Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (March 23 – 29, 2026)

Overview^[1]

• IDF forces continued aerial attacks on Hezbollah terrorist targets across Lebanon and eliminated commanders and operatives in the organization, among them the veteran al-Manar correspondent Ali Shoeib, as well as operatives with ties to Iran. IDF forces also continued ground activity in south Lebanon, locating and destroying weapons, terrorist infrastructure and other assets which had been hidden in civilian structures. Two civilians and three IDF soldiers were killed.
• Hezbollah issued 397 claims of responsibility for attacks on civilian, military and security targets in Israel and on IDF forces in south Lebanon using rockets, missiles, and UAVs, with a record number of 96 claims in a single day. So far, 1,004 claims have been made since the beginning of the attacks. Sources in the organization admitted that at least 400 operatives had been killed since the beginning of the war. Hezbollah’s offensive effort focuses primarily on attacking IDF forces in south Lebanon and attacking northern Israeli communities.
• Hezbollah secretary general, Na’im Qassem, and other senior figures in the organization called for national unity even as they continued to demand the cancellation of the decisions made against Hezbollah and opposed negotiations with Israel. The editor of Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar called for the overthrow of the government.
• Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun, continued to promote his initiative for direct talks with Israel, but without progress. An Egyptian delegation met with Hezbollah representatives and presented its own initiative, but according to the organization “now is the time for the battlefield.”
• The decision of the Lebanese foreign ministry to expel Iran’s ambassador angered Hezbollah and Amal, which called on the Iranian diplomat to remain in Lebanon, while Hezbollah’s opponents welcomed the move and demanded Iran pay for the damages of the war with Israel. An Iranian missile exploded north of Beirut shortly after the decision to expel the ambassador.
• The Lebanese ministry of health reported that about 1,200 people had been killed since the beginning of the war.
• Kuwait announced it had uncovered a Hezbollah terrorist network which planned assassinations and attacks on symbols of the state.

The Fighting In Lebanon

The IDF

• The IDF continued extensive airstrikes on Hezbollah targets across Lebanon along with ground activity in the south of the country. Two civilians and three IDF soldiers were killed and others were wounded. According to the IDF, since the beginning of the campaign on March 2, 2026, more than 2,800 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon have been attacked and more than 800 terrorists have been eliminated (IDF spokesperson, March 29-23, 2026):
  • Attack on Hezbollah infrastructure and elimination of commanders and terrorist operatives: The IDF attacked Hezbollah targets from the air in various areas in Lebanon, mainly in the south, the Beqa’a Valley and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. They attacked military headquarters, sites and squads which fired or were preparing to fire rockets and launch missiles at Israeli territory, weapons warehouses and bridges and crossings over the Litani River to prevent Hezbollah from transferring forces and weapons to south Lebanon, as well as fuel stations of the al-Amanah company, which are a source of funding for Hezbollah. In addition, operatives and commanders in Hezbollah and in organizations operating alongside it were eliminated, including two commanders in the communications unit and a prominent operative in the Qods Force.
  • Ground activity: IDF ground forces continued expanding their activity in south Lebanon and conducting raids to establish the forward defense area to keep Hezbollah away from the Israeli border and distance its capabilities for attacking northern Israeli communities. The forces eliminated Hezbollah operatives in the field, some in close-range combat, and located and destroyed weapons and terrorist infrastructure. Weapons were discovered in a school and a tunnel beneath a church in the village of al-Khiam.

