Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (November 17-24, 2025)

Overview

• The IDF eliminated Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, in a targeted attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. He was responsible for efforts to reconstruct the organization and replenish its arsenal. Hezbollah confirmed his death and the deaths of four other operatives, but did not explicitly threaten Israel, instead calling on Lebanese authorities to take an “appropriate response.”
• IDF forces continued attacking Hezbollah facilities in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley and eliminated terrorist operatives as part of the ongoing activity against Hezbollah’s presence in south Lebanon, which violates the understandings of the ceasefire agreement, and following the organization’s attempts to reconstruct itself and replenish its arsenal. The forces attacked rocket launch sites and weapons depots, and eliminated eight terrorist operatives.
• Hezbollah continued to reiterate its dissatisfaction with the responses of the Lebanese government to Israel’s continued attacks, and called on it to formulate a plan for “confronting the occupation.”
• Lebanon’s President Aoun said he was prepared to participate in regional peace processes under the United States or UN auspices, while Prime Minister Salam accused Israel of being unwilling to negotiate and not adhering to the conditions of the ceasefire agreement.
• Despite the Lebanese government and army’s claims that “progress was being made” in removing Hezbollah’s presence from south Lebanon and implementing the state monopoly on weapons, a senior Hezbollah figure stated that the organization would not disarm and would not hand over its weapons to state authorities, but would preserve its military capabilities.
• UNIFIL began to reduce its forces in south Lebanon following the UN budget cut.
• The visit of the commander of the Lebanese army to the United States was reportedly canceled after he referred to Israel as “an enemy” and because of American dissatisfaction with the pace of Hezbollah’s disarmament.
• According to reports, Hezbollah and Iran began using the port of Tripoli for smuggling weapons and goods because of the tightened oversight at the port of Beirut and at the international airport.
• The IDF attacked a Hamas training compound in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp, killing 13 Hamas terrorist operatives. The compound served Hamas in Lebanon as a training site and a location for preparing to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas claimed Israel attacked a sports field where youths were present.

Eliminating Hezbollah’s Chief of Staff

• On November 23, 2025, the IDF eliminated Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, in an attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut. Tabatabai, a long-standing Hezbollah operative who in the past commanded the elite Radwan Unit and was Hezbollah’s operations officer in Syria, led Hezbollah’s reconstruction when the war against Israel ended in November 2024, renewing the organization’s units and replenishing its arsenal in preparation for war against Israel (IDF spokesperson, November 23, 2025). The Lebanese ministry of health reported five dead and 28 wounded in the attack on the Haret Hreik area in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia (al-Mayadeen, November 23, 2025).
• Hezbollah confirmed that “the great jihad commander,” Haytham Ali al-Tabatabai, aka al-Sayyid Abu Ali, was killed in an act of “Israeli aggression,” and four other operatives were killed with him. Hezbollah said he had joined the organization when it was established more than 40 years ago and had participated in many military operations until the IDF’s withdrawal in 2000, was responsible for the “intervention forces in the Islamic resistance,” and was among the founders of the Radwan Force. Hezbollah added that its jihad fighters^[1] “will advance with determination and courage to topple the projects of the Zionist enemy and its patron, America,” but made no specific threat (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 23, 2025).

     
Right: The attack on Tabatabai’s hideout in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia (al-Akhbar, November 23, 2025). Left: Hezbollah’s mourning notice for al-Tabatabai (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 23, 2025)

