Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (June 8-15, 2026)

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• Lebanon’s leadership continues to promote direct negotiations with Israel as part of the “state first” concept.
• Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Berri is consolidating his status as key in finding an arrangement for Lebanon’s future.
• Iran continues playing a central role in shaping Hezbollah’s positions and managing the crisis.
• The issue of Hezbollah is worsening Lebanese polarization and eroding support for the organization even outside the Shi’ite community.

Overview^[1]

• The United States and Iran formulated a memorandum of understanding on ending military activity, which apparently also includes a ceasefire in Lebanon. Lebanese began returning to the villages of south Lebanon despite warnings from the Lebanese army and Hezbollah.
• The IDF continued to expand its activity north of the forward defense zone in south Lebanon, along with airstrikes on Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, in the Beqa’a Valley and on a Hezbollah headquarters in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia. The forces eliminated Hezbollah terrorists and field commanders, including the holder of the Golan Portfolio.
• Hezbollah issued 130 claims of responsibility for attacks using explosive drones, UAVs, rockets and other weapons. According to the organization, all the attacks targeted IDF forces in south Lebanon but several UAVs fell inside Israeli territory.
• Lebanese President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam reiterated that direct negotiations with Israel were the only way to end the conflict and strengthen state sovereignty. Foreign Minister Rajji accused Hezbollah and Iran of destabilizing Lebanon and the region.
• Hezbollah continued to oppose direct negotiations with Israel, while Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Berri mediates between Hezbollah, state authorities and international actors.
• Hezbollah is combating the erosion of its Shi’ite support base by strengthening the “resistance” narrative.
• Hezbollah congratulated Iran on launching missiles at Israel in response to the attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have reportedly intensified their control over the organization.
• The commander of the Lebanese army visited Pakistan and discussed increased bilateral security cooperation.
• The Christian and Sunni communities in south Lebanon warned of increasing civilian distress with only limited aid from the state.

Lebanon and the Agreement between Iran and the United States

• On the night of June 14, 2026, the prime minister of Pakistan announced that Iran and the United States agreed to end the hostilities, and the agreement is expected to be signed on June 19, 2026. He said both sides had declared an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. The secretariat of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council also stated that fighting and military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, would cease completely. The American president confirmed that an agreement had been reached, but did not address the issue of Lebanon (Reuters, June 15, 2026).
• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stated that he had followed the announcement regarding the memorandum of understanding and appreciated the explicit reference to Lebanon and the recognition that Lebanon’s sovereignty and security as integral to any serious initiative for regional stability. He said the Lebanese expected the understandings to become practical steps which would completely end the cycle of violence and enable Lebanon to achieve stability, security, recovery and reconstruction. Aoun thanked all the countries and entities which contributed to achieving the memorandum and everyone who worked to include Lebanon in the efforts to end the escalation and military operations on the various fronts, without directly referring to any country. He did not relate to the possible impact on the continuation of direct negotiations with Israel (Lebanese presidency X account, June 15, 2026).
• Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri welcomed the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States and said the agreement laid the foundation for regional security and stability, including Lebanon. He praised the United States and Iran for their insistence on including a fundamental and binding clause to halt Israeli aggression against Lebanon in a manner that preserved its sovereignty over all its territory and was not contrary to Lebanon’s independence and freedom to make independent decisions (al-Nashra, June 15, 2026).
• An official source said the Lebanese authorities were not worried an agreement would be reached at Lebanon’s expense and said that Beirut, not Iran, was negotiating the country’s future. According to the source, the fact that Lebanon was preparing for another round of direct negotiations with Israel in Washington on June 22, 2026 proved there was no basis for claims that the United States was coordinating with Iran or Hezbollah regarding Lebanon’s independence in making national decisions. According to interpretations, including Lebanon in the memorandum effectively placed Lebanon under international protection, undermined the logic of the “resistance” and its claims justifying the use of weapons, and strengthened the state’s ability to achieve an arrangement based on a monopoly on arms (Nidaa al-Watan, June 15, 2026).
• Hours after the announcement of the agreement, convoys of Lebanese began to move toward communities in the south (al-Manar, June 15, 2026). The Lebanese army command called on them to delay their return and comply with the instructions of military units in the area because the danger of Israeli attacks still existed (Lebanese army X account, June 15, 2026). The civil defense unit of the Hezbollah-affiliated Islamic Health Authority also called on local residents not to return to their villages until the authorities had confirmed that the ceasefire was fully in force, out of concern for their safety. The unit’s instructions included avoiding entering villages during the dark, checking that access roads were safe, keeping vehicle fuel tanks completely full because there were no fuel stations in the attacked areas, being cautious of suspicious objects and destroyed buildings and using only clean or boiled water (SIMIA Telegram channel, Hezbollah social media affairs office, June 15, 2026).

