Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (October 28 – November 4 ,2024)

Overview^[1]

• The IDF continued its maneuvers in south Lebanon. The forces intercepted Hezbollah terrorist operatives, located and destroyed facilities concealed in civilian sites, and found large quantities of weapons. Israeli Air Force airstrikes targeted Hezbollah positions in Beirut and throughout Lebanon, and targeted strikes eliminated terrorist senior figures and field operatives. An IDF soldier wounded in south Lebanon died his injuries.
• Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 186 attacks on civilian, military and security targets in Israel and on IDF forces in south Lebanon. Rockets, missiles and UAVs were launched at the north of Israel and further south, reaching as far as Tel Aviv and causing significant property damage.
• Hezbollah announced that Sheikh Na’im Qassem has been appointed the organization’s new secretary general, replacing Hassan Nasrallah.
• The IDF eliminated several senior Hezbollah terrorist operatives who commanded sectors in south Lebanon and were responsible for firing rockets into Israeli territory. A Hezbollah naval operative was taken by the IDF in north Lebanon and removed to Israel for questioning.
• A senior Hezbollah-affiliated commentator claimed Israel would increase its attacks on Lebanon in the near future to completely destroy Lebanese villages near the Israeli border.
• Lebanese authorities reported that more than 2,968 people had been killed in Lebanon since the outbreak of hostilities on October 8, 2023.
• Senior Lebanese figures continued to call for a ceasefire and the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. According to reports, Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and who represents Hezbollah in negotiations, agreed to separate the conflict in Lebanon from the conflict in the Gaza Strip.
• Syria: The IDF conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah arms warehouses in the al-Qusayr area near the Syria-Lebanon border. The IDF also detained an operative in Syrian territory who was working for Iran to gather intelligence on IDF forces near the border area.

The Fighting in Lebanon

• IDF forces continued maneuvers in south Lebanon, targeting terrorist operatives with airstrikes and ground encounters. They exposed and destroyed terrorist facilities hidden in civilian areas, including rocket launchers, mortars and anti-tank missiles aimed at northern Israeli communities, as well as small arms, hand grenades and military equipment. The IDF carried out airstrikes on Hezbollah targets throughout Lebanon, including headquarters, launch sites, and arms manufacturing facilities. Fighter jets attacked military compounds of Hezbollah’s logistic reinforcement unit (4400) in the Beqa’a Valley, where Iranian-supplied fuel was stored for Hezbollah’s vehicles and military infrastructure. An IDF soldier wounded in combat in south Lebanon died.

   
Weapons found in a civilian house in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, November 3, 2024). Left: Nazi memorabilia found in a house in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson’s X account, November 1, 2024)

Eliminating terrorist operatives

• The IDF continued its targeted strikes on senior Hezbollah commanders (IDF spokesperson, October 28-November 4, 2024):^[2]
  • Mustafa Ahmad Shahadi, deputy commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, was killed in an airstrike on Nabatieh.

• • Muhammad Khalil Alian, commander of the anti-tank unit in the Hajir sector in the Nasr Unit, was killed in an attack in Burj Qalawiyeh.
  • Ja’far Khadr Fa’our, commander of the missile and rocket array in the Nasr Unit, was killed in an attack in the Jwayya area of south Lebanon.
  • Mu’een Musa Izz al-Din, commander of Hezbollah’s coastal sector, and Hassan Majed Dhiab, commander of the coastal sector’s artillery array, were killed in an airstrike near Tyre.
  • Ali Barakat, a prominent terrorist operative in Hezbollah’s aerial unit, was killed in an airstrike.
  • Farouq Amin al-Ashi, commander of Hezbollah’s al-Khiyam sector, and a platoon commander in the Radwan Force were also targeted.
• Other terrorist organizations which fought alongside reported casualties:
  • The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced that three of its operatives, Fadi Muhammad Hassan, Ahmad Iman Ahmad, and Mahmoud Saleh al-Masri, from the Shaheed Ali al-Aswad Brigade in Syria, were killed.
  • The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) stated that Abd al-Hadi Nazih Barish and Muhammad Mahmoud al-Ali, two of its “field commanders” from the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, along with another operative, Suleiman Imad Hasan, were killed in south Lebanon “on the path to Jerusalem.”

