Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (November 18 – 25 ,2024)

Overview^[1]

• IDF forces continued their maneuvers in south Lebanon, advancing to the “second village line” near the Litani River. The forces eliminated Hezbollah terrorist operatives, destroyed terrorist facilities concealed in civilian sites and uncovered numerous weapons. Meanwhile, the IDF attacked Hezbollah targets from the air in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut and other areas in Lebanon. Four IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting.
• This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 232 attacks (some unverified) on civilian, military and security targets in Israel, including the Greater Tel Aviv area and IDF forces in south Lebanon. On November 24, 2024, Hezbollah claimed a record 51 attacks in a single day. One civilian was killed in Hezbollah attacks and significant property damage was reported.
• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem threatened that any Israeli strike in Beirut would be answered with an attack on central Tel Aviv. He said the organization would continue attacking while working toward a ceasefire. Efforts to negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah continued. Lebanon’s interim prime minister and speaker of the Lebanese Parliament met with American envoy Hochstein and reported progress in negotiations, while awaiting Israel’s response. Hezbollah expressed opposition to Israel’s demand for freedom of operation in Lebanon. A senior Hezbollah figure claimed Hezbollah cooperated with the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL in south Lebanon, and therefore did not oppose expanding the Lebanese Army’s activities in the south.
• Hezbollah was publicly criticized for dragging the country into war and destruction and for its inability to protect the south, alongside calls to disarm the organization after the war.
• Lebanon’s minister of the economy reported economic losses of between $15-20 billion. Damages to electricity infrastructure were reported to have reached $221 million.
• UNIFIL reported several soldiers had been injured in attacks on positions in south Lebanon. An IDF spokesperson stated the attacks were Hezbollah rocket attacks targeting Israel which misfired.
• According to reports, in Syria more than 100 people died in an attack attributed to Israel on pro-Iranian militia and Hezbollah sites in the city of Palmyra in central Syria.

The Fighting in Lebanon

• Ground activity: This past week IDF forces continued their maneuvers in south Lebanon, primarily targeting objectives in the “second village line,” approximately six kilometers from the border. The forces eliminated terrorists from the air and on the ground, and uncovered large quantities of weapons, including rocket launchers, mortars and anti-tank missiles aimed at northern Israeli communities. They destroyed headquarters and terrorist facilities underground and hidden in civilian sites. Operating in Mount Dov, the forces uncovered a launch area containing an Iranian Raad-1 self-propelled anti-tank missile and armed launchers aimed at Israeli territory. Four IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting in south Lebanon this past week (IDF spokesperson, November 18-25, 2024).

• According to Hezbollah statements and reports in Lebanese media, most of the fighting against IDF forces took place on the outskirts of the village of al-Khiyam and in the Deir Mimas-Kafrkila area in the eastern sector of south Lebanon near the Litani River, as well as on the outskirts of the village of al-Bayada in the western sector, which controls the road toward Tyre. According to reports, Hezbollah operatives attacked Israeli forces with rockets, anti-tank missiles and explosive drones (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 18-25, 2024; Lebanon Debate, November 2024; Watan, November 23, 2024).
• Aerial activity: The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah terrorist targets across Lebanon, including headquarters, rocket and missile launchers, and weapons manufacturing sites, many of which were located near civilian sites.^[2] The attacks in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut targeted military headquarters, intelligence command centers and facilities used by Hezbollah’s coastal missile unit and Unit 4400, which is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran through Syria to Lebanon. In addition, more than 45 Hezbollah rocket and missiles launchers across south Lebanon, used to attack Israeli territory, were destroyed (IDF spokesperson, November 18-25, 2024).
• On the night of November 22, 2024, Lebanese media reported an Israeli airstrike on a building in the al-Basta al-Fawqa area in central Beirut, outside the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia. According to reports, at least 15 were killed and more than 60 were injured. The attack reportedly targeted senior Hezbollah terrorist Muhammad Khadr, head of the organization’s operations room and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council. Hezbollah denied that he was present at the site (al-Arabiya, November 23, 2024).

