Spotlight on Terrorism: Lebanon and Hezbollah (November 1-10, 2025)

Overview

• IDF forces attacked Hezbollah facilities and eliminated terrorist operatives as part of the continued activity targeting Hezbollah’s presence in south Lebanon in violation of the understandings of the ceasefire agreement, and in view of the organization’s efforts to renew its arsenal. The forces attacked facilities belonging to the organization’s elite the Radwan Force and killed Hezbollah and Lebanon Battalion operatives. According to reports, Israel warned Lebanon it would intensify its attacks because the activity of the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah was insufficient.
• Lebanese leaders condemned Israel for continuing to attack. President Aoun said the attacks had to stop before Lebanon would enter negotiations with Israel.
• Hezbollah published an open letter rejecting outright any possibility of negotiations with Israel and making it clear that it would not relinquish the “right to resistance.” A senior Hezbollah figure rejected the accusation that the organization was responsible for Lebanon’s economic collapse and accused the government of corruption. Opponents of the organization attacked Hezbollah’s position and said it endangered Lebanon, and reiterated that state institutions were responsible for decisions regarding war and peace.
• The commander of the Lebanese army presented the cabinet meeting with the monthly report on implementing the plan for a state monopoly of weapons and claimed “progress had been made” in disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River toward the goal of reaching the target by the end of the current year.
• The United States Treasury Department reported that Iran had transferred $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of 2025 and called on the Lebanese government to block Hezbollah’s sources of funding. Reportedly, Hezbollah has expanded its drug trafficking and money laundering in Venezuela to help it cope with the economic challenge.
• Hezbollah commanders and operatives wounded in Israeli attacks reportedly underwent plastic surgery to conceal their identities.
• The first coordination meeting on Lebanon’s reconstruction was held with the participation of representatives of the Lebanese government, members of parliament, the army and UNIFIL. A Hezbollah bloc member called on the government to place the issue of reconstruction at the top of its priorities.

The Instability of the Ceasefire^[1]

IDF activity to prevent Hezbollah from renewing its arsenal

• During the past ten days the IDF continued operations against Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon which violated the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement prohibiting the organization’s presence south of the Litani River, and against Hezbollah’s efforts to reconstruct its arsenal in south Lebanon and other parts of the country. IDF forces attacked Radwan Force targets in south Lebanon after the IDF spokesperson issued five evacuation warnings, and at least ten Hezbollah terrorist operatives were killed, six of them belonging to the elite Radwan Force, and two to the Lebanese Battalions for the Resistance to the Israeli Occupation^[2] (IDF spokesperson, November 1–10, 2025). The Lebanese ministry of health reported 12 killed and more than 30 wounded in the Israeli attacks (al-Nashra, November 1–10, 2025). Hezbollah-affiliated websites Hezbollah the names of ten of the organization’s terrorist operatives killed in the attacks and two Lebanese Battalions operatives (South Lebanon – Observer of the Enemy Telegram channel, November 1–10, 2025).
• After the intensified Israeli attacks on Hezbollah targets during October 2025 and early November, Israel reportedly sent a message to the Lebanese army through the American ceasefire-monitoring committee noting that the attacks would continue because of Hezbollah’s efforts to rearm, as in recent weeks it had successfully smuggled hundreds of rockets from Syria, overhauled rockets and launchers damaged in the fighting, and recruited thousands of new operatives. Israel warned that Lebanese army activity against Hezbollah was insufficient in both pace and scope (Israeli TV channel Kan 11, November 8, 2025).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah continued to place responsibility for handling the Israeli “violations” on the state authorities, hinting that the organization’s restraint had limits. On November 6, 2025, Hezbollah published an open letter, reiterating its claim that the organization and Lebanon had abided by all clauses of the ceasefire agreement, while the “Zionist enemy” continued its violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty. Hezbollah also warned against attempts to drag Lebanon into “negotiation traps” and claimed to “resist occupation and aggression”^[3] was a “legitimate right” which had nothing to do with a “decision on peace or war,” but was intended to defend against an “enemy imposing war” on Lebanon.
• Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said they would not negotiate with the “enemy” or surrender to it, stating that Lebanon had no interest in discussing any agreement other than the ceasefire. He accused state institutions of not making a serious effort to provide means of defense and demanded that they force Israel to stop the attacks in Lebanon (al-‘Ahed, November 7, 2025).

