Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (March 29 – April 13, 2026)

Overview^[1]

• The IDF forces continued military activity in Lebanon from the air and on the ground, eliminating terrorist commanders and operatives in Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations from the air, including the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front. On the ground they located and destroyed weapons and terrorist infrastructure and assets hidden in civilian buildings in south Lebanon. Six IDF soldiers were killed.
• During the past two weeks Hezbollah issued more than 660 claims of responsibility for attacking IDF forces in south Lebanon and civilian, military and security targets in Israel with rockets, missiles and UAVs. Hezbollah also claimed having launched a cruise missile at an Israeli navy vessel; it reportedly hit a British destroyer.
• Hezbollah secretary general claimed the capabilities of the “resistance” had surprised Israel, adding that they would continue fighting and would not return to the status quo ante of the current hostilities.
• Israel and Lebanon agreed to direct talks which will begin with a meeting of the ambassadors of the two countries in the United States under American oversight. Officials in the Lebanese administration demanded a ceasefire before the start of the formal negotiations.
• The Lebanese government’s decision to implement the state’s monopoly on weapons throughout Beirut and the announcement of direct negotiations with Israel exacerbated the tension with Hezbollah. The organization opposed talks with Israel and accused the government of acting against the “resistance” instead of fighting alongside it.
• The commander of the Lebanese army said the objectives of the Israeli strikes was to provoke a civil war. The army claimed the strikes had killed six soldiers.
• UNIFIL accused Israel and Hezbollah of responsibility for the deaths of three of its personnel. The IDF spokesperson stated that more than 160 Hezbollah launches were identified as hitting near UNIFIL outposts.
• The designated Iranian ambassador to Lebanon continued to barricade himself in the embassy despite being required to leave the country. Iran’s leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said the Islamic Republic would continue to support the “resistance,” and his senior advisor warned the Lebanese government of “irreversible dangers” if it did not recognize Hezbollah’s role.
• According to the Lebanese ministry of health, more than 2,000 people have been killed since the beginning of the hostilities on March 2, 2026, and more than one million people have been displaced.
• Syrian authorities announced that they had arrested a Hezbollah-affiliated cell which was planning to attack a rabbi in Damascus.

The Fighting in Lebanon

The IDF

• The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets from the air throughout Lebanon along with ground activity in the south, eliminating hundreds of terrorists and destroying terrorist infrastructure and assets. Six IDF soldiers were killed and others were wounded. (IDF spokesperson, March 29-April 13, 2026):
  • Strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure and elimination of terrorist commanders and operatives: The IDF attacked Hezbollah targets from the air in various areas in Lebanon, mainly in south Lebanon, in the Beqa’a Valley and in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. They attacked military headquarters, rocket and missile launch sites and operatives that fired into Israeli territory or were preparing to launch rockets and missiles, and weapons depots. They also attacked bridges and crossings over the Litani River to prevent Hezbollah from transferring forces and weapons to south Lebanon, and gas stations of the al-Amanah company, which serve as a source of funding for Hezbollah. Operatives and commanders in Hezbollah and in organizations operating alongside it were eliminated, among them the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front, Youssef Isma’il al-Hashem. On April 8, 2026, large-scale simultaneous airstrikes were carried out in several areas, eliminating about 200 terrorist operatives and destroying terrorist and infrastructure.
  • Ground activity: IDF ground forces continued expanding their operations in south Lebanon and conducting raids to establish a forward defense zone to distance Hezbollah activity from the border with Israel and push the organization’s attack capabilities away from the communities of northern Israel. The forces eliminated hundreds of Hezbollah terrorists, some of them in close fighting, and located and destroyed large quantities of weapons and hundreds of terrorist facilities and assets. They encircled the town of Bint Jbeil, eliminated more than 100 terrorists and located Hezbollah facilities in a local hospital.

