Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (July 28-August 5, 2025)

Overview^[1]

• IDF forces attacked Hezbollah infrastructure and eliminated operatives of the organization as part of ongoing operations against Hezbollah’s presence in south Lebanon, which violates the ceasefire agreement understandings, and against Hezbollah’s efforts to increase its military capabilities and restore its arsenal, including attacking Hezbollah’s largest precision missile production site in the Beqa’a Valley. The IDF reported that in the eight months since the ceasefire began in November 2024, approximately 500 attacks had been carried out in Lebanon and more than 230 commanders and terrorist operatives had been eliminated.
• According to reports, Hezbollah is preparing for the possibility of renewed fighting with Israel and has begun preparing shelters in north Lebanon for displaced persons.
• The commander of the Lebanese army claimed that Israel’s presence in south Lebanon was the only obstacle to the full deployment of Lebanese army forces.
• Tensions are rising in Lebanon ahead of a government meeting on the state’s monopoly on weapons. The United States reportedly rejected Lebanon’s demand that disarmament take place only after the cessation of Israeli attacks and the withdrawal of IDF forces. Washington has demanded that the government determine a detailed timeline for implementing “the state’s monopoly on weapons.” The Lebanese presidential office told Hezbollah that it had to cooperate with the state, but Hezbollah’s leadership refused, claiming that the demand to disarm the organization came from Israel and they would not surrender.
• Kuwait added Hezbollah and the organization’s financial wing to its sanctions list.
• A Hezbollah operative convicted of killing a UNIFIL soldier in 2022 was sentenced to death in absentia in Lebanon.
• The Hamas representative in Lebanon claimed the Palestinians were committed to respecting the country’s sovereignty and laws.

The Ceasefire in Lebanon

The IDF

• The IDF continued to operate against Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon which violate the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement prohibiting a Hezbollah presence south of the Litani River, and against Hezbollah’s efforts to renew its military capabilities and restore its arsenal. The IDF attacked military sites in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley, including the organization’s largest precision missile production facility and facilities for manufacturing explosives for weapons development. Two Hezbollah terrorist operatives were eliminated in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, July 28–August 5, 2025). The Lebanese ministry of health reported six dead and eight wounded in the IDF attacks (al-Nashra, July 29–August 5, 2025). Hezbollah-affiliated social media accounts confirmed that the dead belonged to the organization (Hezbollah on the Ground Telegram channel, July 29–August 5, 2025).
• The IDF reported that in the eight months since the ceasefire began on November 27, 2024, approximately 500 aerial attacks had been carried out in Lebanon, over 230 commanders and terrorist operatives had been eliminated, and about 90 rocket launchers and thousands of rockets had been destroyed, as had about 20 headquarters, 40 weapons depots, and five weapons production sites, and three camps of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force had been attacked. Around 1,280 violations were submitted to the mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire, of which about 530 complaints were submitted by Israel following IDF enforcement actions. The Lebanese army addressed 460 out of 670 violations that Israel forwarded for its attention, while another 80 violations were enforced by the IDF (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 29, 2025).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah reportedly contacted local authorities in south and north Lebanon to prepare for the possibility of renewed fighting with Israel and requested that mosques and halls be opened to provide possible shelter for displaced Lebanese (al-Hadath, July 30, 2025). Subsequently, “sources” stated that Hezbollah had raised its alert level and told local residents to be prepared for possible displacement. Eyewitnesses reported that dozens of pickup trucks and commercial vehicles had transported mattresses and blankets to storage facilities in north Lebanon and Shi’ite villages. Hezbollah operatives reportedly contacted mayors in Aakkar in north Lebanon to explore the possibility of opening shelters in areas which might receive displaced persons, but the Sunni-majority local authorities expressed reservations and asked to wait “for an actual emergency.” According to reports, Hezbollah established a secret operations monitoring room headed by Hassan al-Muqdad, responsible for the organization’s public relations in Mount Lebanon and the north. Residents were reportedly preparing for the worst, with some securing alternative housing outside the area in case attacks escalated, while others were stockpiling food and medicine as part of what they referred to as “war supplies” (Nidaa al-Watan, July 31, 2025).

