Spotlight on Terrorism – October 2024

Hezbollah attacks

• During October 2024 Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 806 attacks on Israeli military, security and civilian targets, the highest monthly figure since the start of the conflict on October 8, 2023. Hezbollah also claimed to have carried out 47 attacks on October 25, the highest daily figure so far. The attacks involved rockets and missiles, UAVs, exploding drones and anti-tank missiles. Hezbollah also claimed to have used explosive devices and anti-aircraft missiles to attack IDF forces in Lebanese territory (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 1-31, 2024). According to IDF data, at least 2,400 rockets and more than sixty UAVs were launched into Israeli territory. Thirty-three IDF soldiers were killed in fighting in south Lebanon, three IDF soldiers and fourteen civilians were killed in Hezbollah attacks in Israel, and extensive property damage was caused (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 1-31, 2024).

• Hezbollah’s activities during October 2024 included:
  • Increasing attacks on Israeli territory: On October 1, 2024, Hezbollah launched its first rocket attack on the Tel Aviv area. The following day, Hezbollah launched a volley of rockets at the Haifa area in response to an IDF maneuver in south Lebanon, which the organization described as a “barbaric Israeli invasion.” Throughout the month, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for attacks on several targets in Israel. Additionally, Hezbollah increased attacks on Israeli communities within 25 kilometers of the border, claiming there were military forces present, making them “legitimate targets.”

• • Attacks on IDF forces fighting in the ground maneuver: Hezbollah claimed responsibility for attacks on Israeli forces operating in south Lebanon and on troop assembly areas on the northern border. Hezbollah attacked with rockets, drones, anti-tank missiles and explosive devices. Many of the organization’s statements included false claims of “successes” in the field and allegations that Israel was concealing the truth. Among other things, the organization claimed that dozens of IDF soldiers had been killed and injured and that dozens of tanks had been destroyed.
  • Khaybar Operations:^[2] On October 1, 2024, Hezbollah announced the start of the Khaybar operations series, a response to the call, “At your command, Nasrallah!” by launching missiles at the Greater Tel Aviv area. Forty-one Khaybar operations were carried out during October, most of them targeting the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas. A Khaybar drone strike killed four soldiers north of Tel Aviv. Hezbollah claimed that the objective of the Khaybar operations was to demonstrate Hezbollah’s advanced capabilities and confuse and exhaust Israel (al-Jazeera, November 8, 2024).
  • Attack on the prime minister’s residence: On the morning of October 19, 2024, a UAV launched from Lebanon hit the home of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Caesarea. the prime minister and his family were not present and there were no casualties, but the building was damaged. Hezbollah did not mention the attack in its claims of responsibility, but on October 22, 2024, Mahmoud Afif, head of Hezbollah media information, confirmed that Hezbollah took “full and exclusive responsibility for the attack on the criminal’s home” and warned that Hezbollah would attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister again. Na’im Qassem, in his first speech as secretary general, boasted about the attack and justified it as a response to the killing of Nasrallah.
  • Use of new weapons: On October 1, 2024, Hezbollah announced it had used heavy Fadi-4 rockets^[3] for the first time in the attack on the Greater Tel Aviv area. On October 16, 2024, Hezbollah announced the first use of a Qadr-2 missile^[4] in an attack on the outskirts of Tel Aviv two days earlier, as well as the first use of a Nasr-1 missile^[5] in an attack two days earlier. On October 19, Hezbollah announced the first launch of M-80 rockets.^[6] On October 21, 2024, Hezbollah announced the first strike using a Nasr-2 ballistic missile the previous day.^[7]

   
Right: A Qadr-2 missile en route to Tel Aviv (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 16, 2024). Left: Nasr-2 missiles about to be launched at Haifa (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 21, 2024)

Na’im Qassem appointed Hezbollah secretary general

• On October 29, 2024, Hezbollah announced that the Shura Council had appointed Sheikh Naim Qassem as the organization’s new secretary general to replace Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli strike on Beirut on September 27, 2024. In his first speech he pledged to continue Nasrallah’s path and said Hezbollah would conclude the current war against Israel only under conditions favorable to the organization.^[8]

Hezbollah casualties

• In October 2024, Hezbollah stopped publishing the names of senior figures and terrorist operatives killed in IDF strikes, most probably because of the high number of casualties following the escalation of Israeli activities in September 2024 and to prevent further morale decline after Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures were killed.^[9] However, on social media accounts, including unofficial ones affiliated with Hezbollah, pictures of over 500 commanders at various levels and operatives, including fighters from the Radwan Force, were published (Qalaat al Madiq Telegram channel, October 1 and November 1, 2024).

   
Some of Hezbollah’s casualties (Right: October 19, 2024. Left: Qalaat al Madiq Telegram channel, October 23, 2024)

• • Hezbollah’s only mourning notice was issued on October 23, 2024, and confirmed the death of Hashem Safi al-Din, chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, who was killed as a “martyr on the way to Jerusalem” during a “Zionist” attack. The notice claimed that “Sayyid Hashem devoted most of his life to serving Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance” and had “responsibly” managed the Executive Council along with “various institutions and units engaged in resistance.” Hezbollah also pledged to continue the path of “resistance” and jihad until their goals were achieved and they were victorious (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 23, 2024). Shortly beforehand, the IDF spokesperson confirmed that Hashem Safi al-Din, Nasrallah’s proposed successor as secretary general, was killed in an airstrike on Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut on the night of October 3, 2024 (IDF spokesperson, October 22, 2024).

   
Right: Hashem Safi al-Din’s “ID” card (IDF spokesperson, October 22, 2024). Left: From Hezbollah’s mourning notice for Hashem Safi al-Din (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 23, 2024)

• • The IDF reported that 25 other senior Hezbollah commanders and terrorist operatives were killed in the airstrike, including Hussein Ali Hazima, head of Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters; Bilal Saeb Ayyash, head of aerial reconnaissance at the intelligence headquarters; and Mahmoud Mohammed Shahin, head of Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters in Syria (IDF spokesperson, October 22, 2024). According to a Hezbollah statement not published on the organization’s official channels, the “great jihadist commander,” Hussein Ali Hazima, aka al-Hajj Murtada, who had been in charge Hezbollah intelligence for many years, had been killed in an operation by the “bloodthirsty Zionist enemy” and joined his fellow “martyrs” (al-Mayadeen, October 24, 2024; Mehr, October 24, 2024).