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah continued attacking targets in Israeli territory and IDF forces in south Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 29-23, 2026):
  • Between March 23 (12:00 noon) and March 29, 2026 (16:30), Hezbollah issued 397 claims of responsibility for attacks on military, security and civilian targets in Israel and on IDF forces in south Lebanon. They attacked with UAVs, missiles, rockets, anti-tank missiles, artillery shells and anti-aircraft shells, and exchanged fire with the forces in south Lebanon, while some of the attacks were carried out simultaneously with missile and UAV launches from Iran. Since Hezbollah announced the beginning of the war, it has issued 1,004 claims of responsibility, however many of them have no official verification from the IDF spokesperson or confirmation on the ground. On March 26, 2026, 96 claims of responsibility were issued, and the organization said it was a record, the largest number of attacks in a single day since Hezbollah’s establishment. According to the claims, most of the attacks targeted IDF forces in south Lebanon and border communities as far south as the Haifa-Tiberias line (about 30 kilometers from the border), except for one attack which the organization claimed targeted the Defense Ministry and IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv.

• • Two sources said that more than 400 of the organization’s operatives been killed since March 2, 2026, the first comprehensive tally of fatalities, after the occasional publications of small numbers of operatives (Reuters, March 27, 2026). Social media accounts, including unofficial accounts identified with Hezbollah, issued pictures of Hezbollah and Radwan Force operatives who were killed by IDF activity, some of whom were called “commanders” (the X account of QalaatM and the Telegram channels South Lebanon, Watching the Enemy and Hezbollah in the Field, March 29-23, 2026).
  • Hezbollah claimed increased use of surface-to-air missiles to attack Israeli aircraft. That represents a shift in the nature of the confrontation, reflecting Hezbollah’s desire to limit Israel’s freedom of aerial movement. It could also endanger civilian aviation at Hariri International Airport in Beirut, especially since the missile was most likely launched from the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in south Beirut, near the airport (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 28, 2026).
• According to an article published in Lebanon, as opposed to Hezbollah’s handling of the IDF ground maneuver in 2024, when the organization focused on defense, it is now attacking in an attempt to prevent Israeli forces from stabilizing and fortifying positions from which they can advance in Lebanese territory. It was also noted that Hezbollah had returned to the “resistance”^[2] activity which characterized it before the IDF withdrawal in 2000, with reliance on small, mobile squads which penetrate a specific point to carry out a surprise attack and then withdraw. In addition, decision-making is not centralized but is confined to the different military sectors. The article added that Hezbollah decided to invest in using missiles to exhaust the Israeli home front by attacking military targets at varying depths, farther than those reached by missiles in 2024; to exhaust the forces preparing to enter Lebanon by wearing them down with intense fire power and by attacking concentrations of forces, both from the Lebanese side and from “occupied Palestine;” and to create a new “equation” of the evacuation of Israeli settlements within five kilometers of the border with Lebanon, to match the Israel’s evacuating Lebanese villages (al-Madan, March 26, 2026)