• Senior Hezbollah figures who arrived at the scene did not make specific threats. Mahmoud Qamati, deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, said “there is no choice but to adhere to the resistance.”^[2] He claimed Hezbollah operated in full coordination with the state of Lebanon for a unified position to set limits to the “aggression.” He added that the leadership was considering its options and would make a decision “when it deems appropriate” (al-Mayadeen, November 23, 2025). Ali Ammar, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that according to Hezbollah, every attack on Lebanon “crossed a red line” and was unacceptable. He said Hezbollah saw itself as waging an overall campaign against the “enemy,” where the organization’s timing and how it responded to various events did not correspond to those of Israel, but were determined independently, in accordance with its interests and with the situation on the ground (al-Mayadeen, November 23, 2025).
• Ali Damoush, head of Hezbollah’s executive council, speaking at Tabatabai’s funeral in the Dahiyeh the Janoubia, said the “Zionists” ought to be worried because they made “a serious mistake,” but did not issue a specific threat. He said the objective of eliminating Tabatabai was to undermine the determination and will of the “resistance,” but that would not happen because the “resistance” would not retreat or surrender. He added that the role of the state was to defend its citizens and sovereignty, and to resist all external pressures, and claimed that Hezbollah did not care about proposals as long as “the enemy does not commit to a ceasefire” (al-Manar, November 24, 2025).
• Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued to demand that the Lebanese authorities take the initiative in responding to the “aggression.” On Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV Hezbollah accused the Lebanese government of being unable to stand up to Israel, and criticized its calls to hold negotiations with Israel. Hezbollah said that every violation of sovereignty “requires an appropriate response” and that those who declared their monopoly over sovereignty and decision-making in matters of war and peace “must meet the challenge” (al-Manar, November 24, 2025). Ali al-Khatib, vice president of the Islamic Shi’ite Council in Lebanon, said condemnations were no longer the answer and called for the unification of efforts and for carrying out a “political, military and security move that would restrain the aggression” (Radio al-Nur, November 24, 2025).

• Samir Geagea, chairman of the Lebanese Forces faction in the Lebanese Parliament, appealed to President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, saying it was not possible to issue condemnations as usual and file a complaint with the UN Security Council, since that was “never effective and certainly not today either.” He added that if there were no way to create a legitimate military balance which would make it possible to stop Israel’s attacks, the United States and Saudi Arabia should be asked to exert pressure on Israel (Samir Geagea’s X account, November 23, 2025).

Israel-Hezbollah Tensions Escalate^[3]

IDF activity to prevent Hezbollah from rearming

• This past week the IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon which were in violation of the ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024, which prohibited the organization’s presence south of the Litani River. Targets included Hezbollah’s military capabilities, its organizational reconstruction and its efforts to replenish its arsenal in south Lebanon and in the Beqa’a Valley. The IDF attacked weapons depots belonging to Hezbollah’s rocket unit, launch sites and other military sites. The IDF eliminated al-Tabatabai and the four terrorist operatives with him, as well as eight other terrorist operatives in separate incidents, who were engaged in reconstruction activity or represented the organization in villages in south Lebanon (South Lebanon, November 17-24, 2025). Hezbollah-affiliated social media channels claimed that among the dead were the treasurer of the al-Tiri municipality in the Bint Jbeil district of south Lebanon and a member of the local council of Houla (Telegram channel, South Lebanon – Observing the Enemy, November 17-24, 2025).
• The IDF revealed that Hezbollah was taking action to restore its facilities in the village of Beit Lif in the Bint Jbeil district in south Lebanon, including headquarters and weapons depots situated inside civilian homes and near civilian buildings and facilities (IDF spokesperson, November 19, 2025). In response, the mayor of Beit Lif called on the Lebanese army to operate in the area to calm local residents and to refute the “false claims of the Israeli enemy” (al-Manar, November 20, 2025).

Hezbollah

• Even before Hezbollah’s chief of staff was eliminated, senior figures criticized the conduct of the Lebanese authorities in light of the Israeli attacks, with implied threats that Hezbollah was starting to lose patience:
  • Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah secretary general, in a speech marking the anniversary of the elimination of Muhammad Afif, the organization’s head of communications, said Lebanon was facing “dangerous aggression” which had to be confronted with diplomatic and political means. He appealed to the government to formulate a plan to “confront the occupation” and not give up. He added that the “resistance” was a way to expel the “occupier” and stressed that if the citizens of Lebanon were united, the “occupation” could be defeated (al-Manar, November 17, 2025).
  • Mahmoud Qamati, deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, said the attacks were part of an American-Israeli strategy aimed at “dismantling what remains of the power of the resistance.” He criticized the government and claimed that it had failed to defend Lebanon over the past year (Al Jazeera, November 20, 2025).
  • Hezbollah issued a statement for Lebanon’s independence day, saying that safeguarding the state’s independence in the shadow of the dangers threatening it was the responsibility of the Lebanese people and required “resistance to the occupation, to aggression and to patronage.” The organization called for national unity to reject subordination or external dictates, to defend all the state’s territory, to adhere to its sources of strength and to invest efforts “to force the enemy to meet its obligations under the ceasefire agreement and to expel it from our land” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, November 21, 2025).
  • Hezbollah condemned the recent attacks which hit municipal workers and council members in south Lebanon. The body responsible for coordinating and managing municipal affairs in Hezbollah alleged it was an “attempt to terrorize municipal workers and threaten their lives.” The body called on the international community to condemn the attacks and on the state of Lebanon to act to stop them (al-Mayadeen, November 19, 2025).

