Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (May 26 – June 4, 2025)

Overview

• IDF forces continued to operate against the presence of Hezbollah in south Lebanon in violation of the ceasefire understandings and against the organization’s attempts to renew its military capabilities. Six Hezbollah operatives were eliminated and weapons storage facilities in south Lebanon and in the Beqa’a Valley were attacked.
• Senior Hezbollah figures continued to criticize the Lebanese government’s diplomatic conduct in response to Israeli “violations” and emphasized the role of the “resistance.”^[1]
• Senior Lebanese government officials reiterated the claim that the Israeli presence in south Lebanon prevented the army from deploying to the border and claimed that Hezbollah was complying with the ceasefire terms.
• The president and prime minister of Lebanon reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring the state’s monopoly on weapons. Hezbollah expressed outrage at the Lebanese foreign minister’s remarks against the organization but welcomed President Aoun’s actions following their first meeting.
• Hezbollah reportedly changed its organizational and military structure following the penetration of Israeli intelligence and the damage to the organization’s security. According to reports, a Hezbollah operative in south Lebanon was arrested on suspicion of giving information to Israel about wounded Hezbollah terrorist operatives.
• The Iranian foreign minister visited Lebanon and met with senior government officials and with Hezbollah’s secretary general. He claimed his country sought good relations with Lebanon and did not interfere in its internal affairs.
• A senior officer in the Lebanese army informed representatives of the Palestinian “factions”^[2] of the intention to begin disarming the refugee camps in the middle of the month. A senior Hamas figure argued that the issue of Palestinian weapons should be resolved through dialogue.

The Ceasefire in Lebanon

The IDF

• The IDF continued to act against Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon which violated the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement prohibiting the organization’s presence south of the Litani River, and against Hezbollah’s military capabilities and efforts to restore them. Six Hezbollah operatives, including field commanders, were eliminated, and weapons storage facilities in the Sidon area and a warehouse containing rocket and missile launchers in the Baalbek area of the Beqa’a Valley were attacked (IDF spokesperson, May 26 to June 4, 2025). The Lebanese ministry of health reported six fatalities in IDF attacks in south Lebanon (al-Nashra, May 26 to June 4, 2025).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah continued urging the Lebanese government and the international community to take more decisive action against Israel to end its “aggression,” while continuing to stress the role of the “resistance:”
  • After meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Mohammad Raad, head the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed that the “resistance” had liberated” south Lebanon in 2000 with the withdrawal of IDF forces. He stated that the struggle against the “Israeli enemy” could only be successful through a balance of military power, aligned with the aspirations of the people and the actions of the “resistance” (al-Manar, May 26, 2025).
  • The UN coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, met with Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, to discuss recent developments in south Lebanon. They discussed “ongoing Israeli attacks and the need to adhere to [UN Security Council] Resolution 1701 for the sake of regional stability” (al-Manar, May 30, 2025).

• • Hassan Fadlallah, member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, criticized the Lebanese government’s “diplomatic approach” to the Israeli attacks. He said Lebanon had an opportunity to prove that diplomacy was the correct path but those seeking of a diplomatic option had to demonstrate its effectiveness, because “so far the enemy was killing civilians, not releasing prisoners and attacking every day” (al-’Ahed, May 26, 2025).