Elimination of al-Manar Correspondent Ali Shoeib

• On March 28, 2026, al-Manar correspondent Ali Hassan Shoeib, considered one of Hezbollah’s most prominent propaganda mouthpieces, was eliminated in a strike on a vehicle near the town of Jezzine in south Lebanon. The IDF spokesperson confirmed the elimination of Shoeib and reported that he had operated in the intelligence unit of the Radwan Force, while operating under the cover of an al-Manar correspondent (IDF spokesperson, March 28, 2026; X account of IDF spokesperson Effie Defrin, March 29, 2026).^[3]
• Hezbollah combat information issued a death notice for the “heroic mujahid,” Ali Hassan Shoeib, and for the deaths of al-Mayadeen correspondent Fatma Fatouni and her brother, press photographer Mohammad Fatouni, who were also killed in the strike (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 28, 2026). Hezbollah condemned “Zionist crime” and claimed they had been killed while carrying out their “media and national” reporting duties (al-Akhbar, March 28, 2026).
• Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun, the prime minister, Nawaf Salam, and parliament speaker Nabih Berri called the attack “a violation of…international law, international humanitarian law and the laws of war” (al-Nashra, March 28, 2026).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah secretary general, Na’im Qassem, said the “resistance”^[4] had two options: to surrender and relinquish land, honor and sovereignty, or the inevitable confrontation and “resistance” to the “occupation” to prevent it from achieving its goals, especially the [so-called] Greater Israel project. He claimed the timing chosen by the resistance to respond to the “aggression” had surprised the enemy and prevented it from isolating Lebanon. Qassem said responsibility for confronting the “Israeli-American aggression” rested on everyone, government, people, army, forces, sects, parties and every citizen, since it sought to “rob Lebanon of its sovereignty and independence and to provoke a civil war.” He warned that the proposal to conduct negotiations with Israel under fire was unacceptable, imposed surrender on Lebanon and stripped it of all of its capabilities. He said that to achieve national unity the government had to retract the decision to outlaw “resistance’ activity and warned that discussion of the issue of the state’s exclusivity over weapons while “occupation and aggression” continued was a step towards making Lebanon “disappear” (the website of the Hezbollah secretary general, March 25, 2026).
• Political sources said that Qassem’s remarks about national unity were intended to calm the tension between Hezbollah and the state institutions, as he is the central figure in the organization who publicly expresses its official position (Lebanon 24, March 25, 2026). Other Hezbollah figures also noted the need to formulate a national position in the face of the “aggression” while pressuring the government to cancel the decisions against the “resistance:”
  • The head of the Hezbollah faction in parliament, Muhammad Raad, criticized Lebanese who believed that coexistence with the “Israeli occupation” in part of the country preserved national sovereignty better than exercising the legitimate right of the Lebanese to “resist the occupation” and to cultivate and strengthen their spirit and national unity. He criticized the government and accused it of a “grave sin” because of its activity against the “resistance,” especially under circumstances of Zionist aggression against Lebanon, since the Lebanese needed greater national cohesion instead of creating gaps that prevented it (al-Akhbar, March 27, 2026).
  • A member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament, Hassan Fadlallah, called on the Lebanese authorities to act according to the logic of a state responsible for its people and for all parts of the homeland and not to divide the Lebanese into groups. He called for support of the “resistance” and for giving the army the tools it needed for defense against the “Zionist aggression.” Fadlallah claimed that Lebanon’s existence was threatened and warned against attempts to foment disputes among the Lebanese. He claimed “the resistance” was “the will of the people, a human and legal right, and a clause in the national agreement document.” He called for cohesion and cooperation to fortify the national position against the enemy, and noted that priority should be given to halting the “Israeli aggression,” and as for the remaining details, the Lebanese could deal with them among themselves (al-Akhbar, March 24, 2026).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, hardline editor of Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, accused senior figures in the Lebanese government of overt hostility to Hezbollah, of assisting Israel and the United States in achieving their goal of disarming Hezbollah and of deliberate harassment of the Shi’ites in Lebanon. In an article entitled, “They Left No Room for Reconciliation,” he wrote that under the cover of the current war, the team seeking to disarm Hezbollah with the pretext that it constituted a danger to Lebanon had moved to the other side, and now wanted to assist Israel in achieving its goal. According to al-Amin, the team was composed of people united only by “hostility to the resistance,” among them President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange parties and elements outside the government. He accused the government led by Aoun and Salam of taking actions that amounted to treason, regardless of who participated, voted, was present or objected. He called the initiative for negotiations with Israel “begging for peace with the enemy” and attacked Prime Minister Salam for failing to hide his joy and pride at breaking the taboo on communication with the enemy or negotiating with it. That made al-Amin conclude that it was a national duty to overthrow the government (al-Akhbar, March 27, 2026).
• The Amal movement, Hezbollah’s ally, also tried to promote the narrative of unity. The Amal minister of environment, Tamara al-Zein, said many people promoted the discourse of fitna (civil war), while there are those who try to strengthen the discourse of unity. She claimed the ministers were being intimidated and attempts were being made to cast doubt on their national loyalty, even though they were among the most prominent in adopting a discourse that strengthened unity and distanced fitna (al-Markazia, March 25, 2026).

