Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (July 8 – 15 , 2024)

Overview^[1]

• This past week, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 43 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, compared to 47 attacks the previous week. For the first time since the beginning of the fighting, the Lebanese Companies for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation claimed responsibility for firing a rocket at Israel. Two civilians and a soldier were killed and eight soldiers and civilians were injured in the attacks, and property was damaged.
• Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and deep inside the country. Hezbollah reported that three of its operatives had been killed.
• According to reports, Hezbollah tightened the rules for securing information because of Israel’s attacks on senior commanders and operatives.
• Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah gave four speeches in which he reiterated the organization’s position that a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip would lead to an end to fighting on Israel’s northern border and rejected the demand for the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces beyond the Litani River.
• A survey revealed that only 30% of Lebanese residents trusted Hezbollah, but support for Hezbollah’s regional involvement among the non-Shi’ite communities increased.
• The Lebanese foreign ministry filed a complaint against Israel with the UN Security Council because of the damage to agricultural areas in south Lebanon.
• Syria: A Hezbollah operative responsible for the transfer of weapons and who was previously Nasrallah’s bodyguard was killed in an attack attributed to Israel on the Damascus-Beirut road. IDF forces attacked Syrian army targets in response to the launch of UAVs at Eilat and because Syria had violated the agreement for the separation of forces in the Golan Heights.

South Lebanon

• This past week (July 8-15, 2024, as of 12 noon), Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 43 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, compared to 47 attacks the previous week. Hezbollah used anti-tank missiles, artillery, UAVs and various types of rockets. Two civilians and a soldier were killed and a female soldier was wounded:
  •  UAV with an electric motor: On July 11, 2024, Hezbollah attacked with a swarm of UAVs targeting the Western Galilee. Examination of the debris from one of the UAVs indicated it was an Iranian-manufactured Shahed-101, whose motor is electric and quiet rather that gasoline-based and noisy, making early identification and location difficult (Israeli media, July 13, 2024).

• First documentation of Hezbollah’s use of outdated Soviet artillery: On July 11, 2024, there was a direct hit on a building in the Western Galilee. A Hezbollah video showed the first use of a 152-mm M1937 howitzer (ML-20S) launched from in an underground concrete position. It is a USSR-made howitzer which was originally produced in 1937 and used in World War II (Nashab_32 X account, July 2024).

  
Right: The M1937 in its underground position. Left: A house catches fire after the attack on July 11, 2024 (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 13, 2024)

• Hezbollah attacks this past week (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 8-15, 2024):
  • July 15, 2024 (until 12:00): No attacks.
  • July 14, 2024: Four attacks. A suspicious aerial target entering the northern part of Israel from Lebanon was intercepted; no casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson, July 14, 2024).
  • July 13, 2024: Ten attacks. More than 30 rockets were launched at the Kiryat Shmona region in three different attacks; most of the rockets were intercepted. Five female soldiers were injured by falling debris from the interceptions; damage was caused to property. Two members of an emergency squad were injured by rocket hits. Two UAVs were intercepted in Lebanese territory (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 13, 2024).
  • July 12, 2024: Five attacks. A direct hit by an anti-tank missile in Metula; rockets fell in open areas in the Galilee Panhandle and Har Mount Dov. No casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 12, 2024).
  • July 11, 2024: Nine attacks. Ten UAVs were launched at the Western Galilee; a soldier was killed by a UAV hit. Other UAVs were intercepted in Lebanese and Israeli territory, rockets fell with a direct hit to a building in a moshav near the border. No casualties were reported (Israeli media and IDF spokesperson, July 11, 2024).
  • July 10, 2024: Four attacks. Three UAVs fell in the Golan Heights; a female soldier was injured. A rocket fell in an open area near the border; no casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 10, 2024).
  • July 9, 2024: Five attacks. Forty rockets were launched at the center of the Golan Heights in response to the elimination of a Hezbollah operative in Syria; an Israeli couple was killed by a direct hit to a vehicle. An anti-tank missile hit a kibbutz in the north; no casualties were reported. UAVs were intercepted in Lebanese territory and in Israel near the border (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 9, 2024).
  • July 8, 2024 (from 1 p.m.): Six attacks. Rockets hit a kibbutz and damaged its hotel; no casualties were reported. Rockets hit open areas in the Upper Galilee and the Golan Heights; no casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 8, 2024).