• According to a new analysis by The National Interest online magazine, the recent developments in south Lebanon increase the risk of a major clash between the sides. The combination of the loss of a number of senior commanders during the last war and of many of the strategic weapons systems, together with damage to the supply routes from Syria, heavy economic pressure from sanctions and the weakening of the Iranian regime’s status following the war with Israel, put Hezbollah in a sensitive position which could lead to escalation and a broader confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah in the immediate time frame (The National Interest, November 20, 2025).

The Lebanese Government

• The Lebanese leadership reiterated its condemnation of the IDF and its readiness to negotiate with Israel to resolve the disputed issues, particularly the continued Israeli control of five positions in south Lebanon and the release of Lebanese detainees held in Israel:
  • In his speech for Lebanon’s 82nd independence day, President Joseph Aoun said he was prepared to participate in regional peace processes, whether by expanding previous agreements or by formulating new agreements, and to conduct negotiations under the auspices of the UN, the United States or a broader international framework. He called for a coordinated international mechanism to enable the limitation of weapons and effective support for the army, and noted the army’s readiness to present to the five-party committee a timetable for assuming control over the occupied border points, subject to the cessation of the “Israeli aggression.” Aoun claimed that renewing the state’s independence began in south Lebanon, which suffered from prolonged “aggression” and from the absence of state control (Lebanese News Agency, November 21, 2025).
  • Earlier, an interview with Aoun was published in which he said Lebanon had no choice but to negotiate with Israel, as had happened with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and claimed that “militarily, Hezbollah is finished.” During a meeting with Ali Larijani, Iran’s National Security Council secretary, he reportedly told him that Iran was not responsible for the Shi’ites in Lebanon, Lebanon was, after which Larijani left the presidential palace (Asas Media, November 18, 2025). A few hours later, the interview was deleted from the news site because it was “misleading and contained lies and fabrications” (X account of journalist Abdallah Kamach, November 18, 2025).
  • Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said his country was prepared to enter into contacts with Israel and was interested in United States involvement to advance the negotiations. He said he thought a diplomatic solution could be achieved, similar to the 2022 agreement on the maritime border. However, he claimed that although Lebanon had repeatedly expressed willingness for talks, Israel had not actually agreed to meet. He accused Israel of noncompliance with the terms of the ceasefire and claimed that the IDF positions along the border had no significant military or security value (Bloomberg Agency, November 20, 2025).
  • Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and a Hezbollah ally, said complaints should continue to be submitted to the UN Security Council and an urgent session of the council should be demanded to condemn the Israeli “violations.” He added that Lebanon was committed to Resolution 1701 and to the ceasefire agreement, but it had turned into a “focus of condemnation and criticism” (al-Nashra, November 19, 2025).
• Alaa Moussa, the Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, stated that his country continued making efforts to advance negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. He said Egypt was trying to limit weapons to the hands of the state of Lebanon and the expansion of sovereignty over all its territory with the deployment of the Lebanese army, as well as the cessation of Israeli attacks and its withdrawal from the south of the country (al-Jadeed, November 20, 2025).