     
Mourning notice issued by Hezbollah for Hazima (Hassan Nasrallah’s X account, October 25, 2024. Left: Muhammad Jawad’s X account, October 24, 2024)

• During October 2024 the IDF targeted Hezbollah commanders of various ranks and other senior operatives (IDF spokesperson, October 1-31, 2024):
  • Muhammad Ja’far Qasir, commander of Unit 4400, responsible for smuggling in weapons from Iran and its affiliates to Hezbollah in Lebanon for 15 years. He was in charge of Hezbollah’s financing efforts, including leading economic initiatives to fund the organization’s terrorist activities, establishing financial facilities and recruiting businesspeople worldwide. He was also responsible for transferring funds from Iran and Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
  • Zulfiqar Hannawi, commander of the Imam Hussein Division, which operates alongside Hezbollah. The division was established by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force and is composed of thousands of terrorist operatives from various countries in the Middle East, who fight in south Lebanon and attack Israel from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

   
Right: Muhammad Ja’far Qasir with Syrian President Assad and the late Qassem Soleimani, former commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force (Dr. Salim al-Dulimi’s X account, January 25, 2024). Left: Zulfiqar Hannawi (Iran Azadi X account, October 3, 2024)

• • Muhammad Youssef Anisi, a senior figure in Hezbollah’s weapons production management and a key leader in the precision missile production project.
  • Muhammad Rashid Sakafi, head of Hezbollah’s communications network since 2000, closely associated with Hezbollah’s senior leadership. He worked to develop continuous communication across all units and departments within Hezbollah.
  • Suheil Hussein Husseini, head of Hezbollah’s headquarters. In social media posts announcing his death, he was given the title “the great jihadist commander” (Dr. Salim al-Dulimi’s X account, October 11, 2024).

• • Ahmed Hassan Nazzal, responsible for Radwan Force attacks from the Bint Jbeil sector.
  • Hussein Talal Kamal, responsible for the Hajir sector.
  • Mousa Diab Barakat, outgoing head of the Hajir sector.
  • Mahmoud Mousa Karnib, operations commander in the Hajir sector.
  • Ali Ahmad Isma’il, artillery commander in the Bint Jbeil sector.
  • Abdallah Ali Daqiq, artillery commander in the Hajir sector.
  • Ahmed Mustafa al-Hajj Ali, commander of the Houla area.
  • Muhammad Ali Hamdan, commander of the anti-tank unit in the Meis al-Jabal area.
  • Hussein Muhammad Asili, reportedly the commander of the Radwan Force following the death of Wissam Tawil in January 2024 (Mustafa Kamel’s X account, October 13, 2024).

• • Al-Hajj Abbas Salamah, senior official in Hezbollah’s Southern Front command, managing combat in the Bint Jbeil sector.
  • Rida Abbas Awadah, senior communications expert in Hezbollah.
  • Ahmed Ali Hussein, head of a production team focused on Hezbollah’s strategic armament, trained in Iran.
  • Khalil Muhammad Amhaz, operative in Unit 127, involved in the development and launch of explosive and reconnaissance UAVs.
  • Abbas Adnan Musalem, commander of the Aitaroun area in the Radwan Force.
  • Ahmed Ja’far Ma’touq, commander of the Bint Jbeil sector, and his successor.
  • Muhammad Khalil Alyan, commander of the anti-tank unit in the Hajir sector within the Nasr Unit.
  • Mustafa Ahmad Shehadi, deputy commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force. Previously, he was in charge of Radwan Force operations in Syria from 2012 to 2017.

Casualties from other terrorist organizations

Hamas-Lebanon

• During October 2024, Hamas’ military wing announced the deaths of two of its operatives in Lebanon:
  • “Commander” Saeed Ata Allah Ali was killed along with his wife and two daughters in a “cowardly Zionist” strike on their home in the al-Baddawi refugee camp in the Tripoli region of northern Lebanon on October 5, 2024 (Hamas Telegram channel, October 5, 2024). The IDF spokesperson confirmed that Saeed Alaa Naif Ali, an operative of Hamas’ military wing, was killed in an airstrike in Tripoli. According to reports, he led attacks on Israeli targets and worked to recruit operatives for Hamas (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024).
  • Operative Muhammad Hussein al-Luwis was killed in a “cowardly Zionist” strike in al-Fayda-Sa’adnayel, in western Lebanon Valley (Hamas Telegram channel, October 5, 2024). The IDF spokesperson stated that Muhammad Hussein Ali al-Mahmoud was killed in an airstrike on October 5, 2024. He reportedly promoted attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and abroad and furthered the establishment of Hamas in Lebanon, including rocket fire at Israel (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024).

Amal

•    During October 2024, the Amal Movement announced the deaths of at least 61 of its members, including medics and participants in Amal’s scout movement, who were killed in IDF strikes in Lebanon. Among the casualties, 24 were designated as “Jihad fighters,” including “commander” Bassam Muhammad Hassan al-Moussawi, who were killed while fulfilling their “national duty and jihad in defending Lebanon and the south” (Amal Telegram channel, October 7-31, 2024).

Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB)

• The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Fatah’s military, reported that operative Hassan Munir al-Maqdah was killed “while fulfilling his duty in the struggle” during an Israeli airstrike on the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon, south Lebanon. The AAMB stated it would resolutely continue on the path of revolution and resistance “until liberation and return” (AAMB Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).

Foreign operatives fighting in the ranks of Hezbollah

• According to reports, in October 2024 Iraqis were killed fighting in the ranks of Hezbollah. One was an operative in the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades (Qalaat Al Madiq Telegram channel, October 13, 2024), Uday Razzaq al-Lami was affiliated with the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades ; Ali al-Hadi As’ad Atiya al-Salami, affiliated with the “popular mobilization” (X account of Haider al-Quraishi, October 25, 2024); and Abbas Abd al-Hussein Ali al-Khafaji came from Karbala (X account of QalaatM, October 29, 2024).
• It was also reported that at least five Houthi fighters were killed in south Lebanon during October 2024 while fighting in the ranks of Hezbollah against Israel. According to the report, the fighters came from the Sa’dah province in Yemen, considered a Houthi stronghold and home to many of the organization’s senior leadership (Ali al-Sakani’s X account, October 27, 2024).

