Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (May 25-June 1, 2026)

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• For the first time since the beginning of the campaign, signs of public fatigue are appearing within the Shi’ite community in south Lebanon.
• The gap between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah continues to deepen.
• The hostilities in south Lebanon are gradually expanding beyond the Yellow Line, with an Israeli transition to deep, focused operations against Hezbollah infrastructure and UAV arrays.
• The civilian crisis in Lebanon is gradually becoming a strategic component in the hostilities. The destruction of infrastructure, the damage to agriculture and the concern over damage to vital facilities are increasing the internal pressure throughout Lebanon.

Overview^[1]

• This past week the IDF expanded its activity in south Lebanon beyond the Yellow Line and north of the Litani River, seized the Beaufort Castle, attacked hundreds of Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon from the air, mainly in the Tyre and Nabatieh areas and in the Beqa’a Valley. An attempt was made to eliminate the commander of the rocket array of the Imam Hussein Division in a targeted strike in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia. Two IDF soldiers were killed by exploding UAVs in south Lebanon and a female soldier was killed by an exploding UAV in northern Israel.
• Hezbollah intensified its activity in response to the expansion of the IDF activity and issued 181 claims of responsibility for attacks using exploding and standard UAVs, rockets and other weapons on IDF forces in south Lebanon and on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, including in areas distant from the border, such as Acre and Tiberias.
• A first round of security talks between representatives of the Lebanese army and the IDF took place in Washington as part of the direct negotiations between the countries. No breakthrough was achieved, as Lebanon demanded a permanent ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south, while Israel focused on the demand to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure and disarm the organization.
• Hezbollah and its affiliated media outlets continued demanding that the Lebanese leadership halt the direct negotiations with Israel, noting the organization’s opposition to disarmament. They supported Iran’s position that ending the war in Lebanon had to be part of the agreement taking shape with the United States.
• First signs of growing criticism of Hezbollah from within the Shi’ite community in south Lebanon appeared after residents and public figures from Tyre and Nabatieh called for them to be designated open cities and free of weapons under the exclusive sponsorship of the Lebanese state. Public opinion surveys indicated growing support for political solutions, even among the Shi’ite public.
• The Lebanese authorities warned of a worsening civilian and humanitarian crisis because of the extensive destruction of residential infrastructure and agricultural land and possible damage to the Qaraoun Dam, located near the Litani River.

The Fighting in Lebanon

The IDF

• The IDF continued extensive ground and aerial activity in south Lebanon, while expanding the fighting beyond the Yellow Line, destroying Hezbollah infrastructure and deepening operational control on the ground. The forces attacked and destroyed terrorist tunnels, weapons depots, headquarters, surveillance posts, rocket launchers and UAV facilities, eliminating terrorists operating near IDF forces and near the border fence. IDF forces crossed the Litani River and seized the Beaufort Castle (Qal’at al-Shaqif), carried out extensive activity in the al-Slouqi area, and attacked hundreds of targets in south Lebanon, mainly in the Tyre, Nabatieh and Beqa’a Valley regions from the air, to remove direct threats to the northern communities and the Galilee Panhandle. An attempt was made to eliminate the head of the rocket array of the Imam Hussein Division^[2] in a targeted strike in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, under instructions from Israel’s political echelon. An IDF female soldier was killed by an exploding UAV in northern Israel and two IDF soldiers were killed by exploding UAVs in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, May 25-June 1, 2026; Nidaa’ al-Watan, May 30, 2026).
• The IDF spokesperson announced that since the beginning of the hostilities in Lebanon on March 2, 2026, approximately 2,500 Hezbollah operatives had been eliminated, approximately 900 of them since the ceasefire went into effect on April 17, 2026. Targeted strikes were carried out on field commanders and senior figures in Hezbollah’s combat arrays (IDF spokesperson, May 29, 2026).