The Lebanese leadership

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met with the UN envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, and with the UN coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, to discuss the situation in light of recent regional and international developments. Referring to the situation in south Lebanon, Aoun said the Lebanese army was moving toward full deployment south of the Litani River, but Israel’s failure to withdraw and its continued “aggression” could prove an obstacle (Lebanese National News Agency, May 30, 2025). Meeting with members of the French Parliament, Aoun stated that Lebanon was “fully complying” with the ceasefire agreement, but Israel’s continued “occupation” and “aggression” prevented the full deployment of the Lebanese army at the border (Lebanon News, June 3, 2025).
• In a speech at the Lebanese embassy in the UAE, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the continued Israeli presence in south Lebanon was delaying the rebuilding of the state and expanding the government’s sovereignty over all its territory, and particularly the disarmament process. He remarked sarcastically that he did not understand why Israel was still present in the area, when “we are in an era of satellites and surveillance balloons, not in the middle of World War One” (NNA, May 27, 2025). In a press interview, Salam said that the Israeli presence in the south of the country was a “red line for everyone, not just for Hezbollah.” He added that Israel did not adhere to the ceasefire agreement and had not withdrawn from Lebanese territory, carrying out “ongoing violations” every day. He called on the international community, especially the United States, to increase pressure on Israel to implement the terms of the agreement (CNN, May 29, 2025).
• Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, noted Lebanon’s commitment to Resolution 1701. He said that Israel “will not influence us, and the more it continues its aggression, the more we will insist on defending our land and liberating it.” He added that he was disappointed the United States was not pressuring Israel to stop its “aggression” (al-Joumhouria, May 27, 2025). In another interview, he said Lebanon was waiting for Morgan Ortagus, deputy United States special envoy to the Middle East, to visit Beirut in order to understand the American position. He said Lebanon met all its obligations to the ceasefire agreement, unlike Israel, which “refused to implement it.” He claimed Hezbollah remained committed to the agreement, was cooperating with the Lebanese army, had handed over its weapons “without resistance” and agreed to dismantle its military facilities (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 31, 2025).
• “Sources” reported that the United States was concerned about Lebanon’s noncompliance with the ceasefire agreement. According to the “sources,” the United States threatened to impose a timetable on Lebanon for implementing the agreement and disarming Hezbollah. They added that that specific concern was the reason for the postponement of Ortagus’ visit to Beirut (al-Hadath, May 29, 2025). Later, a “senior Lebanese official” stated that they had received notification of the end of Ortagus’ mission, although she might make one final visit to Lebanon. However, the “official” said Washington would not reconsider its demands of Lebanon, regardless of who the American envoy was (al-Hadath, June 3, 2025).

The Lebanese army

• The Lebanese army announced it had found a “concealed espionage device belonging to the “Israeli enemy” in the Marjayoun district. The army added that Lebanese forces and UNIFIL were closely monitoring the situation in south Lebanon in light of the “ongoing violations by the Israeli enemy” (Lebanese army X account, May 27, 2025).

“Israeli espionage device” located by the Lebanese army
(Lebanese Army X account, May 27, 2025)

• Reportedly, the Lebanese army has recently expanded its activity in the border area with Israel, in the areas of al-Adaisseh and Marakeh as far as ‘Aita al-Sha’ab, and approached areas taken over by IDF forces after the February 18, 2025 deadline for the ceasefire implementation. It was also reported that the Lebanese army deployed near the border security fence on the outskirts of ‘Aita al-Sha’ab and Lebanese soldiers had removed the IDF Golani Brigade flag and raised the Lebanese flag in its place (al-Akhbar, June 3, 2025).

UNIFIL

• UNIFIL held a tour for several Christian and Muslim leaders in the town of Yaroun in south Lebanon to show the effects of the recent war, stating that the town’s mosque and church were destroyed during the fighting (NNA and UNIFIL Telegram channel, May 27, 2025).

• UNIFIL commander Aroldo Lázaro gave a speech marking the 77^th anniversary of the founding of the UN peacekeeping forces and mentioned UNIFIL’s commitment to a quieter future for south Lebanon and the region. He said that in recent months the Lebanese army had deployed “significantly” in the south, adding that state authority could not be expanded as long as the IDF remained in Lebanese territory. He said a political process was necessary to deal with the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and with a resolution for the demarcation of borders (UNIFIL Telegram channel, May 29, 2025).

• UNIFIL Deputy Commander Hervé Lecoq claimed Hezbollah had not carried out any military action against Israel since the ceasefire went into effect in November 2024 and that no Hezbollah military presence had been observed in south Lebanon. He also said that since the ceasefire, UNIFIL forces had found between 250 and 300 weapons caches containing rockets, mortar shells and ammunition (al-Arabi, May 29, 2025).
• UNIFIL spokesperson Andrea Tenenti said UNIFIL forces were a tool which could be used to create the necessary conditions for diplomacy and to rebuild trust. He added that the two main conditions for restoring stability were the withdrawal of IDF forces from the five posts in south Lebanon and the redeployment of the Lebanese army throughout the southern part of the country (al-Akhbar, May 29, 2025).
• This past week confrontations between UNIFIL forces and residents in south Lebanon continued:
  • After a Hezbollah operative was eliminated in Yater in south Lebanon on May 27, 2025, a UNIFIL force arrived for a tour of the village. Local residents tried to prevent UN soldiers from entering, resulting in a confrontation during which UNIFIL soldiers drew their weapons and the Lebanese army had to intervene (al-Jadeed, May 28, 2025). UNIFIL spokesperson Andrea Tenenti noted that the organization operated in south Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese government and that any interference in its activity was unacceptable (al-Nashra, May 28, 2025).
  • Residents of the town of Siddiqin stopped a UNIFIL force from entering the Jabal al-Kabir area without a Lebanese army escort. Local residents tried to block the soldiers’ advance, and waved Hezbollah flags and hung them on the UN vehicles. As a result, a Lebanese army force arrived and set up a checkpoint (al-Jadeed, June 3, 2025).

• • Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said he opposed clashes between UNIFIL forces and civilians in south Lebanon. He said that although UNIFIL movements had to be coordinated and accompanied by the Lebanese army, if sometimes that was not the situation, people had to refrain from acting rashly. As the deadline for renewing UNIFIL’s mandate in Lebanon approaches at the end of August 2025, Berri emphasized that mistakes should not be made which would allow “actors” to call for ending UNIFIL activity in Lebanon (al-Joumhouria, May 30, 2025).
• Regarding the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, the Hezbollah daily al-Akhbar claimed that financing for UNIFIL’s continued activity was seriously threatened because the American president was determined to stop American funding for the UN, and the United States provided 27% of the peacekeeping forces’ budget. According to the newspaper, there was no indication that European countries would compensate for the loss or that China would increase its contribution, currently 20%, so it was possible that UNIFIL’s manpower could be reduced by half (al-Akhbar, May 29, 2025).

Disarming Hezbollah

Hezbollah

• “Sources close to Hezbollah” claimed that once the organization’s forces had withdrawn to the north of the Litani River, its weapons with a range of less than ten kilometers were no longer relevant. They added that the organization was willing to agree to a comprehensive weapons deal if it received “guarantees.” The “sources” said Hezbollah wanted to keep light weapons to defend its presence inside Lebanon [sic] (al-Hadath, May 30, 2025).
• Deputy head of the Supreme Shi’ite Council, Sheikh Ali al-Khatib, said the claim that 80% of the “militia” weapons had been dismantled was “malicious” because the “resistance” was not a militia but defended the state and the Lebanese people, had liberated land in the past and would do so again in the future. He said it surprised him that some people claimed disarmament brought achievements. He said the state had to first deliver economic achievements, liberate land and rebuild the country, and not boast of empty accomplishments (Facebook page of the Supreme Shi’ite Council, May 30, 2025).

The Lebanese government

• At a conference in Dubai, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam noted his country’s commitment to reform which would lead to “one weapon” in Lebanon. He said Lebanon had been exhausted “by divisions, wars and patronage by other countries, so we decided to reclaim our state.” He added that they wanted a Lebanon which could choose between war and peace [independently] (Lebanese National News Agency, May 27, 2025).
• Interviewed by the press, Salam said that the Lebanese army was taking broad action for a monopoly on weapons and had already destroyed around 500 Hezbollah military posts south of the Litani River (CNN, May 28, 2025). In another interview, Salam said that the state had to have a monopoly on weapons. He claimed the government had achieved about 80% of its objectives regarding disarming the “militias” in south Lebanon, adding that the government did not want to lead the country into civil war but its commitment to expand and strengthen state authority remained firm (Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2025). After Salam met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri he again stated that the issue of the state’s monopoly on weapons had been clarified in the government’s declaration and that “everyone is committed to it” (al-Nashra, June 1, 2025).
• Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji harshly criticized Hezbollah, asserting that the organization did not want the state to have a monopoly on weapons. He said the state would not compromise on its sovereignty and that Hezbollah was an illegal armed organization. He called on Hezbollah to hand over its weapons and become a normal political party with an ideology and a platform, stressing that no one wanted the slogan “army, people and resistance” (al-Quds al-Arabi, May 28, 2025). Ibrahim al-Moussawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, replied that “it is shameful and disgraceful that such statements come from someone entrusted with diplomacy and the defense of the state.” In response to Rajji’s remark that the Lebanese state did not negotiate its sovereignty, al-Moussawi said, “A state with dignity does not negotiate its sovereignty with the enemy nor with its own people, since the people are the source of sovereignty and the source of authority” (al-’Ahed, May 28, 2025).
• “Well-informed sources” reported that in the near future the Lebanese army would begin an operation to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River. The operation will be conducted “away from the media and in coordination with the organization’s leadership.” According to the report, the operation was supposed to begin before a possible visit of Morgan Ortagus, deputy American special envoy to the Middle East, after Eid al-Adha (June 6-10, 2025), as she was expected to bring “a firm message expressing America’s dissatisfaction with Lebanon’s slowness in seizing illegal weapons” (Nidaa al-Watan, May 30, 2025). The information was published before reports about Ortagus’ expected departure from her position.

