Spotlight on Terrorism – October 2025

The IDF in Gaza

• From October 1 until the start of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas on October 10, IDF forces continued air and ground operations against terrorist targets throughout the Gaza Strip, primarily those of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), focusing on Gaza City. The forces attacked terrorist facilities, eliminated terrorist operatives who attempted to attack IDF forces, discovered weapons, including long-range rockets aimed at central Israel, and revealed underground routes used by terrorist operatives beneath two hospitals in Gaza City.^[2] About twenty Hamas operatives who tried to harm displaced Gazans in the humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip and used children as human shields were attacked. Two IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting (IDF spokesperson, October 1–10, 2025).
• Following the announcement of the ceasefire, IDF forces withdrew from broad areas of the Gaza Strip, including Gaza City, the refugee camps of Jabalia, al-Nuseirat, al-Bureij, Beit Lahia, Deir al-Balah and al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis, and redeployed along the “yellow line.” As part of enforcing the ceasefire, IDF forces eliminated armed terrorist operatives who approached the “yellow line” and posed a threat to the forces, as well as terrorists planning to attack IDF forces. A terrorist facility used for storing weapons and an aerial device intended for an imminent attack on IDF forces was also attacked (IDF spokesperson, October 31, 2025).

     
Right: Map of IDF deployment after the ceasefire agreement (IDF spokesperson, October 12, 2025). Left: Marking of the “yellow line” (IDF spokesperson, October 20, 2025).

• On October 19, two IDF soldiers were killed when Hamas operatives attacked IDF forces in Rafah. In response, the IDF attacked dozens of Hamas terrorist targets, including terrorist squads, weapons storage sites, a six-kilometer tunnel and military facilities (IDF spokesperson, October 19, 2025). On October 28, terrorists attacked IDF forces in the Rafah area, killing an IDF soldier. In response to the soldier’s killing and additional ceasefire violations by Hamas, the IDF attacked Hamas targets throughout the Strip, including dozens of terrorist operatives, a weapons-manufacturing site and rocket-firing positions (IDF spokesperson, October 28–29, 2025). Hamas’ ministry of health in the Gaza Strip claimed that since the start of the ceasefire at least 211 people had been killed and about 600 wounded, including at least 104 killed in the attacks of October 28–29 (Hamas ministry of health Telegram channel, October 29–31, 2025).

     
Right: Armed terrorist squad in Beit Lahia (IDF spokesperson, October 19, 2025). Left: IDF attack in the Shati refugee camp in Gaza (Shehab Agency, October 29, 2025)

• During October, including in the retaliatory attacks in response to Hamas’ ceasefire violations, the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) eliminated terrorist operatives in Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Reportedly, those eliminated included Hamas and PIJ commanders and operatives who participated in the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre, some of whom were involved in holding Israeli hostages:
  • On October 19, during IDF attacks in response to the killing of two soldiers, according to reports Yahya al-Mabhouh, aka Abu al-Abd, commander of the nukhba company in the eastern part of the Jabalia refugee camp, was killed along with five other operatives of Hamas’ military wing in an attack on a café in western Deir al-Balah. According to the Hamas-affiliated media al-Mabhouh was “one of the lions who resisted the three invasions of the Jabalia camp” and that he and his comrades “inflicted heavy losses on the enemy” (al-Siyad TV, October 19, 2025; Shehab Agency, October 20, 2025).

• • On October 19, according to reports Taj al-Din al-Wahidi was killed in an Israeli attack on an apartment in Gaza City (Telegram channel of journalist Yasser Adwan, October 19, 2025). He was deputy commander of the Shaheed Imad Aqel Battalion in the Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Strip. He participated in the October 7, 2023 invasion of Israel and subsequent massacre and had previously survived several attempts to kill him (Quds News Network, October 20, 2025).

