Spotlight on Terrorism – September 2025

Targeted Killings

• During September 2025 the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (ISA/Shin Bet) continued aerial and ground operations against terrorist operatives and facilities belonging to Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip. They attacked command and control compounds, some located in or near civilian structures.^[2] IDF forces began a ground maneuver to encircle and take control of Gaza City. Eliminated in the strikes were commanders and senior figures in Hamas and other terrorist organizations, as well as operatives who participated in the terrorist attack and massacre of October 7, 2023, some of whom held Israeli hostages. Ten IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, September 1–30, 2025). Eliminations included:
  • On September 1, Nur al-Din Dababesh, an operative in the financial department of Hamas’ military wing, was eliminated. He was participated in collecting and transferring tens of millions of dollars to Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip, funds used for the organization’s military buildup and to finance its military activity (IDF spokesperson’s Telegram channel, September 5, 2025).
  • On September 3, Musbah Salim Musbah Dayyah, who commanded the al-Mujahedin Battalions in the Gaza Strip, was eliminated in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp. Dayyah was the fourth commander of the organization to be eliminated in recent months (IDF spokesperson, September 3, 2025). The al-Mujahedin Battalions confirmed the death of their “great commander,” Dayyah, aka Abu Salim, claiming he was a member of the supreme military council and had been killed with his wife in an Israeli strike after having survived previous assassination attempts. The statement noted his long service in the organization and that his son Salim, who served as a field commander in the battalions, had been killed earlier in the war (al-Mujahedin Battalions Telegram channel, September 3, 2025).

• • The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the announced the death of commander Dawud Ahmed Abbas Khalaf, aka Abu al-Majd, who was killed on September 4 in the central Gaza Strip during a clash with an Israeli force attempting to detain him. According to the mourning notice Khalaf, born in the al-Bureij refugee camp, was a commander on the battlefields in Rafah and Khan Yunis, and also participated in Operation Guardian of the Walls and Operation Shield and Arrow (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades Telegram channel, September 4, 2025). According to mourning notice, he was a commander in the general headquarters of the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (PFLP website, September 4, 2025).

• • On September 4, Mahmoud Mahdi Afana, from the Jabalia refugee camp, an operative in Hamas’ military wing, was killed in an attack in Deir al-Balah. He called his parents during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre to boast he had killed ten Israelis (Sunud website X account, September 4, 2025; Sons of Jabalia Camp Facebook page, September 4, 2025; Abna’ Mukhayyam Jabalia Telegram channel, September 5, 2025).
  • On September 7, Ayman Fathi Farhat, aka Abu al-Qassam, a commander in Hamas’ military wing, was eliminated in a strike on the al-Farabi school in Gaza City (Facebook page of his uncle Mahmoud Mahisan, September 7, 2025; Mahmoud Abu Zinad Facebook page, September 7, 2025; Haalat Qassamiyya Telegram channel, September 7, 2025). Farhat was the fifth and last son of Umm Nazzal Farhat, a senior Hamas member and member of the Legislative Council until her death, aka “the Khansaa of Palestine.”^[3] All four of his brothers had been eliminated over the past two decades: Nazzal Farhat was eliminated in 2003 after inventing the first Qassam rocket that managed to reach a range of 2.5 km; Muhammad Farhat was eliminated after carrying out a shooting attack in the settlement of Atzmona in 2002, killing nine soldiers; Ru’ad Farhat was eliminated in 2005; and Wissam Farhat, who commanded the al-Shuja’iyya Battalion, was eliminated in December 2023 (Telegram channel of journalist Ayman Khanidq, September 7, 2025).