The Lebanese Government

• The Lebanese leadership was angry with Israel’s attacks during international efforts to promote negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, and reiterated the position that Israel was “violating” the ceasefire agreement:
  • Lebanese President Joseph Aoun accused Israel of actions which “constitute a crime not only under international law but are also political crimes.” He said that while Lebanon was willing to enter into negotiations with Israel, Israel continued to attack while disregarding the ceasefire agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (Lebanese Presidency X account, November 6, 2025). Meeting with a senior delegation from the United States Treasury Department, Aoun said that negotiations required a suitable atmosphere, primarily the cessation of “aggressive actions” and stability in south Lebanon, and that the United States and other countries supported that position. The American delegation stated its willingness to assist in security and stability in the south and to support Lebanese army activity to expand state authority (Lebanese Presidency X account, November 9, 2025). “Informed political sources” said that Aoun’s repeated demand to stop the attacks and achieve stability in south Lebanon before beginning talks with Israel showed he did not intend to change his position (al-Liwaa, November 10, 2025).
  • Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and a Hezbollah ally, called normalization with Israel “out of the question” and “impossible,” adding that Israeli threats and attacks would not change their position (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 8, 2025).

• An “Arab diplomatic source” said that the recent anger exhibited publicly by American special envoy Thomas Barrack, who called Lebanon a “failed state,” was the result of his feeling that senior Lebanese officials had misled him. According to the “source,” when in closed meetings Barrack proposed to senior officials to hold direct negotiations with Israel, similar to Syria, on security arrangements and later possible participation in the Abraham Accords, they did not oppose and said they would consider it. Barrack informed Washington and Israel, but he regarded the Lebanese leadership’s public announcement that it would agree only to indirect negotiations as a retreat from the assurances he had received. The “source” said that Barrack might have misinterpreted the Lebanese position but did not rule out the possibility that the Lebanese were also trying to gain time. A “diplomatic source” noted that Israel sought to use the negotiations with Lebanon to reopen the 1949 ceasefire agreement and to put all disputed points along the border on the table, as well as the five positions it currently held in south Lebanon, to obtain official Lebanese approval for a continued presence in some areas “as necessary for security” (Lebanon Debate, November 10, 2025).

The Lebanese Army

• The Lebanese army announced it would conduct an exercise with live fire in the Ras al-Naqoura area, which would include artillery fire toward the sea, as part of its operational readiness and defensive plans. The move follows Israel’s escalation and the president’s directive to the armed forces “to confront Israeli ground incursions.” The exercise is another Lebanese army provocation, following officers and soldiers refusing to evacuate a military post in the village of Dounine despite an IDF warning prior to an attack on a nearby Hezbollah facility (Observe Lebanon X account, November 8, 2025).

Criticism of Hezbollah

• Sami al-Gemayel, head of the Christian Kataeb Party, said he supported negotiations with Israel in any form, direct or indirect, political, civil or military, and that if necessary, the president of Lebanon should also participate in them, because the important thing was a complete end to the war in south. He accused Hezbollah of undermining the Lebanese president’s efforts and facilitating Israeli attacks by holding on to its weapons instead of supporting Aoun’s position to negotiate with Israel to protect Lebanon and its sovereignty. He warned against replicating the Gaza Strip model in Lebanon in terms of forced migration and territorial erosion (MTV Lebanon, November 9, 2025).
• Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces Party, sharply criticized Hezbollah’s open letter and the organization’s stance that it adhered to the “resistance.”^[4] He said everyone had seen where the “resistance” led Hezbollah, Lebanon and the Lebanese people, and accused the organization of lying when it claimed to have fully abided by the ceasefire agreement while refusing to hand over its weapons to the state. He added that the Lebanese state did exist, it was the one making decisions, it had decided to disarm Hezbollah and had to be the only one to decide on war and peace (L’Orient Today, November 8, 2025).
• Charles Jabbour, head of the communications and information department of the Lebanese Forces Party, said the weapons issue would turn into a systemic crisis and political chaos. He said it was an illusion to believe that an understanding could be reached with the “Shi’ite duo” [Hezbollah and Amal] regarding the implementation of the constitution or the establishment of a new system, since their existence depended on the absence of a state, and they would not allow, neither politically today nor militarily and security-wise yesterday, the establishment of a real state, because they lived and breathed only in chaos (Nidaa al-Watan, November 6, 2025).