The Lebanese Leadership

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun visited Bahrain and met with King Hamad bin Isa. The king said Bahrain supported Lebanon’s sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity, and opposed any foreign interference in its internal affairs. In particular, he said Bahrain supported Lebanon’s efforts to maintain the ceasefire with Israel, ensure Israel’s withdrawal from “the occupied territories,” implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, restrict the holding of weapons to the state and expand its control over all Lebanese territory. The king said support should be given to the Lebanese army and UNIFIL’s role should be strengthened (Bahrain News Agency, July 23, 2025).
• During a conversation with newspaper editors in Bahrain, Aoun said that any political solution had to be backed by guarantees, claiming Israel had not yet fully implemented Resolution 1701 and still controlled five hills in south Lebanon, while the Lebanese army had already deployed south of the Litani River. He claimed that by the end of 2025 there would be ten thousand Lebanese soldiers in the south and wherever the army was deployed, illegal weapons were being collected and there was no armed presence which did not belong to the army (Lebanon Debate, July 22, 2025).
• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam claimed Lebanon was committed to the ceasefire, Hezbollah did not respond to Israeli violations, and so far Israel had not held up its end of the agreement (al-Nahar, July 24, 2025).
• Prime Minister Salam met in Paris with French President Emmanuel Macron. He thanked France for its continued support of Lebanon’s security, sovereignty and prosperity. Salam said he was returning to Beirut satisfied with Macron’s commitment to help Lebanon renew UNIFIL’s mandate and strengthen bilateral relations, especially regarding security and the economy (Nawaf Salam’s X account July 24, 2025). They discussed the importance of renewing UNIFIL’s mandate and strengthening the ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Macron said that France would contribute €75 million to Lebanon for the Bank of Lebanon’s emergency aid project to support the rehabilitation of areas damaged by the “aggression,” and France planned to hold an international conference in Paris in support of Lebanon (al-Nashra, July 25, 2025)

The Lebanese Army

• Rodolf Haykal, commander of the Lebanese army, issued a statement marking the 80^th anniversary of the founding of the Lebanese army. He said the country faced a series of interconnected challenges, foremost among them the threats from Israel. He said the Lebanese army continued to carry out its missions despite its limited capabilities, expanding state authority over all Lebanese territory and implementing international resolutions, particularly Resolution 1701, in close cooperation and coordination with UNIFIL. He added that “the Israeli enemy still occupies several points following its recent aggression against Lebanon,” and that was the only obstacle to completing the deployment of Lebanese army units in south Lebanon (Lebanese army X account, July 31, 2025).

• The outgoing commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), Michael Kurilla, met in Beirut with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun. They discussed ongoing cooperation between the Lebanese army and the United States and ways to develop it further. According to reports, Kurilla praised the achievements of the Lebanese army following its deployment in most of the cities and villages in south Lebanon. They also discussed Aoun’s firmness regarding the army’s monopoly on weapons and the need to strengthen United States support for the Lebanese army (Nidaa al-Watan, July 31, 2025). Kurilla also met with army Commander Rodolf Haykal to discuss the general situation in Lebanon and the region (Lebanese army X account, July 31, 2025).

UNIFIL

• An “official Lebanese source” claimed senior UNIFIL military commanders were confused and uncertain about the future of their work. According to the “source,” the commanders were not concerned about the renewal of their individual contracts, but messages transmitted through diplomatic channels from Israel included warnings that the operational mandate would not be renewed. UN secretary general António Guterres spoke with Arab and foreign ambassadors and claimed Israel was trying to force UNIFIL to withdraw from 29 positions along the border and was contacting every country with forces in south Lebanon and asking them to withdraw their personnel. In a closed UN Security Council session in March 2025, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UN undersecretary general for peacekeeping operations, reportedly said UNIFIL forces operating south of the Litani River had discovered entrances to Hezbollah tunnels and reported them to the relevant authorities. According to Lacroix, the Lebanese army was deployed at 127 sites south of the Litani River and responded to 60% of the updates it received from the multinational force (al-Akhbar, July 30, 2025).