• • On September 14, the IDF spokesperson reported that a targeted operation had been carried out to locate the last terrorist operatives remaining in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip, during which terrorist targets were attacked, including tunnel shafts and an underground route. According to the statement, 11 terrorist operatives were located and eliminated in the strike on the route, including field commanders (IDF spokesperson, September 14, 2025). The names of 13 killed operatives from Hamas’ military wing in Beit Hanoun were published on the social media: Nazzal Nabil Abdallah Abu Odeh, aka Ghoush; Khaled Akram Mousa Abu Odeh, aka Jafal; Muhammad Akram Abdallah al-Kafarna, aka Sanuna; Imran Nahed Abd al-Rahman Abu Odeh, a sniper commander who reportedly killed four IDF soldiers; Jibril Rushdi Abd al-Latif al-Masri; Jihad Imad Rabhi al-Masri; Fakher Tha’a Ghazi al-Za’anin, aka al-Hotza; Abd Majdi Ibrahim Saadeh; Abd al-Rahman Majdi Muhammad Fayyad, aka al-Taqtaq; Yahya Khalil Muhammad Odeh, aka al-Malahi; Khaled Shahada Odeh Hamed, aka Abu Abin; Issam Mahmoud Saleh Hamed, aka al-Hamdin; Anwar Abdallah Muhammad Fayyad (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, September 26, 2025; X account @Qadeyah1, September 25–26, 2025; Haalat Qassamiyya Telegram channel, September 26–27, 2025).

• • On September 22, Iyad Abu Yusuf, deputy commander of Hamas’ naval police and who participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, was eliminated in an attack in the central Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, September 22, 2025).

• • On September 25, Wael Matariyah was eliminated in an airstrike on the al-Shati refugee camp in Gaza City. He was a commander of the nukhba unit in the al-Shati Battalion of Hamas and participated in the assault on the shelter in Nahal Oz during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, September 25, 2025). “Palestinian sources” reported that on September 17 his house in the al-Shati refugee camp was attacked (al-Shati Beach Camp Facebook page, September 17, 2025).

• • On September 27, Muhammad al-Jamal was eliminated. He shot at the IDF forces during the operation in which four Israeli hostages were rescued from the al-Nuseirat refugee camp in June 2024. He also held hostages. Sari Idris Muhammad al-Aqrab was eliminated. He was a Hamas terrorist operative close to al-Jamal who also participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, (IDF spokesperson, September 27, 2025).
  • On September 28, Hassan Mahmoud Hassan Hussein, commander of the elite nukhba unit in the al-Bureij Battalion of Hamas’ Central Camps Brigade, was eliminated. He was involved in planning and carrying out attacks on IDF forces and in the abduction of Israeli civilians, and took part in the massacre at the shelter on Route 232 near Re’im during the October 7, 2023 attack, together with Muhammad Abu Atwi, who was eliminated in October 2024 (IDF spokesperson, September 28, 2025).

The Attempt to Eliminate Hamas Leadership in Qatar

• On September 9, 2025, the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (ISA/Shin Bet) attacked Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar. The official statement said that the targets had directed Hamas’ activities for years and were directly responsible for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, and conducted the war against Israel. Before the attack, measures were taken to minimize harm to uninvolved civilians (IDF spokesperson and the ISA spokesperson’s unit, September 9, 2025). Hamas announced that none of the senior members of the movement had been killed in the strike and that the dead were Jihad Labad, aka Abu Bilal, head of Khalil al-Hayya’s office; Khalil al-Hayya’s son, al-Ma’mun al-Hayya; three of al-Hayya’s aides, and a Qatari security officer (Hamas Telegram channel, September 9, 2025).^[4]

Rocket Fire

• During September 2025 five rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip, similar to August. Two rockets were fired at the Ashdod area and three at communities bordering the Gaza Strip. Three rockets were intercepted and two fell in open areas. There were no casualties and no damage (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, September 7, 21, and 22, 2025). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing two rockets at Netivot and for firing Badr 3 rockets at Ashdod and Ashkelon in response to “the crimes of the Zionist enemy” (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, September 7 and 26, 2025).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire

Annual Distribution of Rocket Launches

Terrorist Attacks

• During September 2025, there were four terrorist attacks; one in August. Six Israeli civilians and three IDF soldiers were killed:
  • Shooting in Jerusalem: On September 8, two Palestinian terrorists armed with an improvised Carlo machinegun and a pistol opened fire on Israeli civilians waiting at a bus stop at the Ramot junction in Jerusalem and at passengers on a #62 bus. Six civilians were killed and 38 were wounded, five of them seriously. A soldier and armed civilians shot and killed the two terrorists, identified as Muthana Omar, 20 years old, from the village of al-Kabiba, and Muhammad Taha, 21 years old, from the town of Qatana (Israeli media, September 8, 2025). Hamas praised the attack as “a natural response to Israel’s crimes and its war against the Palestinian people.” Hamas claimed that the attack in the heart of Jerusalem was a blow to Israeli security and showed the determination of the youth and the “resistance”^[5] to continue the “struggle,” calling for escalating clashes in Judea and Samaria (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, September 8, 2025). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for the shooting, claiming the two were operatives in its ranks. Hamas said the showcase operation was intended to send a message to “the cowardly occupier” that “all your failed efforts to dry the sources of resistance will only lead to the spilling of the blood of your soldiers and settlers” (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, September 9, 2025).

• • Stabbing at Kibbutz Tzuba: On September 12, a terrorist who worked in the kitchen of the Tzuba Hotel near Jerusalem attacked two guests in the hotel dining room with a knife wounding both, one seriously. Bystanders overpowered the terrorist, who was detained by police forces. He was as Muhammad Shawarma, 42 years old, from the Shuafat refugee camp, who held a blue Israeli ID card (Israel Police spokesperson’s unit and Israeli media, September 12, 2025). Palestinian media reported that Israeli security forces raided his home and detained his brother (Palestinian Media Center Telegram channel, September 12–13, 2025).
  • Attack at the Allenby border crossing: On September 18, a Jordanian terrorist driving a truck carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip arrived at the cargo terminal on the Israeli side of the Allenby crossing on the Israel–Jordan border. He exited the truck and opened fire on IDF soldiers at the site, then used a knife to stab them until security guards shot and killed him. An IDF reserve officer and an IDF soldier were killed in the attack. The terrorist was identified as Abd al-Mutlab al-Qaisi, 57 years old, a member of a Bedouin tribe from Madaba. After the attack the crossing was temporarily closed (Israeli media, September 19, 2025). It was reported that Abd al-Mutlab Hussein Zidan al-Na’imi al-Qaisi, aka Abu Issa, was a former soldier in the Jordanian army and lived in the al-Zahir area of Marj al-Hamam, southwest of Amman (Quds News Agency, September 19, 2025). In a living will attributed to al-Qaisi, he wrote that he was joining “heroic shaheed” Maher Dhiab al-Jazi, the Jordanian who carried out a similar attack at the Allenby crossing in September 2024. Al-Qaisi warned that the silence of Arab states was aiding “the Greater Israel project” and asked if “we will remain silent until the enemy acts on our soil” (Shehab News Agency, September 19, 2025). The Jordanian foreign ministry strongly condemned the attack, stating that the ministry “opposes all acts of violence and any illegal action that threatens Jordan’s interests and its ability to provide humanitarian aid to the Strip” (Jordanian foreign ministry X account, September 18, 2025).

• • Vehicular attack at the Jit Junction in Samaria: On September 28, a Palestinian terrorist driving a truck ran over soldiers near the Jit Junction, near the settlement of Kedumim. The fighters shot and killed the terrorist. An IDF soldier was killed, apparently by friendly fire (Israeli media, September 28, 2025). Palestinian media reported that Mahmoud Hassan al-Aqad, a resident of Nablus, was killed by “occupation” gunfire after carrying out a vehicular attack near the village of Jit, east of Qalqilya (al-Aqsa TV, September 28, 2025). Hamas praised the attack as a response “to the ongoing war against our people in the Gaza Strip, to the killing, arrests, Judaization, and settlement activity in the West Bank and Jerusalem” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, September 28, 2025).

