Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (July 6-13, 2026)

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• Preparations are being made to implement the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel.
• The struggle between the rival camps in Lebanon focuses on shaping the balance of power after the war.
• Hezbollah maintains relative restraint while rebuilding its military capabilities and adapting its combat doctrine.

Overview^[1]

• Lebanese and Israeli delegations are expected to meet in Rome on July 14 and 15 to discuss implementing the framework agreement, while Lebanese President Aoun prepares for his first visit to the White House on July 21, when he will ask the United States to expand its involvement, promote an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and increase assistance to the Lebanese army.
• The Lebanese army reportedly opposes any framework which would require it to meet Israeli demands or coordinate directly with the IDF; the commander of the Lebanese army told the political leadership in Beirut that preserving the army’s unity was his highest priority.
• Hezbollah continues its hard line against the framework agreement, calling it a “surrender agreement” and claiming it violates the constitution. Political figures outside the Shi’ite axis criticized the agreement, claiming it did not guarantee a full Israeli withdrawal.
• IDF forces continued operations in the security zone in south Lebanon, destroying Hezbollah terrorist infrastructure and eliminating terrorists who posed a threat. Hezbollah operatives were reportedly ordered to prevent the strategic underground complex on the Ali al-Taher Ridge from falling into the hands of the IDF, “regardless of the cost.”
• Based on lessons learned from the most recent hostilities with Israel, Hezbollah is adapting its combat doctrine, shifting to a more decentralized model based on small cells, expanding the use of UAVs and reducing its exposure to Israeli intelligence.
• At the funeral of former Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem claimed the organization remained committed to its alliance with Tehran and the “resistance axis.”^[2] Iran reiterated its stance that a final agreement with the United States depended on the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
• The Lebanese government continued preparations for the reconstruction of the south and the return of the displaced, adding that the scale of the damage and the lack of funding required “extensive international assistance.”

The Israel-Lebanon Agreement Framework^[3]

The Lebanese Government

• On July 14 and 15, 2026, Lebanese and Israeli delegations are expected to hold another round of direct negotiations in Rome, the first since the signing of the framework agreement on June 26, 2026. The objective of the meeting is to move the agreement from principles and understandings to formulating operational mechanisms, including the establishment of Lebanese-Israeli-American working groups to deal with the issues of Israel’s withdrawal, the deployment of the Lebanese army, verification and monitoring, Hezbollah’s weapons, the release of prisoners, the return of residents and the consolidation of state authority in the south. Expected to be discussed are the nature of the working groups, their fields of authority and methods of operation, while their membership will be determined at a later stage (Asas Media, July 12, 2026).
• Lebanon is also preparing for President Joseph Aoun’s first visit to the White House on July 21, 2026. He is expected to ask the American administration to expand United States involvement in implementing the agreement, promote an Israeli withdrawal, strengthen the Lebanese army and expand logistical and military assistance, while also advancing Lebanon’s reconstruction. Sources close to the president reported that the objective of the visit was to ensure continued American sponsorship of the political process and for decisions to strengthen the capabilities of the Lebanese army beyond routine security assistance. Aoun reportedly rejected an American proposal for a trilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and said he would not meet with him as long as Israel continued to hold Lebanese territory and attack in Lebanon (Nidaa al-Watan, July 8, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 8, 2026; Akhbar al-Youm, July 9, 2026; al-Diyar, July 10, 2026).
• Sources close to President Aoun said the coming weeks would be decisive in transitioning to implementing the framework agreement, relying on American sponsorship. The meeting in Rome and Aoun’s visit to the White House are intended to advance the activation of the pilot zones, the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and the formulation of implementation mechanisms, while also securing American economic assistance for Lebanon. It was also reported that Aoun was delaying bringing the agreement before the Lebanese Council of Ministers for approval so as not to impede its progress, while Minister of Information Paul Morcos said it was still a framework and not a final agreement (al-Diyar, July 9, 2026; al-Akhbar, July 10, 2026).