Hezbollah Activity

• Between noon, May 25 and noon June 1, 2026, Hezbollah issued 181 claims of responsibility for attacks using explosive and standard UAVs, rockets, mortar shells and anti-tank missiles, an increase of 34% over last week’s 135 claims. Most of the attacks targeted IDF forces operating in south Lebanon, but they also attacked northern Israeli border communities and concentrations of forces near the border. With the expansion of Israeli activity in south Lebanon, Hezbollah intensified its attacks on Israeli territory, targeting both the border communities and distant targets such as Safed and Acre. Hezbollah continued claiming that the expansion of the Israeli ground activity would not impact its ability to launch UAVs and manage a war of attrition, and representing UAVs as an important tool in the current hostilities (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 25-June 1, 2026).

• Senior Hezbollah figure Wafiq Safa said the organization had other weapons and claimed he was confident that continued fighting would lead to Israel’s withdrawal. He said the objective of the renewal of Hezbollah’s military wing activity was to prove that Israel “understands only the language of force.” Safa also warned against the establishment of a local Lebanese force similar to the South Lebanon Army which operated alongside the IDF during the days of the security zone, and claimed Hezbollah would be capable of fighting it if it were established. He claimed the organization did not want a confrontation with the Lebanese army (Radio al-Nour, May 25, 2026).

• With the expansion of the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, fears in Lebanon increased that the western Beqa’a Valley would become another area of confrontation. Reportedly, the latest Israeli strikes focused on the town of Mashghara in the Beqa’a Valley, which absorbed hundreds of displaced families and has now become almost completely emptied of residents in the wake of warnings and repeated bombardments. The area is a strategic axis for Hezbollah, connecting the northern Beqa’a Valley with south Lebanon and serving as a central supply and movement route for the organization’s operatives, and could therefore become a target for Israeli attacks (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 27, 2026).

UNIFIL

• UNIFIL has reportedly begun a gradual reduction of its forces in south Lebanon, in preparation for withdrawing all its forces by the end of 2026. So far, close to a quarter of the force’s soldiers have left because of “security developments” in south Lebanon (al-Nahar, May 29, 2026).

The Direct Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel

The Lebanese Government

• On May 29, 2026, the first meeting was held by delegations of the Lebanese army and the IDF at the Pentagon, attended by the United States undersecretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby. According to Lebanese sources, the meeting ended without a breakthrough. Reportedly, the Lebanese delegation focused on the demand to implement the ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal from the territories under its control in south Lebanon, the release of the Lebanese prisoners and the return of the displaced persons, while noting the need for deployment of the Lebanese army and the application of state authority in the south. Israel focused on the demand to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure south and north of the Litani, and especially the UAV array, and said it was a condition for any progress on withdrawal. Lebanon said the continuation of the Israeli strikes and Israeli’s control over territory made it difficult for the Lebanese army to implement its plan to restrict weapons to the state (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 29-30, 2026; al-Akhbar, May 30, 2026; Nidaa’ al-Watan, May 31, 2026; X account of the Lebanese presidency, May 29, 2026). According to reports, before the meeting the Lebanese delegation received instructions from Lebanese president Joseph Aoun to advance the matter of the ceasefire, stopping the Israeli ground advance and the withdrawal of IDF forces from south Lebanon (al-Diyar, May 26, 2026; Nidaa’ al-Watan, May 28, 2026).
• Meanwhile, there is a growing assessment in Lebanon that without American pressure on Israel no significant progress can be expected, although the Lebanese government has not yet withdrawn from the talks lest it allow Israel to expand its activity in the south. According to official Lebanese reports, Beirut will determine its position regarding the continuation of the process after direct political talks on the political track expected to take place in Washington on June 2-3, 2026 (al-Araby channel, May 30, 2026).
• Reportedly, Lebanese president Aoun is leading contacts with the United States in an attempt to advance a ceasefire, reduce escalation and stop the Israeli advance in south Lebanon. He is in contact with American secretary of state Marco Rubio, who promised to promote the issue, however thus far no practical breakthrough has been made. In Lebanon hopes are pinned on the round of talks expected to take place in Washington on June 2-3 (al-Madan, May 31, 2026).
• Lebanese prime minister Nawaf Salam criticized the Israeli escalation in south Lebanon and called it “total destruction” while claiming Israel systematically attacked cities, villages, civilian infrastructure and heritage sites. He said the Lebanese government regarded negotiations as the practical and less costly option for Lebanon under the current circumstances, even though there was no guarantee they would succeed. He said Lebanon’s objectives were a ceasefire, a full Israeli withdrawal, the release of prisoners, the return of the displaced persons and the reconstruction of the destroyed areas. He called for all the forces to be unified under the Lebanese state and reiterated that decisions of war and peace had to remain solely in the hands of the state and not in the hands of any internal or external factor (X account of the Lebanese prime minister’s office, May 30, 2026).
• Speaker of the Lebanese parliament Nabih Berri expressed reservations regarding the direct negotiations with Israel, claiming that Lebanon had entered them without bargaining chips and with no real ability to achieve gains or impose balanced conditions. Berri claimed he did not want to know the details of the talks and as far as he was concerned, the highest priority was a ceasefire and resolving the crisis of the displaced persons. He again said he preferred indirect mediations, which he claimed had proved themselves in the past, while relying on Iranian pressure in the contacts with the United States as the factor that could end the fighting in south Lebanon (al-Diyar, May 29, 2026; al-Markazia, May 30, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Position