Significant Terrorist Attacks, 2025^[6]

Significant Terrorist Attacks, Annual Distribution

Counterterrorism Activities

• In September 2025, Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, including continued activity as part of Operation Iron Wall to counter terrorism in northern Samaria.^[7] Terrorist operatives were eliminated and dozens of wanted individuals and persons suspected of terrorist activity were detained, including lone assailants and members of terrorist cells who planned to carry out attacks in the near future. Explosives, raw materials for explosives, weapons and funds for financing terrorist activity were found, as were rockets and means for rocket production in Ramallah and Tulkarm. The security forces sealed and demolished the homes of terrorists who had killed Israelis (IDF spokesperson, September 1–30, 2025):
  • On September 1, Israeli security forces operated in the village of Tamun to detain a terrorist involved in terrorist activity. The wanted man tried to escape; he was shot and killed (IDF, ISA, and police spokespersons’ units, September 2, 2025). The Palestinian Authority (PA) governor of the Tubas and Northern Jordan Valley district, Ahmed al-Asaad, claimed that Israeli forces “deliberately shot” at civilians in Tamun, including at a vehicle carrying an officer in the Palestinian security forces and his family. He claimed that at least seven “civilians” had been wounded, one of them seriously, who was also [allegedly] “abducted” (Dozz Palestinian Agency, September 2, 2025).
  • On September 3, Israeli security forces detained Hamas operatives from the Hebron area on suspicion of acting under the direction of Hamas headquarters in Turkey and planning to assassinate National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. The investigation revealed that the suspects had purchased several drones and planned to mount explosives on them for the attack (ISA spokesperson, September 3, 2025).
  • On September 5, Israeli security forces operating in the village of Sida detained a senior Hamas operative who had planned to attack Israeli civilians with explosives (IDF spokesperson, September 5, 2025).
• On September 16, Israeli security forces in Qalqilya eliminated a terrorist operative involved in weapons trafficking. Another arms dealer was killed, and an improvised Carlo machinegun was found when two other terrorist operatives were detained (Police, IDF, and ISA spokespersons’ units, September 16, 2025). Wasim Khalil Abu Ali, 41 years old, and Khaled Nimer Hassan, 34 years old, were killed after a special force raided their workplace in Qalqilya and opened fire at a “group of youths” (Quds News Agency, September 16, 2025). Hamas issued a mourning notice for the deaths of “the mujahid,” released prisoner Wasim Khalil Abu Ali, and “the mujahid” Khaled Nimr Suweilem Hassan (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, September 16, 2025).

• • On September 16, an improvised rocket was found in the village of Na’ima in the Ramallah area. It lacked a warhead and standard explosive material (IDF spokesperson, September 16, 2025). On September 19, Israeli security forces detained three terrorist operatives in the Ramallah area suspected of attempting to fire the rocket. Dozens of rockets were found in the building where they were detained, including two rockets ready for firing without warheads, along with dozens of explosive devices and explosive materials. A lathe for rocket production was also found (IDF spokesperson, September 19, 2025). Later, a rocket was found in the city of Tulkarm, but in IDF assessment it belonged to a different terrorist network (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2025). An op-ed of the Hamas affiliated Shehab News Agency stated that the rocket fired from Na’ima represented “one of an increasing number of attempts to expand the rules of engagement from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank,” reflecting a desire among “local elements” “to impose new military intelligence and security equations on the occupation” (Shehab News Agency, September 19, 2025).

     
Right: Rockets found in Ramallah (IDF spokesperson, September 19, 2025).
Left: Rocket found in Tulkarm (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2025)

• • On September 25, Israeli security forces operated in the town of Tamun to detain a terrorist cell suspected of planning to carry out an imminent attack. The forces surrounded a building where two wanted men identified with the PIJ, Ala’ Joudat Bani Odeh and Muhammad Qassem Suleiman were hiding, both wanted men identified with the PIJ, and who were killed in an exchange of fire (IDF, Police, and ISA spokespersons’ units, September 25, 2025). The PIJ’s military wing reported that Ala’ Joudat Suleiman and Muhammad Qassem Suleiman belonged to the Tamun company of the Jerusalem Brigades and were killed after “an armed clash that lasted several hours” (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, September 25, 2025).