• American General Joseph Clearfield arrived in Beirut to supervise the first phase of the framework agreement with the withdrawal of IDF forces from two pilot zones, while the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is expected to coordinate between Israel and Lebanon and complete the mapping of the pilot zones. However, no agreement has been reached on the boundaries of the first zone, with Lebanese sources claiming Israel seeks to include villages which it does not currently control, as well as areas north of the Litani River (Asas Media, July 12, 2026; al-Diyar, July 11, 2026; al-Akhbar, July 11, 2026).
• The Lebanese media expressed concerns that gradual implementation would allow Israel to condition its withdrawal on additional security demands and influence the boundaries of the pilot zones and the pace of their expansion. It was claimed that turning the temporary model into a permanent mechanism could delay the completion of the Israeli withdrawal and allow Israel to maintain operational control even in areas it did not actually hold (Nidaa al-Watan, July 8, 2026; al-Nashra, July 7, 2026; al-Diyar, July 11, 2026).
• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun continued to promote the framework agreement, calling it the only practical alternative for ending the fighting in the south and restoring Lebanese sovereignty. He said that although the agreement was not ideal, it reflected the current balance of power and gave Lebanon an opportunity to achieve objectives through negotiations that were not achieved during the war. He said that only the state was authorized to conduct the negotiations, the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons would be addressed through internal dialogue rather than by force and the success of the agreement depended on the American commitment to implementing it and on pressuring Israel to meet its commitments (Lebanese presidency X account, July 6 and 10, 2026; al-Nahar, July 6, 2026; al-Diyar, July 10, 2026). Aoun said the objective of his upcoming visit to the White House was to ensure continued American involvement in the framework agreement, promote an Israeli withdrawal, strengthen the Lebanese army and accelerate Lebanon’s reconstruction. He said only the United States could influence Israel, as only Iran could influence Hezbollah (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 9, 2026).
• Aoun also continued to garner domestic political support for the framework agreement through meetings with party leaders, parliamentary blocs and representatives of the economic sector. He said implementing the agreement, establishing the state’s exclusive authority to decide war and peace, deploying the Lebanese army in the south and advancing economic reforms were complementary aspects of restoring Lebanese sovereignty and strengthening Lebanese institutions (Lebanese presidency X account, July 6-10, 2026).
• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam paid an official visit to Turkey during which it was agreed to move bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership. Turkey noted its commitment to Lebanon’s sovereignty and to continued political and regional coordination, which might indicate growing Turkish involvement in the Lebanese arena in the near future (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, July 10, 2026). The Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar claimed Washington viewed Turkey as the regional actor best suited to advance the settlement in Lebanon, even at the cost of reducing Saudi Arabian influence in the country, adding that Ankara might assume a more significant role through its ties with the new Syrian regime (al-Akhbar, July 8, 2026).
• While visiting Cyprus, Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said the Lebanese government’s principle was that war, peace and negotiations were the exclusive responsibility of the state. He called for continued European support for Lebanon, said the government was committed to consolidating state sovereignty and restricting weapons to state institutions, and adding that Lebanon would no longer serve as an arena for regional conflicts (Youssef Rajji’s X account, July 9, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolphe Haykal, to discuss the army’s preparations for implementing the understandings reached during the negotiations in Washington. They focused on preparations for beginning the Israeli withdrawal from the pilot zones in south Lebanon (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, July 6, 2026).

• Diplomatic sources reported that preparations were advancing for the establishment of a new Lebanese army unit which would be trained under American-British supervision and tasked with implementing the security aspects of the framework agreement, including Hezbollah’s disarmament. Reportedly Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and Lebanese army Commander Haykal are opposed, concerned it would undermine the army’s unity and turn it into a tool for implementing Israeli demands (al-Liwaa, July 8, 2026).
• Lebanese military sources said the Lebanese army rejected any framework that would require it to operate according to Israeli demands or enter areas which the IDF had not yet evacuated. The army reportedly said it would deploy only after a full Israeli withdrawal from the relevant areas, would not coordinate directly with Israel and or agree to assume a role which placed it in confrontation with the local population or Hezbollah. It was also reported that the army had completed its operational preparations for deployment in the south but had not yet received final timetables or implementation mechanisms. It was also reported that Commander Rodolphe Haykal told the political leadership that preserving the unity of the army and its status as a national institution was the highest priority (al-Akhbar, July 11, 2026).