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah continued attacking military, security and civilian targets in Israel and IDF forces in south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 29-April 13, 2026). Between March 29, 2026, at 16:30, and April 13, 2026, at 13:30, Hezbollah issued at least 667 claims of responsibility for attacking with UAVs, missiles, rockets, anti-tank missiles, artillery shells and anti-aircraft fire, and for exchanges of fire with IDF forces in south Lebanon. On April 8, 2026, Hezbollah did not issue claims of responsibility, thinking the ceasefire in the war in Iran included Lebanon. The overwhelming majority of the attacks were directed at IDF forces in south Lebanon and along the border and at communities in northern Israel to a distance of 35 km from the border. On April 5, 2026, Hezbollah claimed it had hit an Israeli navy ship with a cruise missile, but the missile reportedly hit a British destroyer (al-Hadath, April 5, 2026). On April 10, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for launching a ballistic missile at the naval base in the Port of Ashdod. Many of the claims have no verification from the IDF spokesperson or confirmation on the ground.

• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem issued an open letter of support and encouragement to the residents of south Lebanon in which he praised their “sacrifice and steadfastness” and claimed a “complete Israeli failure” on the battlefield. He claimed that despite the concentration of “one hundred thousand soldiers,” the “capabilities of the “resistance”^[2] had surprised Israel, which suffered “heavy losses” and did not carry out a ground invasion. He added that during 40 days of fighting, Israel had failed to stop the rocket and UAV fire which reached Haifa and beyond. Qassem added that the extensive attacks on “civilians” was “intended only to cover up Israel’s failure and helplessness on the military front.” He added that the “resistance” was determined to act for the “liberation of homeland and honor” and was not prepared to return status quo ante (website of Hezbollah’s secretary general, April 10, 2026).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, wrote that before the new hostilities Hezbollah had reorganized, taken an inventory of its capabilities and resources, repaired the damage from the previous hostilities and rebuilt a military structure different from the one of the last two decades. He claimed the plan was not based on giving up weapons, capabilities or manpower, but on developing a different pattern of attack management and a new structure, making it more difficulty to identify them during the preparatory stage and complicate tracking them during the war. He said their goals were to inflict “painful blows on the occupation army,” sow fear among the “settlers” and destroy the narrative of victory the “enemy” had tried to establish since the ceasefire in November 2024. According to al-Amin, the campaign required perseverance, understanding of the facts, patience, steadfastness and proper management (al-Akhbar, April 10, 2026).
• According to Hezbollah’s claims, it had conducted an operation of deception in which it displayed weakness outwardly while secretly recovering, and now it was preventing the entrenchment of the IDF south of the Litani River by luring the forces into “death traps.” Its success is [allegedly] reflected in its ability to continue bringing high-quality weapons into the southern area despite the siege and international oversight, as well as in transferring the military command and the jihad council to the hands of a covert “next generation” leadership operating in the shadows while implementing lessons from previous intelligence penetrations. In addition, the “military media” mechanism, which sustained a severe blow in the pager attack in September 2024, was rehabilitated and entrusted to a young technological generation which operates passively, hiding the numbers and names of the dead alongside an active strategy of distributing advanced technological documentation, such as hits on Merkava tanks and night footage, to convey a message of power to the public supporting the “resistance” (al-Diyar, April 1, 2026).
• The IDF attack in the al-Janah area of Beirut, which killed senior Hezbollah figure Youssef Isma’il al-Hashem together with five civilians, illustrated a recurring pattern of harm to the organization’s commanders while they were in a civilian environment. The Lebanese researcher Ali Hamadeh said conducting family visits which expose the commanders and endanger the densely packed civilians around them, was not a mistake. He said it was a tactic which deliberately draws Israeli fire into civilian areas while the organization shows contempt for collateral losses, with the cynical exploitation the civilian victims for its media campaign (Aram News, April 2, 2026).