     
PIJ notices on the deaths of Ala’ Joudat Suleiman and Muhammad Qassem Suleiman
(Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, September 25, 2025)

• During September 2025, the police and the ISA also prevented terrorist activity within Israeli territory:
  • Najib Daq, 25, from Baqa al-Gharbiya, was indicted for supporting ISIS. His interrogation revealed that he had pledged allegiance to ISIS and viewed the organization’s online content, including videos of beheadings and executions. During questioning, it was revealed that his growing religious sentiments and following the war in the Gaza Strip, had made him consider attacking Israeli security forces (Police and ISA spokespersons’ units, September 4, 2025).
  • Amin Hassan Abd al-Qader Azzam, a 22 years old from Tayibe, was charged with planning to kidnap an IDF soldier to use as a bargaining chip to force Israel to end the fighting in the Gaza Strip. According to the indictment, he browsed websites and Telegram channels linked to Hamas, participated in discussions on the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades channel, took part in paintball training as a simulation for military preparedness, downloaded Hamas combat training materials, sought to obtain weapons, tried to recruit partners, requested religious authorization to carry out the act, and ordered tactical gear, including a vest and a communication device (Justice Ministry Southern District spokesperson, September 25, 2025).
  • Issa Madi, 18 years old, from Acre, was detained on suspicion of identifying with ISIS and planning to attack soldiers with an explosive device at a bus stop near the Acre train station. The investigation revealed that he had taken steps to prepare explosives and an explosive device and was in contact with ISIS operatives abroad (Police and ISA spokespersons’ units, September 30, 2025).

Hezbollah

• In September 2025, IDF forces attacked Hezbollah facilities and eliminated operatives of the organization as part of ongoing operations against Hezbollah’s presence in south Lebanon, which violates the ceasefire agreement understandings, and against Hezbollah’s efforts to increase its military capabilities and restore its arsenal. At least 11 Hezbollah terrorists were eliminated, including intelligence and artillery operatives, an arms dealer who had guided cells planning terrorist activity from Syria, and a Hezbollah operative who also served in the Iranian Imam Hussein Division militia and was involved in rocket fire during Operation Northern Arrows, leading Hezbollah rehabilitation efforts after the ceasefire. In addition, aerial and ground attacks in south Lebanon destroyed Hezbollah headquarters in the al-Nabatieh area, weapons depots belonging to the elite Radwan Force, a naval vessel used for intelligence gathering, a rocket launcher, engineering equipment and production sites aiding Hezbollah’s recovery and attack planning against Israel (IDF spokesperson, September 1–30, 2025).^[8] Hezbollah’s social media accounts and affiliated Lebanese media published announcements of the deaths of 13 Hezbollah operatives (Balaa and South Lebanon–Enemy Watch Telegram channels and Lebanese media, September 1–30, 2025):
  • Abd al-Munim Musa Suweidan, aka Osama, from Yatter.
  • Wasim Saeed Jaba‘i, aka al-Hajj Mahdi, from Aaitit.
  • Hussein Khalil Mansour, aka Gharib, from Aitaroun.
  • Muhammad Ali Yassin, aka al-Sham, from Majdal Selm.
  • Kamal Nasser al-Din Raad, from Baalbek.
  • al-Hajj Hussein Saifo Sharif, aka al-Hajj Akbar, from al-Yamounneh.
  • Ammar Hayel Qasibani, aka Sadeq, from Jadeeda Ansar.
  • Hussein Hassan Ramadan, from al-Taybeh, from Jibchit.
  • Hassan Abd al-Karim Shahrour, aka Manar, from Kafr Kila.
  • Muhammad Majid Marwah, from Bint Jbeil.
  • Ali Hussein Qaduh, aka Karbala’, from Tebnine.
  • Muhammad Abbas Shashua, aka Badr, from Sohmor.
  • Muhammad Hussein Yassin, aka Abu al-Fadl, from Kafr Tebnit.

The Lebanese Resistance Brigades^[9]

• On September 3, the IDF eliminated an operative of the Lebanese Brigades for the Resistance to the Israeli Occupation in the village of Shebaa in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, September 3, 2025). The Lebanese Brigades for the Resistance to the Israeli Occupation announced the death of Ali Muhammad Taffaha, aka Maher, from the village of Shebaa (South Lebanon–Enemy Watch Telegram channel, September 4, 2025).