The Lebanese Army

• On the occasion of Lebanon’s 82^nd independence day, Rodolf Haykal, commander of the Lebanese army, said Lebanon was at a “fateful stage” and one of the most difficult in its history because of the Israeli “occupation,” which was keeping the army from deploying in the south of the country. He related to the efforts invested since the ceasefire agreement, especially in expanding the army’s presence south of the Litani River in accordance with Resolution 1701, and in coordination with UNIFIL and the international monitoring mechanism. He said that despite the difficulties, the army was determined to face the situation thanks to the unity of the Lebanese people and the steadfastness of the army itself, and said he was confident that the national will and belief in unity would help Lebanon overcome the difficult period (X account of the commander of the Lebanese army, November 21, 2025).
• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met with army commander Haykal at a camp in the Tyre area to discuss the latest security developments, including Israeli attacks in south Lebanon and the challenges facing the army in its missions in the area. Aoun noted the commitment of the Lebanese army to defend the state’s sovereignty and said he hoped that by the next independence day control in south Lebanon would be complete and full Lebanese sovereignty would have been achieved (Lebanese News Agency and X account of the presidential office, November 21, 2025).

• Haykal later held a meeting with the Lebanese army’s top brass to discuss the latest developments in Lebanon and in the army. He noted the need to liberate the Lebanese territories “occupied” by Israel and reiterated Lebanon’s commitment to Resolution 1701 and to full cooperation with the UNIFIL force to preserve Lebanon’s sovereignty (X account of the Lebanese army, November 22, 2025).
• According to reports, the American administration canceled Haykal’s planned visit to Washington. Reportedly, the reason for the cancellation was a Lebanese army statement which called Israel an “enemy” (MTV Lebanon, November 17, 2025). Senior Republican senator Lindsey Graham criticized the Lebanese army commander’s reference to Israel as an “enemy” and the lack of efforts to disarm Hezbollah, saying, “This combination makes the Lebanese Armed Forces not a very good investment for America” (X account of Lindsey Graham, November 17, 2025). Youssef Rajji, Lebanese foreign minister, claimed that the decision to postpone the visit was taken by Haykal himself, following the cancellation of several meetings by the Americans. Rajji said that despite disappointment with the conduct of the United States, Lebanon maintained its relations with Washington (MTV Lebanon, November 21, 2025). Ibrahim al-Mousawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, criticized the United States for cancelling the visit and claimed that the American administration was being condescending and trying to impose its will on Lebanon. He said no one in America had the right to insult the Lebanese army or its commander (al-Manar, November 19, 2025).
• Following the cancellation of the visit, a “senior American official” noted that the Lebanese army was carrying out actions aimed at disarming Hezbollah, but added that the army did not have the capabilities to carry out the mission. He admitted that given the current situation, the processes taking place were contributing to strengthening the organization and to the renewed acquisition of its power on the ground (al-Arabiya, November 22, 2025).

UNIFIL

• Andrea Tenenti, UNIFIL spokesman, said the UN force had documented more than 7,300 violations north of the Blue Line^[4] since the ceasefire agreement of November 2024 (RIA Russian News Agency, November 19, 2025).
• The deputy director of UNIFIL’s information office, Candice Ardell, said that as a result of UN budget cuts, in the coming weeks the number of UNIFIL forces operating in south Lebanon would be reduced, and they would try to minimize the resulting “negative impact” (LBCI, November 17, 2025). According to reports, 300 soldiers from the Indonesian unit operating at the site in the al-Shomreia area had left, 60 soldiers remained at the site and would leave by the end of the year (al-Akhbar, November 24, 2025).
• UNIFIL commander Diodato Abagnara, speaking on the occasion of Lebanon’s independence day, noted the commitment of the UN force to supporting the Lebanese army, which according to him was central to strengthening stability in the south Lebanon area. He said a renewed, full, extensive deployment of the Lebanese army in the south was essential for expanding the state’s authority and establishing central rule. He said Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity had to be fully respected, since only in that way could the implementation of Resolution 1701 be advanced and the conditions required for sustained stability in the south of the country be established (Telegram channel of UNIFIL, November 22, 2025).

Challenges to Hezbollah

Disarming Hezbollah

• Senior Hezbollah figures remained defiant to the government and army plan to disarm the organization, claiming it was a move intended to assist the “enemy:”
  • Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political bureau, said his organization would not disarm and would not hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state, claiming it feared for the fate Lebanon and the fate of the Lebanese army and “not for any other reason.” He rejected the calls to turn Hezbollah into an exclusively political body, and said the organization’s position was to continue preserving its military capabilities alongside its political activity for the sake of “defending Lebanon” and the principles of the “resistance” (Al Jazeera, November 20, 2025). In response, Youssef Rajji, the Lebanese foreign minister, said that the government had taken a clear position on the issue. He said any armed organization operating outside state institutions was a threat to Lebanon, and Hezbollah had “entered into a military adventure beyond its size” (MTV, November 21, 2025).