Exposure of Hezbollah Terrorist Cells in the Gulf States

•   The security forces in Kuwait continue uncovering local Hezbollah terrorist activity. The ministry of the interior reported the arrests of five Kuwaiti citizens and another person who was not Kuwaiti and whose citizenship was revoked. According to the statement, the connection of the detainees to Hezbollah was proven and members of the network planned to carry out attack national symbols, assassinate senior state figures and harm the state’s supreme interests. They also admitted to receiving advanced military training outside the country from Hezbollah operatives and commanders, including the use of weapons and explosives, surveillance methods and assassination skills. In addition, 14 other individuals involved were identified who had fled the country, five Kuwaiti citizens, five suspects who were not Kuwaiti whose citizenship had been revoked in the past, two holders of Iranian citizenship and two holders of Lebanese citizenship (Kuwait ministry of interior, March 25, 2026).

The Lebanese Government

Diplomatic Efforts to End the War

• Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun, continued efforts to stop the war, while promoting his initiative to open direct negotiations with Israel. He discussed the issue with the prime minister, Nawaf Salam, and with the parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, as well as with foreign guests who arrived in Lebanon (X account of the Lebanese presidency, March 29-23, 2026). Meeting with the British defense ministry advisor for Middle East affairs, Admiral Edward Ahlgren, Aoun said that Lebanon could not fight the wars of others on its soil. He also noted the government would not retreat from its decisions regarding the exclusivity of weapons and the decision on war and peace, claiming the war could have been prevented if Israel had responded to calls to withdraw from the territories it occupied and had been committed to the 2024 agreement (X account of the Lebanese presidency, March 24, 2026).
• The Egyptian foreign minister, Badr Abdelatty, visited Lebanon and met with senior leadership figures to discuss efforts to end the war and offer Egyptian assistance for the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon. President Aoun welcomed any Egyptian effort to activate the Lebanese initiative and reiterated that Lebanon did not want the wars of others to be fought on its soil. He said Israel’s lack of response to his initiative was causing the military situation to deteriorate and worsening the suffering of the Lebanese. Abdelatty expressed his country’s full political support for Lebanon and said Cairo was operating on various political and diplomatic tracks and maintaining contacts with the United States, France and many regional actors, in addition to communication with the Israeli side, to stop the hostilities and prevent escalation. He also emphasized the necessity of supporting the Lebanese state and its institutions, especially the Lebanese army, to impose the state’s sovereignty and ensure that the weapons would be in its hands alone. The Egyptian minister also condemned the “daily Israeli violations,” without referring to Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli territory (X account of the Lebanese presidency and X account of the Lebanese prime minister, March 26, 2026).

• Sources at Abdelatty’s meetings in Beirut described the atmosphere as unencouraging. They claimed that the Israeli prime minister refused to have the war in Lebanon as part of the negotiations between the United States and Iran and maintained his position regarding the elimination of Hezbollah, which indicated that the war in Lebanon would be long and further escalation could be expected (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 26, 2026). Sources added that the Egyptians were trying to help end the fighting but did not have an initiative of their own and therefore the situation was deadlocked because of America’s non-involvement. They claimed the Americans and the Israelis also ignored the attempts by France to promote diplomatic efforts (Nidaa al-Watan, March 29, 2026).
• A meeting was held between an Egyptian security delegation and senior Hezbollah figures ahead of Abdelatty’s visit. The Egyptians reportedly presented an initiative to stop the “aggression” which included a call for a ceasefire, granting full authority to the Lebanese government over the entire territory of the state, and placing the weapons of the “resistance” on the negotiating table. Hezbollah told the Egyptians they could discuss the initiative with parliament speaker Berri, but sources [allegedly] familiar with the details said Hezbollah still believed that “now was the time for the battlefield and the time for diplomatic initiatives had not yet arrived” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 26, 2026; al-Akhbar, March 27, 2026).