First attack of the Lebanese Companies for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation

• On July 12, 2024, the operations room of the Lebanese Companies for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation, a Hezbollah non-Shi’ite Lebanese military wing, claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on an IDF post. It was the organization’s first attack on Israel since the start of hostilities in October 2023. According to reports, the attack occurred at 5:20 p.m. and was “in support of the Palestinian people and to protect Lebanon.” It also reportedly marked the 18^th anniversary of the Second Lebanon War, and the group promised the Lebanese it would “continue the resistance until victory and liberation” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 12, 2024) The IDF spokesperson confirmed that one launch was detected from Lebanon which fell in an open area; no casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson, July 12, 2024).

IDF response

• In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force fighter jets and UAVs attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and deep inside the country. The targets included terrorist facilities, facilities of Hezbollah’s aerial defense system, buildings used for military-terrorist purposes, munitions warehouses, surveillance positions, launching positions and rocket launchers (IDF spokesperson, July 8-15, 2024).

   
Right: Ruins of a building in Tir Harfa. Left: Ruins of a building in Kafr Kila (Fouad Khreiss’ X account, July 11, 2024)

Hezbollah casualties

• Hezbollah reported three operatives killed in IDF strikes in Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 8-14, 2024):
  • Ali Hassan Nakhalah, aka Khazin, born in 1989, from Kafr Tebnit in south Lebanon.
  • Mehdi Muhammad Khair al-Din, aka Abu Turab, born in 2000, from al-Hermel in the Lebanon Valley and a resident of Tamnin al-Tahta in the Lebanon Valley.
  • Ali Hussein Wizani, aka Ali al-Akbar, born in 1989 in Shaqra.

Amal casualty

• The Amal Movement announced the death of operative Musa Muhammad Suleiman, born in 1964, from Kafr Kila in south Lebanon (Amal Movement’s Telegram channel, Central Information Office, July 13, 2024). According to reports, Suleiman and another operative were killed in an Israeli attack in the al-Khardali area in south Lebanon. Reportedly, the attack used a large drone fitted with an assault rifle (Shreim Muhammad’s X account, July 13, 2024). The IDF spokesperson confirmed an attack in the area, but noted that two Hezbollah operatives  had been killed (IDF spokesperson, July 13, 2024).

Hezbollah rules for information security

• According to “knowledgeable sources,” in the wake of the elimination of senior Hezbollah operatives in airstrikes, and fearing that Israel would be able to listen to their conversations, Hezbollah prohibited its operatives from using mobile phones in south Lebanon. The operatives also now use identifiers and code names to identify military bases or meeting sites. The code names are changed almost daily and are transferred to the various units by messengers. The organization also uses a wired and private communication network which was established in the early 2000s with Iranian funding (Reuters, July 9, 2024).
• According to reports, a team of Iranian experts investigated the targeting killings of Hezbollah operatives and concluded that the use of social network applications by junior operatives actually helped Israel to locate nearby senior figures who do not use technology and whose computers are not connected to the Internet. A senior Hezbollah figure admitted that the organization was at war with an “enemy with a technological advantage” and noted that they were acting according to plan and were “in control of the situation” (al-Nabā’, Kuwait, July 11, 2024).
• According to sources close to Hezbollah, Israeli surveillance is not limited to phones: Israel uses other technologically superior methods and cooperates with foreign intelligence agencies. The sources admitted that Israel had infiltrated a private Hezbollah communications network in one of the southern villages. The sources did not dismiss the possibility that there were Israeli agents on the ground who enabled targeted killings, adding that a “special Hezbollah unit” was investigating cases in which displaced Syrians in south Lebanon photographed targets related to the organization. However, the sources claimed that a decrease in targeted attacks had been recorded because of measures taken by Hezbollah and that in the coming days “the world would witness their influence” (al-Arabiya, July 15, 2024).