     
Right: Criticism of Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s “eagerness” to disarm Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The Arabic reads, “Where are you going?” Salam replies, “I’m going to collect the weapons!” (al-Joumhouria, May 28, 2025). Left: Criticism of the government, which fans the flames of the weapons debate. “The country needs a fire truck, not incitement and propaganda!” (al-Liwaa, May 29, 2025)

• According to an editorial in the Lebanese opposition daily al-Liwaa, Hezbollah’s possession of weapons during the municipal elections in May 2025 meant that no real change took place and that the influence of Hezbollah-supported individuals and parties strengthened. According to the article, Hezbollah significantly influenced voter decisions, especially in areas where the organization was deployed, with emphasis on its sphere of influence in south Lebanon and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. The article stressed that due to Hezbollah’s use of [the threat of] weapons for continued control and intimidation, independent candidates and political parties with different opinions did not run for office. It was also noted that in several municipalities where Hezbollah and the Amal Movement won in south Lebanon and in the Nabatieh area, a record number of voters participated, more than in any previous election, reflecting the impact of weapons on the electoral process. The article claimed that Hezbollah’s continued illegal possession of weapons shut the door to the election of unaffiliated individuals who could have developed the areas. In addition, since the organization’s weapons have lost their capacity to deter or offer protection against Israeli attacks, Hezbollah’s possession of weapons has lost all legitimacy and has become a major burden on all of Lebanon (al-Liwaa, May 27, 2025).

Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s relations with the Lebanese leadership

• A Hezbollah parliamentary delegation led by faction chairman Mohammad Raad met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to discuss Lebanon’s challenges, chiefly “preserving sovereignty, ending the occupation, and halting the aggression and violations supported by some of the countries that guarantee the agreement.” The atmosphere of the meeting was reportedly positive and that Aoun joked with Raad that they were neighbors in south Lebanon. “Sources” stated that the meeting was coordinated after Hezbollah had strengthened its organizational and political structure. According to the “sources,” the meeting confirmed that understandings had been reached behind the scenes in recent weeks in the midst of Lebanon’s internal political complexity and regional changes (Radio al-Nour and Lebanon 24, May 26–27, 2024).
• After meeting with Aoun, Raad said the scope of understandings between Hezbollah and the president was broad and expressed satisfaction that state matters were being managed “under the supervision and concern of His Excellency [Aoun].” He added that all doors to President Aoun were open since he was elected in January 2025 and they would remain open “to achieve sovereignty and preserve stability” (al-Manar, May 26, 2025).

• However, Hezbollah criticized Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who said the era of exporting the Iranian revolution was over and that there would be no weapons outside the authority of the state. When Raad was asked about his remark after the meeting with Aoun, he replied “no comment, out of respect for the remainder of friendship that still exists” (al-Manar, May 26, 2025). In an attempt to calm tensions, Salam met with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal Movement and a close ally of Hezbollah, and said there was room for friendship with Raad and that his door was always open to him and to Hezbollah (al-Diyar, June 2, 2025).

• On June 4, 2025, Prime Minister Salam hosted a Hezbollah delegation headed by Raad. After the meeting, he said they had entered smiling because they were interested only in friendship, and they had left smiling as well because they wanted to reach understandings and consensus with the prime minister and with all components of the state. He said they had discussed reconstruction and would meet again to discuss it further. Raad added that they did not base their positions on emotions or prejudice and judged the performance of each official and every person fulfilling state duties, and did not believe that disagreements harmed friendships (al-Manar, June 4, 2025).

• In his Friday sermon, senior Shi’ite cleric Sheikh Ahmed Qabalan said that nothing was more important than preserving national sovereignty and coexistence. He harshly criticized the Lebanese leadership for “allowing Israel to violate Lebanese sovereignty” and for allowing international guarantors to shirk their commitments, and claimed that the government was not fulfilling its role and lacked the courage to exercise sovereignty. He claimed the government was neglecting the south and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut and was not involved in the reconstruction of those areas. He added that there were “elements” who were “operating according to the objectives of the Americans and Israelis” and might bring the country to the brink of civil disaster (MTV, May 30, 2025).

