both during Operation Guardian of the Walls and in this campaign as well, the Palestinian “resistance” received millions of dollars from them in addition to their direct participation in the war.

Sanctioning on Hamas and the PIJ

• The United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on “Hamas persons” in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon responsible for the movement’s cyber operations and UAVs. Among the persons mentioned was Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, who, according to the Treasury Department, leads the cyber department of the military wing (United States Treasury Department website, April 13, 2024).
• The Council of the European Union imposed sanctions on the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, and on the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas military-terrorist wing for their responsibility for acts of sexual violence and widespread violence against women during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre against Israel. It was also reported that the wings and their operatives were now subject to having their assets frozen and having travel bans to EU countries imposed on them. It is now also forbidden to transfer money to them, directly or indirectly (Reuters, April 13, 2024).

Terrorist attacks

Shooting near Silwad

• On April 14, 2024, early in the morning, shots were fired at a force of Border Police fighters operating near the village of Silwad (north of Ramallah). A female fighter was slightly injured (Israeli media, April 14, 2024).

Israeli boy murdered

• On the morning of April 12, 2024, it was reported that an Israeli boy, 14 years old, a shepherd from the Malachei Hashalom Farm (northeast of Ramallah), went missing, not returning to the farm after having gone to graze sheep in the early morning. Security forces were called to the scene and began searching for him. The next day, his battered body was found near the farm. The security forces began pursuit of the murderer or murderers and carried out extensive searches in the Palestinian villages in the area (Israeli media, April 13, 12, 2024). So far, the murderer has not yet been caught.
• When the boy went missing, even before his body was found, Jewish settlers and local Palestinians clashed, and the settlers carried out acts of revenge against Palestinian villages in the area. The Palestinians reported that hundreds of settlers, [allegedly] under the auspices of the security forces, raided the village of al-Mughayyar, near the scene of the incident. They shot at houses and set fire to houses and vehicles. Marzouq Abu Na’im, deputy head of the al-Mughayyar village council, said that more than 40 and vehicles had been set on fire. According to reports a Palestinian was killed and 25 were wounded by settler gunfire (Wafa, April 12, 2024). Later in the day, it was reported that settlers also raided the village of Abu Falah, northeast of Ramallah, and burned vehicles, motorcycles and greenhouses (Wafa, April 12, 2024).
• On April 13, 2024, after the body was found, the settlers again attacked the villages of al-Mughayyar and Abu Falah, and then the towns of Silwad, Turmus Aya, Sinjil and Deir Debwan in the Ramallah district. The settlers blocked the entrances to the towns and attacked passing vehicles. In the villages of Duma, al-Sawiya and Qusra in the Nablus district, Palestinians were reportedly shot at and houses and vehicles were burned (Wafa, April 13, 2024). It was reported that in Kafr Baytin, east of Ramallah, a 17 year-old Palestinian was killed by settler gunfire (Wafa, April 13, 2024).
• There were harsh condemnations from Palestinians. The PA foreign ministry called on international authorities to intervene immediately, prosecute the responsible parties and impose sanctions on them. Muhammad Mustafa, the PA’s prime minister and foreign minister, directed PA representatives around the world to present the events in order to try to curb them (Wafa, April 13, 2024). Hamas called on the Palestinian public to escalate the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria in light of the actions of the settlers (Hamas website, April 13, 2024).

     
Houses and vehicles burned in the village of al-Mughayyar (Anadolu Agency, April 13, 2024)

Stabbing prevented south of Hebron

•  On April 11, 2024, a Palestinian woman arrived at an IDF position near al-Fawwar (south of Hebron). She seemed suspicious, and a knife was found when her belongings were searched. She said she intended to carry out a stabbing attack (IDF spokesperson’s X account, April 11, 2024).

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024^[6]

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities

• The security forces continued their counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria. Dozens of wanted persons suspected of terrorist activities were detained and weapons were seized. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 3,700 wanted persons have been detained, of whom over 1,600 were Hamas operatives (IDF spokesperson’s X account, April 11-15, 2024).
• Before dawn on April 12, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in Tubas killed Muhammad Omar Daraghmeh, commander of the Tubas Battalion, who shot at the forces. Large quantities of weapons and military equipment were found in his vehicle. The forces also detained two wanted persons and confiscated weapons, and uncovered IEDs planted on the roads (IDF spokesperson, Israeli media, April 12, 2024).
• Muhammad Rasoul Daraghmeh, 24 years old, aka “The Rock,” was born and raised in Tubas. He was detained by the security forces twice in the past and served a two-year prison sentence in Israel. He was the commander of the al-Qassam Battalions, the Hamas military-terrorist wing in Tubas, and once the Jerusalem Brigades’ Tubas Battalion had been established and joined by the battalions of the other organizations, he became one of the its commanders. After Ahmed Jamal Daraghmeh, the battalion commander, was killed at the end of February 2024, Muhammad Rasoul Daraghmeh became the battalion commander (al-Jazeera channel website, April 12, 2024). Daraghma was the son of Omar Hamza Daraghmeh, a senior Hamas terrorist operative, who was detained along with his son Hamza immediately after the start of the war, placed under administrative detention in Israel and died at the age of 58 on October 23, 2023 in a detention center (Wafa, April 12, 2024; Palestine Online, April 12, 2024).