• • Hussein Jashi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, strongly opposed calls from the Lebanese government to impose an absolute state monopoly over weapons as long as daily Israeli attacks continued and Lebanese territories continued to be under “occupation.” According to him, the meaning of a call for a weapons monopoly under such conditions was assistance to the “enemy,” whether deliberately or not (Radio al-Nur, November 19, 2025).
• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said they were acting to fully implement the state monopoly on weapons. He said the plans for the demilitarization of south Lebanon were progressing “on the right track” and the army was expanding its presence in the area, particularly near the border with Israel. Salam noted that the first stage of the plan was focused on the south and was expected to be completed by the end of November 2025, while the areas of Beirut and the Beqa’a Valley were included in later stages (Bloomberg, November 20, 2025).
• The Lebanese MP Waddah Sadek said state mechanisms had recently closed more than 60 factories for [Hezbollah’s] manufacture of Captagon and illegal crossings that had been used for smuggling money and weapons to Hezbollah. He warned that the organization’s policies, threats of a new war and failure to disarm were leading Lebanon to self-destruct (Aram News, November 22, 2025).
• Businessman Bahaa al-Hariri, son of former prime minister Rafic al-Hariri, said state sovereignty was damaged when weapons were held beyond state control, and the will of the people was suppressed by those who held power and were not elected officials. He mentioned his father’s vision of the need for one state, one army, one law and the absence of weapons in the hands of militias or the existence of “mini-states” controlling Lebanese lives (al-Liwaa’, November 22, 2025).

Keeping Hezbollah from Reconstructing Itself^[5]

• Yassine Jaber, Lebanese minister of finance, announced that new scanning devices had arrived at the port of Beirut and will be used to make changes in customs procedures to increase security around containers entering or leaving Lebanon. He said the new devices, based on AI technology, could scan 60 containers an hour and analyze their contents. The information is stored for half a year and images can also be sent to the customs authorities in other countries. Jaber, a Shi’ite minister identified with the Amal Movement, claimed all containers would undergo scanning “without favoritism or manipulation” (al-Madan, November 20, 2025).

• The increased supervision at the ports is part of the efforts of the Lebanese authorities to prevent Hezbollah from exploiting trade and transportation routes for smuggling goods and money, and to increase state control over official crossings, part of the ongoing international pressure on Lebanon to adapt itself to accepted international and regional standards and procedures (LBC, November 21, 2025).
• Regarding increased supervision at the port of Beirut and at the international airport, “American sources” stated that in recent months Iran and Hezbollah had been exploiting the port of Tripoli in north Lebanon as an indirect route for smuggling weapons and goods to the organization. According to the “sources,” intelligence reports indicated that Hezbollah used people from outside the Shi’ite community for the smuggling, which was carried out through investment companies, financial companies and personal accounts to disguise the smuggling and make it more difficult for the supervising entities to track the movements of money and goods (al-Arabiya, November 22, 2025).
• In addition, in the past year Hezbollah reportedly operated an alternative financial network based on anonymous digital wallets, money transfer companies and charitable associations to bypass pressures and sanctions on the al-Qard al-Hassan association, the organization’s economic arm. According to “sources in Lebanon,” the organization warned the authorities not to attack the institution and expanded its use of wallets which were not linked to a real identity, some of them registered in African countries and on platforms enabling transfers outside the supervision of the central bank. Meanwhile, Hezbollah employed three defensive strategies: deepening a cash-based economy, concentrating its transactions in dollars and reducing the use of any official financial channel. Thus it established alternative branches for al-Qard al-Hassan, dispersing its gold reserves and launching new associations serving as additional financial conduits (Aram News, November 18, 2025).
• Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah secretary general, called on the government and the Central Bank of Lebanon to stop the measures against the al-Qard al-Hassan association, claiming that they were not directed only against Hezbollah, but against all Lebanese. He claimed the association engaged in “donations for rehabilitation and welfare from all sects and operates for the benefit of citizens, especially the poor” (al-Manar, November 17, 2025).
• Imad Marmal, a Hezbollah-affiliated journalist, said Hezbollah would not stand for al-Qard al-Hassan’s being interfered with, since it was a vital lifeline for citizens and one of the organization’s main arteries. He claimed “cutting the artery” would harm Hezbollah’s broader environment, not only the organization itself, and would open the door to a major crisis and might even arouse popular protests against the government, especially in light of the current atmosphere. According to Marmal it was “a turning point which could lead to a breaking point” (al-Joumhouria, November 19, 2025).
• Given the reports on continuing Iranian assistance to Hezbollah, Mahmoud Qamati, deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, denied that the organization was a tool in the hands of Iran. He said Hezbollah would not sever its ties with Tehran as long as it continued to “support and respect” the organization (Al Jazeera, November 19, 2025).

