Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (June 29-July 6, 2026)

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• The political debate in Lebanon is focused on the future of the framework agreement with Israel.
• Hezbollah is working to delay the implementation of the agreement while avoiding confrontation with the IDF and within Lebanon.
• Iran plans to continue providing Hezbollah with financial support.
• Hezbollah continues to face criticism from within the Shi’ite community over the cost of the war and the reconstruction.

Overview^[1]

• Lebanese President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam defended the framework agreement reached with Israel and said it was the only way to establish the state’s sovereignty and cause the IDF to withdraw from south Lebanon. The government said it was pursuing legal proceedings against Israel for “war crimes.”
• Senior Hezbollah figures and the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament were greatly opposed to the framework agreement and warned it would drag the country into a civil war, while representing the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States as the basis for ending the war.
• The IDF continued locating and destroying weapons and terrorist infrastructure in the security zone in south Lebanon and eliminating terrorists who posed a threat to the forces or attempted to transfer weapons.
• Hezbollah accused the IDF of “violating the ceasefire agreement” but did not claim responsibility for any new attacks. The organization held funerals for more than 200 terrorist commanders and operatives who were killed during the hostilities.
• The United States and the Gulf States imposed sanctions on Hezbollah’s financial network, headed by the al-Qard al-Hassan Association.
• Iran is reportedly preparing to transfer approximately $1 billion in aid to Hezbollah, to be allocated primarily for military reconstruction.
• Delegations from Hezbollah and Amal attended the funeral ceremony of Iran’s former leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran and met with senior Iranian figures. Lebanon’s defense minister represented his country at the ceremony despite the tensions between Beirut and Tehran.
• The Lebanese government is promoting plans for reconstruction and the return of displaced residents, but budgetary constraints, the lack of funding and the continuing insecurity are delaying the process.

The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement^[2]

The Lebanese Government

• Lebanon’s government began discussing the framework agreement signed with Israel in Washington and presented it as a political framework guiding the negotiations rather than as a legally binding agreement. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the agreement’s objective was a full Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and establishing exclusive state authority over weapons in accordance with the Taif Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the government’s policy statement. He said the agreement would be implemented gradually through Israel’s withdrawal from the pilot areas along with the advancement of government plans for the reconstruction of the south and the return of displaced residents. During the cabinet meeting, Hezbollah and Amal ministers voiced reservations regarding both the process and the content of the agreement, while Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said Lebanon continued to pursue legal action against Israel in the international arena over alleged “war crimes” and “violations” of international law (al-Nashra, July 1, 2026; Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, July 2, 2026).