UNIFIL

• The UNIFIL force condemned the Israeli attacks in Lebanon and claimed they “violated” UN Security Council Resolution 1701. UNIFIL said “military actions” on such a scale endangered civilians and delayed a diplomatic solution. UNIFIL claimed it continued to support the implementation of Resolution 1701 on the ground together with Lebanese army soldiers, and called on Israel to stop the “violations” and on the Lebanese side to avoid escalation (UNIFIL Telegram channel, November 6, 2025).

Challenges to Hezbollah

Disarming Hezbollah

• Hezbollah’s open letter related to disarmament and called the government’s decision regarding the exclusivity of weapons a “mistake,” exploited by Israel to impose the demand for the disarmament of the “resistance” throughout all of Lebanon as a condition for stopping its attacks, not only south of the Litani River. Hezbollah clings to the position that the discussion about the state’s monopoly on weapons can take place only within a national framework with the aim of reaching agreement on a comprehensive strategy for security, defense and sovereignty, and not as a response to a “foreign request or Israeli demand.”^[5]
• Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, said the organization would not disarm because its weapons were a source of strength for the state and protected it and the regional countries. He added that they had learned their lesson from Syria, which, he claimed, had met all the American demands and was nevertheless attacked by Israel (Lebanese News Agency, November 10, 2025).
• A few hours after the open letter was published, General Rudolf Haykal, commander of the Lebanese army, presented the cabinet with the second monthly report on the army’s actions to implement the state monopoly on weapons. It claimed the army had dismantled “numerous” military facilities south of the Litani River, sealed tunnels, uncovered more than ten weapons depots since September 2025 and confiscated weapons while strengthening deployment in border areas. He said the army was determined to complete the disarmament south of the Litani River by the end of the current year, but progress was delayed by Israel’s continued presence and control in parts of south Lebanon. According to a minister who attended the discussion, Haykal even proposed temporarily freezing the program to pressure Israel to stop the attacks, but the proposal was neither examined nor approved. However, ministers from the Hezbollah-affiliated political bloc welcomed the idea and requested clarifications regarding the state’s response mechanisms to Israeli “violations” (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 6, 2025; al-Nahar, November 8, 2025).
• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam noted the importance of concentrating weapons in the hands of the government. In a speech at a technology conference in Beirut, he said that the army was still in the first stage of the three-month program to concentrate weapons. Relating to Hezbollah’s open letter, he said the state bore sole responsibility for decisions on matters of war and peace (al-Arabiya, November 7, 2025). On another occasion, he said he would not compromise on the principle of one army and one law which applied to everyone, and that the restriction on weapons was essential for the stability of the state ahead of the reconstruction process. He added that he would not yield to threats of civil war and did not believe there was any party interested in taking the country in that direction (LBCI Lebanon, November 9, 2025).
• Given Israel’s demand that the Lebanese army increase its efforts to disarm Hezbollah, Egypt continued to express willingness to mediate between the countries in an attempt to ease tensions. An “Egyptian senior official” said Egyptian intelligence was examining the comments and reservations raised by Hezbollah regarding the four-stage initiative presented by Egypt’s intelligence chief, General Hassan Rashad, during his visit to Beirut at the end of October 2025, which, referred to Hezbollah’s disarmament north of the Litani River and the demarcation of the land border between Israel and Lebanon. The “official” said that Egypt’s position was that the issue of concentrating weapons in the hands of the Lebanese state required a longer period of time than had been estimated. He said it was currently possible to focus on concentrating weapons in the hands of the state from the area south of the Litani River and from the Palestinian refugee camps, to prevent future violations. “Egyptian officials” said first economic and political stability had to be ensured before the core issues could be discussed, primarily the issue of weapons (al-Akhbar, November 8, 2025).