     
Right: Lebanese return to the town of al-Qassamiya (al-Manar, June 15, 2026). Left: Front page of Hezbollah’s al-Akhbar. “Iran imposed the end of the war in Lebanon” (al-Akhbar, June 15, 2026)

The Fighting in Lebanon

The IDF

• This past week the IDF continued air and ground operations within the forward defense zone and also advanced into areas beyond the Litani River, including near the village of Dabin, approximately 12 kilometers inside Lebanese territory. The forces located weapons, destroyed military facilities and assets in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley region, and eliminated operatives and field commanders, including Ali Musa Daqduq, who headed Hezbollah’s Golan Portfolio and operated for the Iranian Qods Force.^[2] On June 8, 2026, a Hezbollah operative who crossed the border fence into Israel was eliminated. On June 14, 2026, the IDF targeted a Hezbollah headquarters in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut in response to the launch of UAVs into Israeli territory, and a Hezbollah commander was reportedly eliminated (IDF Spokesperson, June 8-15, 2026).

Hezbollah

• Between noon on June 8, 2026 and noon on June 15, 2026, Hezbollah issued 130 claims of responsibility for attacks using exploding drones, UAVs, anti-tank missiles, rockets, mortar shells and anti-aircraft missiles. Hezbollah claimed all the attacks targeted IDF forces operating in south Lebanon and included to prevent their advance. However, the IDF spokesperson reported that some of the UAV launches crossed into Israeli territory (Hezbollah Military Media Telegram channel, June 8-15, 2026).
• A Lebanese security source denied claims that the government was prohibiting or restricting the import of fiberoptic cables, although they are also used to operate Hezbollah’s explosive drones. According to the source, no decision had been made by the relevant government ministries, partly because of the importance of fiberoptic cables to Lebanon’s civilian communications infrastructure. The Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar warned there might be future external pressure to restrict the import of dual-use equipment and said fiberoptic cables could overcome electronic jamming attempts. The newspaper also criticized Beirut Port board member Karim Chebalko for his efforts to promote oversight mechanisms designed to prevent dual-use equipment from reaching Hezbollah (al-Akhbar, June 13, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• The Lebanese army announced that a soldier named Muhammad Suleiman al-Ahmed died after having been injured in an Israeli strike in the Qaaqaaiyet al-Jisr area in the al-Nabatieh Governorate in March 2026 (Lebanese army X account, June 10, 2026). The Lebanese army later reported that a soldier had been critically wounded in an Israeli UAV strike in the al-Nabatieh area (Lebanese army X account, June 13, 2026).
• Lebanese sources were concerned that the expansion of Israeli military activity in the al-Nabatieh area was intended to establish a new situation on the ground ahead of a possible agreement between the United States and Iran which could include a ceasefire in Lebanon. According to the report, Israel seeks to expand the deployment area of the Lebanese army beyond the territory south of the Litani River and push Hezbollah northward as part of future security arrangements. Hezbollah might represent the understandings between Washington and Tehran as a political and psychological achievement, but in practice will find it difficult to show genuine accomplishments in light of the damage it has sustained and the new situation created on the ground (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 13, 2026).

The Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel and the Struggle for State Sovereignty

The Lebanese Government

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun represented the American-sponsored direct negotiations as the best strategy for ending the conflict with Israel and strengthening state sovereignty. Aoun said the immediate objective of the talks was a non-aggression or security arrangement which would end the hostilities, and Hezbollah should be disarmed by addressing the roots of its existence, especially the continuing conflict with Israel, along with strengthening state institutions and the army. He said Hezbollah and its supporters were an integral part of Lebanese society, and therefore an internal confrontation had to be avoided while combining political, social and security measures to establish the state as an alternative to armed centers of power. He called on Israel to abandon its military approach and choose a political path, while presenting himself, the government and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri as a united front working to end the war (Lebanese presidency X account, June 9, 2026).
• Meeting with European parliamentarians, Aoun called for increased assistance to the army and state institutions and said strengthening Lebanese sovereignty was a key condition for national stability. He said the lessons and high price of the recent war showed that a political course had to be prioritized over military confrontation, along with the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south, an Israeli withdrawal and the gradual “resolution of the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons.” He reiterated the importance of national unity, strengthening state security mechanisms and rejecting a situation of a “state within a state” (Lebanese presidency X account, June 9-10, 2026).

• Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said Lebanon was committed to stabilizing the ceasefire and advancing political solutions managed exclusively by state institutions. He said Hezbollah’s possession of weapons was no longer justified and the state had concentrate all security powers in its own hands. He said there was no difference between Hezbollah’s political and military wings, described the organization as an Iranian proxy and said it bore the primary responsibility for Lebanon’s recurring wars (Youssef Rajji X account, June 10, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, June 11, 2026).
• Before it was reported that the United States-Iran agreement included Lebanon, senior Lebanese figures criticized Tehran for opposing their efforts to promote direct negotiations with Israel as part of state sovereignty:
  • Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said Iran’s opposition to the ceasefire agreement showed the depth of its influence over Hezbollah and Lebanon. He called on Hezbollah to support the government’s contacts with Israel and said only the state was authorized to conduct negotiations, lead reconstruction and exercise sovereignty, including over weapons (al-Joumhouria, June 12-13, 2026).
  • Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty required Hezbollah’s disarmament and stressed that it was a Lebanese interest rather than an external demand. He called for separating Lebanon from the negotiations between Iran and the United States, said he supported the American-sponsored contacts with Israel and attacked Iran and Hezbollah, claiming they undermined Lebanon’s stability, reconstruction and economy, and accused the Iranian regime of destabilizing the region through its proxies (Youssef Rajji X account, June 10, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, June 11, 2026; al-Joumhouria, June 13, 2026). The Iranian embassy in Lebanon then criticized Rajji while the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar accused the Lebanese foreign ministry of delaying the appointment of new Iranian diplomats (al-Diyar and al-Akhbar, June 13, 2026).