Opposition to the Agreement

• Hezbollah and its allies continued to criticize President Joseph Aoun and the Lebanese government over the framework agreement and the continuation of direct negotiations with Israel. They claimed the agreement undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty, was meant to lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament and granted Israel political and security gains without committing to a full withdrawal from south Lebanon.
  • The Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament called the framework agreement “an illegal and unconstitutional surrender agreement,” claiming it had been imposed on Lebanon, served Israel’s interests and legitimized Israel’s continued presence in the south. The faction called on the government to cancel the agreement, accused it of implementing it unilaterally despite continuing Israeli violations and reaffirmed its ideological and strategic commitment to Iran and the “resistance axis” (Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, July 9, 2026).
  • According to an op-ed piece in al-Akhbar, the expansion of political opposition to the framework agreement forced President Joseph Aoun to seek external assistance in building support for the initiative. It claimed Aoun had asked Saudi Arabia and the Saudi envoy, Prince Yazid bin Farhan, to help mitigate criticism of the agreement, particularly by exerting influence over Walid Jumblatt and Sunni leaders. However, Jumblatt maintained his opposition, claiming it could undermine Lebanon’s internal stability, while Prime Minister Nawaf Salam had struggled to mobilize broad public support for the initiative even among his own political allies (al-Akhbar, July 10, 2026).
  • The Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar claimed that Lebanon’s participation in the negotiations with Israel in Rome was “submission” to American and Israeli pressure as long as Israel did not meet its commitments and withdraw from south Lebanon. According to the paper, the objective of the Rome meeting was to keep the agreement from collapsing rather than necessarily achieving meaningful progress for its implementation (al-Akhbar, July 9 and 10, 2026). Another article accused President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam of continuing to advance the implementation of the agreement in response to American and Saudi pressure, even though the regional situation had changed and the agreement had lost its political support in Lebanon (al-Akhbar, July 13, 2026).
  • The Jaafari mufti, Ahmed Qabalan, criticized the Lebanese leadership, claiming it promoted a “surrender agreement” which served the United States and Israel, undermined the country’s sovereignty and abandoned south Lebanon. He said continued promotion of the agreement could damage national consensus and lead to civil war. He called for the formation of a “national camp” to defend the “resistance”^[4] and Lebanon’s sovereignty and advocated a Saudi-Iranian understanding as the basis for regional stability (al-Diyar, July 10, 2026).
  • Sources close to parliament speaker and Amal movement leader Nabih Berri said relations between Berri and Aoun were strained because of the framework agreement. They claimed Saudi mediation efforts had not yet produced a breakthrough and contacts between the sides remained limited. Berri reiterated that any future arrangement in Lebanon should be based on the understandings included in the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding, rather than solely on the framework agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel (al-Akhbar, July 10, 2026).
• Hezbollah is reportedly facing growing strategic pressure from Israel, the Lebanese state and the international community, while its position within Lebanon is weakening. According to the assessment, the organization is struggling to present a political alternative to the framework agreement, and its continued opposition may deepen its isolation and lead to confrontation with the state over implementation of the agreement (al-Joumhouria, July 7-8, 2026).
• According to Lebanese and Arab media, Hezbollah’s military and regional weakening has triggered a political struggle over shaping the new order in Lebanon. While the “Shi’ite duo” (Hezbollah and Amal) seek to preserve their position and adapt the distribution of power to the new situation, rivals view recent developments as an opportunity to reduce their influence and reestablish the supremacy of state institutions. Reportedly, the struggle is already reflected in the public sphere through the removal and restoration of Hezbollah and Iranian symbols, slogans emphasizing the idea of Lebanon First and changes to street names as expressions of a broader struggle over the country’s sovereign identity (Lebanon 24; Asharq al-Awsat, July 7, 2026).