• Hezbollah continued its opposition to the direct negotiations with Israel and accused the Lebanese leadership of surrendering to Israeli-American dictates, especially the disarmament of Hezbollah, a demand the organization absolutely rejected. Hezbollah noted the importance of the “resistance”^[3] in “defending” Lebanon against Israeli efforts for military achievements or to impose political conditions. Hezbollah defended Iran’s demand to include ending the hostilities in Lebanon in an agreement with the United States on ending the war:
  • Hezbollah issued a statement marking the 100^th anniversary of the Lebanese constitution, in which it claimed that “the right to resist Israel” was anchored in the constitution and the Taif Agreement, and rejected the calls to disarm on the grounds that depriving Lebanon of “strength” in the shadow of the “continuing Israeli aggression” would “damage to the sovereignty of the state and its unity” (al-Manar, May 26, 2026).
  • Mahmoud Qamati, a member of the Hezbollah political bureau, rejected out of hand the calls in Lebanon to limit its power and disarm, stating that Hezbollah would not agree to any arrangement which would lead to its disarmament, which he said was a red line. He represented Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 as proof of the effectiveness of the [so-called] “path of resistance,” claimed that the current ceasefire had been achieved through Iranian pressure and praised Iran as a regional power which dictated conditions to the United States. He criticized the Lebanese president and the political elements whom he claimed sought to harm the “resistance,” and claimed Israel’s demand to disarm Hezbollah proved how important its weapons were (al-Diyar, May 25, 2026; al-Manar, May 27, 2026).
  • Head of Hezbollah’s Sharia Council, Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek, reiterated the claim that the organization had no interest in the direct negotiations in Washington, calling them “surrender.” He reiterated yet again the organization’s often repeated demands for a complete ceasefire and stopping all attacks, a full withdrawal from Lebanese territory, the return of the displaced persons to their homes, reconstruction of the villages, the release of the prisoners and a dialogue regarding implementation of a “national defense strategy.” Yazbek said they would not waive their demands, even if it meant confrontation and one of “the two glorious outcomes, victory or death as a martyr” (al-Diyar, May 31, 2026).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, accused the government of granting Israel a political platform to continue its attacks through the continuation of the negotiations, and claimed that the United States and elements in the regime were acting to weaken the “Shi’ite duo” [Hezbollah and Amal] and their status in the state. The Hezbollah camp warned against attempts to limit the organization’s institutions, especially the al-Qard al-Hassan Association, the organization’s economic arm, while reiterating that Hezbollah’s weapons would remain a red line even after a future arrangement (al-Joumhouria, May 29, 2026; al-Markazia, May 29, 2026; al-Akhbar, May 30, 2026).
  • Hassan Ezz al-Din and Ali Fayyad, both members of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed Iran had led the way to the ceasefire in Lebanon and attempts to separate the Lebanese issue from the Iranian issue had failed. They criticized the Lebanese regime, claiming it was operating under American influence and becoming hostile to Iran, while claiming that granting concessions in the negotiations with Israel were liable to harm the “resistance” and Lebanon’s sovereignty. Ihab Hamadeh, also a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, criticized the negotiations with Israel and claimed they were dictated by a “Zionist-American axis,” while reiterating that Hezbollah would continue the “military struggle” against Israel (al-Diyar, May 25-26, 2026; al-Akhbar, May 25, 2026).
  • Ibrahim al-Amin, editor in chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar, accused the Lebanese leadership of conducting negotiations with Israel out of weakness, surrender and acceptance of the Israeli-American narrative regarding Hezbollah. He claimed the regime was prepared to make far-reaching political and security concessions to achieve a ceasefire, while attempting to settle accounts with the “resistance” and weaken the political and military status of its Shi’ite base. He warned that continuing such a policy could lead to an “internal eruption” and violent confrontations reminiscent of the days of the civil war, especially because of the sense of alienation among broad sectors in the Shi’ite camp regarding the regime. He said the resistance would hold its weapons after any agreement had been reached, as it regarded them as the “only guarantee” for defending Lebanon and preventing a return to the status quo before the war. He claimed that Aoun and Salam were committed to the United States and Saudi Arabia, and the next stage would require Hezbollah to “adopt harsher internal preparedness to counter attempts to strangle the resistance politically, economically and socially” (al-Akhbar, May 30, 2026).