Disarming Hezbollah

• On the afternoon of August 5, 2025, the Lebanese government met and the first item on its agenda was “completing the discussion regarding the government declaration to extend of the state’s sovereignty over all its territory, by its forces alone, and the arrangements to end the hostilities since November 2024” (Lebanese government website, August 1, 2025). Reportedly, in preparation for the meeting, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with President Joseph Aoun to discuss possible scenarios which might develop. If no consensus were reached among the ministers regarding a timeline for implementing the state’s monopoly on weapons, a vote was expected to be held (Nidaa al-Watan, August 5, 2025). “Government sources” said they had met to address proposals most closely aligned with the internal Lebanese consensus and international pressure, but discussions on formulating an agreed-upon formula were expected to continue until the government meeting (al-Jadeed, August 4, 2025). A “government source close to Aoun and Salam” said time was not working in Lebanon’s favor and the government had no choice but to seize its last opportunity to save the country (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 5, 2025).
• Ahead of the government meeting, Lebanese President Aoun gave a speech for the army’s 80^th anniversary in which he presented the list of Lebanese demands which had been submitted to the United States special envoy, Thomas Barrack. They were the immediate cessation of Israeli hostilities from the air, by sea and on land and an end to targeted killings; IDF withdrawal to the international border line; extension of Lebanese state sovereignty over all its territory; disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, and transfer of weapons to the Lebanese army; an annual payment from friendly nations of $1 billion to Lebanon for ten years to support and strengthen the Lebanese army and security forces; and an international donor conference for Lebanon’s reconstruction to be held this winter. Aoun called on Lebanon’s political forces to address the issue of disarmament responsibly. He said Lebanon was at a critical stage, having to choose between collapse and stability, and Army Day would only be complete if all weapons were placed in the army’s hands, and sovereignty had to be imposed over all parts of the country. Aoun also spoke directly to Hezbollah and its supporters and asked them to trust the state institutions, saying that past efforts would be worthless if the process did not move forward (Lebanon Debate, July 31, 2025).