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun presented the agreement as an expression of the state’s sovereign decision to conduct negotiations itself and restore the exclusive authority over matters of war and peace to the state. He said the agreement did not legitimize Israel’s continued presence but was intended to ensure Israel’s withdrawal, the deployment of the Lebanese army and the consolidation of state sovereignty. He said Lebanon was pursuing an independent course separate from the Iranian-American negotiations, and called on opponents of the agreement to provide a practical alternative, while warning against incitement to civil war or attempts to undermine the country’s stability through street protests. Aoun met with members of parliament, public figures and representatives of the Maronite Church, who said they had confidence in his policy and in the ability of the Lebanese army to lead the implementation of the agreement (Lebanese presidency X account, June 30-July 3, 2026).
• Aoun also criticized the agreement’s opponents, saying they had no practical alternative, while the continuation of the war only exacerbated Lebanon’s destruction. He said the Lebanese army remained united and guaranteed civil peace, and praised Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, for his contribution to preventing internal conflict. He reiterated that Lebanon would not accept Israel’s continued presence in the south, adding that the objective of his policy was to keep Lebanon away from the wars of the “axes” and from regional conflicts (al-Jadeed, July 5, 2026).
• Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, a member of the Lebanese Forces party, which opposes Hezbollah, reinforced the government’s official position, noting that the negotiations conducted by the state were the only legitimate path to achieving full Israeli withdrawal and restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty. He called on the international community to concentrate its support exclusively on state institutions and warned against alternative initiatives which would weaken Lebanon’s negotiating position (Lebanese foreign ministry website, July 1, 2026). He said he had confidence in the army’s future ability to complete the task of establishing the state’s exclusive authority over weapons and reiterated that Hezbollah’s disarmament was an internal Lebanese necessity on the path to establishing a functioning sovereign state (al-Akhbar, July 3, 2026).
• Lebanese minister of industry Joe Issa El Khoury, who also belongs to the Lebanese Forces, said that while Iran sought to preserve Hezbollah’s weapons as a source of regional leverage, the government was working to concentrate all security authority in the hands of the state and to leave decisions on war and peace exclusively to its institutions. He said the government’s objective of asserting its sovereignty and Israel’s demand for Hezbollah’s disarmament overlapped with implementation of the security provision which was contingent upon the transfer of weapons to the state and the completion of Israel’s withdrawal (al-Diyar, June 30, 2026).
• Lebanese justice minister Adel Nassar, a member of the Kataeb Party, which opposes Hezbollah, said the framework agreement required full Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, adding that Lebanon would not relinquish a single centimeter of its territory or accept a security zone on its soil. He claimed Israel wanted to drag Lebanon into a “destructive military confrontation,” whereas Lebanon wanted Israel to choose a diplomatic course through the framework agreement, thereby enabling the state to extend its sovereignty over its entire territory without excluding any actor, including Hezbollah. Nassar also criticized Hezbollah for complicating Lebanon’s position in the direct negotiations by supporting the negotiations between the United States and Iran, in which the Lebanese state had no part, while simultaneously opposing negotiations in which the Lebanese state represented itself. He said Hezbollah had to say if its weapons existed to defend south Lebanon or if south Lebanon existed to defend the weapons (Le Monde, July 5, 2026).
• Sources in the Lebanese army and the government denied that an official notification had been received regarding the mechanism for the withdrawal from the pilot areas, stating that discussions with the United States had not been completed. They claimed a secret security provision attached to the agreement included disputed arrangements, such as towns which were not defined as occupied within the pilot areas, contrary to the position taken by the Lebanese army during the negotiations (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 29, 2026). The heads of the local authorities in al-Ghandouriya and al-Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa also said designating their towns as part of the arrangement did not reflect reality in light of the continuing Israeli strikes, and called on the government to clarify their status and ensure the security of the residents and their return to their homes (al-Diyar, July 2, 2026).
• President Aoun met with the commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, and noted the state’s commitment to deploying the Lebanese army along the border and extending its sovereignty over the south. The American embassy in Beirut said the parties were working to accelerate implementation of the agreement and Washington was preparing to hold another round of Lebanon-Israel talks during July, following an assessment of progress in implementing the agreement and its security provision (Lebanese presidency X account, June 29, 2026). Reportedly, United States continued its contacts with Israel to begin the initial phase of withdrawals, headed by withdrawals from the pilot areas. According to the reports, President Aoun is closely monitoring the contacts and a trilateral coordination committee of the United States, Lebanon and Israel was expected to be appointed to oversee implementation of the agreement (al-Diyar, June 29-30, July 4, 2026).

     
Right: Aoun meets with General Cooper (Lebanese presidency X account, June 20, 2026). Left: Cooper during his visit with Lebanese army Commander Rudolph Haykal (Lebanese army X account, June 29, 2026)

• It was later reported that Cooper’s visit to Beirut marked the transition from negotiation to the practical implementation of the framework agreement. According to the report, the United States was working to complete the military implementation mechanism, centered on the deployment of the Lebanese army in the areas from which the IDF would withdraw, under the supervision of an American team headed by General Joseph Clearfield. It was further reported that implementation was expected to begin in the near future, subject to the completion of the Lebanese army’s preparations and coordination with Israel to preventing the creation of a security vacuum (Nidaa al-Watan, July 6, 2026).