• Reportedly, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem’s increasing criticism of the Lebanese government is not coincidental, but rather reflects Hezbollah’s rejection of the direct negotiations with Israel and possible future steps to limit its power. One of the organization’s main concerns is the pressure exerted on the al-Qard al-Hassan Association, which is perceived as a significant part of the organization’s power and influence in the internal arena (al-Nahar, May 27, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Opponents

• Members of the forum of the Saydet al-Jabal Gathering^[4] sharply criticized Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem for his opposition to “limiting weapons,” and claimed that most Lebanese supported the exclusivity of military power in the hands of the state. The forum accused Hezbollah of attempting to exert political and popular pressure to overthrow the government, and called on the organization to declare the end of its “military activity” and its withdrawal from the confrontation with Israel. The members noted that regional developments and the contacts between Iran and the United States required the political forces in Lebanon to renew themselves within the framework of the state and the constitution (al-Diyar, May 25, 2026).

Challenges for Hezbollah in the Shi’ite Arena

• Reportedly, signs of public criticism of Hezbollah have become apparent in south Lebanon, after residents, activists and public figures from Tyre and Nabatieh called for them to be declared open cities and free of weapons under the sponsorship and protection of the Lebanese state alone. The signatories, among them prominent figures from society, culture, academia and the economy in the south, called for a final end to the war, strengthening the deployment of the Lebanese army and the security forces, advancing an international diplomatic initiative for protecting the south and ensuring humanitarian corridors and basic services for local residents and displaced persons. They also noted the need to distance the south from war and to apply state sovereignty over all its territory. A petition signed by residents of Nabatieh noted the need to protect Beaufort Castle (Qal’at al-Shaqif) and the historical sites in the area. According to reports, the calls had broad political and media resonance and are considered a possible indication of a change in the public mood in the south. Shi’ite political researcher Hareth Suleiman claimed it reflected a decline in public confidence in Hezbollah’s “military” role and a strengthening of the perception that the state and diplomacy were the only way to achieve stability and protection, while part of the public in the south placed responsibility on the Hezbollah for the destruction and losses caused by the continuation of the hostilities (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 30, 2026; Lebanon Files, May 29, 2026).
• Signs of a possible change in Lebanese public opinion were noted, including within the Shi’ite community, regarding the war, the negotiations with Israel and Hezbollah’s role. Reportedly, public opinion polls pointed to increased support for the possibility of a political arrangement and direct negotiations with Israel, contrary to polls issued by bodies close to Hezbollah. According to a poll taken by Statistics Lebanon, 34% of Shi’ites support a political arrangement, while a poll by International Information pointed to a jump in the rate of supporters of a peace agreement with Israel from approximately 25% to approximately 49% in less than a year, with a rise in support for full normalization [of diplomatic relations between Israel and Lebanon]. According to the report, the economy continues to be the central concern of the Lebanese even during wartime, and the data reflect growing erosion in public support for the “military option” and an increase in willingness to examine political solutions (al-Nahar, May 30, 2026).