The Gaza Strip

Rocket fire

• During October 2024, 28 rockets were fired at Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip, compared to four rockets in September. No casualties were reported:
  • October 4 (noon) – Two rockets were fired at Kissufim and Ein HaShlosha; one was intercepted, and the other fell in an open area. No injuries were reported (Israeli media, October 4, 2024). The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), claimed responsibility for the attack, which was “in response to the crimes of the occupation” and in defense of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades Telegram channel, October 4, 2024). The Brigades issued a video showing rocket launches along with pictures of Hassan Nasrallah and three senior Hezbollah figures killed in IDF strikes in Beirut (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades Telegram channel, October 5, 2024).

   
Rocket fire and Hassan Nasrallah in a PFLP video
(Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades Telegram channel, October 5, 2024)

• • October 6 (afternoon) – Two rockets were fired at the Ashkelon coast. One was intercepted and the other fell in an open area. No injuries were reported (Israeli media, October 6, 2024). The Jerusalem Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), claimed responsibility for launching rockets at Ashkelon and the cities, towns and villages near the Gaza Strip (Paltoday Telegram channel, October 6, 2024).
  • October 7 (morning) – Four rockets were fired from the southern Gaza Strip at the western Negev, exactly one year after the start of the Hamas attack and massacre. Three rockets were intercepted and one fell in an open area. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson, October 7, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility, claiming it had launched a number of 114mm Rujoum rockets at the Rafah crossing and Kerem Shalom (Hamas military wing Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).
  • October 7 (before noon) – Five rockets were fired from the Khan Yunis area at the Greater Tel Aviv area. One rocket fell in an open area in Holon, where two women were injured by shrapnel (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 7, 2024). Hamas’ Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, its military wing, claimed responsibility for launching M-90 missiles at Tel Aviv as part of the “ongoing war of attrition and in response to the Zionist massacre” (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).
  • October 7 (afternoon) – Five rockets were fired from northern Gaza Strip at the cities, towns and villages near the border; the rockets were intercepted. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson, October 7, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing the rockets (Paltoday Telegram channel, October 7, 2024).
  • October 8 (afternoon) – Two rockets were fired at the cities, towns and villages near the Gaza Strip; the rockets were intercepted. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 8, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility (Palestine al-Youm Telegram channel, October 8, 2024).
  • October 9 (noon) – A rocket was fired at the cities, towns and villages near the Gaza Strip; it was intercepted. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 9, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing several rockets (Paltoday Telegram channel, October 9, 2024).
  • October 11 (noon) – A rocket was fired from the northern Gaza Strip at the cities, towns and villages near the border; the rocket was intercepted. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 11, 2024). The Nidal al-Amoudi Brigade of the AAMB claimed responsibility for firing Aqsa-103 rockets at Sderot (al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades – Nidal al-Amoudi Brigade Telegram channel, October 11, 2024).
  • October 12 (afternoon) – Two rockets were fired at Ashqelon from the northern Gaza Strip and fell in open areas. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 12, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility rockets at Ashkelon and the cities, towns and villages near the border (Paltoday Telegram channel, October 12, 2024).
  • October 16 (afternoon) – A rocket was fired from the northern Gaza at the cities, towns and villages near the border; the rocket was intercepted. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 16, 2024). The Omar al-Qassem Forces, the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), claimed responsibility for short-range rocket fire, in coordination with the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees (DFLP central media Telegram channel, October 16, 2024).
  • October 16 (evening) – Two rockets were fired at Sderot from northern Gaza toward the Sderot area and intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 16, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for firing a volley of rockets (Paltoday Telegram channel, October 16, 2024).
  • October 21 (afternoon) – A rocket was fired at Sderot from the northern Gaza Strip and intercepted. No injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 21, 2024).

Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire since June 2022

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits

UAVs launched from the Gaza Strip

• On October 10, a UAV was intercepted after crossing from the Gaza Strip into Israel. There were no injuries or damage (IDF spokesperson, October 10, 2024). Hamas’ military wing issued a video of the launch of an al-Zawari suicide UAV at an IDF patrol east of Khan Yunis on October 10. The video showed the stages of UAV preparation, launch, flight, and its apparent impact on the target (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 13, 2024).

Counterterrorism activities

• During October 2024, Israeli security forces eliminated prominent terrorist operatives in the Gaza Strip, and Israeli Air Force aircraft targeted terrorist operatives operating in civilian sites in the Gaza Strip to plan and execute terrorist attacks against IDF forces and the State of Israel. In all cases, measures were taken to minimize harm to civilians:^[10]
  • On October 1, Muhammad Zanoun and Basel Akhras, who participated in the Hamas attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, were killed in an airstrike (IDF spokesperson and Israeli Security Agency spokesperson, October 8, 2024).
  • On October 2, Abd al-Aziz Salha was killed in an airstrike in Deir al-Balah. He was involved in the brutal slaughter of two IDF reservists in Ramallah in October 2000, and he was photographed standing at the Ramallah police station window, showing his blood-stained hands. Salha, 43, originally from the village of Deir Jarir in Binyamin, was arrested in 2001 but released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange in 2011 and deported to the Gaza Strip. In recent years, he was involved in directing terrorist activities in Judea and Samaria (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024).

• • On October 9, Palestinian media reported 17 fatalities in an Israeli strike on displaced persons’ tents at the al-Iman al-Said hospital in northern Gaza (al-Aqsa TV, October 9, 2024). The IDF spokesperson confirmed that aircraft struck a command and control center operating in a facility previously used as a medical complex in the Jebalya refugee camp. At least ten Hamas terrorist operatives and two PIJ terrorist operatives were identified among the fatalities, some of whom participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, October 10, 2024).

• • On the evening of October 17, 2024, the IDF spokesman announced that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau, had been killed by IDF forces in Rafah.^[11] According to the statement, on October 16, 2024, IDF forces identified three suspicious figures moving between buildings in the Tel al-Sultan neighborhood in Rafah. After the forces shot at the suspects, one was seen entering a building and a tank fired at him. A drone identified the armed suspect, masked and injured, sitting inside the building, prompting a second tank shell, which killed him. The two other suspects were also killed. On the morning of October 17, after forces entered the building, they recognized the deceased as al-Sinwar, and tests confirmed his identity (IDF spokesperson, October 17, 2024).
  • On October 18, 2024, Hamas announced al-Sinwar’s death, expressing pride in his having “fallen on the battlefield.” Hamas claimed al-Sinwar had died fighting for the defense of al-Aqsa, the rights of the Palestinian people, and the liberation of “Palestine,” and praised him as a commander who led the “resistance” movement in Gaza to “numerous achievements,” especially during Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Hamas claimed the enemy was mistaken if it believed that eliminating “resistance” leaders like al-Sinwar, Isma’il Haniyeh, and Hassan Nasrallah would extinguish the “resistance” flame, adding that the Palestinian struggle would continue until its “legitimate goals” had been achieved (al-Mayadeen, October 18, 2024).