Locating underground facilities in south Lebanon

• On November 3, 2024, IDF forces raided a Hezbollah compound used for planning raids into Israeli territory and operations against IDF forces. They discovered underground facilities, hideouts and enemy fighting pits equipped with large quantities of weapons. The entire compound was destroyed and secondary explosions indicated a large cache of weapons in the area.

Hezbollah terrorist operative taken from north Lebanon

• On November 2, 2024, Lebanese security agencies reported they had launched an investigation following reports from residents in the al-Batrun area of north Lebanon. Residents claimed that an unidentified military force had landed from the sea, moved toward a coastal cabin, and abducted a Lebanese man. The force reportedly took the man to the shore and left the area on speedboats (Lebanese News Agency, November 2, 2024).
• According to reports, the raid, which lasted only four minutes, was conducted by about 20 soldiers, including two “civilians.” Security camera footage showed a group of 20 armed men holding a man whose face was covered by his shirt (al-Jadid, November 2, 2024). Another source claimed that a special force of more than 25 “naval and frogmen” landed at al-Batrun beach near Tripoli and abducted a Lebanese man from a cabin (MTV Lebanon, October 31, 2024). According to reports he was Imad Amhaz, a senior Hezbollah figure, though later claims described him as a Lebanese Navy officer (al-Hadath, November 2, 2024).
• The IDF confirmed that special forces had captured a Hezbollah operative who had “extensive maritime knowledge” and transferred him to Israeli security forces for questioning.

    
Right: Imad Fadel Amhaz. Left: Security camera coverage of the operation (Hadil Ahmed’s X account, November 2, 2024)

• Sources claimed that Imad Fadel Amhaz had no ties to Lebanese security services and that he had rented a new apartment in al-Batrun a month earlier to begin studies. According to reports ten foreign SIM cards were found in his apartment, a cell phone, a foreign passport, and a camera for recording of the apartment, data which was allegedly remotely erased by Israel (al-Akhbar, November 3, 2024).
• According to the Hezbollah-affiliated daily newspaper al-Akhbar, security camera recordings were deleted, but a camera installed on a nearby building photographed the commandos who carried out the “abduction.” Investigators have proposed several theories, including that some members of the commando unit had been in the area for reconnaissance before the operation (al-Akhbar, November 3, 2024).
• Ali Hamiyeh, Lebanese ministry of transportation and a member of Hezbollah in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed that Amhaz was a civilian and commercial ship captain undergoing training at a civilian institute. He confirmed the authenticity of the abduction footage circulating on social media and emphasized that security agencies were investigating the matter (al-Jadeed, November 2, 2024).
• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, consulted with the Lebanese Army commander and senior UNIFIL officials, seeking updates on the investigation’s findings. He also directed Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib to file an urgent complaint with the UN Security Council, stressing the need to expedite the investigation (al-Nashra, November 2, 2024).
• A UNIFIL deputy spokesperson denied claims from Lebanese residents that the UN’s naval force assisted in the “abduction” and emphasized that UNIFIL had no involvement in the incident or any other violations of Lebanese sovereignty. The spokesperson warned that spreading misinformation and false rumors was irresponsible and endangered the safety of UN peacekeepers (al-Nashra, November 2, 2024)

Hezbollah

Attacks

• This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 186 attacks on military, security, and civilian targets in Israel, as well as IDF forces in south Lebanon, with anti-tank missiles, artillery shells, UAVs, precision missiles, various types of rockets, anti-aircraft missiles which targeted Israeli Air Force aircraft. On October 29, Hezbollah claimed it downed an Israeli Hermes-900 UAV operating over the Marjayoun airspace and released footage of the incident (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 28-November 4, 2024). The attacks included:
  • Extensive use of electric-powered UAVs: Hezbollah escalated its UAV operations, including the use of electric-powered UAVs. On November 2, Hezbollah announced it had launched UAVs to attack Israeli Air Force bases. Footage released on November 3 showed UAVs with electric engines, some of which differed from the types previously used by Hezbollah (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 3, 2024).
  • On the night of October 31, 2024, seven UAVs were launched at Israel from multiple locations. The Israeli Air Force intercepted all threats using fighter jets, helicopters and aerial defense systems. Throughout October 2024, the Israeli Air Force intercepted more than over 100 UAVs.