     
Right: A mourning notice issued by Hamas for the death of Muhammad Rasoul Daraghmeh. In the background is a picture of his father (Hamas’ Telegram channel in IOS, April 12, 2024). Left: The weapons found in Daraghmeh’s vehicle (IDF Telegram channel, April 12, 2024)

• A Palestinian was killed by the security forces in the al-Far’ah refugee camp (south of Tubas) (IDF spokesperson, April 12, 2024). He was Muhammad Issam Shahmawi (Wafa, April 12, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades issued a mourning notice for his death.

• On the morning of April 15, 2024, Israeli security forces surrounded the house of a wanted Palestinian in Nablus. After his wife claimed he was not at home the forces had to enter the house to detain him. Clashes developed with local residents and the forces shot and killed a Palestinian who tried to throw an IED at them (Israeli media, April 15, 2024). Palestinian media reported the death of Yazen Shtayyeh, 17 years old from the village of Salem (east of Nablus), and two Palestinians wounded by the security forces. The PA organized a military funeral for him and his body was carried by operatives of Palestinian forces (Wafa, April 15, 2024).

Mahmoud Abbas

• Mahmoud Abbas, PA chairman, spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and informed him of the situation in the Palestinian arena, especially in the Gaza Strip, and the importance of speeding up the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Strip. He thanked el-Sisi for Egyptian’s aid for the Gaza Strip, its efforts for a ceasefire and its support for the Palestinian move to obtain full membership in the United Nations. El-Sisi emphasized Egypt’s position supporting the Palestinians and its efforts to stop the war in the Gaza Strip, provide humanitarian aid and prevent the displacement of the Palestinians from the Strip. Abbas and el-Sisi said they would continue coordination and consultation at all levels (Wafa, April 9, 2024). Mahmoud Abbas spoke with other Middle Eastern leaders including King Abdullah of Jordan, the ruler of Qatar, the King of Bahrain and the secretary general of the Arab League (Wafa, April 9, 10, 2024).

Muhammad Mustafa enlists support for the new PA government

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister and foreign minister, arrived in Algeria for official visit to Algeria and was greeted with a formal reception (Algerian prime minister’s office Facebook page, April 13, 2024). During his visit, Mustafa met with senior government officials in Algeria, including Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, Prime Minister Nadir Larbaoui, and Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf. Meeting with the Algerian president, Mustafa praised Algeria’s efforts in international forums, especially in the UN Security Council, and its ongoing efforts to enlist agreement to end the war in the Gaza Strip, support the acceptance of the PA as a full UN member and recognize a Palestinian state. Mustafa also expressed appreciation for Algeria’s role in providing aid to the Palestinians since the beginning of the war, airlifting medical and humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip from Algeria and hosting wounded Palestinians (Wafa, April 14, 2024).

• While in Algeria Mustafa also met with Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian deputy foreign minister, and noted the need to mobilize efforts to stop the war in the Gaza Strip and bring in aid. Bogdanov stated his principled position supporting the PA’s request for full UN membership (Russian foreign ministry website, April 14, 2024)
• Before going to Algeria, Muhammad Mustafa met in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, with Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi Arabian foreign minister. They discussed efforts to end the war in the Gaza Strip and introduce emergency aid. Mustafa also reviewed his new government and its goals (Muhammad Mustafa’s Facebook page, April 9, 2024).

PA move for full UN membership

• After the UN Security Council forwarded the PA’s request for full membership in the UN to the committee responsible for accepting new members, the members of the committee met to discuss the issue. According to reports the members of the committee were unable to reach an agreement. The representative of Malta, who serves as the president of the Security Council for the month of April, said that two-thirds of the members of the committee were in favor of the request. According to diplomatic sources, the official vote in the Security Council is expected to take place on April 18, 2024 during a special session which will deal with the Middle East (Agence France-Presse, April 12, 2024).