Efforts for a Ceasefire and the Negotiations with Israel

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun continued to promote his initiative for direct negotiations with Israel in an attempt to stop the fighting and prevent further escalation. Without explicitly referring to Hezbollah, he said he was surprised at those who wondered why he insisted on continuing the diplomatic efforts and did not join the fighting against Israel. He said that “negotiation is not a concession, and diplomacy is not surrender,” and the goal was to stop the killing, the destruction and the injuries (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 5, 2026). At a meeting with Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot, Aoun said that Lebanon adhered to the initiative of negotiations, which would begin with a hudna, a temporary ceasefire, during which direct negotiations would take place between Lebanon and Israel to stop the military escalation. He said the initiative was a genuine opportunity to restore regional stability. He did not hide his displeasure that Israel had not responded to the initiative and claimed the continuation of the Israeli bombings and the harm to civilians “proved” that Israel “continued its aggression and escalation despite international efforts to contain the tension in the region” (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 8, 2026).

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said they would act “by all means at our disposal” to stop the fighting, adding that decisions regarding war or peace had to remain in the hands of the state. He made a speech in which he referred to IDF activity and to statements by senior Israeli figures, which he claimed indicated long-term goals that included “a significant expansion of the occupation of Lebanese territories, talk about the establishment of buffer zones or security strips, and the displacement of more than one million Lebanese from their homes.” He added that Lebanon had become the victim of a war whose results or end could not be determined with certainty, and therefore they had the duty to redouble the political and diplomatic efforts to stop the ongoing violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• President Aoun welcomed the American-Iranian announcement of April 8, 2026 regarding a two-week ceasefire. He said he hoped it would be the first step toward a final, comprehensive agreement on “volatile” regional issues (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 8, 2026). At the government meeting, Aoun expressed regret that the ceasefire in the war in Iran did not include Lebanon and noted that he and Prime Minister Salam were holding contacts with foreign leaders in an effort for Lebanon to be part of the ceasefire agreement so that negotiations could begin. He added that it was unacceptable for anyone other than the state leadership to conduct the negotiations (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 9, 2026).
• Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said he was in contact with more than one party involved in the ceasefire agreement with Iran. He said there were “confirmations” that Lebanon was part of this agreement, however he did not rule out the possibility that Israel would try to “disrupt the agreement, as the party most harmed by it” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 8, 2026).
• On April 9, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he had instructed the opening of direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible. He said they would focus on disarming Hezbollah and regulating peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon (X account of Benjamin Netanyahu, April 9, 2026). The following day, the first phone call was held by the Lebanese ambassador to the United States, Nada Hamadeh Mouawad, and Israeli ambassador Yechiel Leiter, with the participation of the American ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa. Reportedly, they agreed to hold a first meeting at the State Department in Washington on March 14, 2026, to discuss the declaration of a ceasefire and the date for the start of the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel under American auspices (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 10, 2026).
• According to a Lebanese source, the meeting between the ambassadors in Washington would focus on the need to stop the hostilities before the talks began. He said it was a Lebanese condition and they were now waiting to hear what the Israeli ambassador would say. The source added that President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam had separated the Lebanese and Iranian issues from one another, and therefore the collapse of the talks between the United States and Iran had no effect on the talks in Washington and would not be allowed to interfere (Nidaa’ al-Watan, April 13, 2026)., Lebanon’s minister of culture, Ghassan Salameh, said the first meeting between the ambassadors had not been intended for conducting negotiations, but rather for discussing logistical issues. He said the Lebanese ambassador could speak only about the attempt to achieve a ceasefire and that was a “red line” (al-Jadeed, April 12, 2026).

