Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (July 13-20, 2026)

Trending

• There has been progress in formulating the mechanisms for the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel.
• The Lebanese president is trying to secure American support for Lebanon’s position regarding the Israeli withdrawal.
• Hezbollah avoids escalating tensions with Israel and with the Lebanese government.
• There is uncertainty regarding the international force which will replace UNIFIL when its mandate ends at the end of 2026.

 

Overview^[1]

• The Lebanese and Israeli delegations completed another round of direct talks in Rome under American mediation and principles were formulated for implementing the first phase of the framework agreement, which will enable the deployment of the Lebanese army. Israel was accused delaying the withdrawal of IDF forces from the pilot areas to preserve leverage.
• Lebanese President Aoun arrived in the United States for talks with senior American administration officials to persuade them to pressure Israel to start implementing the framework agreement and to secure American support for the Lebanese army.
• Hezbollah and Amal criticized the framework agreement, claiming the objective of the pilot areas was to maintain an Israeli presence in south Lebanon and eventually disarm the “resistance.” The Hezbollah-affiliated editor of al-Akhbar claimed a demand for Israel’s withdrawal from all south Lebanon appeared in the draft framework agreement, but Lebanese President Aoun ordered it removed.
• IDF forces continued operations in the security zone in south Lebanon, destroying Hezbollah terrorist infrastructure and eliminating terrorists who posed a threat. Hezbollah accused Israel of “violating the ceasefire,” but did not actively respond. A Lebanese army soldier was killed in an explosion in south Lebanon; the IDF reported it had been caused by an explosive device planted by Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah reorganized its units in south Lebanon and reduced its activity in the border villages.
• The Syrian interior ministry announced that the smuggling of a large quantity of advanced weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon had been prevented near the border with Iraq, including 150 explosive UAVs, and long-range and anti-tank missiles.
• Dozens of members of the Lebanese Parliament called on the UN Security Council to extend UNIFIL’s mandate, which is due to expire at the end of 2026. The German foreign minister proposed establishing an EU force with an international mandate.

Direct Negotiations and the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement

The Talks in Rome

• On July 14-15, 2026, the sixth round of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations was held in Rome under American auspices to advance putting the framework agreement signed on June 26, 2026 into practice.^[2] Principles for implementing the first phase of the agreement were reported, including a gradual Israeli withdrawal from one of the pilot areas [the second area is outside the security zone and no IDF forces are stationed there] along with the deployment of the Lebanese army and the establishment of security, military and technical committees to oversee the practical aspects of the agreement. The decision was made to move to the technical stage, focusing on formulating oversight and verification mechanisms ahead of activating all parts of the agreement, with the talks expected to resume at the end of July 2026 at the earliest (al-Joumhouria, July 14, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, July 15-16, 2026).
• Despite the progress, significant disagreements remained regarding activating the first phase of the agreement and the balance between Israel’s security requirements and Lebanon’s demand to preserve its sovereignty. Lebanon demanded a binding timetable for continued Israeli withdrawals, an end to Israel’s use of UAVs and that the deployment of the Lebanese army remained solely in the hands of the state. Government sources in Lebanon said the purpose of the contacts was to separate the issue of the Israeli withdrawal from the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament, based on the opinion that the success of the pilot areas would make it possible to expand implementation of the agreement in subsequent phases (Aram News, al-Sharq al-Awsat, Nidaa al-Watan, July 16, 2026).
• The Lebanese media analyzed the implications of the developments in the framework agreement. According to Lebanon 24^[3] and al-Liwaa^[4], the Rome talks marked the transition from theory to practice. However, it was noted that success depended on Hezbollah’s cooperation, the Lebanese government’s ability to meet its commitments and regional stability, particularly in light of the impact of America-Iran relations on the pace of progress (Lebanon 24, July 17, 2026; al-Liwaa, July 16, 2026). Al-Joumhouria^[5] claimed that activating the framework agreement was delayed not only by technical disagreements regarding the pilot areas, but also by a bilateral lack of interest in completing the process at this stage. According to the newspaper, Israel seeks to delay its withdrawal to retain leverage in south Lebanon, while Hezbollah will not close the Lebanese front as long as the confrontation between Iran and the United States remains uncertain, wanting to preserve the Lebanese front as a strategic card (al-Joumhouria, July 18, 2026).