Hezbollah and Amal

• Hezbollah continued to defy and confront the Lebanese government.^[3] Senior organization figures condemned the continuation of the American-sponsored direct negotiations with Israel and claimed they served Israeli and American interests. They opposed any arrangement not based on a ceasefire and a full Israeli withdrawal while noting the legitimacy of the “resistance” as “central to of Lebanon’s defense:”
  • Ihab Hamadeh, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization’ adhered to “resistance,” and insisted that any future arrangement had to be based on a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He rejected the legitimacy of political initiatives “dictated by the United States or Israel” and said Hezbollah did not consider itself bound by arrangements which did not achieve “liberation.” He said Hezbollah was an integral part of the regional “resistance axis,”^[4] reiterating the ideological and operational links between Beirut, Tehran, Baghdad and Sana’a (al-Diyar, June 10, 2026).
  • The Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament called on the Lebanese government to restore its relations with Iran and criticized the direct contacts with Israel, which it claimed contradicted the principles of national sovereignty and could widen Lebanon’s internal divisions (Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc website, June 12, 2026).
  • Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said an American-Iran agreement could be an opportunity to advance Lebanese interests. He called on the Lebanese authorities to exploit the developments and adopt a firmer position in the negotiations, while rejecting the idea of “pilot zones” and opposing any arrangement that would include recognition of Israeli “freedom of action.” He said Lebanon should focus on demanding a full ceasefire and a timetable for an Israeli withdrawal (al-Diyar, June 14, 2026).
  • Ibrahim al-Amin, editor in chief of Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, wrote an article claiming the negotiations led by Washington required Lebanon to make security concessions without guarantees of an end to Israeli attacks or a full withdrawal. He claimed Iran and the “resistance axis” had deterred Israel, while elements within the Lebanese army were wary of moves that could turn it into a tool for serving American and Israeli interests (al-Akhbar, June 9, 2026).
• In preparation for the next round of negotiations in Washington, President Joseph Aoun and Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri continued coordinating positions and promoting a framework based on a comprehensive ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal and strengthening the status of the Lebanese army. Aoun worked for an official position from Hezbollah and for the first time requested the organization submit is positions in writing for discussion within state institutions. Reports indicated growing involvement by Saudi Arabia and Qatar in mediation efforts, along with assessments within the “resistance camp” that the understandings between Iran and the United States would influence the shaping of any future arrangement in Lebanon (al-Akhbar, June 12, 2026; al-Joumhouria, June 12, 2026).
• Reportedly, Hezbollah’s rocket fire and Aoun’s decision to promote direct negotiations widened the gaps between the presidential palace and Hezbollah and led to a significant reduction in direct communications. However, indirect channels remained in place, primarily through Nabih Berri. Lebanese political sources said there were intensive contacts between Berri and Hezbollah concerning the American proposals for a ceasefire and a possible arrangement for Lebanon. Berri and a Hezbollah delegation held a long meeting to discuss Hezbollah’s reservations regarding the Washington Declaration on the ceasefire and the establishment of “pilot zones” in south Lebanon, and “clarifications” conveyed through the American ambassador to Lebanon. According to the report, the parties are expected to continue consultations with assessments that “cautious progress” is being made in the contacts, although continued fighting and operational developments on the ground could still derail efforts to reach understandings (al-Diyar, June 10, 2026).
• Berri met with Egypt’s ambassador to Lebanon, Alaa Mousa, who said Cairo supported a comprehensive ceasefire and continuing the American-sponsored negotiations while backing Berri’s positions and role in the contacts concerning the future arrangement in south Lebanon (al-Diyar, June 10, 2026).
• An article published in al-Joumhouria represented Berri as the key to any future arrangement in Lebanon, and claimed that no agreement could be implemented without his consent and without his role as a mediator between the United States and Hezbollah. According to the article, Berri rejected clauses in the American proposal perceived as one-sided and was promoting a framework based on a ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and a parallel Hezbollah withdrawal north of the Litani River (al-Joumhouria, June 10, 2026). According to an article in al-Nahar, Hezbollah, the Amal Movement and Iran obstructed the political process because they were concerned it would reduce their influence in the Lebanese arena. Reportedly, the recent developments were intended to reinforce the status of Hezbollah and Nabih Berri in the negotiations at the expense of state institutions (al-Nahar, June 11, 2026).
• The chairman of the executive committee of the Amal Movement said Amal and Hezbollah rejected the idea of the “pilot zones” and any future arrangement had to begin with a ceasefire and a complete Israeli withdrawal. He called for the formulation of a unified Lebanese position regarding the negotiations and Hezbollah’s weapons (Nidaa al-Watan, June 13, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Opponents