Opposition to the Agreement

• Senior Hezbollah figures continued to attack the framework agreement, describing it as a “surrender agreement,” “humiliation,” “a trap” and “stillborn.” Hezbollah members of parliament Hassan Fadlallah, Hussein Jishi and Ibrahim al-Moussawi claimed the agreement violated the constitution and the Taif Agreement, granted Israel legitimacy for its continued presence in the south and made Israel’s withdrawal contingent upon Hezbollah’s disarmament. They said the agreement served Israeli and American interests, turns Lebanon into a bargaining chip in the United States-Iranian negotiations and nullified the achievements of the “resistance.”^[3] They noted that Hezbollah did not recognize the agreement, would not allow it to be implemented and would continue to rely on Iranian support and the Tehran-Washington diplomatic course, while at this stage avoiding “military” escalation or an internal crisis, but without relinquishing its right to respond whenever it chose (al-Araby al-Jadeed, al-Diyar, al-Joumhouria, Hezbollah Parliamentary Bloc website, June 29-July 5, 2026).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of the Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar, claimed the disclosure of the security provision “proved” the agreement was not intended to secure an Israeli withdrawal but rather to compel Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its organizational structure as a precondition for any future Israeli withdrawal. He said the provision obligated the state, under American supervision, to establish a dedicated military force within the Lebanese army to lead Hezbollah’s disarmament, while Israel was committed only to a “redeployment” rather than a full withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He criticized President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam for concealing the provision and its true significance from both the public and the Lebanese military delegation, which, he said, had raised professional objections during the negotiations which were rejected. He concluded that the security provision was not a blueprint for stabilizing Lebanon but rather “a recipe for civil war,” because it placed the state’s institutions and the Lebanese army in direct confrontation with Hezbollah (al-Akhbar, July 6, 2026).
• Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, continued to lead the political opposition to the framework agreement, calling it a “civil war agreement” which harmed Lebanon’s interests and sovereignty. He said the struggle against the agreement would be conducted exclusively through constitutional institutions, while opposing the overthrow of the government, escalation in the streets or internal confrontation. He reiterated his commitment to preserving civil peace, declared any harm to the Lebanese army and its commander, General Rudolph Haykal, would be a “red line,” and warned against attempts to pit the army against Hezbollah. He also called for revisions to the agreement’s implementation mechanisms, particularly the pilot areas, and said he was willing to reach a broad compromise with regional and international support (al-Akhbar, June 30, 2026; al-Diyar, July 1, 2026).

• The Amal Movement claimed the agreement served Israeli interests through the mechanism of the pilot areas and was an attempt to turn the Lebanese army into an enforcement tool against the “resistance.” It called the Lebanese army a red line, called for preserving national unity and preventing civil war, and demanded full Israeli withdrawal, the return of the displaced and the continuation of legal action against Israel over alleged “war crimes” (al-Diyar, July 3, 2026).
• In the assessment of political sources, Hezbollah and Amal have accepted their inability to block the agreement politically and have therefore shifted from trying to collapse it to attempting to delay its implementation, raise its political cost and buy time until a possible change in the regional balance of power, while avoiding internal confrontation and direct conflict with state institutions (Aram News, July 4, 2026). Political sources also said President Aoun and Parliament Speaker Berri continued to cooperate to preserve the government’s stability, prevent unrest in the streets and ensure the continued participation of the “Shi’ite duo” (Hezbollah and Amal) in the government (al-Diyar, July 4, 2026).
• The Jafari Mufti, Sheikh Ahmed Qabalan, criticized the framework agreement and Lebanon’s leadership, calling it “a document of surrender” which undermined the country’s sovereignty and granted legitimacy to the continued “Israeli occupation.” He warned against attempts to turn the Lebanese army into an instrument for confronting Hezbollah (“a game of an army within an army”) and called for preserving the formula of “the army, the people and the resistance” as the foundation of national security. He claimed the demand for “one army and one weapon” served American and Israeli interests and could lead to internal division and undermine national unity (al-Joumhouria, July 5, 2026).
• Given the tensions between Hezbollah and President Aoun over the agreement, Hezbollah’s al-Manar television channel broadcast a critical video targeting the Lebanese president entitled, “Aid to the enemy… humiliation for Lebanon” (al-Nahar, July 5, 2026).