• • On October 22, the PIJ’s military wing’s new spokesperson, Abu Hamza al-Askari, issued his first recorded statement. He admitted that hundreds of PIJ “fighters” had been killed in the fighting over the past two years, including senior military figures. A mourning notice was issued of 15 senior members of the military wing who had been eliminated, including six members of the military council: Muhammad Isma’il Abu Sahil (Abu Ahmed), Hassan Ali al-Na’im (Abu Ali), Dr. Riyad Salah Hashish (Abu Salah), Yusuf Hasani Nabhan (Abu Mahmoud), and Marzuq Muhammad al-Sha’ar (Abu Muhammad). Also eliminated were the former military spokesperson Najji Maher Abu Saif (Abu Hamza) and the “commanders” Ibrahim Muhammad Jum’a, Ibrahim al-Qatrawi, Muhammad Zakariya al-Bayuk, Tha’er Mansour Abed, Khaled Musa al-Banna, Abdullah Mahmoud Abu Ayada, Ayman Nasser Za’arb, and Wael Rajab Abu Fanuna (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 22, 2025). Abu Fanuna, killed in January 2024, was represented as director of PIJ-affiliated al-Quds al-Youm TV channel.^[3]

• • On October 24, the IDF spokesperson announced that in recent months Israeli forces had eliminated all the terrorists responsible for kidnapping three Israeli civilians from the Nova festival during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, October 24, 2025).

     
Right: Hamas terrorists kidnapping Avinatan Or on October 7, 2023.
Left: Pictures of those eliminated (IDF spokesperson, October 24, 2025)

• • On October 27, the IDF spokesperson reported that during four months of operations in northern Gaza, IDF soldiers had eliminated five Hamas battalion commanders and nine company commanders and deputies. Twelve terrorist operatives from the Beit Hanoun Battalion were eliminated, including two company commanders, a platoon commander and the head of the sniper unit (IDF spokesperson, October 27, 2025).

• • On October 29, the IDF spokesperson reported that in retaliatory attacks following Hamas ceasefire violations, dozens of terrorist operatives from various organizations were eliminated, including those involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. The names of 26 were made public, including Hatem Maher Musa Qidra, commander of the nukhba company in northern Khan Yunis who led the raid on Kibbutz Ein HaShlosha; Muhammad Issa, nukhba platoon commander; Fawaz Oweida, head of a nukhba squad; and Muhammad Abu Sharia and Nidal Abu Sharia from the organization calling itself “Lords of the Wilderness” (IDF spokesperson, October 29, 2025). Hamas claimed that some of the names were fictitious while others had not been killed or were killed at  different times (Hamas media information office, Gaza Strip, October 30, 2025).

• On October 29, according to reports, Abdullah al-Laddawi, aka Abu Obeida, commander of the Shaheed Imad Aqel Battalion in the northern brigade of Hamas’ military wing, died of his wounds after being injured in the Israeli attack in Gaza City on October 19, which also killed his deputy, Taj al-Din al-Wahidi. He had previously survived two Israeli attempts to kill him, one of which cost him an eye, and he and other operatives had [allegedly] been trapped in a tunnel for 22 days before being rescued and returning to battle (al-Siyad channel and Quds Agency, October 29, 2025).

• • On October 30, the al-Mujahideen Movement announced that “commander” Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Sharia, aka Abu Ibrahim had been killed in an Israeli attack during morning prayers the previous day. He was the nephew of Assad Abu Sharia, the group’s leader who was eliminated in June 2025 (al-Mujahideen Movement Telegram channel, October 30, 2025).