Hezbollah

Attacks

• This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 232 attacks on Israeli military, security and civilian targets, including in the Greater Tel Aviv area, and on IDF forces in south Lebanon.^[3] The attacks involved anti-tank missiles, artillery shells, drones, precision missiles, various types of rockets and anti-aircraft fire which targeted Israeli Air Force aircraft over Lebanon. In some of its claims of responsibility, the attacks were described as part of the Khaybar Operations, whose slogan was, “At your call, Nasrallah!” Hezbollah also announced claimed attacks on civilian communities which allegedly “had become military targets.” Hezbollah also claimed to have intercepted an Israeli Air Force Hermes-450 drone on November 18, 2024, over the town of al-Taybeh in Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 18-25, 2024). One civilian was killed in the attacks and significant property damage was reported (Israeli media, November 25-28, 2024).
• Key events from the week:
  • A record number of daily attacks: On November 24, 2024, Hezbollah issued 51 claims of responsibility for attacks on Israel, the highest daily number since the start of the conflict on October 8, 2024. According to a Hezbollah diagram, the attacks were carried out in Lebanese territory and targeted locations in Israel up to 150 kilometers from the border. The list included nine IDF bases, five camps and military positions, 127 border posts along the Israel-Lebanon border, 14 civilian communities, 18 assembly areas and the downing of a drone. As part of the attacks, 38 heavy rockets (surface-to-surface missiles, according to Hezbollah) and four “quality missiles” were launched (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 25, 2024). Apparently reports about arrangements in Lebanon ahead of a ceasefire led Hezbollah to exert pressure on Israel and demonstrate its capabilities.

• • The use of new weapons: As part of its escalation, Hezbollah reported it was using new weapons to attack Israel. On November 18, 2024, Hezbollah issued a video allegedly showing the first use of Fajr-3 rockets against an Israeli base two days earlier. The footage shows rockets being launched from a mobile multi-barrel launcher. On November 23, 2024, Hezbollah announced the first use of cruise missiles in an attack on an IDF base two days prior but did notprovide details about the two types of cruise missiles shown in the video. The attack in the video has not been verified.

• • New electronic component mounted on a UAV: In a Hezbollah video showing the launch of two explosive drones e on November 20, 2024, an electronic component was visible on the upper front section of one of the drones which was not part of the drone’s original design. It was apparently a satellite navigation component intended to improve the drone’s accuracy (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 20, 2024).

   
One of Hezbollah’s two explosive drones with an external electronic component (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 20, 2024)

Hezbollah casualties

• On November 18, 2024, Hezbollah announced the deaths of four operatives from its combat information unit who were killed along with Muhammad Afif, head of Hezbollah communications, in an Israeli strike in Beirut on November 17, 2024. The four, called “knights of the resistance media,” were reportedly al-Hajj Mousa Haidar, al-Hajj Mahmoud al-Sharqawi, Hilal Turmus, and Hussein Ramadan. They “carried the banner of truth and the word of resistance” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 18, 2024). Such an announcement is unusual for Hezbollah, which has maintained a policy of secrecy since late September 2024 and does not acknowledge casualties, except for high-ranking figures like Afif.
• On November 18, 2024, the commander of Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket array, Ali Tawfiq Dweik, was eliminated in an Israeli strike in the village of Jouz in south Lebanon. According to the IDF spokesperson, Dweik had commanded the medium-range rocket array since September 2024, after succeeding the previous commander who was killed in an Israeli strike. Dweik was reportedly responsible for more than 300 rocket launches at Israeli territory (IDF spokesperson, November 19, 2024).
• According to the social media, the number of Hezbollah casualties since the start of the conflict on October 8, 2023, has exceeded 1,700 operatives and senior figures, including fighters from the al-Radwan Force (Qalaat al-Mudiq Telegram channel, November 24, 2024). Media outlets and social media accounts continue to publish the names of senior figures killed in strikes:
  • According to reports Khadr Hussein al-Zein was killed; he had been a bodyguard for Hassan Nasrallah and had previously participated in the Syrian civil war (QalaatM X account, November 21, 2024).
  • A “senior American security official” confirmed that Ali Musa Daqduq, responsible for Hezbollah’s Golan File, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in the al-Sayyidah Zaynab area south of Damascus on November 10, 2024. According to the official, Daqduq was deputy commander of the Radwan Force at the time of his death (NBC News, November 22, 2024).