   
Right: A new type of UAV with an electric engine before it was launched at an IDF base. (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 3, 2024). Left: An electric-powered UAV moments before it was launched (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 3, 2024)

• • New weapons: On November 1, 2024, Hezbollah issued a video entitled “You will have no tanks left” [a phrase previously used by Nasrallah], showing a launcher equipped with three anti-tank missiles (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 1, 2024). The video showed a new anti-tank system, Thar-Allah (“the vengeance of Allah”), with three Russian-made Kornet-E missiles. There was also a dual RPG-7 launcher (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 1, 2024). In February 2024, a Hezbollah “officer” said the organization possessed a number of That-Allah anti-tank systems: Thar-Allah 1, with two launchers; Thar-Allah 2, with three launchers, and Thar-Allah 3, with four launchers (Mujtaba X account, February 27, 2024). Until that point, only the two-launcher system had been documented in use.

   
Right: A Thar-Allah launcher with three Kornet-E anti-tank missiles. (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 1, 2024). Left: A dual RPG-7 launcher. (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 1, 2024)

• Imad 5 underground facility (November 3, 2024):^[3] On November 3, 2024, Hezbollah released a 1:27-minute video titled “We will never abandon the battlefields, and we will never lay down our weapons,” revealing the Imad 5 underground facility, designed for storing precision missiles and heavy rockets. The video showed a six-barreled launcher containing heavy missiles or rockets moving along a track at an approximately 45-degree angle. It is then raised to the surface using a chain and pulley system connected to an electric motor (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 3, 2024).

     
Right: A sign reading “Imad 5 Facility” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 3, 2024). Left: Six missiles moments before being elevated to ground level via a track system. (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 3, 2024)

• On October 31, 2024, Hezbollah released a statement detailing recent activities on the front: Since September 17, 2024, Hezbollah claimed to have fired 655 rocket and missile barrages of various types, 63 of them in the previous three days; 76 operations involving the launch of more than 170 UAVs of various models, with 11 of them in the past three days; 20 anti-aircraft missile launches targeting Israeli aircraft operating in Lebanese airspace, with four of them in the past three days (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, October 31, 2024)

New Hezbollah secretary general appointed

• On October 29, 2024, Hezbollah announced that Sheikh Na’im Qassem had been appointed as the new secretary general by the Shura Council, replacing Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed by Israel in Beirut on September 27, 2024. In his first speech, Qassem pledged to continue Nasrallah’s path, claiming that Hezbollah would conclude the current war with Israel only on terms favorable to the organization.^[4]
• Mahmoud Qamati, a member of Hezbollah’s Political Council, stated that all vacant leadership roles had been filled. He added that Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s hints to eliminate Na’im Qassem “do not threaten them,” noting Hezbollah’s resolve and denying claims of significant missile losses, while asserting the group’s ability to strike targets beyond 140 kilometers. As to the negotiations for a ceasefire, he said Hezbollah relied on Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, adding they were not prepared to negotiate under fire (al-Jazeera, November 29, 2024).
• Hassan Fadlallah, a Hezbollah parliament member, stressed that only Hezbollah’s leadership, headed by Qassem was in charge of decision-making during the conflict, asserting that any further Israeli “assassinations” would only strengthen Hezbollah’s resistance. He claimed the objective of Israel’s “aggression” was to destroy Hezbollah and create a new regional “equation.” He said the “resistance” would continue launching missiles until the “occupation” ended its “aggression” (October 30, 2024).
• A “security source” reported that in the wake of the recent targeted killings of senior commanders, Hezbollah appointed Muhammad Haidar and Haitham Ali Tabatabai to leadership positions. Tabatabai, formerly in charge of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and its special forces in Syria and Yemen, was given a prominent role in the military structure (al-Hadath, November 2, 2024).