The Ceasefire

• On October 10, a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas went into effect following indirect negotiations mediated by the United States, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey. On October 13, the twenty remaining live hostages, held in the Gaza Strip since Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack and massacre were returned to Israel. In exchange, Israel released nearly two thousand Palestinian prisoners and detainees, including 250 terrorists sentenced to life imprisonment, and the rest were Gazans detained since the October 7 attack and massacre. About 150 of those who had received life sentences were deported to Egypt, and the rest were transferred to the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and east Jerusalem. Although according to the agreement Hamas was required to release the 28 remaining bodies of murdered hostages within 72 hours after the start of the ceasefire, by the end of October only 17 bodies had been returned. In two additional cases, the body of a Palestinian collaborator with the IDF was returned, whom Hamas claimed was a “soldier,” and remains of a hostage whose body had already been returned to Israel. In exchange for the hostages’ bodies, Israel transferred to the Gaza Strip the bodies of Palestinian terrorists, many of whom had participated in the October 7 attack and massacre (Israeli media, October 31, 2025). The agreement also increased the amount of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, and the UN reported that more than 24,000 tons of UN aid had been delivered within twenty days of the ceasefire’s start (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 30, 2025).
• The twenty-point American plan for the future of the Gaza Strip, which served as the basis for the ceasefire agreement, stipulated that in the second phase, to be negotiated indirectly between Israel and Hamas, a temporary transitional government would be established, based on a non-political Palestinian technocratic committee, to manage daily affairs in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would not be part of the government, and the movement and all other armed factions in the Strip would be required to disarm. However, in practice, Hamas quickly moved to re-establish its governance of the Gaza Strip, including by killing opponents and “collaborators,” and began efforts to rebuild its military wing.^[4]

Rocket fire

• During October 2025, until the ceasefire went into effect, eight rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip, compared to five the previous month. Five were fired at the Ashdod area, and three toward the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip border. Six rockets were intercepted and two fell in open areas. Seven people were injured during the alerts in Ashdod (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 1–2 and 7, 2025). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing rockets at Mefalsim, Kfar Sa’ad, Ashdod and Ashkelon in response to “the crimes of the Zionist enemy” (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 1, 2025). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for firing rockets at Ashdod in response to “harm to civilians” (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, October 2, 2025).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

Preventing a Flotilla from Reaching the Gaza Strip

• On the night of October 1, Israeli Navy forces prevented the Global Sunud (“perseverance”) Flotilla from reaching the Gaza Strip.^[5] The ships set sail at the end of August 2025 to “break the blockade of the Gaza Strip.” Without clashes or the use of force, the soldiers intercepted forty-two vessels carrying hundreds of pro-Palestinian activists in the Mediterranean Sea and transferred them to the Port of Ashdod; the activists were later deported abroad (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 2–3, 2025).
• On October 8, Navy forces, again without the use of force, seized nine vessels, part of the Sunud Flotilla, which were sailing toward the Gaza Strip; one vessel had about a hundred pro-Palestinian activists on board. The activists were transferred to the Port of Ashdod and subsequently deported from Israel (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 8, 2025).

Terrorist Attacks

• During October 2025, one attack was carried out, compared to four the previous month. There were no casualties:
  • A vehicular and shooting attack on Route 443: On the evening of October 2, 2025, two Palestinian terrorists drove to the Beit Sira checkpoint on Route 443, west of Ramallah. They tried to run over the IDF soldiers manning the checkpoint, and one of the terrorists attempted to shoot at the soldiers; he was shot and killed. The other terrorist tried to flee the scene; he was detained (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 2, 2025). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported the death of Muhammad Ali Yusuf Shtaiyeh, 37 years old, near the town of Beit ‘Ur, west of Ramallah (Quds Agency, October 2, 2025). Hamas issued a mourning notice for “the mujahid shaheed” Muhammad Ali Yusuf Shtaiyeh, who was killed “by the bullets of the occupation while attempting to carry out a shooting and vehicular ramming attack” near the Beit ‘Ur al-Fauqa checkpoint (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, October 3, 2025).