Lebanon-Iran Relations

Iranian Ambassador Expelled from Lebanon

• Lebanon’s foreign minister, Youssef Rajji, announced that he asked the director general of the Lebanese foreign ministry to summon the chargé d’affaires of the Iranian embassy in Beirut, Tawfiq Samadi Khoshkhah, and to inform him of the decision to revoke the accreditation of the Iranian ambassador, Mohammad-Reza Shibani, and to declare him persona non grata, requiring him to leave Lebanon no later than March 29, 2026 (X account of Youssef Rajji, March 24, 2026). The Lebanese foreign ministry summoned Lebanon’s ambassador to Tehran, Ahmad Sweidan, for consultations regarding what it described as a violation of diplomatic norms and the principles of accepted relations between the two countries (Fars, March 24, 2026). The Lebanese foreign ministry issued a clarification stating there had been no severance of diplomatic relations, but rather a step taken due to a violation of diplomatic norms after the Iranian ambassador made statements that constituted interference in Lebanon’s internal politics and met with unofficial parties without briefing the foreign ministry. It was further stated that Lebanon always sought friendly relations with Iran based on equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (X account of the Lebanese foreign ministry, March 24, 2026).
• According to reports, following the Lebanese announcement, the Iranian ambassador asked Hezbollah and Amal to intervene in the decision to expel him (al-Hadath, March 24, 2026). It was also reported that parliament speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri told the Iranian ambassador that he should not leave Lebanon. Berri told President Aoun that expelling the Iranian ambassador was unacceptable (X account of journalist Hassan Olleik, March 24, 2026). However, according to another report, Berri knew about the intention to expel the Iranian diplomat after he met with President Aoun on the evening before the announcement (Nidaa al-Watan, March 24, 2026).
• Sources in Lebanon claimed that the understanding between President Joseph Aoun and Foreign Minister Rajji was that the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon should be summoned for a warning and not to inform him he was to be expelled (al-Akhbar, March 25, 2026). However, sources claimed the attempt to show the foreign minister had made the decision alone was incorrect. Political sources said that the decision was a Lebanese and Gulf decision and the Lebanese president and prime minister had requested the expulsion of the ambassador. They added that a retreat from the decision would be considered surrender to Iran (MTV Lebanon, March 25, 2026).
• Despite the instruction from the foreign ministry, an official source said that in Lebanon they understood that the Iranian ambassador did not intend to leave and would ignore the expulsion order with the support of Hezbollah and parliament speaker Berri. According to the source, in practice the ambassador will become a refugee inside the embassy since the Lebanese authorities cannot storm the diplomatic compound, while he will not be able to leave because he will be subject to measures by the authorities (Nidaa al-Watan, March 29, 2026).
• The decision to expel the Iranian ambassador provoked an uproar in Lebanon, as the Shi’ite camp condemned the move, while Hezbollah’s opponents welcomed it:
  • Hezbollah condemned the decision, calling it “irresponsible and to be condemned” as it did not serve Lebanon’s national interests and was “a surrender to external pressures.” Hezbollah called it “a national and strategic sin” opening the door to internal division, deepening the national rift and leading the state onto a dangerous path of dependence, weakness and vulnerability (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 24, 2026).
  • An organization called Meeting of the National Parties and Forces and the Association of Muslim Scholars organized a protest in front of the Iranian embassy in Beirut with the slogan, “The ambassador of the Islamic Republic is in his home.” The deputy head of Hezbollah’s political bureau, Mahmoud Qamati, called the decision to expel the ambassador “cursed.” He called Lebanon “distorted and false,” claiming it joined the “aggression” against Iran alongside the United States and Israel, and said they would never agree to it. Qamati said he had nothing but contempt for Foreign Minister Rajji and declared that the decision would not be implemented, the Lebanese people would not submit to it under any circumstances, and the Iranian ambassador would remain in Lebanon. He threatened Rajji and told him not to play with fire because the fire would burn him and the people with him and the people behind him (Tafasil platform, March 26, 2026).

• • Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, called the decision “dangerous.” He said he had visited the deputy prime minister, Tarek Mitri, and told him that the president and prime minister of Lebanon were required to address the consequences of the decision. Fayyad added that the step reflected the collapse of the “logic of the state” since decisions regarding foreign policy were under the authority of the president, and warned that the next stage would be severing relations with the Islamic Republic, and that would be “a much bigger and more dangerous problem” (al-Manar, March 25, 2026).
  • The Amal movement called on the political echelon to immediately retract the step in order to prevent the state from falling into political crisis. The movement said it would not accept the implementation of the decision under any circumstances, adding that retracting a mistake was a national virtue. It was further stated that the decision deviated from what was “accepted” and was “suspicious in its timing…and was a provocative raid directed against a diplomatic bridge” (al-Akhbar, March 25, 2026).
  • At the first cabinet meeting held after the decision to expel the ambassador the issue was not discussed and the ministers representing Hezbollah and Amal boycotted the meeting. However, the independent minister for administrative development affairs, Fadi Makki, who broke the Shi’ite boycott, said he opposed the decision but had participated in order to ensure the regularity of public work, stating there was “no choice but the state.” According to the report, the assessments are that the boycott of the meeting did not reflect the Shi’ite parties’ withdrawal from the government, but was rather a message of “political protest regarding the decision-making process.” Therefore, it was conflict management through partial disruption instead of a complete rupture (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 26, 2026).
  • The chairman of the Christian Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea, said the Lebanese government had acted correctly in its recent decision regarding the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador, and he believed it was essential in light of current developments, especially with the accumulation of the damage Iran had caused Lebanon for decades. He added that what occurred recently proved unequivocally that the confrontation was no longer against an internal actor, but against Iran directly. He called for a comprehensive file of the losses suffered by Lebanon as a result of the war to be prepared, and to demand that Iran bear full responsibility for them (MTV Lebanon website, March 24, 2026).
  • Sources in the Lebanese Forces added that the foreign minister had not made a decision of such magnitude alone. They wondered what if the Iranian ambassador refused to implement the decision? Who would receive him? No one – not the president, not the government and not even Berri, and said it encouraged the Lebanese government to make more decisions in the future (MTV Lebanon, March 25, 2026).
  • The chairman of the Christian Phalange party, Sami Gemayel, welcomed the decision to expel the ambassador and said it was a demand they had also raised because of Iran’s role in turning Lebanon into a military arena and dragging it into a war that the Lebanese people had no connection to. After a meeting with President Aoun, Gemayel said opening the front and bringing Lebanon into the war had been an Iranian decision, and Lebanon was now paying the price in destruction and losses (X account of the Lebanese presidency, March 26, 2026).

An Iranian Missile Detonates in Lebanon

• On March 24, 2024, explosions were reported in areas north of Beirut, including the town of Jounieh, which was considered one of the safer areas during the current war. Residents in the Keserwan and Mount Lebanon areas reported explosions and smoke at several sites. A military source said it was an interception of an Iranian missile with a dispersal warhead and that the fragments were scattered in several areas, however he did not state the party responsible for the interception. According to various reports, the missile was supposed to hit an American target in Lebanon, such as the embassy or the Hamat air base, or a British target in Cyprus (Grand Lebanon news website, al-Hadath, March 24, 2026). The IDF spokesperson stated that according to the data in IDF possession, a ballistic missile launched from Iran fell in Beirut (IDF spokesperson, March 24, 2026).
• The Lebanese army reported that units had scanned the area and collected the parts. The examinations revealed it was a Qadr-110 guided ballistic missile manufactured in Iran, about 16 meters long, which contained a number of small missiles. According to the statement, the missile exploded at a high altitude, which reinforced the assessment that its target was outside Lebanese territory. However, it was not determined whether the explosion was caused by a technical malfunction or by the impact of an interceptor missile, while senior officials in the Lebanese army stated that there were no missile interception batteries within Lebanese territory and the army continued to investigate the circumstances (X account of the Lebanese army, March 25, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• The army commander, General Rodolph Haykal, met with President Joseph Aoun and briefed him on the security situation in the country in general and in south Lebanon in particular. Aoun requested security measures be reinforced in the various areas of Lebanon, especially Beirut, to ensure the safety and security of the hosting centers (X account of the Lebanese presidency, March 23, 2026).