The Tension between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Administration^[3]

• On April 9, 2026, the Lebanese government instructed the army and the security forces to begin deploying reinforcements to impose the state’s full sovereignty over the Beirut district and to limit weapons to the legitimate forces. Reportedly all the required steps would be taken against whoever violated the instruction and they would be referred to legal processes (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 9, 2026).
• The government instructions, which joined a series of measures taken against Hezbollah since the beginning of the new hostilities against Israel, including a ban on the organization’s “military activity,” as well as the announcement of direct negotiations with Israel, provoked furious reactions from Hezbollah figures, media outlets affiliated with the organization and Hezbollah supporters:
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem called on the senior Lebanese leadership to “stop making concessions and getting nothing in return.” He linked the “resistance”^[4] with “the state, the army and the people” and stated that they “defended the land, restored its sovereignty and expelled the occupier” (website of Hezbollah secretary general, April 10, 2026)
  • Deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, warned that after the current war, a “popular tsunami would sweep away this government, its political sins and its politics.” He said the government had to apologize to the Lebanese people and to the “resistance,” rescind all the “decisions made against the resistance” and turn to a path of understandings with the “resistance” regarding the strategy for defending Lebanon’s security. Qamati also threatened that if the government “persisted in its opposition to Hezbollah and in surrender to American, Israeli, European and Arab dictates,” it would lead the country to civil war and chaos (al-Manar, April 10, 2026). He accused the government of violating the law and bypassing Parliament by conducting direct negotiations with Israel. He said Hezbollah would not allow anyone to condition the use of the “resistance’s” weapons, which were a “legitimate right” they would not give up until the land had been liberated, the displaced returned and the war ended. Qamati added that no one in Lebanon wanted a return to civil war (Al Jazeera Mubasher, April 12, 2026).
  • An op-ed piece in Hezbollah-afilliated daily al-Akhbar accused the Lebanese regime of adopting an “American-Israeli narrative” and leading a “provocative conspiracy” which would inevitably push the country toward an explosion. The piece claimed that the decision to disarm Beirut was “another gift to the occupation,” and added that Prime Minister Salam “did not hide his full alignment with hostility toward the resistance, the capital and its people,” and even “went further and adopted positions that not even [the IDF spokesperson in Arabic] Avichay Adraee or the enemy government dared to adopt” (al-Akhbar, April 10, 2026).
  • On April 11, 2026, hundreds of Hezbollah and Amal supporters gathered in Riad al-Solh Square in Beirut, opposite the government building, to demonstrate their support of the “resistance” and rejection of “surrender to the Zionist enemy” (al-Manar, April 11, 2026). However, Hezbollah and Amal issued a joint statement asking people not to “hold demonstrations at such a sensitive stage” in order to preserve stability and civil peace and “not to be dragged into the division desired by the Israeli enemy” (al-Diyar, April 11, 2026). Sources stated that the announcement was made after Arab countries exerted substantial pressure on Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri, warning that “playing in the street was a red line” and any attempt to storm the government or try to carry out a coup would not pass quietly. European countries also warned that they would not remain silent if that happened (Nidaa’ al-Watan, April 11, 2026).
• The Lebanese leadership said it was determined to prevent a civil war. President Joseph Aoun stated that preserving internal peace was a red line, and that whoever damaged it was serving Israel. He also said some media outlets were being destructive, and while he supported freedom of expression, it had to be exercised responsibly. He added that the security forces were prepared but there was no fear of clashes because the Lebanese people were tired of wars, and “A thousand enemies outside the house are better than one enemy inside” (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 5, 2026). Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said in a speech marking 51 years since the outbreak of the civil war that everyone had to stand side by side and prevent civil war or even the threat of it. He said his responsibility was to strengthen what was shared among the sects that composed Lebanon and calm tensions among them, and noted that imposing the authority of the state over all its territory would provide security and peace for all and make it possible to apply the authority of the law to everyone equally (X account of the Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office, April 12, 2026).
• Hezbollah’s political opponents welcomed the government’s moves against the organization and the for state’s monopoly on weapons and said they supported direct negotiations with Israel. Chairman of the Christian Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea, called the decision to collect weapons in the Beirut district “the first step on a journey of a thousand miles,” adding that it had the support of most Lebanese (Nidaa’ al-Watan, April 9, 2026). Chairman of the Christian Phalange party, Sami Gemayel, said they supported negotiations between Lebanon and Israel and stood behind the president and the prime minister because in that way Lebanon was regaining control over its future and returning decision-making to its legitimate institutions (X account of Sami Gemayel, April 9, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• The commander of the Lebanese army, General Rodolph Haykal, toured the headquarters of the South Litani sector at the Benoit Baraka” base in Tyre, the headquarters of the Fifth Infantry Brigade in the al-Shawakir area in Tyre, and the army’s engineering works at the al-Qasmiyeh bridge over the Litani River. He alleged the objective of the “ongoing attacks of the Israeli occupation” was to undermine Lebanon’s stability and provoke a civil war (official website of the Lebanese army, April 9, 2026).