Additional video taken by Hudhud UAV

•   On July 9, 2024, Hezbollah published a 9:52-minute video, which according to claims was filmed by a Hudhud UAV. The video focused on the Golan Heights and showed intelligence and early warning bases, headquarters and military bases, Iron Dome bases and buses for transporting soldiers. The video ended with aerial photographs of urban areas in Tiberias as a trailer for the next video (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 9, 2024). It was the second Hudhud published by Hezbollah, the first was of the Haifa region on June 18, 2024.^[2]

   
Right: Map of IDF headquarters and bases in the Golan Heights. Left: Iron Dome launchers at an IDF base in the Golan Heights (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 9, 2024)

Hassan Nasrallah Delivers Four Speeches

• On July 9, 2024, Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, gave a speech at an al-Shura ceremony.^[3] He said the “support front” in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, and the political support of Syria and Iran, provided a “positive picture,” compared to the “disappointing positions of the Arab and Muslim countries” regarding events in the Gaza Strip. He said Hezbollah performed its duty to “support the Gaza Strip” and was paying the price for it with daily deaths, including at the senior command level. He added that the actions of the “resistance” since October 8, 2023 were irreversible and they would continue until “the goal” had been achieved, despite the dead, the demolished houses and the threat of war (al-Manar, July 9, 2024).
• On July 10, 2024, Nasrallah gave a memorial speech for Aziz Unit commander Muhammad Naama Nasser, who was killed in an Israeli attack on July 3, 2024^[4] (al-Manar, July 10, 2024):
  • Hezbollah’s achievements: Since the beginning of the fighting, every day the organization has recorded achievements which Israel admits are of strategic significance. Hezbollah is achieving its goals to exhaust Israel’s economy, manpower and society, and they will force it to stop the war. The fighting forced Israel to deploy 100,000 officers and soldiers to the border instead of the Gaza Strip, fearing Hezbollah would “infiltrate or invade the Galilee.” He claimed the IDF suffered from a severe manpower shortage and “therefore” had to try and recruit ultra-Orthodox for the first time.
  • The ceasefire negotiations: As soon as a ceasefire is reached in the Gaza Strip, there will immediately be a ceasefire on the Lebanese front “without discussion” because it is a “support front.” He claimed Hamas made the decisions in the ceasefire negotiations, and the entire “resistance axis”^[5] supported every decision the movement made.
  • The possibility of war: He warned that if Israel continued fighting in south Lebanon after a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah “will not show tolerance.” He wondered how Israel threatened to invade south Lebanon when it failed to take control of Rafah and had not achieved a “decisive victory.” The “resistance,” he claimed, was “cautious,” but also prepared for all “serious” possibilities, even though it wanted to remain optimistic regarding the end of the fighting, it was not afraid of a war.
  • Distancing Hezbollah from the border: Distancing Hezbollah 8 to 10 kilometers (5 to 6 miles) from the Israel-Lebanon border, as Israel wants, will not solve its problems

• On July 11, 2024, Nasrallah gave a speech to mark the fifth evening of Ashura. He said that “jihad, ‘resistance’ and martyrdom are integral parts of our precious culture of life.” He rejected the claims inside Lebanon that “the culture of resistance equals a culture of death” and said that “the resistance freed the land, preserved dignity and encouraged prosperity.” He added that the shaheeds “created life and victory” in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and everywhere (al-Manar, July 11, 2024).
• On July 13, 2024, Nasrallah gave a speech at the Central Ashura Council. He claimed that “resistance” would emerge victorious and proud of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. According to him, many of the wounded Hezbollah operatives have already recovered and returned to fighting. He also referred to the attempt to eliminate Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing, in Khan Yunis and accused Israel of carrying out a “massacre of the displaced” while claiming that it wanted to attack the Hamas leaders (al-Manar, July 14, 2024).

Statements from Senior Hezbollah Figures

• Senior Hezbollah figures referred to the possibility of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and south Lebanon and the possibility of an escalation in the conflict on the northern border while emphasizing Hezbollah’s achievements in combat:
  • Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, said that the world [sic] had to choose between continued fighting in the Gaza Strip and a ceasefire. He said there was no third option which would make Hezbollah “surrender.” If there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah will stop its operations, and that if the fighting continues In the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah will also continue fighting (al-Nashra, July 10, 2024).
  • Ali Damoush, deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, claimed Israel had begun to talk about the possibility of a political solution instead of war because it was “afraid” of a large-scale confrontation with Hezbollah and understood the messages of the “resistance”, that any war would lead to Israel’s defeat (Lebanese News Agency, July 12, 2024).
  • Nabil Qaouq, a member of Hezbollah’s Central Council, claimed Hezbollah had “proved” it could destroy the Iron Dome aerial defense system, claiming it was “unable to defend itself,” and therefore Israel was now asking for protection from the United States. He claimed it was a strategic and historical “achievement” for the “resistance” because it [allegedly] left Israel defenseless and without confidence in its army. He also claimed Hezbollah’s explosive UAVs had “broken Israel’s power” and become a symbol of destroying Israeli supremacy (Lebanese News Agency, July 10, 2024).
  • Nawaf al-Mosawi, responsible for resources and borders in Hezbollah, claimed the “resistance” [Hezbollah] had capabilities and expertise which the largest armies did not have, and the “resistance” had produced drones that could not be located and shot down. He claimed that the war in the Gaza Strip ended, the Lebanese “support front ” would stop (al-Mayadeen, July 12, 2024).
  • Sheikh Hassan al-Baghdadi, a member of Hezbollah’s Central Council, said a result of the current fighting would be the strengthening of the “deterrent equation” which has been in effect since the war in July 2006. He claimed that since the beginning of Operation al-Aqsa Flood Israel has felt defeated had not achieved anything even after ten months (al-Nashra, July 14, 2024).