^[6]Significant Terrorist Attacks, 2025

Distribution of Significant Terrorist Attacks over the Past Decade

Counterterrorism Operations

• During October 2025, Israeli security forces continued routine counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria. The forces eliminated terrorist operatives, including terrorists who planning to carry out attacks in the near future and others who threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at the forces. Wanted persons and Palestinians suspected of terrorist activities were detained. Explosives, materials for making explosives, weapons, and lathes for manufacturing weapons were found, along with funds used to finance terrorist activity and written propaganda inciting terrorism. Security forces sealed and demolished the homes of terrorists who had carried killed Israelis. Two IDF soldiers were wounded by an explosive device thrown during an operation in Tubas; the suspects were detained (IDF spokesperson, October 31–November 1, 2025):
  • On October 1 in the village of Bitunia, as part of the investigation of a terrorist cell from Ramallah detained the previous month on suspicion manufacturing rockets and an attempted rocket launch, Israeli security forces located 15 rockets in various stages of production. Explosives, weapons, and other combat materials prepared and collected by the cell members were also seized (IDF spokesperson, October 1, 2025).

• • On October 8, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) revealed it had prevented a shipment of advanced weapons from reaching Judea and Samaria. The weapons were sent to terrorist operatives by the special operations division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the special operations unit of the Qods Force. The shipment included 15 anti-tank rockets, 29 Claymore-type explosive charges, four drones (two capable of dropping explosives), hand grenades, machine guns and pistols. The shipment was found during the investigation of an arms dealer from the Ramallah area, and several individuals involved in the affair were detained (ISA and IDF spokespersons, October 8, 2025).

• • On October 10, a terrorist threw an explosive device at an IDF force in Jenin; he was shot and killed. There were no IDF casualties (IDF spokesperson, October 11, 2025). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported the death of Muhammad Adnan Yusuf Salameh, 25 (al-Aqsa TV, October 10, 2025). Hamas published a mourning notice for the death of “the mujahid shaheed,” Muhammad Adnan Salameh, who was killed “by occupation forces’ gunfire” near Cinema Square in central Jenin (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, October 11, 2025).

• • On October 16, a terrorist operative threw an explosive device at an IDF force in Qabatiya; he was shot and killed. There were no IDF casualties (IDF spokesperson, October 11, 2025). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported the death of Mahdi Ahmed Kamil, 20 years old, in the town of Qabatiya, south of Jenin (Quds Agency, October 16, 2025).
  • On October 28, Israeli security forces operated in the village of Qud, near Jenin, to eliminate a terrorist cell affiliated with a Jenin refugee camp network planning to carry out an attack. The forces identified three terrorists leaving a cave and neutralized them. An Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked the cave (IDF and police spokespersons, October 28, 2025). Hamas’ military wing announced that two of the dead belonged to its ranks, “commander” Abdullah Muhammad Jalameh and “mujahid” Qais Ibrahim al-Bitawi, killed along with “mujahid” Ahmed Azmi Nashrati after an armed clash with “occupation” special forces in the village of Qud (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, October 28, 2025). The PIJ’s military wing reported that the three dead were its operatives: “commander” Ziyad Nasser Muhammad Gaatz, 23 years old, “mujahid” Ahmed Azmi ‘Aref Nashrati, 29 years old, and Abd al-Wahab Hassan Abd al-Wahab al-‘Alaqma, who were killed after an armed clash lasting several hours with “enemy” forces who had surrounded them in the cave (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 28, 2025).

• During October 2025, the police and the ISA also prevented terrorist attacks inside Israel:
• On October 31, it was cleared for publication that on October 17, a 14-year-old boy from Jaffa was detained in Ramallah on suspicion of belonging to and conspiring with terrorist organizations. During questioning he revealed that he had made contact with ISIS and Hamas and provided photos of sites in Israel allegedly connected to the security forces. The investigation also revealed that he wanted to prepare explosives, become and shaheed and attack the State of Israel (police spokesperson, October 31, 2025).