Speech by Hezbollah secretary general

• On November 20, 2024, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem delivered a recorded speech relating to the continuation of fighting against Israel, developments in ceasefire negotiations and “post-war” issues inside Lebanon (al-Manar, November 20, 2024):
  • Israeli attacks on Beirut would will be answered with attacks on Tel Aviv. He was referring to the killing of Muhammad Afif, Hezbollah’s director of communications, in an Israeli strike in Beirut, outside Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, on November 17, 2024. He said that “when the capital city is under enemy attack, the response has to be in central Tel Aviv.” He added that “the enemy” had to understand that when it attacked Beirut matters could not be left to chance. Qassem sought to return to the “equation” strategy of responses employed by his predecessor, Hassan Nasrallah.
  • Justifying “support” for the Gaza Strip: He stated that Hezbollah felt honored to be among “the few” supporting the Gaza Strip, mentioning Iraq, Yemen and Iran, but not Syria, which is also considered part of the “resistance axis.”^[4] He said Hezbollah was fighting on two fronts, supporting Gaza and striving to repel Israeli “aggression” against Lebanon.
  • The Israeli maneuver in south Lebanon: He acknowledged that Hezbollah initially expected the Israeli maneuver to last only 15 days but noted that it had extended due to the “resistance of the brave.” He claimed that Hezbollah fighters inflicted casualties on IDF forces in every village “the enemy” entered and that the mission was not to halt “the enemy’s” advance but “to resist it wherever it progresses.”
  • The American proposal for a ceasefire: He did not reject the draft outright but said the organization had two demands: a complete end to “aggression” and preservation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, and that they would not agree to allow Israel freedom of action in Lebanon. He added that the success of the negotiations depended on Israel’s response and the seriousness of Prime Minister Netanyahu. According to Qassem, the organization would negotiate while continuing to fight.
  • “The day after”: He stated that Hezbollah would assist in rebuilding everything destroyed during the war and called on the Lebanese people to be patient. He added that Hezbollah would remain present in the political arena and play an active role in selecting Lebanon’s new president.
• “Sources familiar with Hezbollah’s secrets” said Qassem’s most recent speech was an attempt to maneuver between two rival camps within the organization, one prioritizing weapons over politics and the other giving precedence to politics. According to the “sources,” the first part of the speech was an effort to appease the “military” camp, while the remainder sought to satisfy the “political” camp. One of the “sources” speculated whether the continuation of the war might delay the outbreak of internal conflict within Hezbollah (Nidaa al-Watan, November 21, 2024).

Other statements

• Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s Political Council, said the organization would not allow IDF forces to advance toward points they had previously attempted to reach. Referring to the killing of Muhammad Afif, the organization’s communications director, Qamati called it an attempt by “the enemy” to impose a “new equation” and said that whenever Israel targeted Beirut, they would respond against “the enemy’s capital” (i.e., Tel Aviv). Regarding efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement, Qamati claimed that Israel would obstruct a political solution in Lebanon, as he alleged it had done in the Gaza Strip, and expressed hope to halt the “aggression” through the “power of resistance” (al-Jazeera, November 19, 2024).

Media commentary

• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, claimed that the Lebanese public, beyond seeking to end the conflict with Israel, also demanded the implementation of all international resolutions aimed at disarming the “resistance.” According to al-Amin, that included a group of “law enforcement individuals,” motivated figures seeking to gain power and an “extremist group” which reflected the desires of Americans, Europeans and Gulf states demanding the full dismantling of the “resistance’s weapons” and the end of the conflict with Israel. He rejected the demands, stating that Israel would remain “the enemy” which Hezbollah had to ensure ceased to exist, and that even the end of the war would not mean the end of the “resistance” but rather its “reconstruction” and further strengthening (al-Akhbar, November 20, 2024).