• In an attempt to calm the tensions, head of Hezbollah’s Sharia Council, Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek, issued an open letter to “young Lebanese and heroic fighters” noting the organization’s support for the displaced persons. He praised Lebanese “patience, steadfastness and determination” and claimed Hezbollah was a “partner in their suffering and distress, with faith that Allah’s help is near.” To Hezbollah operatives he said they were “Allah’s chosen ones” and Allah would “use them punish the enemy soldiers” (al-Diyar, May 31, 2026).
• With the growing pressure on Hezbollah and internal criticism in Lebanon, Amal and Hezbollah continued showing a united public front to strengthen the narrative of the “resistance” as a central component in Lebanese national security. The chairman of the Amal Movement executive committee, Mustafa a-Fouani, met with chairman of Hezbollah’s executive council, Ali Damoush. They said “national unity and the resistance” were the basis for confronting Israel and preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, and again represented Hezbollah as a legitimate component of “national strength,” while calling for the government to find a solution for the displaced persons and the shelters (al-Diyar, May 26, 2026).

• Despite assertions of unity, there were indications of gaps between Hezbollah and the speaker of parliament and Amal leader, Nabih Berri, regarding their stance toward the Lebanese government and continuing to pressure it. Berri described the hostilities with Israel as a “broad” threat to the south, the status of the Shi’ites and Hezbollah’s institutions, but at the same time was reserved about calling for the overthrow of the Lebanese government, and said it was necessary to preserve stability and national cohesion (al-Madan, May 31, 2026). Elements identified with Berri noted the need to preserve internal stability and the state institutions, adding that there was currently no real intention to dismantle the government or withdraw the “Shi’ite duo” ministers from it. Qassem Hashem, a member of the Lebanese Parliament identified with Berri, described Na’im Qassem’s remarks about citizens going out into the streets to topple the government as merely an “opinion” and noted the importance of the “unity of the internal position” in light of the challenges facing Lebanon (al-Joumhouria, May 27, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 26, 2026).

Sectarian Tension in Lebanon

• Lebanese president Aoun used the Eid al-Adha blessing for messages of national unity, solidarity and preventing the sacrifice of the younger generation in wars and confrontations, while representing the state as the unifying framework responsible for Lebanon’s stability (X account of the Lebanese presidency, May 26, 2026).
• The Sunni mufti of Lebanon, Abdel Latif Derian, publicly said he supported the government’s line regarding Israel, and said the negotiations for a ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal were a political and religious measure worthy of blessing. He implicitly criticized the “resistance” and of the existence of weapons outside the framework of the state, which he said weakened Lebanon’s institutions and harmed its internal stability (al-Akhbar, May 25, 2026).
• The veteran Druze leader Walid Jumblatt warned against an attempt to detach Hezbollah from its Shi’ite environment in a manner liable to lead to sectarian confrontation, but still said he supported a political arrangement and even direct negotiations with Israel (al-Diyar, May 25, 2026).
• Sunni member of the Lebanese Parliament Waddah Sadek criticized Hezbollah and Iran’s influence on the Shi’ite community. He called on the Shi’ite public to return to the state and distance itself from the regional confrontation “leading to isolation, destruction and heavy loss of life” (Waddah Sadek X account, May 29, 2026).