• Criticism of the framework agreement also came from figures in the political system who were not identified with the Hezbollah-Amal Shi’ite camp:
  • Long-time Druze leader Walid Jumblatt said he supported negotiations with Israel in principle but criticized the framework agreement, stating it did not guarantee a full Israeli withdrawal and represented a one-sided achievement for Israel. He called for preserving national unity, standing with the residents of south Lebanon and rejecting any attempt to undermine their belonging to Lebanon. Druze spiritual leader Sami Abi al-Muna joined the call for unity, avoiding internal incitement and strengthening state institutions and national partnership (al-Nahar, July 7, 2026).
  • Jumblatt also met with Army commander Haykal and said he supported the army’s national role. He noted the need to strengthen the military institution, preserve national unity and build a stable domestic front in light of the security developments, particularly in south Lebanon (Lebanese army X account, July 8, 2026).
  • Political figures supporting the framework agreement rejected Jumblatt’s criticism, stating that although the agreement was not ideal, it reflected the situation created by the war and was the only practical alternative for restoring state sovereignty. They said linking the Israeli withdrawal to strengthening the state’s exclusive authority over weapons was preferable to alternatives, such as normalization or a peace agreement, because attempts to resolve the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons solely through internal dialogue had repeatedly failed (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 11, 2026).
  • Former Lebanese Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz, who is affiliated with the sovereign-national camp, said the agreement was not constitutionally binding because it had not been approved by either the government or Parliament. He said it obligated Lebanon, especially regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament, while the issue of the Israeli withdrawal remained vague and without a timetable, therefore the agreement was biased in Israel’s favor (al-Diyar, July 8, 2026).
  • An editorial in the anti-Hezbollah daily al-Joumhouria warned that even if the framework agreement were advanced, it could end with only a limited security arrangement rather than the end of the state of war. As long as the issues of Hezbollah’s weapons and the Iran-Israel confrontation remained unresolved, the agreement would constitute only an interim stage on the way to another round of fighting (al-Joumhouria, July 11, 2026).

Support for the Agreement

• Samir Geagea, chairman of the Lebanese Forces party, said Lebanon’s future required a sovereign state with the exclusive authority to possess weapons, decide war and peace and conduct negotiations with Israel. He said that while the framework agreement was not ideal, it was currently the only practical alternative to continued fighting, and he called for giving President Aoun political backing to complete the process. He criticized Iran’s attempts to preserve its influence in Lebanon by linking the Lebanese arena to its negotiations with the United States (al-Nahar, July 10, 2026). He said President Aoun preferred first to exhaust the political track, but in his opinion the dialogue efforts with Hezbollah had reached their end (Nidaa al-Watan, July 11, 2026).
• The Kataeb Party and its chairman, Samy Gemayel, said implementing the agreement, completing the deployment of the Lebanese army and restricting the possession of weapons to the state were essential conditions for rebuilding the country and restoring the confidence of the international community. They criticized Hezbollah, stating that its continued possession of weapons and Iran’s involvement in Lebanon undermined the country’s sovereignty and delayed its reconstruction (Kataeb website, July 7; Samy Gemayel X account, July 8, 2026).
• Former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora expressed full support for President Aoun’s policy and said deciding on war, peace, weapons and negotiations had to remain exclusively in the hands of the state. He said they should use the current political window of opportunity to secure an Israeli withdrawal, advance reconstruction and accelerate economic reforms. He added that the expansion of Israeli control in the south was the result of policies which had been conducted over the years “outside the framework of the state” (Lebanese presidency X account, July 9, 2026).
• The daily al- Liwaa^[5] wrote that the negotiations with Israel were the only practical alternative for ending the fighting, completing Israel’s withdrawal, enabling the residents of the south to return and launching reconstruction. Lebanon faces a choice between continued internal division and the formation of a unified national position which would enable the state to advance the implementation of the framework agreement. The upcoming round of talks in Rome and President Aoun’s forthcoming visit to Washington will serve as a test of the American commitment to advancing the agreement and expanding assistance to the Lebanese army (al-Liwaa, July 13, 2026).

The Fighting in Lebanon

The IDF

• This past week the IDF continued ground and aerial operations in the security zone in south Lebanon to enforce the terms of the ceasefire and prevent Hezbollah from reestablishing its presence near the border. They attacked terrorist infrastructure, weapons depots and weapons, Hezbollah operatives engaging in military activity or attempting to restore terrorist infrastructure were eliminated, and operations continued to locate and destroy tunnels and weapons, some of which had been concealed in civilian areas. In the village of Majdal Zoun, two tunnels with dozens of weapons were destroyed, following the destruction of another tunnel at the site in late June 2026. IDF forces also continued operating on the Ali al-Taher Ridge to prevent Hezbollah terrorists from emerging from the tunnels and eliminated terrorists identified in the area (IDF Spokesperson, July 6-13, 2026).