Support for the Agreement

• The chairman of the Lebanese Forces Party, Samir Geagea, said the framework agreement was an opportunity to restore state sovereignty, end the ongoing conflict with Israel and establish the state’s exclusive authority over weapons. He added that the agreement reflected the balance of power created by Hezbollah’s policies and made it clear that Israel’s continued presence in the south was a direct result of the organization’s activities. He noted that the Lebanese army enjoyed broad national legitimacy and the principal challenge in implementing the agreement was political rather than military (al-Diyar, July 1, 2026; al-Nahar, July 2, 2026).
• The Kataeb Party said it fully supported President Joseph Aoun, the government and the framework agreement, calling it a historic opportunity to restore state sovereignty. According to the party, the agreement was expected to enable Israel’s withdrawal, the reconstruction of the south, the deployment of the Lebanese army throughout the country and Lebanon’s disengagement from the influence of the “Iranian project” and from illegal weapons. The party also criticized Hezbollah’s threats and accused it of attempting to undermine the state’s authority (Kataeb website, July 1, 2026; Lebanese presidency X account, July 2, 2026).
• The opposition Saydet al-Jabal Gathering^[4] welcomed the signing of the framework agreement, saying it marked Lebanon’s return to functioning as a sovereign state responsible for its own security and for restoring control over its territory. It called for full support for the state, the Lebanese army and the judicial system, stating that recent events had demonstrated that the Lebanese army was capable of preserving stability and preventing security deterioration despite Hezbollah’s opposition to the agreement. It added that the framework agreement marked a political turning point in which the Lebanese state replaced Hezbollah as the body responsible for Lebanon’s security and sovereignty (al-Markazia, June 29, 2026).
• After meeting with President Aoun, Najat Saliba, a member of the Lebanese Parliament, said she supported the efforts he was leading, particularly the framework agreement. She noted the importance of protecting Lebanon and its sovereignty and said only the Lebanese state could lead negotiations aimed at recovering all Lebanese territory and enabling the return of all displaced persons. She added that they looked forward to the establishment of a state capable of leading the reconstruction and restoring Lebanon’s international standing while ensuring security and stability for all Lebanese (Lebanese presidency X account, July 2, 2026).
• According to an op-ed piece in Nidaa al-Watan, a newspaper affiliated with Hezbollah’s opponents, Lebanon was approaching a decisive confrontation between the state and the “Iranian faction,” which could reshape the country’s political system. According to the article, Hezbollah was shifting the focus of the confrontation from the struggle against Israel to the domestic arena by inciting the public against President Aoun, Prime Minister Salam and supporters of the framework agreement. It further stated that such a course of action could ignite internal conflict, divert the state from implementing the agreement and the Israeli withdrawal and deepen Lebanon’s political and economic crisis (Nidaa al-Watan, July 6, 2026).

The Lebanese army

• The Lebanese army continued to represent itself as principally responsible for implementing the framework agreement, while stating that they would not serve as an tool for confronting Hezbollah. Military and political sources said the army supported establishing the state’s exclusive authority over weapons through a gradual political process and opposed expanding its mission beyond its deployment in the south. The army enjoyed the backing of President Aoun, Parliament Speaker Berri and other senior figures, who noted the need to preserve its unity and prevent civil war. It was further stated that the successful implementation of the agreement depended on internal political consensus, Israeli withdrawal and continued security coordination with the United States (al-Araby al-Jadeed and al-Joumhouria, July 3, 2026; al-Akhbar, July 4, 2026).

The Fighting in Lebanon

The IDF

• During operations in the security zone in south Lebanon, the forces located weapons, an underground shaft and other terrorist facilities and assets. From the air and on the ground they eliminated terrorists inside and near the security zone, including armed terrorists operating from tunnels and terrorists attempting to transfer weapons. They also attacked Hezbollah infrastructure within the security zone in response to the organization’s violations of the ceasefire (IDF Spokesperson, June 29-July 6, 2026).

Hezbollah

• This past week as well, Hezbollah did not issue claims of responsibility for attacks on IDF forces, the policy it has followed since June 20, 2026. Instead, it continued its psychological and media campaign accusing Israel of “violating” the ceasefire by destroying villages and attacking civilians, while claiming it was monitoring the “violations” and reserved the right to “defend” Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, June 29-July 6, 2026).

• The Hezbollah leadership reportedly instructed its operatives to focus on disrupting the implementation of the framework agreement while avoiding direct military confrontation with Israel, the Lebanese army or UNIFIL. According to the report, the organization was reducing its overt military presence in areas near the border while preserving its intelligence infrastructure and influence in the south to prevent the state from establishing full security control. It was also claimed that the policy was coordinated with the Amal Movement and encouraged by Iran, which seeks to preserve Hezbollah as a strategic asset by shifting the focus of the confrontation from the military arena to the political, administrative and legal arenas (Aram News, July 1, 2026).
• With the de facto suspension of the fighting, Hezbollah held formal funerals during the past week for more than 200 commanders and operatives who had been killed in the hostilities since March 2, 2026. Approximately half were held on July 5, 2026, including 19 fatalities from the town of Baraachit and 17 from the town of al-Aabbassiyah (Balaagh Telegram channel, June 29-July 6, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• Army ordnance disposal teams continued engineering operations in south Lebanon to neutralize bombs and unexploded ordnance. The Lebanese army called on residents to avoid handling suspicious objects (Lebanese army X account, July 4, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Challenges

Local Shi’ite Criticism^[5]

• An article in the French daily Le Monde reported the deepening divisions within Lebanon’s Shi’ite community following the latest campaign against Israel and the framework agreement. While some Shi’ite residents continued to support Hezbollah, stating that sacrifice was necessary for defending Lebanon and preserving the “resistance,” the article also presented voices questioning the human and economic cost of the confrontation, Hezbollah’s decisions and its dependence on Iran. Interviewees, including Amal and Hezbollah supporters as well as residents of south Lebanon, criticized the extent of the destruction, the delays in reconstruction and the lack of compensation, although many of them continued accuse Israel of responsibility for the situation and opposed disarming Hezbollah as long as the Israeli threat continued (Le Monde, July 1, 2026).