• • On October 16, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, the commander of Hamas’ UAV unit in northern Gaza, was killed in an airstrike (IDF spokesperson, October 16, 2024).
  • On October 18, 2024, Hamas announced the death of Mahmoud Hamdan, aka Abu Yusuf, commander of the Tal al-Sultan Battalion in Rafah, killed while “confronting the occupation army in the Tal al-Sultan neighborhood, alongside the leader of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Yahya al-Sinwar” (Hamas West Bank Telegram channel, October 18, 2024). Later, the IDF spokesperson stated that the announcement from September 10, 2024, regarding the death of Muhammad Hamdan was incorrect, and he was actually killed in a clash with IDF forces on October 18, 2024, about 200 meters from where al-Sinwar was killed. According to the statement, Hamdan had been responsible for the security of al-Sinwar and the six hostages who were murdered and whose bodies were found in Rafah at the end of August 2024 (IDF spokesperson, October 18, 2024).

• • On October 23, Muhammad Abu Atiwi, the nukhba commander of the al-Bureij Battalion of Hamas’ Central Camps Brigade, was killed in an airstrike. According to reports, he commanded the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre in a shelter on Route 232 near Re’im, where 16 Israelis were murdered and four abducted. He was also involved attacking IDF forces in the Gaza Strip. Since July 2022, he had been employed by UNRWA (IDF spokesperson, October 24, 2024).

• • In October 2024, the IDF confirmed previous targeted killings of senior Hamas figures and operatives of its military wing:
  • The IDF confirmed reported that three senior Hamas figures, close associates of Yahya al-Sinwar, were killed in a strike approximately three months previously. They were Rawhi Mushtaha, head of Hamas governance in Gaza, was killed in an airstrike in July 2024, along with Sami Odeh, commander of Hamas’ general security forces, and Sameh al-Saraj, responsible for security within Hamas’ political bureau and executive committee. According to reports, Mushtaha had direct influence over Hamas’ military operations and held other senior position, including overseeing the political council’s prisoners’ portfolio. He was also a founder of Hamas’ general security forces (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024). Hamas has not officially confirmed their deaths.

.   
Sami Odeh and Sameh al-Saraj’s “ID cards” (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024)

• • Muhammad Rifai, a terrorist operative in the Gaza Brigade who participated in the massacres in Kfar Aza and Nahal Oz on October 7, 2023, was killed in an airstrike on Hamas compound at the Shejaiya School in Daraj Tuffah on September 30, 2024 (IDF spokesperson and Israeli Security Agency spokesperson, October 8, 2024).
  • Samer Abu Daqqa, head of Hamas’ aerial array, was killed in an airstrike in the al-Mawasi area in September 2024. He led Hamas’ aerial invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, using paragliders and UAVs. He had also been head of Hamas’ UAV unit and involved in the production and development of weapons for the organization (IDF spokesperson, October 14, 2024).

Israel, Judea and Samaria

Terrorist attacks

• During October 2024, Palestinian terrorists carried out eight attacks, compared to six in September. Eight civilians and two security personnel were killed. Three of the attackers held Israeli ID cards, and two others were Jordanian citizens:
  • Shooting and stabbing attack in Tel Aviv: On October 1, two Palestinian terrorists indiscriminately opened fire on passengers in a light rail car at the Jerusalem Boulevard station in Jaffa, then continued to shoot pedestrians. Seven people were killed and 16 were injured. Security personnel and armed civilians shot the two terrorists, killing one and injuring the other. They were identified as Muhammad Misk, 19, and Ahmed al-Haimouni, 25, both from Hebron (Police and Israeli Security Agency spokespersons, October 1-2, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for the attack, calling it part of Operation True Promise 2, which was followed shortly after by an Iranian ballistic missile attack. According to Hamas, “operatives” stabbed a soldier, seized his weapon and then executed the attack at two locations in central Tel Aviv. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades warned there would be further attacks as long as the “occupation and aggression” against the Gaza Strip continued (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Telegram channel, October 2, 2024). Hamas also issued a mourning notice for Muhammad Rashad Misk as killed during the “heroic operation in Jaffa” with prisoner Ahmad al-Haimouni (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 3, 2024).

• • Stabbing at an IDF base: On October 3, 2024, a Palestinian terrorist from Yatta armed with a knife went to an IDF base near Hebron. IDF soldiers shot and killed him (IDF spokesperson, October 3, 2024). He was as Salah Ziyad Issa Shawahin, 23, from Yatta, south of Hebron (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, October 3, 2024). The Mujahideen Brigades in Judea and Samaria^[12] claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming that Shawahin had wounded soldiers and the Israeli authorities were concealing it (Mujahideen Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 3, 2024).
  • Shooting in Beersheba: On October 6, an armed Israeli Bedouin terrorist opened fire inside a McDonald’s in the central bus station in Beersheba. A Border Police officer was killed and 12 were injured. Soldiers shot and killed the terrorist, identified as Ahmed Said Suleiman al-Uqbi, 29, a resident of Uqbi near Hura, an Israeli citizen with a criminal record. He was related to the terrorist who killed an IDF soldier at the same location in 2015 (Israeli media, October 6, 2024). Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida praised the attack, claiming al-Uqbi was “one of the heroes of our people within the occupied ‘interior’ ” (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, October 6, 2024).
  • Stabbing in Hadera: On October 9, an Arab-Israeli terrorist armed with an axe and a knife rode a motorcycle through several areas in Hadera, randomly attacking passersby. He murdered one Israeli civilian and wounded five others. Armed civilians shot and wounded him (Israeli media, October 9, 2024). The attacker was identified as Ahmed Jabareen, 36, from Umm al-Fahm, originally from the village of al-Taybeh in Jenin district. He received Israeli citizenship through marriage to an Israeli citizen (Walla News, October 9, 2024). According to the indictment, Jabareen, who was extremely religious and supported ISIS, expressed hatred of Israel and Jews and attacked because of religious and nationalist motives (Israeli media, November 12, 2024). Social media circulated a photo of Jabareen with Wiam al-Hariri, a Hamas operative from the Jenin refugee camp, who was killed by Israeli security forces on November 1, 2023 (jeniincamp Telegram channel, October 9, 2024). Hamas praised the “heroic attack,” claiming it had sent the message that Israel’s “crimes” in Gaza, Judea and Samaria would not go unpunished, the flame of “resistance” would continue to burn, and its strikes would continue deep inside Israeli territory. Hamas also called for continuing to attack Israel until “Israeli aggression” ended and Israel was defeated (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 9, 2024). The PIJ called the attack a “natural response” to Israel’s “genocidal war” and ongoing crimes against Palestinians” (PIJ media information Telegram channel, October 9, 2024).