• During the past two weeks, the Lebanese army reported the deaths of six of its soldiers in Israeli strikes in south Lebanon and in the Beqa’a Valley (X account of the Lebanese army, March 29-April 13, 2026).
• After the announcement of a ceasefire in the war between Israel and the United States and Iran, and the expectation that it would include the hostilities in Lebanon, the Lebanese army command called on civilians to wait before returning to the villages and towns in the south. It warned them not to approach areas which “the forces of the Israeli occupation had invaded,” to preserve their safety, especially because the continued Israeli strikes could endanger them (X account of the Lebanese army, April 8, 2026).
• The Lebanese army announced that following the “enemy invasion” of the border towns in south Lebanon, which [allegedly] led to siege, isolation and cutting the supply lines of its units, the army was forced to redeploy and reposition of some of its forces, although it left forces in the affected areas and assisted local residents to the best of its ability. The army command also strongly warned against the danger of incitement and casting doubt on its role by media outlets and social networks, since that would create internal tension and harm the residents, precisely at a time when the military institution was making the utmost effort to fulfill its duty under enormous pressures and unprecedented challenges and with limited resources (X account of the Lebanese army, April 1, 2026)
• A ceremony was held at the Port of Beirut to receive 39 APCs donated to the Lebanese army by France. The ceremony was attended by the Alice Rufo, minister delegated by the French minister of the armed forces, Major General Hassan Ouda, Lebanese army chief of staff and Hervé Magro, the French ambassador to Lebanon (X account of the Lebanese army, March 31, 2026).

     
Ceremony for the reception of the APCs (X account of the Lebanese army, March 31, 2026)

UNIFIL

• A preliminary UN investigation found that three Indonesian UNIFIL soldiers were killed by Israeli fire and an explosive device planted by Hezbollah in south Lebanon at the end of March 2026. Following the findings, the spokesperson for the UN secretary general demanded that the parties involved investigate the cases and criminally prosecute those responsible for harming the peacekeeping forces. A UNIFIL spokesperson said he was concerned by the Israeli-Hezbollah fighting near the force’s positions, and warned that it could trigger a gunfire response. She called on both sides to lay down their arms, emphasized their duty to ensure the safety of UN personnel, and said there was no military solution to the conflict, its continuation would only lead to more death and destruction (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 7, 2026).
• On April 3, 2026, the IDF stated that a Hezbollah rocket had fallen inside a UNIFIL post in al-Adisa in south Lebanon and wounded three UN personnel, two of them seriously (IDF spokesperson, April 3, 2026). The IDF noted that Hezbollah exploited the proximity of its operatives to UNIFIL positions and posts to advance terrorist activity against Israel. According to the IDF, since the beginning of the hostilities, about 165 Hezbollah rocket launches have been fallen inside or near UNIFIL posts (IDF spokesperson, April 5, 2026).