• In September 2025, IDF forces continued operations in the buffer zone in the Golan Heights, conducting focused raids on villages inside and outside the zone, in the Quneitra and Daraa provinces of southern Syria. During the operations, suspects involved in planning terrorist activities against IDF forces were detained (IDF spokesperson, Israeli media, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, and Syrian media, September 1–30, 2025).
• On September 8, Syrian media reported that Israeli aircraft attacked weapons and missile depots, air defense system storage sites, and an ammunition depot in Latakia, Homs and Palmyra (Syrian Arab News Agency; Homs Rural Facebook page, September 8, 2025).

Attacks against Israel

• During September 2025, the Houthis’ military spokesman, Yahya Saria, claimed responsibility for 26 attacks against Israeli targets using ballistic missiles (10 attacks) and drones, compared with 18 attacks in the previous month. Some of the attacks were carried out with cluster-warhead missiles, while others were claimed to have used several drones against various targets. For example, on September 7, 2025, Saria claimed that eight drones had been launched at six different targets. Saria claimed that all the airstrikes throughout the month had successfully achieved their objectives (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, September 1-30, 2025). The IDF Spokesperson announced the interception of nine ballistic missiles and 12 drones. At least six additional missiles disintegrated before reaching Israeli territory. However, three drone impacts were recorded: on September 7, 2025, a drone launched from Yemen hit the arrivals hall of Ramon Airport in the Arava; one person was slightly injured; on September 18, 2025, a drone fell in the courtyard of a hotel in Eilat, causing a fire, but there were no casualties; on September 24, 2025, a drone exploded in a tourist center in Eilat, injuring 22 people, including two in serious condition (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, September 1—30, 2025).
• Throughout the month, the IDF continued striking Houthi military targets in Yemen (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, September 1—30, 2025):
  • On September 10, 2025, targets were attacked in Sana’a and al-Jawf, including military camps, the Houthi military information department headquarters, and a fuel storage site used for Houthi military activities. The Houthis claimed the strikes hit “civilian targets,” killing at least 46 people (al-Masirah, September 11, 2025). The Houthi-affiliated newspapers September 26 and al-Yemen reported that 32 of their journalists had been killed by the “Israeli aggression” against their headquarters in Sana’a (al-Masirah, September 14, 2025).
  • On September 25, 2025, targets of the security and intelligence apparatus and the Houthi army were struck in the Sana’a area, including the General Staff command headquarters, compounds of the security and intelligence apparatus, the Military Information Department headquarters, and military camps where weapons and operatives were identified. The Houthis claimed that prisons belonging to the security apparatus and neighborhoods in Sana’a had been attacked, and that at least 11 people had been killed (al-Masirah and Saba News Agency, September 25-27, 2025).

Houthi attacks against Israel – September 2025

Houthi attacks against Israel – 2025^[10]

Attacks against vessels

• During September 2025, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saria also claimed responsibility for attacks on two vessels in the Red Sea as part of what he called an “Israeli shipping ban.”
  • On September 1, 2025, it was claimed that the “Israeli” tanker Scarlet Ray had been attacked in the northern Red Sea by a ballistic missile and that a direct hit had been identified (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, September 1, 2025). The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) organization reported that the ship’s crew had noticed an unidentified object splashing near the vessel, but the tanker continued on its course (UKMTO X account, August 31, 2025). The British maritime security company Ambrey stated that the vessel “matches the Houthis’ target profile,” sails under the Liberian flag, and is under “public Israeli ownership” (Reuters, August 31, 2025).
  • On September 2, 2025, the MSC ABY was attacked in the northern Red Sea by two drones and a cruise missile, and a direct hit was claimed. According to Saria, the ship was targeted for “violating the ban on entering the ports of occupied Palestine and its connection to the Israeli enemy” (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, September 2, 2025). There was no independent confirmation of a strike or damage to the vessel.