The challenges of reorganizing Hezbollah

• A “source close to Hezbollah” reported that all levels of Hezbollah’s organizational and military structure had changed, and that the change was based on reducing unit size. According to the source, the change was made because Israeli intelligence had “penetrated the previous organizational structure of Hezbollah,” and the organization’s security forces had suffered a major blow (al-Hadath, May 29, 2025).
• Lebanese political commentator Qassem Youssef said Hezbollah was attempting to reactivate its security, military, social and political mechanisms in Lebanon after recent difficulties. He noted that one of the organization’s priorities was renewing the activity of the al-Qard al-Hassan Association, Hezbollah’s financial arm, and opening new branches. He added that Hezbollah had been forced to opt for renewing the Association’s activities because of a crisis at home and a decline in foreign donations. In his assessment, sooner or later Hezbollah might collide with the Lebanese state, since al-Qard al-Hassan operates illegally. He also said that in the near future Hezbollah would probably focus on socially responsible NGOs, as they formed its primary link with its surrounding Shi’ite community. He noted that ahead of the parliamentary elections slated for May 2026, the issue of al-Qard al-Hassan was particularly important because the NGOs alone would not be able to finance Hezbollah’s anticipated high expenses. According to Youssef, the Lebanese central bank and foreign states opposed to Hezbollah would continue trying to eliminate the organization’s sources of funding (Aram News website, May 28, 2025).
• Ali Haidar, Israeli affairs editor at the daily al-Akhbar, wrote that the fighting in Lebanon had not ended with the ceasefire but entered a new stage. He said that even during the fighting Hezbollah began to rebuild its ranks, reduce traditional centralization and become more flexible. He claimed that the alternative leadership headed by Na’im Qassem had successfully managed the fighting. Haidar claimed that despite military losses, Hezbollah remained active and capable of defense, and politically, attempts to isolate the organization had failed, and it remained a prominent and resilient social and political entity (al-Akhbar, May 31, 2025).

New Hezbollah spy affair

• A Hezbollah operative from south Lebanon was arrested on suspicion of collaborating with Israeli intelligence. It was reported that Mahmoud Ayoub, a Hezbollah operative from the village of Kharouf in the Nabatieh area, who worked as a financial director at the Ragheb Harb Hospital, was suspected of giving detailed information on wounded Hezbollah terrorist operatives and their families to Israeli intelligence services. According to the report, Ayoub was part of a network of about 700 full-time Hezbollah operatives who were active in Kharouf. He was arrested in an operation conducted jointly by the intelligence division of the internal security forces and Hezbollah’s security apparatus (al-Arabiya, June 2, 2025).

The Iranian Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon

• Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi paid an official visit to Lebanon. Arriving at Rafic Hariri Airport in Beirut, he said Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity were of great importance to Iran, which respected Lebanese internal affairs and did not interfere in them. He added that Tehran wanted to improve bilateral relations based on mutual respect. During his visit Araghchi held meetings with senior Lebanese government officials and with the Hezbollah leadership:
  • Meeting with Araghchi, President Joseph Aoun said that Lebanon sought to strengthen relations with Iran and that internal Lebanese dialogue, as well as dialogue between states, would lead to resolving various issues without. Araghchi reportedly said Iran supported Lebanon’s sovereignty and its efforts to end the “Israeli occupation.” He added that Iran supported Lebanon and the countries had good relations based on the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs (X account of the Lebanese Presidential Office,  June 3, 2025).

• • “Government sources” reported that the meeting between Araghchi and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam had been “good and relaxed,” and Salam had received an invitation to visit Tehran, saying he would respond “when the circumstances were right.” They reportedly discussed ways to strengthen bilateral partnership and the operation of a joint Iran-Lebanon committee. According to the “sources,” Araghchi asked Salam to lift the ban on flights from Iran to Lebanon, which had been in effect since February 2025, but Salam said the decision was based on security considerations (al-Nashra, June 4, 2025).
  • “Sources” reported that Lebanese foreign minister Youssef Rajji had criticism regarding the causes of the war in Lebanon and told Araghchi that “military adventures did not end the Israeli occupation and placed Lebanon in a difficult situation.” Regarding future relations with Iran, Rajji said solutions were the result of diplomacy and that any contact between a domestic actor and an external one had to be conducted through the state. Rajji also emphasized that Lebanon’s reconstruction was tied to the disarmament of Hezbollah, while Araghchi stated that disarming Hezbollah was a Lebanese decision (al-Hadath, June 3, 2025).
  • Araghchi visited the grave of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. He claimed that final victory belonged to the Lebanese people and the “resistance,” and that the defeat of the “Zionist regime” was inevitable (Mehr, June 3, 2025).