Lebanon and Iran

• Although the Lebanese foreign ministry revoked the credentials of Iran’s designated ambassador, Mohammad-Reza Sheibani and instructed him to leave the country no later than March 29, 2026, Sheibani remained inside the embassy building in Beirut. President Aoun said Sheibani was not an ambassador because he had not submitted his credentials and was in the embassy without any official title or position (X account of the Lebanese presidency, April 5, 2026).
• Iran’s leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, sent a letter to Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem thanking him for the condolences and expression of sorrow over the death of his father, former leader Ali Khamenei, and noted the feelings of love and loyalty expressed by Hezbollah’s “fighters.” He said the history of the “Islamic resistance” was full of “struggle, courage and sacrifice” [sic], adding that Hezbollah’s leaders were true role models. Khamenei said Qassem was now leading the organization at a decisive moment in the history of the “resistance,” emphasizing his confidence in his resourcefulness, wisdom and courage. Khamenei reiterated the fixed policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to support the “resistance against the Zionist and American enemy” (al-Diyar, April 1, 2026).
• In an open letter marking 40 days since the death of Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah secretary general said he mourned the loss of Iran’s leader but was proud he fell as a shaheed. He said the plot of the “Zionist-American enemy” had failed because the Iranian people and its forces stood firm, and the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as successor enabled Iran to rise again, foil the aims of the “enemy,” and force it to surrender to negotiations under Iran’s conditions. Qassem pledged that Hezbollah would continue on the path of the “resistance” despite the price, and that its “fighters” would ruin Israeli plans and prevent Israel from achieving its aims or gaining stability in south Lebanon (website of Hezbollah secretary general, April 10, 2026).
• Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser to Iran’s leader, warned Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam not to ignore the role of Hezbollah and the “resistance.” He said Lebanon would face “irreversible security dangers” and claimed Lebanon’s stability depended solely on synergy and close cooperation between the government and the “resistance” (al-Akhbar, April 11, 2026).
• Reportedly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Qods Force established a multi-layered organizational structure in Lebanon resembling the model implemented in Syria after the shrinking of Iranian activity in the Syrian arena. The structure, which operates as a “parent company” under the cover of bodies such as the Lebanon Corps, a supervisory-administrative mechanism vis-à-vis local actors, and the Palestine Corps, which coordinates activity with Palestinian factions, is intended to grant legitimacy to the Shi’ite axis, prevent Hezbollah’s isolation and blur the traces of Iranian activity through the use of new names and the recruitment of Sunni and Palestinian operatives. According to Palestinian sources and commentator Ali al-Amin, Lebanon has turned from a support front into a forward operational arena and Tehran’s strategic regional center of gravity, while Revolutionary Guards officers directly manage and supervise operations and decision-making inside Hezbollah and in various sectors in the country, operating from an understanding that loss of its hold on Lebanon would be a fatal strategic blow to Iran’s regional standing (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 7, 2026).

The Civilian Situation in Lebanon

• The Lebanese ministry of health reported that 2,055 people, about 80% of them men, have been killed since the beginning of the hostilities between March 2, 2026 and April 12, 2026 and 6,588 people were wounded (Facebook page of the ministry of health, April 12, 2026). According to the ministry, at least 303 people were killed in the series of strikes on April 8, 2026 (Reuters, April 9, 2026).
• More than one million people have been displaced from their homes since March 2, 2026. The Lebanese authorities established 674 reception centers which are not fully occupied, while 85% of the displaced do not live in them. It was further reported that families in Beirut prefer sleeping in the streets, close to their original homes, instead of moving to distant centers. According to the report, the main problem is financing basic living needs, since so far only $90 million have been received of the $308 required, a sum significantly lower than during the previous hostilities (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 6, 2026).
• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with the UNIFIL commander, Major General Diodato Abagnara, and Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, to coordinate efforts to transfer aid to the residents of the border villages in the south (X account of the Lebanese prime minister’s office, April 8, 2026).
• According to a report, about 50,000 people in the Tyre area are under threat of severe food and medicine shortages because of the destruction of the al-Qasmiyeh bridge over the Litani River. The Lebanese army reopened the bridge and the authorities are examining supply alternatives, also for about 15,000 Lebanese army and UNIFIL soldiers in the area (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 9, 2026).
• The head of the Lebanese Red Cross, Dr. Antoine al-Zabi, warned of the collapse of hospitals because of the burden of the wounded and shortages of medical equipment, which could require the establishment of field hospitals. There are also difficulties in accessing attacked areas, delaying the rescue of casualties (al-Diyar, April 9, 2026).
• A Qatari plane carrying medical and humanitarian aid landed at Rafic al-Hariri Airport in Beirut and was received by the health minister and the Qatari ambassador to Lebanon (Nidaa’ al-Watan, April 10, 2026).