Other Statements

• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, claimed Israel had lost the element of surprise and its ability to paralyze Hezbollah’s capabilities. He claimed Israel’s aerial defense systems could not provide an effective response to Hezbollah’s firepower, so in the event of a war in all likelihood the organization would launch a major attack on the Israeli home front. He claimed that in such a scenario, Hezbollah would destroy strategic civilian and military facilities and lead to the displacement of approximately one and a half million Israelis (al-Akhbar, July 10, 2024).
• “Sources” said that Hezbollah was focusing on attacks on Israeli targets in the Golan Heights because of assessments that Israel might try to outflank Hezbollah from the Golem Heights towards south Lebanon. The “sources” said that Hezbollah sought to establish two equations, one to demonstrate the “unity of the arenas” with Syria and the ability to launch an attack from Syrian territory without the regime’s consent, and the other to challenge the Israeli equation regarding the removal of Iran, Hezbollah and their allies from southern Syria to a distance of 40-80 kilometers (about 25-50 miles) from the border (al-Medan, July 14, 2024).

Criticism of Hezbollah

Findings of a Lebanese public opinion survey

• Arab Barometer, an organization which conducts surveys in the Arab world, conducted a survey in Lebanon during February to April 2024 and found that only 30% of the Lebanese had trust in Hezbollah, while 55% did not trust it at all. According to sectarian distribution, 85% of Shiites in Lebanon had trust in Hezbollah, an increase of 7% compared to the previous survey in 2022, while only 9% of Sunnis, 9% of Druze and 6% of Christians held similar views, similar to the previous survey.
• On the question of Hezbollah’s involvement in regional politics, only a third agreed that its involvement was positive for the Arab world, while 42% expressed an opposing position; 78% of the Shi’ites defined Hezbollah’s role in the regional arena as positive, compared to 13% of the Sunnis (an increase of 8% compared to the previous survey), 12% of the Christians (an increase of 7%) and 16% of the Druze (an increase of 10%).
• According to Arab Barometer, if Israel invades Lebanon, public support for Hezbollah is expected to increase, as Hezbollah will be regarded as protecting the homeland. However, if Hezbollah is seen as causing the war to expand, the expansion of the war, it may lose the increase in gained among non-Shi’ites since October 7, 2023 (Foreign Affairs, July 12, 2024).

Hezbollah operatives attack civilian who criticized the organization

• Amer Halawi, a Lebanese civilian who used social media to criticize the passage of vehicle convoys of senior Hezbollah officials in communities in south Lebanon, risking the lives of civilians because the officials were targets for Israeli attacks, was beaten while sitting in a cafe in Tyre by a number of Hezbollah supporters, who also threatened to stab him (Sky News in Arabic, July 8, 2024). He said the attack which killed Muhammad Naama Nasser, the commander of Hezbollah’s Aziz Unit, in the al-Housh region southeast of Tyre on July 3, 2024, was near his aunt’s house, and Amer’s daughter was staying there at the time. He said about 15 people surrounded him and some of them hit him (Amer Halawi’s Facebook page, July 5, 2024)

    
Right: Hezbollah supporter (white shirt) strikes (Sky News in Arabic, July 8, 2024). Left: Amer Halawi (Amer Halawi’s Facebook page, July 5, 2024)