• Shooting on Route 4: On October 15, 2024, a Palestinian terrorist shot at vehicles on Route 4 near Yavne, killing a police officer and injuring four. Armed civilians shot and killed him (Israel Police Force spokesperson’s unit, October 15, 2024). He was Muhammad Bassam Khalil Dardouna, 28 years old, from Jebalya in the Gaza Strip, who was illegally in Israel with permits obtained before October 7, 2023 (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, October 15, 2024). Hamas praised the shooting, calling it a “natural and necessary response in light of the ongoing massacre, siege and mistreatment of our people and our land.” Hamas claimed it and previous attacks demonstrated the “resistance’s ability to cause the enemy pain” (Hamas Telegram channel, October 15, 2024). The PIJ also praised the attack, claiming it showed the “constant readiness of the ‘resistance’ and its ability to deliver painful blows to the oppressive entity, anytime and anywhere in our occupied lands” (PIJ Telegram channel, October 15, 2024).
• Shooting near the Dead Sea: On October 18, 2024, two Jordanian civilians infiltrated Israeli territory and attempted to enter Neot HaKikar a moshav to the south of Dead Sea area. They attacked at an IDF unit which arrived at the scene; the soldiers shot and killed them. An IDF soldier and reserve fighter were wounded (IDF spokesperson, October 18, 2024). The terrorists were identified as Amer Qawas and Hussam Abu Ghazaleh, Jordanian citizens who left recorded wills claiming they planned to “support” the residents of the Gaza Strip. Abu Ghazaleh also said he wanted join Hamas’ military wing (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, October 18, 2024). Mu’adh al-Khawaldeh, Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan spokesman, said the two were members of the movement and had participated in “solidarity actions” with Gaza and the “resistance” (Agence France-Presse, October 18, 2024). Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, said Hamas was proud of the attack, calling it “a brave action which revitalizes the Jordanian front,” adding that “those who carried it out are heroes and aninspiration for Jordanians” (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, October 18, 2024).

    
Right: Amer Qawas (top) and Abu Ghazaleh recording their wills (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, October 18, 2024). Left: The body of one of the Jordanians (Palestinian Media Center website, October 18 2024)

• • Vehicle ramming near Ofra: On October 19, a Palestinian driver sped toward a police vehicle at the entrance to the settlement of Ofra. The driver, Yusuf Ahmad Adnan Tah, 27 years old, from Nablus, was killed in the collision. No other injuries were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 19, 2024). Hamas praised the “heroic ramming operation” and expressed condolences over Tah’s death. Hamas called the attack “a new message proving resistance attacks will continue in response to the massacre in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip” (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, October 19, 2024).
  • Combined attack at the Hizma roadblock: On October 27, 2024, a Palestinian driver sped toward an IDF force near the Hizma roadblock, south of Jerusalem. He then took out a a knife to stab the soldiers; he was shot and killed (IDF spokesperson, October 27, 2024). He was Sami al-Amoudi, from the Shuafat refugee camp (Shehab News Agency, October 27, 2024). Hamas issued a mourning notice for Sami Fathi Zakaria al-Amoudi, stating that he “was killed by occupation forces’ gunfire after carrying out a ramming attack near the town of Hizma” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel,

• • Possible vehicle ramming near Tel Aviv: On October 27, 2024, an Arab-Israeli truck driver drove at high speed and struck dozens of people standing at a bus stop. Armed civilians shot and killed him. One Israeli citizen was killed and 36 others were injured. The attacker was identified as Rami Natour, from Qalansawe. The event is still under investigation and so far there has been no official confirmation that it was a terrorist attack (Israel Police Force spokesperson’s unit and Israeli media, October 27, 2024). Hamas expressed its condolences for the death of Rami Natour, referring to him as “Nasrallah” who carried out a heroic ramming operation north of Tel Aviv (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 27, 2024).

Critical terrorist attacks, 2024^[13]

Annual distribution of critical terrorist attacks

Counterterrorism activities

• • During October 2024, Israeli security forces continued counter-terrorism operations across Judea and Samaria, focusing on northern Samaria, primarily Tulkarm, Nablus and Jenin. Security forces entered Palestinian cities and refugee camps to locate terrorist suspects and dismantle terrorist facilities. Explosives, laboratories, weapon manufacturing lathes and funds for financing terrorist activities were found, and terrorist operatives were attacked from the air:
  • On October 1, 2024, Israeli security forces operating in Nablus, eliminating Abd Shahin, a senior terrorist operative who organized shooting attacks on IDF forces and recruited operatives for additional attacks. Four soldiers were wounded in exchanges of fire in the Balata refugee camp (IDF spokesperson, October 1, 2024). The PIJ military wing reported that “commander” Abd al-Hakim Ma’mun Shahin, 33 years old, and Diyaa Hani Dwikat, an operative from the Nablus Battalion were killed when “enemy forces” “stormed” Nablus and the Balata refugee camp (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 1, 2024).
  • On October 3, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked a building in Tulkarm where terrorists were gathering to plan an imminent attack. At least 12 terrorists were killed in the strike, including Zahi Yasser Abd al-Razeq Oufi, head of Hamas infrastructure in Tulkarm, and Ghaith Radwan, a senior PIJ operative in Tulkarm. Other Hamas operatives killed: Ayman Tangi, Basel Nafe’, Ahmad Jamal Ubayd, Isam Qouzah, Atir Majdi Hussein al-Luwaisi, Anwar Muhammad Mousa Masimi, Mahmoud Harwish and Maamoun Anbas. Another PIJ operative killed was Rakan Bilal (IDF spokesperson, October 5, 2024). Palestinian media reported that 18 people were killed in the strike on a café in the Tulkarm refugee camp (Wafa, October 3, 2024). Hamas’ military wing confirmed the deaths of eight of its members: “commander” Zahi Yasser al-Oufi, Ayman Khaled Tanji, Basel Mahmoud Nafe’, Ahmad Jamal Ubeid, Muhammad Maamoun Anbas, Athir Mazen al-Luwaisi, Majdi Jamal Salem and Muhammad Naser Khreiwesh (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 4, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing confirmed the death of “commander” Ghaith Badi’ Radwan, 26 years old, a commander of the Tulkarm Battalion (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 4, 2024).