• The minister of public works and transport, Fayez Rasamny, held an urgent call with the director general for land and maritime transport, Dr. Ahmed Tamer. He issued instructions to take immediate precautionary measures in light of threats regarding the evacuation of the maritime area between al-Naqoura and Tyre. The sailing of fishermen or their departure from the fishermen’s harbor in the port of Tyre was banned until further notice, and supervision of maritime traffic was tightened to prevent potential risks (X account of the Lebanese ministry of transport and public works, April 7, 2026).

International Activity against Hezbollah

• The authorities in Syria foiled the plot of a Hezbollah-affiliated terrorist cell to assassinate a rabbi in Damascus. The Syrian ministry of the interior said the security forces had arrested a woman who was a member of the cell while she was trying to plant an explosive device in front of the home of a religious figure near the Mariamite Church in the Bab Touma area. The device was neutralized and the four other members of the cell were arrested. The preliminary investigations revealed a link to Hezbollah and it became clear that the suspects had undergone military training outside the country, including skills in planting explosive devices (Facebook page of the Syrian ministry of the interior and Syria TV, April 11, 2026). Hezbollah denied the [allegedly] “false and fabricated” claims of the Syrian ministry. According Hezbollah, it has no activity, connection or ties with any party in Syria, and it has no presence on Syrian soil, noting that it “cared [sic] about Syria’s security, its stability and peace with all its citizens.” Hezbollah called on the relevant parties in the Syrian state “to carry out a careful examination before making false accusations, especially in light of the existence of intelligence bodies seeking to ignite tension between Lebanon and Syria” (al-Akhbar, April 12, 2026).

     
The suspects and the explosive device
(Facebook page of the Syrian ministry of the interior, April 11, 2026)

• Costa Rica designated Hezbollah, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hamas and the Houthis, as terrorist organizations. The foreign ministry said the designation was made as part of its international commitments to combat terrorism and terrorism financing, and to prevent any form of activity or influence by those groups within Costa Rica, thereby contributing to security and safety, and the protection of democratic institutions (Nidaa’ al-Watan, April 9, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

• Palestinian sources revealed the main reasons why the armed Palestinian “factions”^[5] in Lebanon did not actively participate in the hostilities which began on March 2, 2026, unlike the previous hostilities which began on October 8, 2023. They were the strategy of ambiguity and secrecy adopted by Hezbollah, which led to a reduction in military and security communication with its allies, including the Palestinians, and to separate activity by its units, Hezbollah’s transition to guerrilla warfare, which does not require a large concentration of forces in the field, and a similar change made by Hamas’ military wing, which decided about a month and a half after the start of the operation al-Aqsa Flood, Hamas’ terrorist attack and massacre of October 7, 2023, following the heavy losses it suffered, to break up its military forces into small groups with freedom of movement and the ability to make rapid decisions without cumbersome hierarchical constraints. The Palestinian “factions” will not issue death notices for those killed during the campaign because of the “fragility” of the social-security structure of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (al-Madan, April 7, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[3] See the April 2026 ITIC report, Renewal of Hostilities and Negotiations with Israel Increase Tension between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government
^[4] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[5] Terrorist organizations.

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