The Lebanese Government

Efforts to reach an arrangement for the Israel-Lebanon border

• According to reports, after a ceasefire agreement is reached in the Gaza Strip, the Lebanese government will adopt an arrangement for the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from the border to an area near the Litani River, while Israel will agree to changes in the border line, as Hezbollah demanded, in addition to additional confidence-building measures (Washington Post, July 10, 2024).
• “Informed political sources” said that Amos Hochstein, the United States president’s envoy, was working to complete the agreement demarking the land border between Israel and Lebanon before the presidential elections in November 2024, in view of the possibility that Donald Trump could return to the White House. According to the sources, the agreement includes the cessation of hostilities on both sides: Israel will stop its attacks, air raids and [alleged] “violations” at sea and on land, Hezbollah will no longer construct observation towers on the border, and the Lebanese army will increase its forces south of the Litani River. It was also reported that an agreement had been reached on seven of the 13 disputed border points (al-Diyar, July 14, 2024).
• Antonio Tajani, foreign minister of Italy, said that his country was trying to forge an agreement on the border line between Israel and Lebanon based on the maritime border agreement signed between the countries in 2022. He said the goal was to find a solution which would create a distance between Israel and Hezbollah in an attempt to reduce tensions and prevent escalation (Bloomberg, July 10, 2024).
• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the interim government in Lebanon, spoke with the David Lammy, the British foreign minister. They discussed bilateral relations and attempts to resolve the tense situations in south Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Lammy said that Britain wanted to see the border crisis resolved peacefully through a negotiated settlement and indicated that he intended to visit Lebanon in the near future (LBCI, July 13, 2024; David Lammy’s X account, July 13, 2024).
• Abdullah Bou-Habib, Lebanese foreign minister, stated that security in south Lebanon relied first on the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and then on the signing of a final agreement regarding the Israel-Lebanon border. He warned that a deterioration into war would affect not only Lebanon and Israel but all neighboring countries, and emphasized the need for the parties to reach a peaceful solution (Lebanese News Agency, July 12, 2024).

Lebanon lodges complaint against Israel with the UN

• Abdullah Bou Habib, Lebanese foreign minister, said that on July 3, 2024, the Lebanese delegation to the UN had submitted a complaint to the Security Council regarding the Israeli attacks on farmers and agricultural areas in the border area. The complaint included official data regarding the number of fires that broke out as a result of Israel’s [alleged] use of white phosphorus, and stated that the area burned in south Lebanon was 2,100 dunams, in addition to 6,000 dunams of agricultural land. Lebanon called on the UN Security Council to condemn Israel for intentional harm to Lebanese civilians and territories and to ensure that it would not evade punishment for its actions (Lebanese News Agency, July 12, 2024).

The Lebanese Army

•  General Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese army, met with Aroldo Lazaro, commander of UNIFIL. They discussed the situation in Lebanon and the region and the developments on the border in south Lebanon (Lebanese army X account, July 9, 2024).

• According to “informed sources,” the Lebanese Parliament will have to extend Joseph Aoun’s term as army commander beyond its official end on January 10, 2025, because Defense Minister Maurice Sleem opposes the appointment of Hassan Odeh as the next chief of staff. According to the sources, as part of extending Aoun’s term, the Parliament is also expected to extend the term of office of the heads of the other security services and possibly also the employment of all public sector employees. The sources added that the army’s situation could be “sensitive” if Aoun retired before a replacement was appointed or before a mechanism could be agreed on to direct and control the army in the absence of a permanent commander (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 13, 2024).

Lebanon’s Economy

• Jean Beiruti, the secretary general Tourism Unions’ Federations, said that many foreign tourists had canceled their planned arrival in Lebanon because of the current circumstances. He said the tourism sector in Lebanon had recorded losses of more than $3 billion in the last ten months (MTV Lebanon, July 11, 2024).

UNIFIL

• Diplomatic sources said that the draft for the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate, which will end on July 30, 2024, had been completed and would be forwarded to the office of the UN secretary general. According to the sources, the draft is similar the proposal approved last year and that no request has been submitted by any country to amend it or to introduce changes to UNIFIL’s power. It was also reported that the discussion in the UN Security Council on Resolution 1701 was expected to take place on July 24, 2024 (al-Medan, July 11, 2024).
• Najib Mikati, prime minister of the interim government in Lebanon, met with UNIFIL commander, Aroldo Lazaro, to discuss the situation along the blue line [the Israel-Lebanon border], the cooperation between the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL forces, and Resolution 1701 (Al-Nashra, July 9, 2024).
• Lazaro met with Nabih Berri to discuss the situation in south Lebanon (NBN, July 9, 2024).