The President of Lebanon Visits the United States

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun arrived in the United States for his first official visit with the president and other senior American administration officials regarding the framework agreement and United States support for the efforts of the Lebanese government. The United States reportedly requested the visit not be postponed despite the regional escalation wanting to continue advancing the agreement and separate the Lebanese arena from the confrontation with Iran. As the same time as Aoun’s visit, a delegation from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was expected to arrive in Beirut to formulate the mechanisms, and discussions on the disputed issues were reportedly continuing, including the return of Hezbollah operatives to the southern villages, the authority of the Lebanese army and the future of the international oversight mechanism (X account of the Lebanese presidency, July 18, 2026; al-Madan, July 19, 2026).
• Aoun met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss the agreement. Aoun said the American position should be aligned with Lebanon’s position through an Israeli withdrawal from the first pilot area. He called for stronger American support for the Lebanese army and military institutions, and American investment in Lebanon’s various sectors. Aoun added that Lebanon opposed any Syrian military intervention, while stating the importance of relations based on mutual respect for bilateral sovereignty. Rubio praised the courage of the Lebanese government under Aoun’s leadership in light of its determination to reestablish state authority, disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its terrorist infrastructure and move toward achieving peace. He also noted the American administration’s commitment to the framework agreement and supporting the Lebanese government, stating that the Lebanese issue should not be linked to any other negotiating discourse (United States State Department website, July 19, 2026; X account of the president of Lebanon, July 19, 2026).

• According to Western diplomatic sources Aoun was expected to face American pressure to continue implementing the framework agreement and might also be required to demonstrate future willingness to take part in Washington’s regional initiatives, including the possibility of Lebanon joining the Abraham Accords (al-Joumhouria and al–Nahar, July 20, 2026).
• Before the visit Aoun held talks to coordinate with Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and briefed them on the issues to he would discuss with the American administration. He was reportedly expected to note the need to stabilize the ceasefire, accelerate the Israeli withdrawal, continue assistance to the Lebanese army and advance the reconstruction of the south, while Berri again called for advancing a gradual withdrawal based on districts rather than pilot areas (al-Diyar, July 18, 2026).
• Aoun continued to present the framework agreement as the only practical alternative for stabilizing Lebanon and said that only the state and the Lebanese army were authorized to have military powers. He also reiterated that Lebanon would not relinquish its sovereign rights, including the return of the displaced persons, prisoners and bodies and the reconstruction of the south (X account of the Lebanese presidency, July 13-15, 2026).
• Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, who is affiliated with the Lebanese Forces party, which opposes Hezbollah, stated that the completion of the deployment of the Lebanese army was contingent on a full Israeli withdrawal (X account of Youssef Rajji, July 16, 2026).

Lebanese Army Deployment

• The Lebanese army continued its preparations to become the main entity responsible for enforcing the framework agreement in south Lebanon. Its efforts focus on completing operational readiness, formulating coordination and oversight mechanisms with the United States and establishing a military presence on the ground (al-Joumhouria, July 14, 2026; al-Joumhouria, al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 16-17, 2026). Reportedly, cooperation between Lebanon’s security forces and Western countries has increased regarding border security, combating smuggling and developing monitoring capabilities (Lebanon 24, July 16, 2026).
• Disagreements remain regarding the operation of the activation mechanism. The main gaps concern the sequence of actions between the Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of the Lebanese army, the scope of the oversight mechanism’s authority and the identity of the parties which will participate in it. While Israel seeks to link further withdrawals to measures against Hezbollah, Lebanon emphasizes that the deployment of the army will take place only after an Israeli withdrawal from the relevant area, while preserving the state’s sovereignty in operational decision-making (Nidaa al-Watan, July 15, 2026; al-Madan, July 16, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 16-17, 2026).
• A diplomatic source stated that the Lebanese army was expected to inspect private property in the town of Froun together with Lebanon’s judicial authorities and then deploy in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, followed by al-Ghandouriyeh, Qalaouiyeh, Burj Qalaouiyeh and Srifa. However, the source claimed that Israel refuses to withdraw from Zawtar al-Sharqiya, while another report quoted sources as saying that the Lebanese side had still not received notice of an Israeli withdrawal from either Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh or Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh. The source added that Italy said it was prepared to assist the United States in the verification mechanism for the pilot areas, while the Lebanese government had agreed to European involvement (Sky News Arabia and al-Nahar, July 18, 2026).
• The Lebanese army expanded its activity in the south with patrols, checkpoints and observation posts in a number of towns designated for inclusion in the pilot areas. The army also conducted highly publicized patrols to demonstrate its presence on the ground and show that some of the disputed areas were not under Israeli control. The army command reportedly continues to coordinate with Hezbollah to enable the deployment of forces without friction (Lebanon Debate, July 15, 2026; Lebanese army Facebook page, July 16, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 16, 2026; al-Joumhouria, July 17, 2026).