Criticism of Hezbollah

• Amin Gemayel, former Lebanese president, warned that if Hezbollah did not disarm there would be a new war far more intense than the current conflict. He said that while there was a chance for a “fragile” and temporary agreement between Lebanon and Israel, it would only pave the way for a larger crisis and a new war if the status quo remained unchanged and Hezbollah retained its weapons. He said there was every chance Hezbollah would prepare for another round with Israel (al-Arabiya, November 21, 2024).
• Nadim Gemayel, Lebanese MP from the Kataeb Party, stated that the current conflict was not between Lebanon and Israel but between Israel, Hezbollah and Iran. He said Hezbollah had initiated the war in Lebanon, and yet it was Lebanon, which did not start the war, which had to find a solution. He added that “military Hezbollah has ended” and that the organization should acknowledge its defeat and inability to protect the villages of the south, focusing solely on internal Lebanese politics. Gemayel emphasized that the Lebanese people wanted a complete resolution to all crises, those between Israel and Hezbollah and those between the Lebanese and Hezbollah, and called on Hezbollah to hand over its weapons to the state authorities (al-Hurra, November 23, 2024).
• Dima Sadeq, a Lebanese Shiite journalist known for her opposition to Hezbollah, criticized Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem, who stated that “the ground would speak,” referring to the continuation of Hezbollah’s actions on the battlefield. She said, “the ground says the south is lost,” with villages falling one after another and dozens of villages erased from the map. She added that “our best sons are dying by the dozens and hundreds. They fight with full faith and spirit, yet no one comes to help them, not Iran, not Syria.” She said that “the ground” was calling “to have mercy on the south, to have mercy on your base and to save what can be saved before the losses and disasters escalate and the state collapses” (MTV TV, November 24, 2024).

The Situation in Lebanon

Casualties

• According to the Lebanese ministry of health, between the beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023, and November 23, 2024, 3,754 Lebanese had bee killed and 15,626 wounded (Lebanese ministry of health X account, November 24, 2024).

The displaced

• According to data from the UN Refugee Agency, approximately 560,000 people have fled to Syria since the escalation of Israeli attacks in Lebanon in September 2024. Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, UNHCR representative in Syria, said that 65% of the displaced were Syrians who had previously sought asylum in Lebanon to escape the ongoing war in Syria. He added that Lebanese refugees were returning to Lebanon at a rate of hundreds per day, believing that conditions in Lebanon might provide them with better opportunities for services and livelihood despite the Israeli attacks. According to reports, the number of displaced persons crossing the border has decreased from 10,000–15,000 people per day to 2,000 because Israeli strikes targeting border crossings (UN website, November 22, 2024).
• Bassam Mawlawi, Lebanese minister of the interior, instructed the general directorate of internal security to take all measures to prevent the establishment or expansion of Syrian refugee camps near the Litani River, in Ba’albek, al-Hermel, or the Beqa’a Valley (al-Nashra, November 21, 2024).

Economic damage

• Amin Salam, Lebanese minister of the economy, reported that Lebanon’s war-related economic losses ranged between $15 billion and $20 billion (al-Arabiya, November 19, 2024).
• According to reports, war-related damage to Lebanon’s electricity grid amounted to $221 million, with attacks causing direct damage to 15 of 65 power stations in the country, resulting in power outages in large areas, especially the Beqa’a Valley, south Lebanon and Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Akhbar, November 19, 2024).

The Lebanese army

• The Lebanese Army has accused Israel of attacking its forces and killing several soldiers:
  • On November 19, 2024, three soldiers were killed when the “Israeli enemy” attacked a military center in the town of al-Sarafand. The Lebanese ministry of health reported that eight more soldiers were injured in the strike.
  • On the same day, one soldier was killed and another injured in an attack on a military vehicle on the road leading from Burj al-Muluk to al-Qlaaya in south Lebanon.
  • On November 24, 2024, one soldier was killed and 18 others injured in a strike on a military center in al-Amiriya on the al-Qlaileh-Tyre road. Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, accused the international community of remaining silent in the face of “ongoing attacks against the Lebanese Army and our citizens.”

   
Lebanese army center attacked in al-Amiriya
(Ali Shoeib’s Telegram channel, November 24, 2024)

• In a statement marking Lebanon’s 81^st Independence Day, Lebanese Army Commander Joseph Aoun declared that army units remained deployed in south Lebanon and would not leave the area, as it was an integral part of Lebanese national sovereignty. He said the army continued to carry out its missions throughout Lebanese territory, confronting any attempt to “undermine security and stability,” as national unity and civilian peace were top priorities. He added that the army operated with UNIFIL forces under Resolution 1701 and said that efforts to reach a ceasefire were ongoing (Lebanese Army X account, November 21, 2024).
• French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu called on the Gulf States to find ways to strengthen Lebanon’s armed forces, which will be vital for securing border areas after the war. He also stated that “there is no better solution at this stage than implementing Resolution 1701 and supporting the armed forces in Lebanon” (Agence France-Presse, November 19, 2024).