Syria

Senior Hezbollah operative eliminated

•    On July 9, 2024, a vehicle was attacked on the Damascus-Beirut road near the al-Sabourah checkpoint, about 8 kilometers (5 miles) west of Damascus and 10 (about 6 miles) southeast of the Syria-Lebanon border. The casualty was Hajj Abu Fadl Qarnabash, who was formerly one of Hassan Nasrallah’s bodyguards (Unews, July 9, 2024). Hezbollah confirmed the death of Yasser Nimr Qarnabash, aka Amin, born in 1970 from the town of Zawtar al-Charqiyeh in south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 9, 2024). According to “sources,” Qarnabash was the deputy commander of Hezbollah’s operatives and weapons “transfer unit” from Syria to Lebanon (al-Hadath, July 9, 2024). The attack was near a military checkpoint of Syrian army’s 4^th division of the Syrian Army in al-Sabourar and according to the sources, he had been in charge of transferring UAVs from Syria to Lebanon. According to reports, the Syrian driver was injured and another passenger, who identity is unknown, was burned in the vehicle (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 9, 2024).

Syrian army targets attacked

•  According to “Syrian military source,” on the night of July 8, 2024, Israeli aircraft launched missiles from the Mediterranean at a target near ​​the city of Banias, in southwestern Syria on the Mediterranean shore, causing material damage (Syrian defense ministry, July 9, 2024). According to social media, the target was an aerial defense battalion in the Arab al-Mulk area, about 7 kilometers (about 4 miles) north of Banias (Alaa al- Diab’s X account, July 9, 2024).

• On July 10, 2024, IDF armored forces and artillery attacked Syrian army facilities in the Golan Heights after it had been discovered that they were violating the 1974 Israeli-Syria separation of forces agreement (IDF spokesperson, July 10, 2024). According to reports, the target of the attack was the al-Daraiya company in the southern area of ​​al-Quneitra, where several Syrian army-Hezbollah positions also operate. No casualties were reported. According to reports, after the attack an Israeli plane dropped leaflets warning the Syrian army forces against entering the buffer zone and threatened an attack on any violation of the separation of forces agreement (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 10, 2024).

    
Right: The scene of the attack. Left: A leaflet dropped from an Israeli plane after the attack (Syrian Monitoring Center, July 10, 2024)

• On the evening of July 11, 2024, a rocket launched from Syria reportedly hit open area in the southern Golan Heights; no casualties were reported. In response, IDF forces attacked a position of the Syrian army in the Tasil area in southern Syria (IDF spokesperson, July 12, 2024).
•   On the night of July 13, 2024, IDF forces attacked a Syrian army central headquarters and Syrian army military facilities, as well as aerial defense targets. The attack was in response to the launch of two drones from Syrian territory which were intercepted north of Eilat on July 13, 2024 (IDF spokesperson, July 14, 2024). According to reports, the military headquarters was completely destroyed; also attacked were a residential building in the village of Sousah in the Damascus area used by pro-Iranian militias and other pro-Iranian groups, and air defense positions in southern Damascus and in the al-Sanamin area in Dara’a. It was also reported that there were one dead and six wounded among the Syrian soldiers and operatives of pro-Iranian militias (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, July 14, 2024). The Syrian News Agency reported that a Syrian soldier had killed and three wounded in an attack in the Kafr Sousah area (SANA News Agency, July 14, 2024).

   
An underground parking lot attacked in Kafr Sousah (SANA, July 14, 2024)

• The Syrian foreign ministry condemned the attack in the Damascus area. It issued a statement protesting the continued international silence regarding “Israeli disregard for international laws and treaties and the crimes against the people in the Gaza Strip.” The Syrian foreign ministry also warned that the continuation of Israeli attacks in Syria and the region could lead to “a dangerous escalation and severe and unexpected consequences” (SANA, July 14, 2024).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For further information, see the June 24, 2024 ITIC report, "Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria, June 17-24, 2024."
^[3] Ashura is the tenth day of the Muharram, the first month of the Muslim calendar. Shi'ites mark the day to mourn the death of Imam Hussein bin Ali and many members of the Ali bin Abu Taleb family in the battle of Karbala in 680 CE.
^[4] For further information, see the July 7 2024 ITIC report, "Reactions to the targeted attack of the commander of Hezbollah's Aziz Unit."
^[5] Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

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