Hezbollah Recovers and Rearms

• Despite the suspension of flights from Iran to Lebanon since February 2025 and the American administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, the United States Treasury Department reported that since the beginning of the current year, the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had transferred nearly $1 billion to Hezbollah through money exchange agencies. As a result, the Treasury imposed sanctions on two Hezbollah operatives and a Syrian businessman involved in transferring the funds. One of those designated was Jaafar Mohammad Qasir, responsible for managing Hezbollah’s financial team and the organization’s economic profit portfolio. He is the son of Muhammad Jaafar Qasir, who commanded Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, which was responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and was eliminated in October 2024 (United States Treasury Department website, November 6, 2025).
• John Hurley, the American Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said the Lebanese government now had an opportunity to advance Hezbollah’s disarmament and return control of the country to the Lebanese people. He said the key to achieving the goal was to eliminate Iranian influence by stopping the funds Tehran transferred to Hezbollah (Reuters, November 9, 2025).
• Hurley arrived in Lebanon as part of a United States Treasury delegation led by Sebastian Gorka, the National Security Council’s counterterrorism director. The delegation met with President Aoun to discuss cutting off Hezbollah’s sources of funding. Aoun reportedly said Lebanon was strictly implementing the procedures to prevent money laundering, smuggling or use of funds to finance terrorism, and imposed severe penalties for financial crimes of all kinds. He added that in addition to financial measures, the army and security services were pursuing terrorist cells and referring them to legal action (al-Arabiya and Lebanese Presidency X account, November 9, 2025). However, “informed sources” said the delegation emphasized that Hezbollah’s disarmament was the top priority, even before the financial reforms demanded by the international community. They were also not satisfied with how the Lebanese authorities were dealing with the al-Qard al-Hasan Association, Hezbollah’s financial arm, and warned that if Beirut did not commit to Hezbollah’s disarmament and the implementation of international procedures to combat terrorism financing and money laundering, Lebanon would “be left to its fate” (al-Hadath, November 10, 2025).

• A “military source in Lebanon” said that the November 2024 ceasefire had not ended the conflict but had turned it into a “smart war of attrition,” with Israel conducting pinpoint attacks and Lebanon struggling to clear the area of weapons. Meanwhile, Hezbollah was exploiting the situation to reorganize by restoring its supply network through Syria and other routes, dispersing weapons and producing weapon components in Lebanon. In addition, according to the source, the organization had shifted to a decentralized, flexible operational structure based on small cells, UAVs and anti-tank capabilities, operating “below the threshold of war” to maintain deterrence without being dragged into a large-scale confrontation. In recent weeks Hezbollah also changed its force deployments, moved warehouses and strengthened defenses to reduce exposure after commanders were eliminated. According to reports, within the organization there was a growing understanding that an offensive move would lead to political and social collapse in Lebanon, so a policy of “strategic patience” had been adopted to avoid escalation until the regional balance changed (Aram News, November 5, 2025).
• “Sources close to Hezbollah” claimed that operatives wounded in Israeli attacks, including senior commanders, underwent plastic surgery to conceal their identities. According to the report, the operations were performed in Iraq and Iran with the assistance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as in Hezbollah clinics in Lebanon. It was also claimed that some commanders underwent surgery as a preventive measure even though they had not been injured in the attacks (al-Hadath Lebanon, November 9, 2025).