Media commentary

• According to sources, Hezbollah informed the relevant individuals, especially Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, that it agreed to a 60-day lull in the fighting and full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, with an agreement to move its weapons north of the Litani River, establishing a demilitarized zone in south Lebanon (MTV, Lebanon, October 30, 2024).
• Lebanese “political sources” close to Hezbollah stated that the group would oppose any changes to the terms or mechanisms of the resolution. While it would not object to an increase in international and Lebanese military forces, it opposed adding new countries to the UN peacekeeping forces, particularly Germany, which had become “a partner of the enemy in the fighting.” Hezbollah added it had not agreed to dissociate the fighting in Lebanon from the fighting in the Gaza Strip, which was “illogical.” Hezbollah added that Nabih Berri was their official representative in the negotiations, and that any ceasefire discussions would depend on an end to Israeli “aggression.” The “sources” added that Hezbollah hoped the Lebanese public would understand that there would be no negotiations regarding the disarming of Hezbollah, and after the war the “resistance” would remain “the necessary path of action” (al-Akhbar, October 30, 2024).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar and close to Nasrallah, called American Envoy Amos Hochstein a “clown” and said the main problem was that there were still people who listened to him and believed that the Americans canted to exert pressure on Israel to end the war in Lebanon. Al-Amin added that anyone who wanted to separate the Lebanese and Gazan arenas did not understand what “what Israel is doing with the support of the United States, Britain, Germany and with the cooperation of some of the Arab states, was forcing the arenas to unite.” For that reason, he said, “the resistance project” was the only possibility, and anyone who blamed it for what was happening had to know that from now on he would be complicit in the “aggression” (al-Akhbar, November 1, 2024).
• On another occasion, al-Amin related to Israel’s ground maneuver in Lebanon and its objectives. He claimed that in the coming days and weeks Israel would intensify its aggression, and claimed Israel was trying to completely destroy the Lebanese villages on the border, which will be the final nail in the coffin of Israel’s stated goal of returning northern Israeli residents to their homes.

The Situation in Lebanon

Casualties

• According to the Lebanese ministry of health, since the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023, 2,968 people have been killed and 13,319 injured (Lebanese ministry of health X account, November 2, 2024).

Civilian help for Lebanon

• Amin Salam, the Lebanese minister of economy, claimed that Israel had completely destroyed many agricultural areas, and it would take years to restore them. Salam noted that in all his meetings with the international community, the officials he met with reminded him that Lebanon was paying the price for the “struggle” between the United States and Iran. During the interview, he mentioned that the Lebanese government was thinking about the “day after,” and there was a fear that civil war could break out because of the deep economic crisis (al-Jazeera, November 1, 2024).

The Lebanese Government and Contacts for a Ceasefire

• Senior government officials and public figures in Lebanon continued to express their desire to work toward a ceasefire in Lebanon:
  • “Sources” reported that the United States had requested Lebanon declare a unilateral ceasefire with Israel in an attempt to advance talks for a final settlement (Reuters, November 1, 2024). The office of Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, denied the report, stating that the government’s position was clear on a mutual ceasefire request from both sides and implementing Resolution 1701 (Reuters, November 1, 2024). American Envoy Amos Hochstein said the report was false (Amos Hochstein’s X account, November 1, 2024).
  • A “source close” to Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said an agreement had been reached with Hochstein in Beirut on terms to be implemented within 60 days, including a comprehensive ceasefire across Lebanon and Israel. According to the “source,” one of the agreed-upon conditions was the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the south up to the border (al-Jazeera, November 1, 2024).
  • Abdallah Bou Habib, Lebanese foreign minister, said his country was determined to continue negotiations until a ceasefire had been achieved. An “official Lebanese source” reported that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu did not currently want a ceasefire, Hochstein’s visit to Israel failed and there was no optimism in Lebanon (Sky News in Arabic, November 1, 2024).
  • Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, expressed “strong support” for all key conditions in the ceasefire agreement proposed by Amos Hochstein, including the deployment of the Lebanese Army in south Lebanon and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to ensure a swift international response if the army failed to stop Hezbollah (The Washington Post, November 3, 2024).
  • Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, accused Israel of rejecting the Lebanese roadmap which had been agreed upon with Hochstein, and speculated that any political solution to the crisis would be delayed until after the presidential elections. He declined to “predict the crisis’ developments” in light of the election results, noting that “this leaves matters in Lebanon dependent on developments on the ground” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 1, 2024). On another occasion, Berri expressed support for the details of Hochstein’s plan. He stated he did not deny Iran’s support for Hezbollah but added that if the United States helped Lebanon, “we would not take orders from Iran” (The Washington Post, November 3, 2024).