• • On October 9, Israeli undercover forces operating in Nablus eliminated four senior terrorist operatives who were in a vehicle, including Issam al-Salaj, the head of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) in Balata (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, October 9, 2024). The AAMB announced that four of their operatives had been killed: “field commander” Issam Muhammad al-Salaj, who commanded the AAMB in the Balata refugee camp; “field commander” Abd al-Halim Muhammad Nasser, one of the commanders of the Askar refugee camp, Salim Izz al-Din Abu Sa’dah and Na’im Muhammad Abd al-Hadi. The AAMB pledged to avenge their “pure blood,” promising that the “leaders of the entity” would pay the price (AAMB Telegram channel, October 9, 2024). Hamas accused Israel of “another Zionist crime” with the “assassination” and reiterated that the movement and other Palestinian [terrorist] organizations were committed to continuing the “resistance” in Nablus and throughout Judea and Samaria (Hamas website, October 9, 2024).

• • On October 9, Hamas announced the death of operative Abd al-Raouf Rajah al-Masri, killed in the town of Aqaba in the Tubas district, after exchanging gunfire with “enemy” forces who surrounded his home. According to reports, he participated in several “heroic operations,” including a shooting attack with two other Izz al-Din al-Qassam operatives at the Mehola Junction on August 11, 2024, in which an Israeli was killed (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 9, 2024).
  • On October 10, Muhammad Abdullah, PIJ head in the Nur Shams refugee camp, was killed in an airstrike along with another terrorist operative. Abdullah was responsible for numerous attacks targeting Israeli security forces (IDF spokesperson, October 11, 2024). Palestinian media reported that Muhammad Iyad Muhammad Abdallah and Awad Jamil Safar Omar were killed in an attack on their vehicle in the Nur Shams refugee camp (al-Aqsa TV, October 11, 2024). The PIJ confirmed the deaths of Muhammad Iyad Muhammad Abdallah, 20, and Awad Jamil Saqr Omar, 31, commanders of the Tulkarm Battalion (al-Quds Brigades Telegram channel, October 12, 2024).
  • On October 14, Israeli security forces conducted a counterterrorism operation in the Jenin area, surrounding a building where wanted Palestinians were hiding. The Palestinians shot at the forces and one armed terrorist was killed in the exchange of fire; three others were detained. In another incident, Israeli security forces killed a PIJ terrorist operative in a clash in Qabatiya (IDF spokesperson, October 15, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing confirmed that “commander” Mahmoud Mamoun Abu al-Robb, 23 years old, who commanded the Qabatiya squads of the Jerusalem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion, was killed while confronting “occupation” forces storming the al-Sibat neighborhood in Jenin (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 15, 2024).

• On October 15, Israeli security forces operating in the Jenin refugee camp eliminated wanted Palestinian terrorist Karim Jabareen, who was planning an imminent attack. The forces surrounded the building where Jabareen had barricaded himself and eliminated him in an exchange of fire (IDF, Israel Police Force and Israeli Security Agency spokespersons, October 15, 2024). Hamas’ military wing issued a mourning notice for Karim Jabareen, who died “during a confrontation with an occupation special force while barricaded in a house in the Jenin refugee camp” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 16, 2024). The AAMB also issued a mourning notice for Karim Samer Jabareen (al-Mayadeen, October 17, 2024).

• • On October 26, Israeli security forces operating in Tulkarm eliminated Islam Odeh, a Hamas operative suspected of planning imminent attacks. The forces surrounded a building where Odeh had been hiding for seven hours; they were attacked by gunfire from inside the building. Explosives and bomb-making equipment were found in Odeh’s vehicle (IDF spokesperson, October 26, 2024). Hamas’ military wing issued a mourning notice for “commander” Islam Jamil Odeh (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 26, 2024).

• • On October 31, Israeli security forces eliminated Hussam Mallah, head of the Hamas military wing’s ne in Tulkarm and responsible for planning attacks for the first anniversary of the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre (Israel Police Force X account, October 31, 2024). Hamas issued a mourning notice for terrorist operative Husam Bassam al-Mallah in a clash in the Tulkarm refugee camp. According to Hamas, “the perseverance of our mujahideen, the people’s ‘resistance fighters,’ in the arena of confrontation and resistance is the greatest testament to the failure of the occupation army’s policy, which has returned to quiet ‘assassination’ operations” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 31, 2024).

• On October 31, Israeli security forces operated in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm. An Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked two armed terrorists who were shooting at the forces. They were Abd al-Aziz Abu Saman and Ahmad Issam Fahmawi, who were involved in shooting and planting explosives (IDF spokesperson, November 1, 2024). Hamas issued a mourning notice for their deaths and it expressed its appreciation for all the “heroes of the resistance” in Tulkarm, its refugee camps and throughout the region (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 31, 2024).

    
Hamas mourning notice for Abd al-Aziz Abu Saman and Ahmad Issam Fahmawi (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, October 31, 2024)