• However, according to reports, the American response to Lebanon delivered on August 2, 2025, required the government to set a timetable for disarmament and the extension of state authority over all its territory and did not include the guarantees requested by the Lebanese government (Nidaa al-Watan, August 5, 2025). “Sources” reported that the response document delivered to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated that the American response could not be changed or negotiated. While it included all the principles from the Lebanese document, they were listed in reverse order, with disarmament as a condition for any negotiation on halting Israeli attacks and IDF withdrawal from five points in south Lebanon (al-Akhbar, August 5, 2025).
• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said raising the issue of exclusive control of weapons on the next government meeting’s agenda was natural. He said he had put together a clause in accordance with the Taif Agreement to extend the state’s sovereignty over all its territory and to complete the implementation of the latest ceasefire agreement. Salam said he was surprised the Shi’ites opposed the issue, since it was not provocative and had been mentioned in President Aoun’s inaugural speech and the government’s founding statement (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 31, 2025). In a statement for Army Day he noted that the state could only be saved by diligent work to restrict weapons to the exclusive control of the Lebanese army, and stability could be achieved only by expanding the Lebanese state’s authority over all parts of the country (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, August 1, 2025). In another statement, Salam said the demand for Hezbollah’s disarmament was not American but rather Lebanese, and had already been raised in the past (al-Hadath, August 4, 2025).
• President Aoun met at his palace with Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, in an attempt to devise a way to extricate Lebanon “from the political tensions which external forces are trying to force on it” (al-Mayadeen, July 31, 2025). According to “Hezbollah and Amal sources,” Raad explained Hezbollah’s position to Aoun, which was that no discussion on handing over weapons could begin before Israel committed to withdrawing from the five hills, stopped its attacks, released prisoners, and “began reconstruction” [sic] (al-Akhbar, August 2, 2025). The office of the Lebanese president reportedly informed Hezbollah that the organization had no choice but to cooperate with the state. “Sources” reported that Hezbollah was shocked by the demands of its allies that it disarm. “The sources” added that Aoun’s Army Day speech and placing the disarmament issue on the government’s agenda created popular, political, and governmental momentum in support of the Lebanese government (al-Hadath, August 3, 2025).
• Wafiq Safa, head of the Hezbollah’s liaison and coordination unit, reportedly met with Rodolf Haykal, commander of the Lebanese army (al-Jadeed, July 31, 2025) to discuss the upcoming establishment of a joint Hezbollah-Lebanese army committee for the disarmament process and its timetable (al-Akhbar, August 1, 2025).
• “Sources close to Hezbollah” reported that the organization was open to ways to establish the state’s monopoly on weapons. Draft proposals were reportedly exchanged between the presidency and Hezbollah with the objective of finding common ground. It was noted that the United States refused to accept half-measures and demanded a consensus-based government timetable for the weapons issue, but Hezbollah preferred not to have specific dates since setting a timetable would [allegedly] be a concession to American and Israeli conditions (al-Jadeed, August 2, 2025).
• Nevertheless, throughout the week, Hezbollah continued to defy the demand to disarm, emphasizing the importance of the role of the “resistance.”^[2] Hezbollah accused Israel of originating the disarmament demand and said it would not agree to discuss the weapons issue before Israel halted its attacks in Lebanon and withdrew its forces from the five points in south Lebanon:
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem gave a speech marking the anniversary of the death of the organization’s military commander Fuad Shukr,^[3] and presented Hezbollah’s opposition to the demand to disarm. He claimed that Hezbollah’s weapons were meant for the “struggle” against Israel and not for Lebanon’s internal arena, and they were part of Lebanon’s “strength.” He claimed that whoever demanded Hezbollah hand over its weapons actually wanted them handed to Israel, which the organization opposed. He accused American special envoy Barrack of coming to Lebanon to frighten the leadership by warning that Israel’s “aggression” would expand if Hezbollah did not disarm, and he wanted Hezbollah to disarm only for Israel’s sake, but no one could demand that the organization surrender. According to Qassem, Lebanon had presented a unified position to Barrack, demanding that Israel cease its “aggression” before dialogue could begin. Qassem added that the government could not demand that Hezbollah give up everything before taking action to stop the Israeli “aggression” “by all means” and to rebuild the country, and that any call for disarmament without fulfilling the organization’s demands would only serve Israel’s plans. He claimed the “resistance” in Lebanon was a “pillar of the state” and worked for its “liberation and construction.” He said Lebanon would not be a satellite of Israel, and it was important to defend it from “occupation” with a focus on ending the “aggression” (al-Mayadeen, July 30, 2025).

• • At the unveiling of a monument to Fuad Shukr in the Harat Hreik neighborhood in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia of Beirut, Hezbollah political council member Mahmoud Qamati said, “We have no choice but to unite, politically and socially, with all our strength and means to defend our homeland, alongside the Lebanese army.” Qamati claimed that the “resistance” was a “national necessity” for Lebanon’s interest, strength, and sovereignty, along with its national partners, led by the Lebanese army and security forces (al-Akhbar, July 28, 2025). Interviewed on TV, Qamati claimed that Hezbollah was armed in accordance with international law and the “resistance” continued in line with international law and national duty. Regarding the cabinet meeting, Qamati implicitly warned that the ministers might make a balanced, wise decision, or a foolish one, and Hezbollah recommended they make a wise decision “in accordance with Lebanon’s national interest and to save it from destruction” (al-Manar, August 3, 2025).