The Lebanese Government

• On November 24, 2024, Josep Borrell, the EU foreign minister, visited Lebanon, where he met with (al-Nashra, November 24, 2024):
  • He met with Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government,, who noted the need to exert pressure on Israel to end its “aggression” and to a ceasefire. He added that Lebanon relied on European support for economic and political assistance and for strengthening the role of the army (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, November 24, 2024).
  • At a meeting with Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, they discussed developments “in light of continued Israeli aggression.”
  • Borrell also met with Lebanese Army Commander Joseph Aoun and announced that the EU would provide €40 million in aid to the Lebanese Army to strengthen its capability to implement Resolution 1701. Borrell added that “the sovereignty of the Lebanese people should not be held hostage, whether by an internal or external actor.”

Contacts for a Ceasefire

• On November 19, 2024, Amos Hochstein, the American envoy, visited Lebanon to discuss the positions of the Lebanese government and Hezbollah regarding the United States draft proposal for a ceasefire. He met with Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, and Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, who also represents Hezbollah in the negotiations:
  • After meeting with Berri, Hochstein said that it was a moment of decision-making for all parties and that there was a real opportunity to end the conflict. He described the atmosphere as positive and the discussions as “very constructive,” noting progress while refraining from publicly revealing the disputed points (al-Mayadeen, November 19, 2024).
  • Berri remarked that a few details remained to be resolved and that they were awaiting Israel’s position. He added that the United States was responsible for guaranteeing Israel’s position, claiming Hochstein stated he was aligned with Israel on the draft but warning that “this is not the first time Israel reneges on its commitments” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 19, 2024).
  • Mikati stated that the government sought a ceasefire while preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty. He noted the need to implement international resolutions and strengthen the role of the Lebanese Army in the south (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, November 19, 2024).
• “Well-informed sources” told the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar that there was an understanding on all clauses of the United States draft, with discussions currently focusing on a single border-related issue, which constituted the main obstacle to the agreement. The sources noted secrecy surrounding the matter, and it remained unclear if it pertained to the 13 disputed border points (al-Akhbar, November 20, 2024).
• Al-Akhbar reported that Hochstein and Lebanese officials focused on the draft agreement and included clauses Lebanon considered of great importance, such as border issues, implementing timelines and the terms of the ceasefire. According to the report, Lebanon’s demand was for the immediate announcement of a specific date for the full and rapid withdrawal of IDF forces from all Lebanese territory, accompanied by the release of Hezbollah captives held by Israel and the return of combatants’ bodies. The report added that Lebanese officials warned that holding Hezbollah captives, even for a few hours, would compel Hezbollah to “do what it had to” to secure their release, meaning there would be no ceasefire (al-Akhbar, November 21, 2024).
• After reports in Israeli and American media hinted at a “green light” from Israel to move forward with a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, “sources” in the Lebanese government said they were waiting for Israel’s response to Hochstein’s proposal. According to the sources, Israel’s escalated strikes were setting conditions rather than rejecting the proposal (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 25, 2024). Elias Bou Saab, deputy speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said “the Israeli enemy” escalated its actions whenever an agreement approached, but still expressed optimism about achieving a ceasefire (Radio al-Nour, November 25, 2024).
• Statements from Hezbollah regarding the negotiations:
  • Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s Political Council, was pessimistic about the chances of the negotiations, arguing that the U.S. was not an honest broker but a participant in the “aggression.” He added that Hezbollah would not agree to any clause allowing Israel to violate Lebanese sovereignty. He also stated that Hezbollah maintained full coordination and cooperation with the Lebanese Army at the highest levels and cooperated with the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL in south Lebanon. Therefore, the organization had no opposition to expanding the army’s forces or activities (Arab Television, November 24, 2024).
  • Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah stated that while they related to the negotiations “very seriously,” the “resistance” continued its actions [attacks] on the ground. He emphasized that the war would never end if “the enemy has exaggerated conditions” and rejected any possibility of “sovereignty violations or granting freedom of movement to the enemy in the country.” He said the goal was to halt the “aggression” while Lebanon stands tall (al-Jadeed, November 20, 2024).
  • Hezbollah MP Ali Fayyad said that Hezbollah was prepared for all scenarios if Israel wanted to prolong negotiations and escalated its actions on the ground. Regarding the possibility of Israel gaining freedom of action in Lebanon, he stressed that Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and Speaker Berri would not agree to any Israeli violation (al-Jadeed, November 21, 2024).