• In the camp of Hezbollah’s opponents, efforts continued to present the negotiations with Israel as a strategic opportunity to strengthen the Lebanese state, establish the exclusivity of its institutions in the fields of security and policy and reduce the influence of Hezbollah and Iran:
  • The Lebanese Forces and Kataeb parties backed President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, and presented the negotiations as an opportunity to strengthen state sovereignty and restore its authority to make decisions. The parties criticized Hezbollah and Iranian involvement in Lebanon, and called for implementation of the principle of the state’s exclusive control of weapons (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, June 8, 2026; Kataeb website, June 9, 2026).
  • George Adwan, chairman of the Administration and Justice Committee from the Lebanese Forces Party, said making decisions beyond the framework of state institutions damaged its sovereignty. He said he supported for President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, adding that the current negotiations were part of an effort to return national authority to the state (al-Diyar, June 9, 2026).
  • Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar claimed Hezbollah followed Iranian dictates and undermined the state’s negotiation efforts with Israel, while hinting that the Lebanese arena served Tehran as a bargaining chip in its contacts with Washington. He said the Lebanese leadership was gradually formulating a firmer position toward the organization and Iran’s intervention, based on the view that applying state sovereignty and advancing political negotiations were a Lebanese interest and not an external demand (al-Joumhouria, June 9, 2026).
  • Nadim Gemayel, a member of the Kataeb faction in the Lebanese Parliament, criticized Hezbollah, calling it an extra-state Iranian proxy. He called for increased oversight of the border with Syria, strengthening the army and dismantling the organization’s centers of influence in state institutions as part of the effort to restore exclusive security authority to the state (al-Diyar, June 13, 2026).
• Elie Mahfoud, an attorney and chairman of the Movement for Change party, submitted a bill to turn the principle of the Lebanese state’s exclusive control of weapons into law. According to his proposal, all weapons and military or semi-military frameworks will be transferred to the responsibility of the army and the official security mechanisms, along with the establishment of enforcement mechanisms, border oversight and penalties for possession of illegal weapons or financing armed organizations. He said the proposal was not directed against Hezbollah alone but against any extra-state entity in possession of weapons, and its purpose was to strengthen governing institutions and establish the principle of equality before the law. However, he said Hezbollah was responsible for the “security situation” in south Lebanon and called on the organization to hand over its weapons to the state, claiming that only the Lebanese army was authorized to defend national sovereignty and prevent the existence of parallel security forces (Nidaa al-Watan, June 11, 2026).

Challenges for Hezbollah

Cracks in Shi’ite Support^[5]

• An op-ed piece noted that Hezbollah was ramping up its criticism of President Joseph Aoun because of signs of growing support among parts of the Shi’ite public for his efforts to promote the state’s exclusive control of weapons and political negotiations. The article added that to curb the erosion in its support base, the organization was portraying the president’s policy as an attempt to attack the political status of the Shi’ite community, not only to reduce Hezbollah’s military power (al-Nahar, June 11, 2026).
• Reportedly, Hezbollah is working to reestablish the legitimacy of its continued possession of weapons by emphasizing the “legitimate right to resist occupation.” According to the commentary, the organization seeks to establish the claim that even if a ceasefire is achieved, the continued Israeli presence on Lebanese territory will justify the continued existence of the “resistance”^[6] and the preservation of its military capabilities (al-Madan, June 14, 2026).
• A person who said he was a “Hezbollah fighter” claimed during an interview that the fighting was intended to defend Lebanon, alongside critical civilians and displaced persons who said the organization bore responsibility for the continued suffering and destruction in the country. In response, Hezbollah issued a denial and claimed that the man did not belong to its ranks and that the interview had not been coordinated with it. Beyond the denial itself, the response reflected Hezbollah’s sensitivity to how it was represented in the media at a time when the public debate in Lebanon over its role, its weapons and the price the state was paying for the war was becoming stronger (CNN, June 11, 2026; Lebanon Debate, June 11, 2026).