• The Lebanese army reported that a soldier had been killed in the Israeli strike in Deir al-Zahrani, and another soldier in a strike in the village of Tebnine (X account of the Lebanese army, March 28, 2026).
• The commander of the Lebanese army, General Rodolph Haykal, toured several units in Beirut and Sidon and was briefed on security measures. He noted the necessity of maintaining readiness to prevent disturbances and of taking a firm hand against attempts to weaken internal stability. Haykal added that despite the “rumors and propaganda campaigns” trying to minimize the value of soldiers’ efforts, the army would not hesitate “to bear its national responsibility” (X account of the Lebanese army, March 27, 2026).
• The Lebanese army and security forces were reportedly carrying out a “preventive redeployment” of their units in the south to “prevent the presence of official elements in direct friction with IDF forces” or the occurrence of clashes between them. A Lebanese source said the security forces employed the principle of remaining in a fixed territory alongside the residents until the last moment, and explained that the forces withdrew only after the evacuation had been completed and before any possible Israeli incursion, in order to ensure neither they nor the residents were exposed to danger. The source added that the evacuation of police stations had no designated central plan, but was based on changing field data, since when a town had been emptied, its police station was evacuated accordingly, and the forces joined the nearest military point (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 27, 2026).
• Ghada Abu Alwan, a military court judge, issued arrest warrants for two Hezbollah operatives after an indictment was filed against them for violating the measures taken by the government which could expose Lebanon to hostile acts. Weapons and ammunition were found in their possession and seized, including 21 Grad rockets, eight automatic rifles and about 3,000 bullets. Judge George Mezher issued an arrest warrant for a Hezbollah operative on weapons offenses (Nidaa al-Watan, March 25, 2026). A source confirmed that the detainees had admitted to transferring the rockets and claimed that they were fulfilling their duty in the confrontation against the Israeli army, which occupied Lebanese land and carries out repeated attacks against the state (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 24, 2026).

Opponents of Hezbollah

• The chairman of the Christian Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea, criticized Hezbollah’s threats against the government and state institutions and its demands that the government retract its decisions, stating it was completely unacceptable (MTV Lebanon website, March 24, 2026). Geagea also rejected Hezbollah’s accusations that the Lebanese Forces were responsible for the decision to expel Iran’s ambassador and were fomenting internal division. He said the last people who had the right to speak about division in the country were Hezbollah and the entire “resistance axis,”^[5] because for 40 years they had taken over and controlled state institutions and conducted wars they alone had decided on. He added that the state was now in chaos, facing a war more insane than all the wars it had expeienced. He admitted he was not optimistic about the war’s ending soon, unless President Aoun’s initiative for negotiations with Israel began having an effect (al-Nahar, March 25, 2026).