International Activity against Hezbollah

• On November 18, 2025, the trial opened in Germany of a Lebanese citizen who was charged with dozens of offenses, including membership in Hezbollah and the purchase of parts for UAVs for the organization worth $1.4 million. According to the prosecution, the defendant, who was arrested last year, supplied the parts for the UAV that struck a retirement home in Herzliya on the eve of Yom Kippur in October 2024, and therefore he was charged with aiding attempted murder, since there were no casualties. The defendant himself denied the accusations and claimed that he was not connected to Hezbollah, although he admitted that his uncle belonged to the “military wing” of the organization (Bild, November 18, 2025).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

The IDF Attacks a Hamas Training Compound

• On November 13, 2025, the IDF attacked a Hamas training compound in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon, in south Lebanon, and 13 Hamas terrorist operatives were killed.^[6] According to the IDF, the compound served Hamas’ branch in Lebanon for training and preparation for carrying out terrorist attacks on IDF forces and the State of Israel, while using the civilian population and civilian facilities and despite the decision of the Lebanese government to dismantle armed organizations in the Palestinian refugee camps (IDF spokesperson, November 18 and 21, 2025).^[7]
• Hamas condemned the attack, calling it a continuation of the “Zionist attacks on our people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.” Hamas denied that the site attacked served as the movement’s training center and claimed that it was a sports field and that the casualties were a group of youths who had been at the field (Hamas Telegram channel, November 18, 2025). In response, the IDF spokesperson in Arabic published a Hamas invitation from 2023, which called on young people to join the movement’s activity in the refugee camp (X account of the IDF spokesperson in Arabic, November 19, 2025).^[8]
• Representatives from Lebanese movements and Palestinian terrorist organizations, and including from Hezbollah, held a solidarity meeting in Sidon in support of the residents of the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp. At the end of the meeting a joint statement was published, in which the participants condemned the Israeli attack and rejected the claim that it was a training compound. It rejected outright any call for negotiations with Israel, claiming it was necessary “to continue the resistance in all possible forms” (al-Manar, November 20, 2025).

     
Right: The funeral of those killed in the refugee camp (Portal of Palestinian Refugees, November 20, 2025). Left: The meeting of the terrorist organizations and “resistance” movements in Sidon (al-Manar, November 20, 2025)

^[1] Terrorist operatives.
^[2] Terrorism and violence whose objective is to destroy the State of Israel.
^[3] For further information, see the October 2025 ITIC report, Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Efforts Amid the IDF’s Enforcement of the Ceasefire in Lebanon and the November 2025 report, Hezbollah’s defiance, the instability of the ceasefire andattempts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese dialogue
^[4] The Israel-Lebanon border.
^[5] For further information, see the November 2025 ITIC report, Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction.
^[6] The IDF spokesperson emphasized that before the attack steps were taken to reduce the likelihood of harm to civilians, including the use of precision munitions, aerial surveillance and additional intelligence information.
^[7] For further information, see the May 2025 ITIC report, Disarming the Palestinian Factions in Lebanon and the June 2025 report, The Armed Palestinian Terrorist Organizations in Lebanon.
^[8] For further information, see the December 2023 ITIC report, The Al-Aqsa Flood Pioneers A new youth movement established by Hamas in Lebanon to attack Israel.

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