International Activity against Hezbollah

• The secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Jassem al-Budaiwi, again defined Hezbollah, “with all its leaders and factions,” as a terrorist organization, and condemned the statements of the organization’s secretary general, Na’im Qassem, against Bahrain following the arrest of people suspected of spying for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Al-Budaiwi said Hezbollah and Iran undermined stability in the Gulf States by recruiting operatives, smuggling weapons and establishing terrorist networks, while mentioning security exposures in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. He noted the support of the Gulf States for the government of Lebanese president Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam, and called on all the political forces in Lebanon to unite around the state and its reforms to rescue Lebanon from its crises (al-Arab, May 26, 2026).
• The vice president of the European Parliament, François-Xavier Bellamy, criticized Europe’s policy toward Hezbollah over the years, and said the continental countries had normalized the organization’s status and treated it as a regular political actor despite its possession of a military wing and deep influence within the institutions of the Lebanese state. He said there was no distinction between Hezbollah’s political and military wings and described it as a theoretical abstraction, while mentioning Lebanese activists such as Lokman Slim who paid with their lives for their opposition to the organization’s influence. He welcomed the direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, calling them a sign of hope and as a way to free Lebanon from a situation of collective hostages, while noting that Hezbollah was the central factor harming Lebanese sovereignty. He said France’s role was to support this process and encourage its success (Nidaa’ al-Watan, May 29, 2026).

The Situation in Lebanon

• According to the Lebanese ministry of health, since the renewal of the hostilities on March 2, 2026, 3,412 people had been killed and 10,269 people wounded (al-Nashra, May 31, 2026). Reportedly, more than 5,500 housing units had been destroyed since the beginning of the ceasefire on April 17, 2026, while the number of housing units destroyed or damaged since the beginning of the fighting crossed the threshold of 61,000, with extremely significant destruction in more than ten villages in south Lebanon (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 29, 2026).
• The Litani River Authority warned of the danger of attacks in the area of the Qaraoun Dam, stating that damage to the dam could cause a disaster for the population and infrastructure downstream because of its importance for the country’s water, energy and agricultural security. Hezbollah accused Israel of trying to justify future attacks on the dam and other civilian infrastructure, and claimed that could threaten the water, electricity and agricultural security in Lebanon and lead to internal tensions in the country (al-Akhbar, May 27, 2026; al-Manar, May 28, 2026).
• Lebanese agriculture minister Nizar Hani stated that approximately 60,000 hectares of agricultural land, approximately 22.5% of all the agricultural land in the country, had been damaged by the Israeli strikes. He said that no real substitute existed for those areas because of their importance for food security and the Lebanese economy (al-Joumhouria, May 30, 2026).
• International aid efforts continued. UNIFIL distributed hundreds of food portions to displaced families in the Sidon area, and Poland transferred more than one hundred tons of equipment and medical aid to support the Lebanese healthcare system (al-Diyar, May 25, 2026; al-Manar, May 27, 2026).

Palestinians in Lebanon

• The Fatah leadership in Lebanon criticized calls to impose a siege, starvation and displacement on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and warned against incitement which threatened the relations between Lebanese and Palestinians and the country’s internal stability. Fatah claimed the Palestinian refugees were “not a burden, but a people displaced from their land following the nakba,” and rejected attempts to represent them as responsible for the crises in Lebanon or to target them for collective punishment. Fatah called on the authorities in Lebanon to deal with the discourse of incitement through legal and media means, while noting Fatah’s commitment to Lebanon’s security and preserving civil peace, while standing up for the rights of the refugees and the Palestinian camps (al-Diyar, May 30, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] The Imam Hussein Division, established by the Iranian Qods Force and Hezbollah, is composed of thousands of terrorist operatives from various countries in the Middle East. It was involved in the Syrian Civil War and later also operated alongside Hezbollah in the fighting in south Lebanon and in attacking Israeli territory from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
^[3] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations whose objective is to destroy the State of Israel.
^[4] A popular organization composed mainly of Maronite Christians, established in 2006 within the March 14 camp, which opposed the Syrian presence in Lebanon following the assassination of prime minister Rafic al-Hariri. The organization supports consolidating the authority of the state over all parts of Lebanon and strengthening the state institutions.

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