Hezbollah

• During October the IDF continued its operations to prevent Hezbollah from renewing its military capabilities, reconstructing its arsenal and maintaining a presence in south Lebanon in violation of the ceasefire. Given its accelerated efforts to rebuild its facilities^[7] and the slow progress and delays in implementing the Lebanese army’s plan to disarm Hezbollah,^[8] the IDF intensified enforcement in the al-Nabatiyeh area north of the Litani River and in the Beqa’a Valley (see map). The IDF attacked engineering equipment and a quarry used for producing cement which supported reconstruction work, as well as facilities for producing missile production, weapons depots, and military compounds belonging to Hezbollah and its elite Radwan Force. Twenty Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, most of them involved in infrastructure reconstruction, including the logistics commander of the southern front headquarters and a maintenance officer, commanders and operatives in the Radwan Force and Hezbollah’s aerial unit, a weapons smuggler, and local liaisons responsible for the organization’s interfacing with the local population (IDF spokesperson, October 1–November 1, 2025).
• Mourning notices were issued on Hezbollah’s social media accounts and communication channels for the deaths of twenty-four of the organization’s operatives (balagh and South Lebanon–Observer of the Enemy Telegram channels and Lebanese media, October 1–November 1, 2025):
  • Ali Muhammad Qara‘uni, aka Abu al-Fadl, from Kafra.
  • “Engineer” Ahmed Hassan Saad, aka Amir, from Kfar Roummane.
  • “Engineer” Mustafa Hussein Razzak, aka Sadiq, from Kfar Roummane.
  • Hasan Ali Atwi, aka Muhammad Hussein, from Kfar Kila.
  • Muhammad Ali Issa, aka Abu Mustafa, from Kafra.
  • Ali Hassan Qaddouh, aka Abu al-Fadl, from Yater.
  • Ali Hussein Sultan, aka Dhu al-Fiqar, from Souaneh.
  • Hassan Ma’ruf Rahhal, aka Abu Ali Ma’ruf, from Khirbet Selm.
  • Ahmed Ali Ba’albaki, aka Tha’er, from Selaa.
  • Issa Ahmed Karbala, aka al-Hadi, from Ayn Qana.
  • Maher Hassan Younes, aka Jawad, from Arabsalim.
  • Muhammad Haidar Ghazini, aka Jihad, from Ayn Biswar.
  • Hisham Mousa Khalil, aka Haidar, from Maarakah.
  • “Commander” Abbas Karki, aka al-Hajj Abu Jihad, from Harouf.
  • Ridha Muhammad Atwi, aka Nour, from Zawtar al-Gharbiya.
  • Zein al-Abidin Hussein Fatouni, aka Karbala’, from al-Halloussiyah.
  • Muhammad Akram Arabiya, aka Haidar, from Qlaileh.
  • Abd Mahmoud al-Sayyid, aka Karbala, from Beit Lif.
  • “Commander” Ali Nour al-Din al-Mousawi, aka Sayyid Assad, from Nabi Chit.
  • Hussein Ibrahim Suleiman, aka Abu Turab.
  • Hassan Ibrahim Suleiman, aka al-Hadi.
  • Hussein Ali Tohmeh, aka Abu al-Fadl, from Aita al-Shaab.
  • Ibrahim Mahmoud Raslan, aka Abu Ja’far, from Kounine.
  • Hassan Hamed Gheith, aka Muhammad Aliq, from the Sir al-Gharbiyeh.

• In October 2025 the IDF continued operations in the buffer zone on the Golan Heights, conducting targeted raids in villages both inside and outside the zone, in the Quneitra and Daraa provinces of southern Syria. The forces prevented weapons from being smuggled into Israel and Lebanon, including pistols, rifles and anti-tank rockets (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and Syrian media, October 31–November 1, 2025).