International Activity Against Hezbollah’s Financing

• The United States Treasury Department announced that the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center, which includes the United States and six Persian Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman), imposed sanctions on five entities and 16 individuals who played key roles in Hezbollah’s financial network. The list included the al-Qard al-Hassan Association, Hezbollah’s financial arm, and al-Mal Bank, which is also one of the organization’s main banking arms, as well as Ibrahim Ali Daher, who heads Hezbollah’s central financial unit, and senior al-Qard al-Hassan figures (United States Treasury Department website, June 30, 2026).

Relations with Syria

• When Asaad al Shibani, the Syrian foreign minister visited Lebanon, according to reports Hezbollah was reassured by the Syrian government’s willingness to engage in dialogue with the organization, reducing concerns about a confrontation with Syria’s new regime. Reportedly, for that reason, Hezbollah was currently avoiding a public confrontation with Damascus (al-Nahar, July 3, 2026).
• During al-Shibani’s meetings with senior Lebanese figures, both sides noted the expansion of bilateral political, security and economic cooperation, with particular emphasis on border security and preventing smuggling. They also announced the appointing of a Lebanese-Syrian committee to serve as the primary framework for managing bilateral relations (X accounts of the Lebanese presidency and the Lebanese prime minister’s office, July 2, 2026).

Iran and the Lebanese Arena

Iranian Support for Hezbollah

• Iran is reportedly preparing to transfer approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah through alternative financial mechanisms, with most of the funds earmarked for rebuilding the organization’s military capabilities and only a smaller portion intended for the reconstruction of the Shi’ite population affected by the war (Nidaa al-Watan, July 1, 2026).
• Hezbollah is reportedly preparing to resume compensation payments to those affected by the war using Iranian funds transferred through Iraq to finance repairs to damaged homes and restore the operation of its social services network. However, a call by Hezbollah’s Jihad al-Bina Association^[6] for residents to document the damage and keep receipts, without committing to a timetable for compensation, prompted rumors that the organization was facing financial difficulties and delays in implementing its reconstruction program (Aram News, June 29, 2026; al-Nahar, June 29, 2026).

The Lebanese Presence at Khamenei’s Funeral

• An official Hezbollah delegation, which included family members of the former secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, participated in the funeral held in Tehran for the leader, Ali Khamenei, who was eliminated in an Israeli strike at the beginning of the war between the United States and Israel and Iran on February 28, 2026 (al-Manar, July 3, 2026).

• Members of the Hezbollah delegation, headed by Member of Parliament Muhammad Fneish, met with the speaker of the Iranian Majlis (Parliament), Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and praised the Islamic Republic’s support for the organization. They added that they believed the war in Lebanon was halted because of Iranian intervention and the United States and Israel were compelled to implement the terms of the memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the United States calling for an end to the war and an Israeli withdrawal. Qalibaf said that during the negotiations Iran said the “resistance front”^[7] and Lebanon were of fundamental importance to it, and it demanded that the agreement include an end to the war against Iran’s “resistance front” allies. He added that Hezbollah’s conduct during the recent war demonstrated to the world the interdependence of the “resistance” factions (al-Mayadeen and al-Joumhouria, July 5, 2026).
• A delegation from the Amal Movement also attended the funeral and met with the Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, who noted Iran’s commitment to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and linked its implementation to the continuation of negotiations with the United States. The Amal representatives reiterated their opposition to the “framework agreement,” praised Iran’s support for Lebanon and the “resistance” and presented the American-Iranian understandings as the basis for resolving the situation in Lebanon (al-Diyar, July 2-3, 2026; al-Nashra, July 3, 2026; al-Joumhouria, July 4, 2026).
• Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement, reiterated his commitment to the “resistance axis” and to relations with Iran. In a message published ahead of Khamenei’s funeral, he praised Khamenei’s legacy and stated that “the wounds inflicted on Iran wound every honorable Lebanese” (al-Diyar, July 2, 2026).
• Despite the tensions between the Lebanese government and Iran, the Lebanese defense minister, Michel Menassa, went to Tehran to represent Lebanon at the funeral. He was received by the Iranian deputy minister of defense for international affairs, Seyed Hamzeh Qalandari, and other senior figures (al-Nahar, July 3, 2026).