• George Okais, a member of the Strong Republic faction, sent a message to Hezbollah stating, “We will settle accounts with you later. You prevented the establishment of a state, and the political system in Lebanon has been freed from the complex of the ‘party’s’ [Hezbollah] absolute control over the state” (X account of MTV Lebanon, March 25, 2026).
• The head of the information unit in the Lebanese Forces party, Charles Jabbour, said Hezbollah had become isolated in Lebanon, rejected by the Arab world, and designated as a terrorist organization in the Gulf and the West. It was under a suffocating national, political and geographical siege, and had only one choice left, to declare its surrender before it destroyed what remained (X account of Charles Jabbour, March 27, 2026).
• At the general headquarters of the Lebanese Forces party in Maarab, a town in western Lebanon, a “For the Salvation of Lebanon” conference was held to protest Hezbollah’s repeated dragging of Lebanon into war. The chairman of the Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea, said that what Lebanon was witnessing today was the result of a long path which he had warned about in recent years, and said he hoped Hezbollah had learned its lesson in the past two years and would prevent the worst. He said they were not meeting out of hostility to Hezbollah, but to spare Lebanon. The attendees placed responsibility on Hezbollah and on the Iranian regime for bringing Lebanon into the war and called on the government to document all the damages and demand Iran pay for them. They also warned that the continued existence of weapons outside the framework of the state was no longer an issue of political dispute but an existential danger (al-Madan, March 28, 2026).

The Civilian Situation in Lebanon

• The Lebanese ministry of health reported that at least 1,189 people had been killed since the beginning of the fighting on March 2, 2026, in addition to 3,427 wounded (al-Nashra, March 28, 2026).
• Ahmed al-Hajjar, the minister of interior and municipalities in Lebanon, said the government was monitoring the developments in the south which had led to multiple crises, including mass displacement to safer areas. He said most efforts were concentrated in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and the security forces were working for the safety of the Lebanese and the displaced, and were strengthening their security presence through intelligence elements and uniformed patrols. He said the presence of weapons in the accommodation centers [shelters] was unacceptable and the security forces would intervene in any case that required it. He added that a number of arrests were carried out in several accommodation centers (al-Joumhouria, March 24, 2026).
• The Beirut city guard is reportedly conducting field patrols in all the city’s streets and neighborhoods in accordance with the directives of the governor of Beirut, Judge Marwan Abboud. The patrols are implemented around the clock to contribute to strengthening security and stability, maintaining public safety and instilling a sense of security among the residents of Beirut and those staying there, given the worsening displacement crisis caused by “Israeli aggression” (MTV Lebanon, March 25, 2026).
• French UNIFIL forces in cooperation with the Lebanese army escorted a humanitarian aid convoy carrying four tons of food products for families in south Lebanon. UNIFIL peacekeeping forces confirmed the continuation of their deployment in the area to strengthen coordination with the local authorities and facilitate the arrival of humanitarian aid throughout the area south of the Litani (MTV Lebanon, March 25, 2026).
• An International Red Cross delegation headed by the regional director for the Near and Middle East, Nicolas von Arx, briefed President Aoun on their activity in cooperation with the Lebanese Red Cross and in coordination with the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces operating in the south. Von Arx said they had helped ensure access to water for more than 800 thousand people, provided basic assistance to about 10,000 people in various villages, and supported hospitals to ensure the continued treatment of the sick and wounded. After meeting with parliament speaker Berri, von Arx said the International Committee would continue its presence in the field, especially in the areas which were most severely affected and those whose access was complex (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 27, 2026).
• The World Food Programme (WFP), with contributions from several international organizations, delivered an aid convoy of 15 trucks loaded with humanitarian equipment to the Christian villages in the Marjayoun district. The aid included large quantities of food, personal hygiene items, drinking water, blankets, mattresses and basic kitchen utensils. The organizers said the convoy was the first step of a comprehensive humanitarian emergency plan, and that additional shipments would be sent in the coming days to cover other areas to support the affected population (al-Diyar, March 27, 2026).

• UNICEF reported that more than 370,000 Lebanese children had been forced to leave their homes, and about 20% of the population had been displaced. The agency called to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to all those in need. In addition, an official in the UN Women agency said a quarter of Lebanese women and girls had been forced to flee their homes (al-Markazia, March 27, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Terrorist.
^[3] See the September 2019 ITIC report, Hezbollah’s media empire, the November 2019 report, Hezbollah’s Twitter Presence (Update), and the November 2019 report, Hezbollah’s Twitter Presence (Update 2).
^[4] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[5] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

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