• • Hussein Jishi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said Hezbollah would disarm “only if there is a strong state capable of defending itself and deterring the enemy.” He said the state’s capabilities were insufficient to confront the “enemy” and prevent it from attacking, adding that everyone should know that “no one can prevent us from defending our people, homeland, and dignity, no matter how high the cost” (al-‘Ahed, July 30, 2025).

• • Ali Fayyad, member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said that anxiety was growing in Lebanon in light of Israeli and American statements, noting that the objective of the pressure on Lebanon was to push the authorities in Beirut, Lebanese public opinion, and Hezbollah’s leadership to surrender to Israeli dictates and conditions. Speaking in south Lebanon, he claimed Israel was promoting a dangerous scenario in which the conflict would shift from a Lebanese-Israeli confrontation to an internal Lebanese conflict, with Israel observing the internal disputes from outside. He said Lebanon had notified the American mediator of its position, which was that Israel first had to commit to a ceasefire and withdraw from the five outposts in south Lebanon before any negotiations began. He also warned against making concessions without something in return or guarantees (al-Akhbar, August 3, 2025).
  • Ali al-Miqdad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed the cabinet meeting on disarmament should not have taken place at all, and anyone who demanded the disarmament of the “resistance” put himself on the side of the “Israeli-American project” (NBN Channel, August 3, 2025).
  • Senior Shi’ite mufti Ahmed Qabalan claimed that the state was attacked daily, yet its leadership was busy with restrictions on weapons instead of defending its citizens and sovereignty. He said the legitimacy for the use of governmental weapons came from the need to protect the state and its infrastructure, warning against giving up defensive tools in the face of threats such as occupation and corruption. According to him, the weapons of the “resistance” and the army were vital for sovereignty, and the lack of partnership between the two would lead to disaster (Lebanese National News Agency, August 1, 2025).
• “Lebanese sources” reported that Hezbollah warned of “anarchy” if the Lebanese government decided to disarm the organization. “Sources close to Hezbollah” said Hezbollah was preparing to hold a “popular protest” in response to the government’s expected decision, but “Lebanese sources” emphasized that the organization had decided not to do battle with the army (al-Arabiya, August 4, 2025). Amid the tension, it was reported that the Lebanese army deployed reinforced forces in the Ras al-Nabaa, Bashara al-Khoury, and al-Tayouneh areas of Beirut (Bint Jbeil News Telegram channel, August 5, 2025).
• Given Hezbollah’s stated position, “diplomatic sources” reported that Lebanon had received threats that all areas in the country, including Beirut, could become targets for attacks. There was also the threat that Lebanon would be placed on the blacklist of financial restrictions and banned from importing oil and flour (al-Hadath, July 31, 2025).
• “Sources close to the Shi’ite duo” [Hezbollah and Amal] confirmed that the Lebanese state had been signaled in recent weeks that if the government did not make an official decision to determine a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament, the country would be vulnerable to an Israeli escalation. The signals were reportedly part of the second American response document, which was more explicit and forceful than the previous one. “Sources from the Shi’ite duo” said they had data and information indicating that Israel was [allegedly] preparing to escalate, but no political or international decisions had yet been made regarding the scope and timing of the escalation. According to the sources, Hezbollah was taking the threats seriously and was considering the level of escalation it could tolerate without being dragged into a response, and what would be considered a red line justifying a direct, possibly extensive response. According to the report, the internal debate within Hezbollah today was not just about “should we respond?” but about “how? where? and to what targets?” (al-Nashra, August 2, 2025).
• In the assessment of “military experts,” Hezbollah lost its logistical advantages and its strategic depth had been damaged, while Israel’s surveillance capabilities had reached unprecedented levels, making any threat of long-range missiles an impossible and costly gamble. It was noted that Hezbollah still possessed medium- and long-range missiles capable of striking deep into Israel, but there was growing doubt about the effectiveness of the missile stockpile and Hezbollah’s ability to use it in light of Israeli aerial surveillance (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 2, 2025).
• Hezbollah’s political opponents continued to emphasize the need to complete disarming the organization and called for a decision to be made in this regard during the cabinet meeting:
  • Samir Geagea, head of the Christian Lebanese Forces party, said that Hezbollah’s weapons were of no use in defending Lebanon, since “they bring nothing to Lebanon but damage and destruction and no longer deter Israel.” According to Geagea, Lebanon had two choices: either the government decided to disarm all organizations or “face a hot summer” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 29, 2025). On another occasion, Geagea said Hezbollah had been destroying Lebanon for 40 years, and that 70% to 75% of Lebanese did not support Hezbollah’s path, but the organization insisted on continuing. He said that Hezbollah has no right to declare war, only the government does (Radio Free Lebanon, August 3, 2025).
  • Lebanese justice minister Adel Nassar, affiliated with the Christian Phalange Party, said Lebanon could not be a complete state as long as there were weapons beyond its legal control. He said there was no justification for the continued existence of such weapons since they had become a curse for Lebanon, which had been acknowledged by the relevant parties. He added that no one could impose conditions on the state regarding weapons (Lebanon Debate, August 1, 2025). Before the cabinet meeting, Nassar said they demanded that a timetable be set for disarmament, adding that it was inconceivable Hezbollah would take the Lebanese “to suicide” along with it (MTV, August 5, 2025). Michel Douaihy, a Christian member of the Lebanese Parliament, stated that the government and the president bore a historic responsibility whose fulfillment could not be postponed, and an decision was needed explicitly requiring that Hezbollah’s weapons be held solely by the army. He added that the decision would not be complete or serious unless it included a definite timetable for implementation, without interpretations and conditions from the “Shi’ite duo” (Michel Douaihy’s X account, August 5, 2025).