    
Weapons seized during IDF operations in the Mount Hermon area
(IDF spokesperson, October 18 and 23, 2025)

Attacks against Israel

• Following the entry into force of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on October 10, 2025, Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi ordered the suspension of military operations against Israel and against ships “identified with Israel.” However, al-Houthi and senior figures in the movement’s leadership warned that they are prepared to resume activity if “the Israeli enemy” violates the agreement.^[9] The Houthis’ military spokesman, Yahya Saria, stated that since the beginning of the war, the Houthis carried out 758 “operations” using 1,835 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, drones, and warships. Additionally, 346 attacks were carried out against “Israeli” vessels that violated the “blockade on Israeli shipping,” and more than 228 vessels were attacked (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, October 16, 2025).
• During October 2025 (until the beginning of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip), Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saria claimed responsibility for one attack against “several sensitive targets in the occupied Jerusalem area” using a “Palestine 2” hypersonic ballistic missile with a cluster warhead. According to him, the attack successfully achieved its objectives, causing “millions of herds of usurping Zionists” to flee to bomb shelters (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, October 5, 2025). The IDF Spokesperson announced the interception of one ballistic missile launched from Yemen and the interception of seven drones launched from Yemen, four of which were intercepted within one hour (IDF Spokesperson, October 1-8, 2025).

Houthi attacks against Israel – 2025^[10]

Elimination of the Houthi chief of staff

• On October 16, 2025, the Houthi forces announced the death of the chief of staff, Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari, “as part of his jihad activity on the road to Jerusalem.” The announcement emphasized that the rounds of conflict with “the enemies” have not ended and they will be punished for the “crimes” they committed. Although the announcement did not disclose the circumstances of his death, it is assumed that al-Ghamari was killed in the Israeli airstrike on August 28, 2025, against a building in Sana’a, where dozens of senior Houthi officials were present. The Houthi Prime Minister and at least 11 ministers were also killed in the attack (Al-Masirah, October 16, 2025). The Houthi official media announced that the new chief of staff is Yusuf Hassan Ismail al-Madani, commander of the “Western (Fifth) Military Region,” responsible for the Red Sea and Yemen’s coastal areas and for the Houthis’ naval forces (Saba News Agency, October 16, 2025). The IDF Spokesperson confirmed that al-Ghamari had been eliminated in the August 28, 2025, strike, noting that he had played a key role in building the Houthis’ military power and establishing their missile and weapons-production systems. He was trained by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran (IDF Spokesperson, October 16, 2025).

• Senior leaders of the Houthi movement and members of the “Axis of Resistance” published eulogies for al-Ghamari, emphasizing his role in the “resistance” against Israel and clarifying that they will continue his path. The following are notable statements:
  • Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al-Houthi emphasized that al-Ghamari contributed significantly to the struggle in support of the Gaza Strip. Referring to the Israeli strike in which al-Ghamari was wounded, al-Houthi said that “the enemies” tried to recruit spies to provide them with information, and one of the notable crimes they committed was assisting the Israeli strike on the government meeting. According to him, “the spies” monitored the meeting and reported to “the Israeli enemy” (Al-Masirah, October 16, 2025). In another reference, al-Houthi claimed that the Yemeni people view the armed forces and military establishment as an expression of their aspirations, and that “the enemy” must understand well that casualties among the Yemeni people have no negative impact on morale (Houthi Movement Telegram channel, October 21, 2025).
  • The Houthi movement’s announcement stated that al-Ghamari oversaw the rebuilding of the armed forces, developed operational plans, and formulated offensive tactics. He also advanced the Houthi armed forces’ reliance on self-production. During the war, he led the planning and coordination of military operations “in support of the Palestinian people while resisting the crimes of the Zionist enemy.” In this context, he “imposed absolute control over the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait and besieged the ports of occupied Palestine” (Ansar Allah Movement Telegram channel, October 18, 2025).
  • Mahdi al-Mashat, chairman of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, stressed that the death of the chief of staff “will only increase our strength and courage more than before.” According to him, his death has had and will have no impact on performance, and their stance remains firm regardless of challenges and sacrifices (Saba News Agency, October 20, 2025).
  • In a statement by the Houthis’ Defense Minister, Muhammad Nasser al-Atifi, it was noted that al-Ghamari dedicated all his efforts and time to the path of jihad and fulfilled his responsibility at the highest level. It was also stated that he was killed “while performing his duty in support of the Palestinian cause.” The statement also said that the Houthi forces are fully prepared in all areas for any confrontation or “aggression” (Houthi Movement Telegram channel, October 16, 2025). It should be noted that reports were published that al-Atifi was also critically wounded, and possibly even killed, in the Israeli strike that eliminated al-Ghamari, and he has also not been seen publicly since, despite statements being published in his name (Al-Mashhad Al-Yamani, October 22, 2025).
  • The new Houthi chief of staff, Yusuf al-Madani, promised that they would continue “on the jihadist and practical path that al-Ghamari laid out during his tenure.” He added that al-Ghamari’s blood is a force for them to continue “in the struggle for Allah and in support of the oppressed” (Al-Masirah, October 17, 2025).