Hezbollah’s International Activity

• To cope with the economic challenge facing Hezbollah over the past year, “Lebanese diplomatic sources” reported that the organization was expanding its illegal activity in Venezuela despite American threats to take action against President Nicolás Maduro for involvement in the drug trade. According to the report, four Lebanese families connected to Hezbollah, who had been based in Venezuela for years, expanded their activities in drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling, purchasing companies operating in the fields of energy, shipping and agricultural exports. Individuals linked to Hezbollah also hold real estate assets in the United States and African countries, transferring money to their relatives in Lebanon “legally” (Aram News, November 6, 2025).
• The national police in Panama and Interpol reported that authorities in Venezuela had arrested Ali Zaki Hajj Jalil, a Venezuelan citizen of Lebanese descent, who was the main suspect in the investigation of the explosion of the Alas Chiricanas Flight 901 plane in July 1994, in which 21 people were killed, including 12 Jews. The United States government concluded that Hezbollah was responsible for the attack, which occurred about a day after the Hezbollah and Iranian bombing of the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires, and offered a $5 million reward for information leading to the identification of those responsible (Panama Police website, November 8, 2025; al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 10, 2025).

Reconstructing Lebanon

• The first coordination meeting for Lebanon’s reconstruction was held at the Nabih Berri Cultural Complex in the town of al-Masilha in south Lebanon at the invitation of Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. It was attended by government ministers, UNIFIL commanders, a Lebanese army representative and members of parliament from several political blocs, including Hezbollah representatives. A representative speaking on behalf of Berri said the meeting was part of national efforts to rebuild “what Israel had destroyed in Lebanon.” Hezbollah bloc member Hassan Fadlallah said that the meeting was being held while “blood is being shed on the soil of south Lebanon in Israeli attacks.” Fadlallah said the Hezbollah bloc insisted that reconstruction “be at the top of the state institutions’ priorities.” He added that the gathering was a prelude to practical steps to be taken to “prevent the enemy from achieving its goal of expelling the residents of south Lebanon” (al-Nashra and Red TVLebanon, November 4, 2025).

     
The first coordination meeting for Lebanon’s reconstruction
(al-Nashra, November 4, 2025; al-Liwaa, November 5, 2025)

• Following the meeting, SIMIA, Hezbollah’s social media monitoring unit, launched an online campaign to promote the country’s reconstruction plans, claiming that the government was dragging its feet and not implementing them because of external pressures. Not to leave the issue of reconstruction only as a proposal on paper, Hezbollah called on its supporters to spread posters on social media with slogans such as “Israel insists on sabotaging the reconstruction plan, its implementation will be our victory” under the hashtag “reconstruction_priority.”

     
From the “reconstruction_priority” campaign (SIMIA, November 4, 2025)

• Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, claimed that Lebanon’s economic collapse was the result government corruption and Hezbollah was not responsible (Lebanese News Agency, November 10, 2025).
• Meeting with the forum of residents of the towns near the southern border, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said reconstruction of the area was among the government’s top national priorities. He said the government had completed a plan for restoring infrastructure and basic services to the country’s south and that implementation would begin as soon as funding arrived, particularly from the World Bank (Lebanese News Agency, November 5, 2025). He also rejected claims that the government was not addressing the reconstruction of south Lebanon and reminded his listeners that his first visit after the formation of the government had been to the south. He said he was striving to secure the funds required for reconstruction and that if anyone had better access, they could inform the government. He said, “I am not the one responsible for the destruction” (LBCI Lebanon, November 9, 2025).

^[1] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Efforts Amid the IDF’s Enforcement of the Ceasefire in Lebanon and the November 2025 report, Hezbollah’s defiance, the instability of the ceasefire andattempts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese dialogu
^[2] An arm of Hezbollah established in 1997 to attract non-Shi'ite operatives.
^[3] Attack Israel.
^[4] Terrorism and violence against Israel.
^[5] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, Implementation of the Lebanese Army’s Plan to Disarm Hezbollah: Status Report and the November 2025 report, Hezbollah’s defiance, the instability of the ceasefire andattempts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese dialogue

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