Challenges for Hezbollah

• Kuwait’s foreign ministry announced the inclusion of Hezbollah and the al-Qard al-Hassan Association, the organization’s financial arm, in its sanctions list. Three individuals were also included, including Adel Mohammad Mansour, head of al-Qard al-Hassan, and two citizens of Tunisia and Somalia (al-Sharq al-Awsat and Kuwait’s foreign ministry website, July 28, 2025).
• Joseph Chahour, author of Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God, noted that Hezbollah was facing the greatest crisis since its establishment. He said recent Israeli attacks had significantly damaged its infrastructure and sources of funding, particularly in Shi’ite areas (Aram News, July 29, 2025).
• A Lebanese court convicted six Hezbollah operatives for involvement in a 2022 shooting incident in al-Aaqbiyeh, south Lebanon, in which a UNIFIL patrol was attacked and one peacekeeper was killed. It was reported that the main suspect, who has not yet been apprehended, was sentenced to death in absentia, while another was sentenced to three months in prison and four others were fined (AP, July 30, 2025).
• Syria’s internal security foiled another attempt to smuggle weapons and ammunition into Lebanon (Syrian state television, July 31, 2025).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

The Palestinians in Lebanon

• Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, the Hamas representative in Lebanon, met with the vice president of Lebanon’s Supreme Islamic Shi’ite Council, Ali al-Khatib. Abd al-Hadi said the Palestinian “organizations” were guests in Lebanon and were committed to respecting the country’s sovereignty, security, stability, and laws, and that the Palestinians were not prepared to cause harm to Lebanon. He said the approach to the issue of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and to issues related to Palestinian presence should be comprehensive, humanitarian, social, legal, and political, and not just from the perspective of security (al-Nashra, July 30, 2025).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Hezbollah and the Palestinian organizations operating in Lebanon to destroy the State of Israel.
^[3] Fuad Shukr, one of the founders of Hezbollah, was the organization's most senior military commander and head of its strategic apparatus. He was eliminated in an Israeli strike in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, Beirut, on July 30, 2024, in response to the murder of 12 children and teenagers by a rocket attack in Majdal Shams. For further information, see the August 2024 ITIC report, "Reactions to the Deaths of Fuad Shukr and Isma’il Haniyeh."

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