Anti-Israel activities

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq

• During October 2024, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq issued 72 claims of responsibility for attacks against 76 targets in Israeli territory using drones and cruise missiles, compared to 31 claims of responsibility in the previous month. The increase in the number of attacks occurred amid the beginning of the IDF maneuver in southern Lebanon, the escalation in Lebanon, the elimination of senior Hezbollah leaders and commanders, and the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. It should be noted that there has been no verification of the claims about the attacks, except in cases where the IDF Spokesperson confirmed interceptions or hits in Israeli territory. Two IDF fighters were killed by a drone at a base in the Golan Heights, the first Israeli fatalities since militia attacks began in Iraq on November 2, 2023 (IDF Spokesperson, October 1-31, 2024)^[14]. The following are details of the attacks (Islamic Resistance in Iraq Telegram channel, October 1-31, 2024):
  • October 1 – Targets in three areas in the heart of the “entity” using al-Arqab cruise missiles.
  • October 2 – Three targets in three separate drone attacks in northern Israel.
  • October 3 – A target in southern Israel, allegedly attacked for the first time using a drone with advanced capabilities.
  • October 4 – Three targets in three separate drone attacks in the Golan Heights and Tiberias. Two IDF soldiers were killed when a drone hit a military base in the Golan Heights, and two other military personnel were seriously wounded. In addition, the IDF Spokesperson confirmed that a drone that crossed into Israeli territory in the Beit She’an Valley from the east was intercepted.
  • October 5 – Three “vital” targets in northern Israel using drones.
  • October 5 – A target on the northern outskirts of Haifa and a target in southern Israel using al-Arqab cruise missiles.
  • October 6 – Three targets in the Golan Heights in three separate drone attacks. The IDF Spokesperson said a Navy missile ship intercepted two drones launched from the east in the Mediterranean Sea. The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone launched from the east off the coast of Gush Dan.
  • October 7 – A “military” target using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said the Air Force intercepted a drone that made its way into Israeli territory from the east and did not cross into Israeli territory.
  • October 8 – Five targets in five separate attacks in central and northern Israel using al-Arqab cruise missiles and drones.
  • October 8 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone approaching Israel from the east was intercepted.
  • October 9 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones.
  • October 9 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
  • October 9 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
  • October 9 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the second time) using drones.
  • October 9 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones.
  • October 10 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
  • October 10 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (for the second time) using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said two drones approaching Israel from the east were intercepted.
  • October 10 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
  • October 11 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones.
  • October 12 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using Drones.
  • October 12 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the second time) using drones.
  • October 12 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the third time) using drones.
  • October 12 – Two targets in Eilat using drones.
  • October 13 – A “military” target in the Golan Heights using Drones.
  • October 13 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the second time) using drones.
  • October 14 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley using drones.
  • October 14 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley (for the second time) using drones.
  • October 14 – A “vital” target in eastern Israel using a drone with advanced capabilities.
  • October 15 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
  • October 15 – A “vital” target in central Israel using a drone with advanced capabilities. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone approaching Israel from the east was intercepted.
  • October 17 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones.
  • October 17 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones.
  • October 17 – A “military” target in Israel using drones. A drone launched from the east reportedly penetrated the Arava region and fell in the southern Negev, north of Mitzpe Ramon.
  • October 18 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones.
  • October 19 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones.
  • October 19 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone launched from the east and crossing from Syria fell in the northern Golan Heights. There were no casualties.
  • October 19 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones.
  • October 19 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone approaching Israeli territory from the east was intercepted.
  • October 20 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone that penetrated from the east fell in an open area in the northern Golan Heights. There were no casualties.
  • October 20 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the second time) using drones. According to the IDF Spokesperson, a drone launched from the east was intercepted in Syrian territory.
  • October 20 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone that penetrated the Jordan Valley was intercepted.
  • October 21 – Military target in the Golan Heights using drones.
  • October 22 – A “vital” target in Tiberias using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said a drone that penetrated from the east fell in an open area in the northern Golan Heights.
  • October 22 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley using drones.
  • October 22 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley (for the second time) using drones.
  • October 22 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
  • October 23 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones.
  • October 23 – A “vital” target in Eilat (for the second time) using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said two drones launched from the east were intercepted in the maritime area near Eilat.
  • October 23 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones. According to the IDF Spokesperson, a drone launched from the east was intercepted in Syrian territory.
  • October 23 – A “vital” target in central Israel using drones.
  • October 23 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the second time) using drones.
  • October 24 – A “military” target in northern Israel using drones (the video showed an alleged attack on the Ramat David Air Force Base on October 23).
  • October 24 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley using drones. The video of the launch showed a picture of Yahya Sinwar on a drone. Sinwar, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, was killed in a clash with IDF forces in the Gaza Strip.
  • October 24 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones. The video of the launch showed a picture of Hashem Safi al-Din on a drone. Safi al-Din, head of Hezbollah’s executive committee and the organization’s designated secretary-general, had been officially proclaimed dead after an Israeli airstrike a day earlier.
  • October 24 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones.
  • October 25 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones (the video showed that the attack was carried out on October 24).
  • October 25 – A “vital” target in Eilat (for the second time) using drones (the video showed that the attack was carried out on October 24). The IDF Spokesperson said a drone launched from the east fell into the Red Sea before entering Israeli territory.
  • October 25 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones (the video showed that the attack was carried out on October 24).
  • October 26 – A military target in Acre using drones.
  • October 27 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones (the video showed the attack was carried out on October 26). The IDF Spokesperson said the Air Force intercepted a drone that was approaching from the east and did not cross into Israeli territory.
  • October 27– A “vital” target in the Golan Heights (for the second time) using drones (the video showed this was an attack carried out on October 26).
  • October 27 – A “vital” target in Eilat using drones (the video showed the attack was carried out on October 26).
  • October 28 – A military target in northern Israel using drones.
  • October 30 – A “vital” target in northern Israel using drones (in the video, it is stated that it is a target in Nahariya).
  • October 30 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones. According to the IDF Spokesperson, an aircraft that penetrated from the east exploded in the northern Golan Heights. There were no casualties or damage.
  • October 31 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
  • October 31 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (Acre) using drones.
  • October 31 – A “vital” target in southern Israel (a radar site in Dimona) using drones.
  • October 31 – A “vital” target in northern Israel (Haifa) using drones.
  • October 31 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights using drones.
  • October 31 – A “vital” target in central Israel using drones.
  • October 31 – A “vital” target in southern Israel using drones. The IDF Spokesperson said the Air Force intercepted two drones launched from the east that did not penetrate Israeli territory.

Saraya Awliya al-Dam

• The Saraya Awliya al-Dam militia issued 17 separate claims of responsibility for attacks against 20 targets in Israel, all using drones (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, October 8-30, 2024). There has been no verification of the claims:
  • October 8 – A “vital” target in Israel.
  • October 14 – Two separate “vital” targets in Haifa.
  • October 14 – Two separate “vital” targets in the Jordan Valley.
  • October 17 – A “vital” target in Tel Aviv.
  • October 18 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights.
  • October 24 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights.
  • October 25 – A “vital” target in Haifa.
  • October 25 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights.
  • October 26 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights.
  • October 26 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley.
  • October 26 – Two “vital” targets in the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley.
  • October 28 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights.
  • October 28 – A “vital” target in northern Tiberias.
  • October 29 – A “vital” target in the Golan Heights.
  • October 29 – A “vital” target in Haifa.
  • October 30 – A “vital” target in northern Tiberias.
  • October 30 – A “vital” target in the Jordan Valley.