     
Al-Ghamari’s funeral (Al-Masirah, October 20, 2025)

• • IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour expressed his condolences on al-Ghamari’s death and said that al-Ghamari’s eternal struggle to defend Yemen’s honor and sovereignty and the victorious confrontation against the “crimes of the Zionist enemy” had recorded an eternal epic in the history of the Yemeni Mujahideen. He also stressed the readiness to strengthen strategic ties with the Houthi forces in dealing with “the Zionists and global arrogance.” Pakpour also welcomed the appointment of the new Houthi chief of staff, Yusuf al-Madani (Tasnim News Agency, October 19, 2025). Abdolrahim Mousavi, chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, stated that al-Ghamari had played a decisive role “in punishing the Zionist entity for its crimes in the Gaza Strip and its attacks against Yemen” (Al-Alam Network, October 16, 2025).
  • Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem stressed in his condolence message that al-Ghamari “courageously led the movement in support of the Gaza Strip and its people, shattered the reverence for the American forces in the Red Sea and disrupted the Zionists’ nights.” Qassem welcomed the appointment of the new chief of staff, al-Madani, adding that they are confident that al-Ghamari’s blood will lead to victory (Hezbollah’s media arm Telegram channel, October 19, 2025).
  • Hamas’ military wing said that “the cowardly policy of assassinations had long since proven its failure” and that “the blood of our people and leaders will illuminate our path to dignity and freedom” (Hamas’ military wing Telegram channel, October 16, 2025). The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) said that “our Palestinian people will remain loyal to the victims of the Yemeni people” (PIJ Telegram channel, October 16, 2025).
  • Kata’ib Hezbollah said in a statement that al-Ghamari supported “the oppressed in all corners of the world and dedicated his life to defending the Muslims and punishing their enemies.” The Iraqi militia also stressed that “the deep pain has given rise to armies of fighters who will not rest until the two horns of the devil are removed from the land of messages.” In its statement, the militia told the Houthi movement that “together we will fulfill the promise of Allah and the hopes of the oppressed” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, October 16, 2025).

Attacks against vessels

• During October 2025 (until the beginning of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip), the Houthis’ military spokesman, Yahya Saria, claimed responsibility for one attack against a vessel that allegedly “violated the ban on entering the ports of occupied Palestine”:
  • On October 1, 2025, Saria stated that the vessel Minervagracht was attacked in the Gulf of Aden using a cruise missile and suffered a direct hit that caused a fire to break out (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, October 1, 2025). The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on September 29, 2025, about an explosion near a ship sailing in the Red Sea, approximately 230 km southeast of the port of Aden in Yemen, and that the ship was on fire (UKMTO X account, September 29, 2025). The European Union task force (EUNAVFOR Aspides) confirmed that the cargo ship MV Minervagracht, flying the Dutch flag, was attacked and was on fire and drifting at sea. All 19 crew members were rescued by frigates from Greece and France. Two of them were injured, one of whom was evacuated in serious condition to a hospital in Djibouti (EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, September 30, 2025). It was later reported that the crew member who was seriously injured died of his wounds (Reuters, October 7, 2025).