UNIFIL

• UNIFIL continued its operations in south Lebanon, both in support of the civilian population and in carrying out its security missions. The force commander, General Diodato Abagnara, donated medical equipment to the government hospital in Tebnine and noted the force’s commitment to supporting civilian institutions (Lebanese News Agency, July 1, 2026).
• Meanwhile, a UNIFIL spokesperson said that since the resumption of hostilities in March 2026, the force had faced increasing restrictions on its freedom of movement but had continued to operate from its positions. Contacts for establishing an alternative multinational force continued at the initiative of France and Italy and with American support, with the objective of helping the Lebanese army implement the security arrangements and extend state sovereignty in the south (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 3, 2026).
• Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani called the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel “a step forward,” and said Italy, in coordination with France, was prepared to participate in an international mission which would be established following the conclusion or reorganization of the UNIFIL mission, while continuing to assist in building the capabilities of the Lebanese army and rebuilding state institutions (al-Markazia, June 29, 2026).

The Situation in Lebanon

• The Lebanese ministry of health reported that since the beginning of the current campaign on March 2, 2026, 4,304 people had been killed and 12,203 wounded (al-Nashra, July 5, 2026).
• The Christian villages near the border in south Lebanon, particularly Debel, Ain Ebel and Rmaish, continued to deal with a difficult humanitarian and security situation despite the ceasefire and preparations for implementing the framework agreement. Residents are reportedly “suffering” from the continued Israeli military presence, with some dependent on humanitarian assistance for their basic needs. meanwhile, there were calls for an increased deployment of the Lebanese army in the area, along with criticism of insufficient state involvement. Local residents said they were concerned that continuing to link Israel’s withdrawal and Hezbollah’s disarmament could delay reconstruction and their return to normal lives for an extended period (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 3, 2026).

The Displacement and Reconstruction Crisis

• The Lebanese government continued to advance its reconstruction plan, which includes damage assessment, debris removal, infrastructure rehabilitation, reducing the number of reception centers and providing temporary housing solutions for families that have not yet returned to their homes. Th evacuation of unauthorized reception centers in Beirut was completed as part of implementing the displaced persons return plan (Lebanese News Agency, July 1, 2026).
• The Lebanese minister of social affairs, Hanin El Sayed, presented the main elements of the government’s plan for reconstructing the south and dealing with the displacement crisis during her visit to the Tyre District. She said about 400,000 displaced persons had already returned to their homes, but many others were still unable to return because of the extent of the destruction and the continuing fragile security situation (al-Diyar, July 4, 2026). According to figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 646,000 displaced persons have returned to their homes since the ceasefire went into effect, but about 500,000 remain displaced, mainly because of the continuing Israeli presence and the absence of a timetable for withdrawal (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 3, 2026).
• Despite Lebanese government efforts, delays in the reconstruction process were reported. In the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia district of Beirut the necessary funding had still not been allocated to address dozens of dangerous buildings, although damage assessments were completed and debris removal operations continued. Professional sources warned that the continuing delays endangered residents and illustrated the gap between the government’s declarations and the actual pace of implementation (al-Akhbar, July 2, 2026).
• Studies published in Lebanon indicated the state’s continuing failure to manage the displacement crisis. Only about 15% of the displaced relied on official reception centers, while approximately 85% had found independent solutions, reflecting a loss of confidence in state institutions. The researchers called for adopting a new model based on community assistance, regulation of the rental market and strengthening local authorities (al-Akhbar, July 3, 2026).
• According to a report issued by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, the war displaced approximately 20% of Lebanon’s population, including about 140,000 elderly people, who have experienced reduced access to healthcare, welfare services and economic security. The report called for the development of a dedicated response for the elderly population as part of the reconstruction programs (ESCWA report, June 29, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] See the June 2026 Amit Institute report, The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement: Insights and Responses
^[3] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[4] The Saydet al-Jabal Gathering is a Lebanese political-civic organization established in 2001, one of the oldest and most consistent opposition groups to Iran and Hezbollah.
^[5] See the June 2026 Amit Institute report, Criticism of Hezbollah Increases among the Shi’ites in Lebanon
^[6] See the June 2019 Amit Institute report, Jihad al-Bina Association in Lebanon: A Hezbollah social foundation engaged in construction and social projects among the Shiite community, being a major component in Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure
^[7] Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, all Iranian proxies whose collective objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel.

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