Islamic Resistance from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques

• A militia called “Islamic Resistance from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques [i.e., in Mecca and Medina]” (Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Bilad al-Haramayn), which claims to operate from Saudi territory, announced “the beginning of its jihad operations.” The militia claimed responsibility for attacking “a vital site in occupied Palestine” with a drone on the afternoon of October 25, 2024. It added that the operation was carried out “as a sign of support for Palestine and Lebanon.” The militia emphasized that the launch, allegedly carried out from Saudi territory, is the will of the country’s residents, and that additional actions against Israel are expected until the end of the “aggression” against the Gaza Strip and Lebanon (Saberin News Telegram channel, October 26, 2024). There has been no verification of the claimed attack or the actual existence of the militia.

The Houthis

• In October 2024, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saria claimed responsibility for eight attacks against targets in Israel using drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. The following are the details (Yahya Saria’s Telegram channel, October 1-31, 2024):
  • October 1 – An attack by a Jaffa drone against the Jaffa (Tel Aviv) area, and an attack by four Samad-4 drones against Eilat. It was claimed that both operations achieved their objectives. The IDF Spokesperson reported that on the night of September 30 to October 1, 2024, the Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone over the Mediterranean Sea, dozens of kilometers off the coast of central Israel (IDF X account, October 1, 2024).
  • October 2 – An attack on “military sites deep inside the Zionist entity” using three Quds-5 cruise missiles. It was claimed that the attacks achieved their objectives, while Israel concealed it. There has been no verification of the claims, and it may be an attempt by the Houthis to present themselves as having participated in the Iranian missile attack the previous evening, as they did in the previous attack in April 2024.
  • October 3 – Several Jaffa drones were launched at the city of Jaffa (Tel Aviv). It was claimed that the operation achieved its objective without Israel succeeding in intercepting the drones. According to the IDF Spokesperson, the Air Force intercepted a suspicious aerial target in the maritime area off the coast of Gush Dan, without alarms being activated (IDF Spokesperson, October 3, 2024).
  • October 7 – Two ballistic missiles attacked two “military targets” in the Jaffa area, the first –Filastin 2, and the second – Dhu al-Fiqar. It was claimed that the attack achieved its objectives. The IDF Spokesperson said the Air Force intercepted a surface-to-surface missile launched from Yemen. There were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, October 7, 2024).
  • October 7 – Several Jaffa and Samad-4 drones were launched at targets in the Jaffa and Eilat areas, and some of the drones successfully hit their targets. The IDF Spokesperson said that two drones launched from the east were intercepted near Rishon LeZion and Palmachim (IDF Spokesperson, October 7, 2024).
  • October 22 – An attack on an Israeli military base east of the city of Jaffa (Tel Aviv) using a Filastin 2 hypersonic ballistic missile. The missile allegedly hit its target while evading Israeli and American interception systems (Yahya Saria’s X account, October 22, 2024). The claim has not been verified.
  • October 29 – An attack on Ashkelon’s industrial zone using several drones. It was claimed that the objectives of the attack were successfully achieved (Yahya Saria’s X account, October 29, 2024). The IDF Spokesperson said that a drone launched from Yemen fell in an open area in the Ashkelon area. There were no casualties and no damage (IDF Spokesperson, October 29, 2024).

Houthi attacks in the maritime area

• During October 2024, the Houthis claimed responsibility for nine attacks against vessels, compared to two in the previous month. Here are the details:
  • October 1 – Attack on the British oil tanker Cordelia Moon in the Red Sea using eight ballistic and cruise missiles, a drone, and an unmanned surface vehicle (USV). According to Yahya Saria, the spokesman for the Houthi forces, the tanker sustained extensive damage. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) confirmed that the tanker’s crew had reported four hits in nearby waters followed by a USV hitting the tanker and causing damage. However, the tanker continued on its way with no casualties reported.
  • October 1 – The ship MARATHOPOLIS was attacked in the Indian Ocean by a cruise missile. The same ship was attacked again in the Red Sea, using a drone. Saria claimed that the hit was successful. The claims have not been verified.
  • October 10 – An attack on the “American” oil tanker Olympic Spirit in the Red Sea using 11 ballistic missiles and two drones. Saria claimed that the tanker was hit and severely damaged in the attack. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) confirmed that the tanker’s crew reported damage from an unknown weapon and damage to the vessel. Subsequently, the crew reported three falls in the water nearby. However, the tanker continued on its way with no casualties reported.
  • October 10 – A cruise missile attack on the ship St. John in the Indian Ocean. According to Saria, the hit was accurate. There has been no verification of the claims.
  • October 18 – The ship Megalopolis was attacked by several drones in the Arabian Sea. Saria claimed the attack was successful and its objectives had been achieved. There has been no verification of the claims.
  • October 28 – The SC Montreal was attacked by two drones while sailing in the Arabian Sea. According to Saria, the attack succeeded, and its objectives were achieved. No other reports have been published about this attack.
  • October 28 – The Maersk Kowloon was attacked by a cruise missile in the Arabian Sea. It was claimed that the hit was accurate. There has been no verification of the claims.
  • October 28 – A double attack against the Motaro in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait using several ballistic missiles. It was claimed that the attack succeeded, and its objectives were achieved. The UKMTO confirmed that the crew had reported three falls in waters nearby, but the vessel continued on its way with no casualties reported.

• The editorial of issue 466 of ISIS’s weekly al-Naba calls on Muslims everywhere, including in “Palestine,” not to adopt approaches that are not based on Islamic law (Sharia), such as secular nationalism and Khomeinism, since all of them are doomed to failure. The author of the article, titled “The Man Fights Bravely,” criticizes (Sunni) Hamas for forging a strategic alliance with the “infidel” Shiite axis. He also speaks out against glorifying the image of the head of Hamas’ political bureau, Yahya Sinwar, who was killed on October 16, 2024, transforming him into the “Arab Che Guevara” and portraying him as a hero who was killed “fighting and confronting his enemies.” The author notes that the problem is that Sinwar was killed for “idle reasons” rather than for Islam (al-Naba, October 24, 2024).