Hezbollah-Iran relations

• Hezbollah welcomed the Iranian missile attack on Israel on June 7, 2026, in response to the Israeli strike in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, claiming it “proved” Tehran’s commitment to defending Lebanon. The organization called for the restoration of relations between Beirut and Tehran, rejected the criticism of Iran in the Lebanese government and represented the “resistance axis” as central to the negotiations with Israel (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, June 9, 2026).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor in chief of Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, claimed the latest Iranian response strengthened Hezbollah’s position in the negotiations and showed that the Lebanese arena could not be separated from any future regional arrangement. He said that Hezbollah was a strategic asset for Iran and integral to the contacts with the United States (al-Akhbar, June 9-11, 2026).
• Hezbollah felt strengthened after the Iranian attack because it was the first time Iran had come to the organization’s aid since it began confrontations with Israel in October 2023. In addition, the Iranian demand that the ceasefire in Lebanon be part of the agreement with the United States helped put Hezbollah at the center of the Lebanese and regional equation, while the organization’s position was weakening within the Shi’ite community and vis-à-vis the Lebanese government. Hezbollah regards the recent developments as an opportunity to rehabilitate its political status in Lebanon after a period of military and political pressure. The article added that Iranian support was intended not only to deter Israel but also to make clear that Hezbollah remained a central strategic asset for Tehran and an important part of the Lebanese political system (Le Monde, June 9, 2026).
• Two sources noted that since the elimination of Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have reorganized Hezbollah and effectively taken control of it, turning it from an ally into a direct proxy. According to a report, Iran was behind the decision to fire the rockets at Israel on March 2, 2026, beginning the current hostilities (The Times, June 9, 2026). According to another report, senior Iranian military figures are deployed throughout Lebanon and liaise between Tehran and Hezbollah, and are involved in commanding the organization and in decision-making during hostilities against Israel. They convey the organization’s situation and needs to the regime in Tehran, and transfer more funds, equipment, weapons and training to Hezbollah to prevent the Lebanese government from restricting organization (Israeli TV channel Kan 11, June 13, 2026).

Sectarian Tensions in Lebanon

• The distribution of posters supporting Hezbollah and the legacy of former secretary general Hassan Nasrallah in several central locations in Beirut drew a quick response from the Lebanese authorities, which ordered their removal and began an investigation to identify those responsible. According to the report, the security services are examining the possibility that it was an organized and coordinated operation because the posters were hung simultaneously in several areas of the city. The incident reflects the growing political sensitivity surrounding Hezbollah’s public presence in the capital and the authorities’ efforts to reduce public displays of the organization’s power and influence at a time when the internal debate in Lebanon over its status and future role is intensifying (al-Akhbar, June 11, 2026).

• An article in the daily al-Nahar pointed to a growing alienation of some of Hezbollah’s Sunni allies from the organization, stating that they have begun supporting the state’s exclusive control of weapons and the policy led by President Joseph Aoun. According to an article, the statements of Faisal Karami, Osama Saad and others reflect deterioration of Sunni support for Hezbollah and the increase of the demand to reinforce state authority and advance political arrangements. The article noted Hezbollah’s growing political isolation outside its Shi’ite support base (al-Nahar, June 10, 2026).
• Ahmed Qabalan, the Shi’ite mufti, criticized Lebanon’s leadership and accused President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam of promoting a policy which “serves American and Israeli interests and damages the resistance.” He called for the preservation of national unity and the prevention of internal division, noted the importance of cooperation between the state, the army and Hezbollah, and represented the organization as an essential part of Lebanon’s defense against Israel. Qabalan backed Amal leader Nabih Berri and called for increased regional cooperation with countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan as part of his vision for a regional system which would reduce American influence in the Middle East (al-Diyar, June 10, 2026; al-Joumhouria, June 12, 2026).
• Shi’ite cleric Sayyed Ali Fadlallah claimed Lebanon’s internal division weakened the state and served Israel. He called for a national dialogue to formulate agreement around the state’s security and sovereignty, said he hoped the understandings between Iran and the United States would stop the fighting and called for increased state involvement in resolving the economic crisis and the plight of the displaced persons (al-Diyar, June 12, 2026).
• To position himself between the camp supporting negotiations and the “resistance camp,” former Progressive Socialist Party chairman and senior Druze figure Walid Jumblatt presented a position combining opposition to continued Israeli “violations” and activity in Lebanon with reservations about a path of full peace with Israel at the current time. He warned against what he described as Israeli “expansionist ambitions” and said he distrusted the United States as a mediator, while noting the need to strengthen the Lebanese army and an international presence in the south to prevent further escalation. He also called for adopting a pragmatic approach based on preserving internal stability and avoiding confrontations which could harm Lebanon’s social fabric (al-Joumhouria, June 11, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• Lebanese army Commander Rudolf Haykal visited Pakistan as part of the Lebanese army’s efforts to expand its security and military ties beyond the circle of traditional partners in the West and Arab countries. He and his hosts discussed possibilities for increasing cooperation in training, force buildup and support for the Lebanese army in view of the security challenges it faces, along with exposure to Pakistan’s security and industrial capabilities (Lebanese army X account, June 10, 2026).