• • Araghchi met with Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem, and Mojtaba Amani, Iranian ambassador to Lebanon was also present. According to reports Qassem said he was grateful to Iran and its leadership for its ongoing support for the Lebanese people and the “resistance” and noted Iran’s “positive role” in the region and in supporting the “Palestinian resistance.”^[3] He also stated that Hezbollah was committed to Lebanon’s reconstruction, stability, the preservation of its sovereignty and the removal of the “occupation” from its lands. Araghchi noted the importance of Iran-Lebanon relations and Iran’s desire to assist Lebanon in its economic, political and social spheres on the basis of mutual respect (al-Nashra, June 4, 2025).

The Reconstruction of Lebanon

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, meeting with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, said the country needed more than $7 billion for reconstruction. He noted that the goal of obtaining $250 million from the World Bank had been achieved (Lebanon 24, June 2, 2025).
• According to reports, Ali Hamieh, who was minister of transport and public works on behalf of Hezbollah in Najib Mikati’s interim government [until the formation of Nawaf Salam’s government], was appointed as President Aoun’s advisor for the reconstruction of villages in south Lebanon (al-Liwaa, June 3, 2025). Hamieh is expected to play a key role in shaping the state’s reconstruction plan, coordinating activity with international institutions and donor countries, and overseeing implementation of the project (Lebanon Debate, June 4, 2025).

Disarming the Palestinian Refugee Camps

• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of Hezbollah’s daily newspaper al-Akhbar, criticized Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s “enthusiastic” agreement with the position of Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas regarding disarming the Palestinian [terrorist] organizations in Lebanon’s refugee camps. According to al-Amin, Salam’s contradicted the moderate policy of President Joseph Aoun, which holds that the Lebanese army should not enter the refugee camps and that confrontation had to be avoided at all costs. Al-Amin claimed that anyone seeking to disarm following the government’s proposed course of action was in fact submitting to the conditions of the United States and the Gulf states, and thus realizing the will of the “enemy.” He claimed that senior officers in the Lebanese army were in favor of President Aoun’s position and said they did not want to clash with the armed elements in the refugee camps, as any confrontation would increase the likelihood of bloodshed. He concluded that Prime Minister Salam was misreading the situation and had to understand that Mahmoud Abbas had no real ability to influence what happened in the camps. In his view, dialogue and coordination with the organizations was the correct path (al-Akhbar, May 27, 2025).
• “Palestinian sources” reported that a senior officer in the intelligence directorate of the Lebanese army had officially informed a delegation of the Coalition of Palestinian Forces that the army was prepared to take responsibility for the weapons in the refugee camps in Lebanon in stages, starting in mid-June. According to the “sources,” he demanded their cooperation and the handover of heavy and medium-weight weapons (al-Nashra, May 28, 2025). However, a “senior security official” said that in the first camps the process might go smoothly because Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas’ organization, controlled them, but the challenge would lie in the next camps, particularly Ain al-Hilweh, which had a prominent presence of “factions” which did not follow Fatah and the Palestinian leadership and were close to Hezbollah, such as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and jihadist factions (Independent Arabia, May 30, 2025). Reportedly, Fatah military commanders and former officers sent a letter rejecting everything discussed by Mahmoud Abbas during his visit to Beirut (al-Akhbar, May 30, 2025).
• Senior Hamas official Ali Baraka met in Beirut with a PFLP delegation led by deputy secretary general Abu Imad Ramez. They discussed developments in the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and noted that the approach to the issue had to be comprehensive and not related only to security. They said dialogue between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian leadership in Lebanon was the correct approach to safeguarding the interests of both the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples (Hamas Telegram channel, May 30, 2025).
• A Palestinian delegation headed by PLO Executive Committee secretary and Fatah Central Committee member Azzam al-Ahmed arrived in Lebanon to promote implementing the understandings between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas regarding centralizing weapons under the Lebanese state and disarming the Palestinian “factions”^[4] in the refugee camps. According to an announcement from the delegation, a meeting would be held soon to finalize the procedures for handing over the weapons. “Sources affiliated with Hamas” expressed doubt about the seriousness of the process and claimed it was a superficial effort being conducted remotely by PA officials in Ramallah. According to the report, the main question was whether all types of weapons would be handed over or only heavy and medium-weight weapons (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 2, 2025).

^[1] Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[2] Terrorist organizations.
^[3] The Palestinian terrorist organizations.
^[4] Terrorist organizations.

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