Hezbollah

• This past week Hezbollah did not issue claims of responsibility for attacks on IDF forces, the policy it has followed since June 20, 2026. It continued to accuse Israel of “violating the ceasefire” and attacking and causing destruction in south Lebanon, while reiterating that it reserved the right to respond (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 7-10, 2026). Sources close to Hezbollah said the organization maintained a high level of “operational readiness” and updated its defense plans in light of the uncertainty surrounding the American-Iranian contacts and concerns over expanded Israeli activity, while stating that any significant Israeli escalation would be met with a response by the organization (Lebanon 24, July 9, 2026; al-Diyar, July 10, 2026).
• A Lebanese security source claimed that the fighting near Ali al-Taher Hill targeted a strategic underground facility known as Imad 4.^[6] According to the report, the fortified complex has a network of tunnels, a command-and-control center for the Badr Unit, and storage sites for missiles, UAVs and other weapons, and is one of Hezbollah’s main command centers in the Nabatieh sector (Aram News, July 8, 2026). Security sources said Hezbollah operatives had received instructions to prevent the organization’s complex from falling into Israeli hands, regardless of the price. Reportedly, the fighting along the Tebnine-Nabatieh al-Fawqa-Ali al-Taher axis reflected the organization’s determination to defend the hill, even at the cost of heavy casualties (Lebanon 24, July 7, 2026). It was also claimed that during the negotiations Israel unsuccessfully sought to include the Ali al-Taher Ridge within the pilot zones. Both sides attach strategic importance to the area, making it a likely focal point of friction in the event of renewed escalation (Asas Media, July 10, 2026).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor in chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar, wrote that the ceasefire and the framework agreement had not ended the hostilities but rather began a new phase of the conflict. He said Hezbollah was nearing the end of its restraint, was preparing for a future “resistance axis” confrontation and was examining new operational methods to increase the damage inflicted on Israel while reducing the price paid by the Lebanese home front (al-Akhbar, July 8, 2026).
• Lebanese security sources said Hezbollah was reassessing its combat doctrine in the wake of Israeli superiority in intelligence, surveillance and AI. According to the report, the organization was shifting to a more decentralized model based on small cells, expanding the use of suicide UAVs and fiberoptic-guided UAVs, and reducing the use of the Radwan Force. According to the sources, the objective is to improve the organization’s survivability and its long-term ability to wage a war of attrition (Aram News, July 9, 2026).
• In another report, Lebanese security and political sources said Hezbollah was reorganizing its leadership and decision-making mechanisms following the severe damage it sustained during the latest hostilities. Hezbollah was reportedly not appointing a deputy secretary general and instead preferred to strengthen collective decision-making through the Shura Council and the organization’s institutions, while reducing its dependence on a single leader. It was further claimed that the change came as a result of both from the heavy losses of the senior command and from concerns about intelligence penetration, leading to a more cautious, broader and more complex decision-making process which was also influenced by the domestic situation in Lebanon and by Iranian considerations (Aram News, July 7, 2026).

Iranian Involvement in Lebanon

• During the funeral of the former Iranian leader, Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem delivered a speech mostly devoted to defending the “resistance axis” and reinforcing the ideological and strategic ties with Iran, representing Khamenei as the leader of the nation and the supreme authority of the “resistance.” He said Hezbollah remained committed to its alliance with Iran, which he said had played a central role in securing the ceasefire and continued to support the “resistance’ (Hezbollah secretary general’s website, July 8, 2026).

• Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the resumption of negotiations between Iran and the United States was contingent on the implementation of the Lebanon-related clause in the memorandum of understanding and the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon. According to Araghchi, Iran wanted expanded relations with the entire Lebanese political system, not only with Hezbollah, while continuing its support for Lebanon and the “resistance axis” (al-Diyar, July 8, 2026).
• According to an op-ed piece in the Lebanese daily al-Liwaa, the renewed escalation between the United States and Iran and the freezing of the memorandum of understanding weakened Iran’s attempts to link the Lebanese file to its negotiations with Washington. That is expected to reduce the ability of the framework agreement’s opponents to delay its implementation and strengthen the position of the Lebanese state to promote the agreement as the primary path for resolving the situation in the south (al-Liwaa, July 10, 2026).
• The Lebanese government continued its efforts to balance maintaining channels of communication with Tehran with emphasizing its sovereignty. The Lebanese leadership reportedly rejected Iranian initiatives to deepen Tehran’s involvement in implementing the framework agreement with Israel, including the inclusion of an Iranian representative in the mechanism overseeing the agreement. The government in Beirut also noted that Lebanese-Iranian relations would be conducted on the basis of non-interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs (Nidaa al-Watan, July 7, 2026; al-Joumhouria, July 9, 2026).

• A source close to the “Shi’ite duo” reported that during the visit of an Iranian delegation to Lebanon, Hezbollah’s leadership was harshly criticized by political parties and figures, mainly from the Christian and Sunni camps, which benefited from Iranian support over the years but did not express support for Tehran after the war, particularly following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Reportedly, the delegation asked Hezbollah to convey to those figures a message expressing the Iranian leadership’s disappointment (Lebanon 24, July 12, 2026).
• The deputy chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shi’ite Council, Ali al-Khatib, returned from a visit to Iran and Iraq and said senior Iranian officials had reiterated their commitment to continue supporting Lebanon and Hezbollah, while also calling for the restoration of relations with the Lebanese government. He said that on behalf of the Iranian foreign he had conveyed an official invitation for the Lebanese foreign minister to visit Tehran (al-Diyar, July 10, 2026).

UNIFIL

• In light of the relative decline in the level of violence since the end of June 2026, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon announced it had gradually expanded the scope of its operational activities in south Lebanon and increased its presence on the ground, alongside the return of residents to their villages. It noted that the force continued to monitor developments, coordinate with the parties and assist in the restoration of civilian infrastructure, but emphasized that the security situation remains fragile and continued coordination and operational activity were essential for stabilizing the area (al-Diyar, July 9, 2026).
• UNIFIL continued to expand its civilian activities with local authorities in south Lebanon through humanitarian assistance, assessments of reconstruction needs and the promotion of cooperation with local authorities, as part of its efforts to support civilian recovery and strengthen the stability of the region (Lebanese National News Agency, July 7-8, 2026).

The Situation in Lebanon

• The Lebanese ministry of public health reported that since the resumption of the fighting on March 2, 2026, 4,322 people had been killed and 12,210 wounded, an increase of three fatalities during the past week (Lebanon 24, July 11, 2026).

The Displaced Persons-Reconstruction Crisis

• The Lebanese ministry of public health reported that since the resumption of the fighting on March 2, 2026, 4,322 people had been killed and 12,210 wounded, an increase of three fatalities during the past week (Lebanon 24, July 11, 2026).
• With preparations for the beginning of the implementation of the framework agreement with Israel and the withdrawal of IDF forces from the pilot zones, the Lebanese cabinet, chaired by Nawaf Salam, discussed accelerating the return of the displaced, rebuilding infrastructure, reopening transportation routes and preparing for the upcoming school year, while the preliminary estimate of the damage was placed at approximately $3-$4 billion (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, July 6, 2026).
• the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar published articles about the worsening plight of the displaced in south Lebanon while criticizing the performance of state institutions. According to the reports, the authorities are working to close some reception centers and transfer families to alternative facilities, even though many of them cannot return to their homes because they were destroyed or remain in areas under Israeli control. Displaced persons quoted in the reports claimed that the alternative housing conditions are poor and that the state treats them more as an administrative burden than as victims of war. At the same time, it was argued that the severe housing shortage and rising rental prices are making it difficult for residents to return to the south. Local authorities are attempting to address the crisis by limiting rental prices, making use of vacant buildings and installing prefabricated housing units, but they warned that without a comprehensive government plan, the crisis will worsen as more residents return to the area (al-Akhbar, July 9-10, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.
^[3] See the June 2026 Amit Institute report, The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement: Insights and Responses
^[4] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[5] A Lebanese daily newspaper with a nationalist editorial policy, considered objective.
^[6] See the August 2024 ITIC report, Hezbollah Issues Video of Its Imad 4 Underground Facility: Reactions and Implications

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