UNIFIL

• In cooperation with the local authorities, the Italian force in UNIFIL delivered humanitarian aid to displaced families in the Tyre Governorate, while emphasizing its commitment to improving the living conditions of the civilian population. That reportedly illustrated the growing dependence of Lebanese in the south on external assistance and the activity of international organizations because of the difficulty of state institutions to provide a full response to humanitarian needs in the area (Nidaa al-Watan, June 8, 2026).
• A UNIFIL spokesperson said the UN secretary general had presented the Security Council with several alternatives for the future of the international force in south Lebanon, including different models for the scope of forces and operational authorities. He said one of the proposals included a shift to a format of unarmed observers along with a limited security force, which would make it possible to continue implementing the tasks defined in Resolution 1701, including monitoring the Blue Line, monitoring violations and following developments on the ground. The spokesperson said the decision rested with the Security Council as part of the discussions on renewing UNIFIL’s mandate, and that until a new decision had been made, the force would continue to operate according to its existing mandate (Nidaa al-Watan, June 13, 2026).

The Situation in Lebanon

• According to Lebanese government data, since the beginning of the current hostilities on March 2, 2026, at least 3,783 people have been killed and 11,699 wounded (al-Nashra, June 14, 2026).

• The Association of Christian Villages in south Lebanon warned of worsening civilian distress in the border areas because of destruction, damage to essential services and difficulties in delivering aid. The association called on the government to increase assistance and reconstruction, and emphasized that responsibility for protecting residents lay with the state (al-Diyar, June 9, 2026). Church institutions continue distributing food, medicine and humanitarian equipment to thousands of families, filling part of the gap created by the absence of an adequate state response (al-Diyar, June 8, 2026).
• The Sunni and Druze towns in the south also bear the cost of the fighting, reflected by damage to livelihoods, agriculture and freedom of movement. Efforts were made in some communities to distance military activity in order to reduce the risk of Israeli strikes (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 12, 2026).
• The deterioration of security continues having a negative impact on Lebanon’s tourism and hotel industry. Although some hotels benefit from temporary occupancy by displaced persons, the entire sector suffers from a sharp decline in bookings, with about 75 % of potential bookings for the summer season not having materialized (al-Nahar, June 12, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

• Muhammad al-Asaad, Palestinian ambassador to Lebanon, met with the mufti of Tyre and its districts to strengthen ties between Palestinians and Lebanese during the continuing fighting in the area. The two noted the importance of preserving unity, social cohesion and cooperation between the two peoples, along with support for Palestinian rights and opposition to Israeli activity in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip (Palestinian News Agency, June 10, 2026).
• The Palestinian refugee camps in the Tyre area continue to absorb displaced Lebanese despite the damage they sustained in Israeli strikes. There were reports of growing reliance on community aid and criticism of the state, UNRWA and the Palestinian embassy because of the limited response to the needs of displaced persons and residents (al-Akhbar, June 13, 2026).
• Two officers in the Palestinian national security forces were killed by gunfire in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp. Subsequently, alert levels were raised in the camp, security forces were deployed and an investigation was begun. The Fatah leadership described the incident as an attempt to undermine stability in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (al-Diyar, June 14, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] In November 2024, it was reported that Daqduq was wounded in an Israeli strike in Damascus, however there was no official confirmation that he had been eliminated. For further information on Daqduq’s activities, see the March 2019 report, Ali Mussa Daqduq (Abu Hussein Sajed): portrait of the commander of Hezbollah’s military network in the Syrian Golan Heights (“the Golan Portfolio”)
^[3] See the June 2026 Amit Institute report, Hezbollah’s Campaign against the Lebanese Government
^[4] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.
^[5] See the June 2026 Amit Institute report, Criticism of Hezbollah Increases among the Shi’ites in Lebanon
^[6] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.

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