UNIFIL

• On October 29, 2024, the Austrian defense ministry announced that eight Austrian UNIFIL soldiers had been injured by a missile strike in al-Naqoura, although the source of the attack was unclear (Reuters, October 29, 2024). UNIFIL reported that a rocket struck the force’s headquarters, causing a fire, although no severe injuries were reported. According to the statement, the rocket was launched from north of the headquarters, likely by Hezbollah or its affiliates. UNIFIL called on Hezbollah to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel and property and warned that any attack on them was a violation of Resolution 1701 and international humanitarian law (UNIFIL X account, October 29, 2024). The IDF reported that the UNIFIL headquarters was hit by a Hezbollah missile launch from the area of Hallousiyah al-Fawqa (IDF spokesperson, October 29, 2024).
• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, requested Foreign Minister Bou Habib to monitor the investigation into the rocket strike on the Austrian UNIFIL battalion’s headquarters. Additionally, Mikati condemned the “Israeli strike” on UNIFIL forces and praised the role the forces play in maintaining security and stability in south Lebanon (al-Nashra, October 31, 2024).

   
Right: The strike on the UNIFIL headquarters (UNIFIL’s Telegram channel, October 29, 2024). Left: The trajectory of the rocket that struck the headquarters (IDF spokesperson, October 29, 2024)

• UNIFIL spokesperson Andrea Tenenti reported that since October 1, 2024, there had been more than 30 “incidents” damaging UN property or facilities or injuring UNIFIL personnel. He claimed Israel was responsible for 20 of the incidents, seven of which, he claimed, were “deliberate.” He added that actions by both the IDF and Hezbollah endangered UNIFIL forces (al-Nashra, October 30, 2024).
• General Aroldo Lázaro, UNIFIL force commander, met with Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government; Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament; Abdallah Bou Habib, the Lebanese foreign minister; and General Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Army. According to UNIFIL, they discussed the ongoing fighting and its impact on civilians, and Lázaro emphasized the need for a diplomatic solution and the implementation of Resolution 1701 to stop acts of aggression (UNIFIL Telegram Channel, November 1, 2024). According to reports, Berri informed Lázaro of the understandings reached with American Envoy Hochstein and reiterated Lebanon’s commitment to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (al-Nashra, November 1, 2024).

Syria

• According to reports, on October 31, 2024, Israel conducted an airstrike targeting several residential buildings in the al-Qusayr area, located south of Homs (SANA, October 31, 2024). According to an additional report, one of the missiles struck the vegetable market in al-Qusayr, injuring five people and damaging several nearby buildings (Sputnik, October 31, 2024). The IDF spokesperson confirmed that Israeli Air Force fighter jets had targeted weapon storage facilities and headquarters used by Hezbollah’s al-Radwan Force and the munitions unit in the al-Qusayr area near the Syria-Lebanon border (IDF spokesperson, October 31, 2024).
• On November 3, 2024, the IDF reported that during a recent operational activity in Syria, IDF forces detained a Syrian citizen, Ali Suleiman al-Aasi, who resides in the Saida area of south Syria. Al-Aasi, who was reportedly handled by Iran, was engaged in gathering intelligence about IDF forces in the border area for future terrorist activities. He is currently being investigated in Israel (IDF spokesperson, November 3, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Since the end of September 2024, Hezbollah has not reported the deaths of commanders and operatives.
^[3] For further information, see the August 2024 ITIC report, "Hezbollah Issues Video of Its Imad 4 Underground Facility: Reactions and Implications."
^[4] For further information, see the ITIC report, "Sheikh Na'im Qassem, Hezbollah's Newly-Appointed secretary general."

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