UNIFIL

• On November 20, 2024, UNIFIL reported that six soldiers had injured by a rocket launched by “non-governmental actors” in Lebanon, which hit a base in the Ramyeh area. In another incident, UNIFIL headquarters was hit by five rockets, and in a third, “an armed person” shot at UNIFIL forces. No injuries were reported in the latter two incidents. The organization said that any attack on UN forces violated international law (UNIFIL Telegram channel, November 20, 2024). The IDF spokesperson stated that a UNIFIL post in the town of Shema in south Lebanon was struck by rockets launched by Hezbollah from the al-Malkiya area at the Galilee (IDF spokesperson, November 19, 2024).
• On November 22, 2024, UNIFIL reported that four Italian observers had been injured after two 122mm rockets hit the Western Sector Command headquarters in the town of Shema. The rockets were likely launched by Hezbollah or an affiliated organization, hitting a bunker and a logistics area and causing significant damage. It was further noted that it was the third attack on the base within a week (UNIFIL Telegram channel, November 22, 2024). The IDF spokesperson reported that a UNIFIL post was hit by Hezbollah rocket fire from the Deir Qanoun area (IDF spokesperson, November 23, 2024).

• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, spoke with Giorgia Meloni, the Italian prime minister, expressing solidarity with UNIFIL forces following the attack which injured four Italian soldiers. He stated that “what happened was unacceptable” and that Lebanon strongly condemned the incident, pledging to take all necessary measures to ensure such behavior was not repeated in the future (al-Nashra, November 23, 2024).
• During his visit to Lebanon, Josep Borrell, the EU foreign minister met with Aroldo Lázaro, commander of the UNIFIL forces. According to reports, both said the only road to an end of “aggression” along the border was the full implementation of Resolution 1701 (UNIFIL Telegram channel, November 24, 2024).

Syria

Attack attributed to Israel in the Palmyra region

• On November 20, 2024, a “military source” in Syria reported an “Israeli” strike on several buildings in the Palmyra area in central Syria which killed 36 and injured more than 50, causing significant damage to buildings in the area (Syrian ministry of defense Facebook page, November 20, 2024). According to another report, airstrikes targeted three sites in Palmyra: a location hosting a meeting of senior operatives from pro-Iranian militias, the Iraqi al-Nujaba militia, and a Hezbollah senior operative; a weapons depot; and another site in the al-Jamiya neighborhood. The report stated that at least 105 people were killed in the strike, including 70 Syrian militia operatives, 29 non-Syrian fighters (most affiliated with al-Nujaba), four Hezbollah operatives and two civilians (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 24, 2024).
• The Syrian foreign ministry “strongly condemned” the attack, stating it “reflects the ongoing Zionist crimes against the countries and peoples of the region.” It added that “the crimes committed by the Zionist entity in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine pose a real threat to the security and stability of the region” (SANA, November 20, 2024).

   
The attack on Palmyra (Sham FM Telegram channel, November 20, 2024)

Israeli attack on the Syria-Lebanon border

• On the evening of November 23, 2024, it was reported that an Israeli strike targeted the Jousieh border crossing on the Syria-Lebanon border, causing property damage (Syrian News Agency, November 23, 2024). The IDF spokesperson confirmed that fighter jets attacked military facilities near the Jousieh border crossing in northern Beqa’a. According to the statement, Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, responsible for armament and cooperation, uses the Syrian-controlled border crossing to transfer Iranian weapons to Lebanon through Syria (IDF spokesperson, November 24, 2024).

Anti-Hezbollah actions

• On November 20, 2024, the New Zealand government announced the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, expanding the designation that previously applied only to its military wing. New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon stated that accordance with legislation, there was evidence proving the organization knowingly engaged in terrorist activities (Radio New Zealand, November 20, 2024).
• On November 21, 2024, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, following a recommendation from the National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, announced the imposition of economic sanctions on 24 clients of al-Qard al-Hassan, Hezbollah’s financial wing. The sanctions targeted clients who deposited significant amounts with the association, which facilitates the organization’s acquisition of weapons and payment of salaries to operatives in its military wing (Defense Minister’s Office spokesperson and Israeli media, November 21, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] The IDF stated that prior to each strike, numerous measures were taken to minimize the risk of harm to civilians, including preliminary intelligence gathering, precise surveillance, and advance warnings to evacuate the population near the targets.
^[3] In several instances, no such attacks were verified.
^[4] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

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