     
Lebanese army soldiers in the south of the country (Lebanon Debate, July 15, 2026; Lebanese army Facebook page, July 16, 2026)

Opposition to the Agreement

• The transition from the stage of political discussions to the formulation of mechanisms for the agreement increased criticism from Hezbollah and its allies. The main criticism was directed at the pilot areas, the oversight mechanisms and the deployment of the Lebanese army, which Hezbollah represented as an American-Israeli move to restrict the “resistance”^[6] and gradually lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament:
  • Hezbollah figures, including Hassan Fadlallah, Ali Fayyad, Rami Abu Hamdan and Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, all members of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, represented the agreement as serving Israeli and American interests. They claimed the objective of the pilot areas outline was to perpetuate the Israeli presence in the south, subordinate the Lebanese army to external oversight mechanisms and lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament. They noted that the organization would continue to adhere to the “resistance,” oppose any attempt to disarm it and be supported by the “resistance axis”^[7] in the event of a regional escalation (al-Joumhouria, July 15; al-Diyar, July 16-19, 2026).
  • Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and head of the Amal movement, reiterated his reservations regarding the framework agreement, but said he would support any course which would actually lead to an Israeli withdrawal, the return of the displaced persons, the release of the prisoners and the reconstruction of the south. He said he was opposed to pilot areas, which he claimed could delay the withdrawal for years, draw the Lebanese army into a confrontation with Hezbollah and lead to civil war (al-Joumhouria, July 14, 2026).
  • Hezbollah and the Amal movement held a protest rally in Tyre whose slogan was, “We oppose [the agreement] and do not compromise.” Hezbollah Lebanese Parliament member Hassan Ezzeddine and Amal Lebanese Parliament member Ali Khreis reiterated their opposition to the agreement, arguing that it granted Israel political and security achievements, perpetuated Israeli presence in south Lebanon and linked the Israeli withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament. They reiterated their opposition to direct negotiations with Israel and the pilot areas, called for a full Israeli withdrawal without preconditions and warned against any attempt to disarm Hezbollah or weaken the “resistance,” while noting the continued coordination and unity between Hezbollah and Amal (al-Diyar and al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 18, 2026).

• • An op-ed piece in the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar claimed the pilot areas were part of a broader Israeli concept for reshaping the security situation in south Lebanon. According to the article, Israel seeks to combine a ground presence, fire control, strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure and phased withdrawals in a way which will preserve its freedom of action even after withdrawing from certain areas (al-Akhbar, July 14, 2026). According to other op-ed pieces, the pilot areas are not merely a technical step, but rather a mechanism to provide Israel with continuing leverage over enforcing the agreement. According to the paper, Israel seeks to condition each additional withdrawal on an assessment of the Lebanese army’s performance in dealing with Hezbollah, thereby preserving its freedom of action and delaying further withdrawals if it concludes that Lebanon is not fulfilling requirements (al-Akhbar, July 16-17, 2026).

• • Al-Akhbar editor in chief Ibrahim al-Amin accused Lebanese President Joseph Aoun of leading a process of normalization with Israel and Hezbollah’s disarmament with American-Saudi backing. He claimed Aoun had taken managing the negotiations into his own hands, bypassing state institutions and working to implement the “agreement of shame,” which grants legitimacy to the Israeli presence in south Lebanon. Al-Amin warned that implementation of the agreement could lead to internal conflict in Lebanon and represented Aoun’s planned visit to Washington as part of an American effort to advance the process (al-Akhbar, July 17, 2026).
  • Al-Amin also claimed he had a copy of the draft declaration of intent, which was formulated after the first round of talks between Lebanon and Israel in April 2026. He claimed it included a security addendum with 11 clauses. Clause 2 explicitly stated that the objective was to achieve a “gradual Israeli withdrawal from all of south Lebanon,” while Clause 9 referred to a “full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and the completion of a peace agreement through a political process.” However, he said the team representing the Lebanese president edited the clauses out on Aoun’s instructions and agreed to sign a document which did not include any reference to “withdrawal” or to “all Lebanese territory.” Al-Amin rejected Aoun’s claim that he had been forced to sign the agreement to avoid canceling his meeting with the American president and to prevent a large-scale Israeli attack, asking, “What else will Aoun offer for the sake of ‘his American friend?’ ” (al-Akhbar, July 20, 2026).
  • The Jafari Mufti Ahmed Qabalan claimed the agreement subordinated Lebanon to American and Israeli dictates, undermined the state’s sovereignty and put the Lebanese army at the service of oversight mechanisms which served Israel. He claimed Hezbollah’s weapons were a fundamental part of Lebanon’s defense and any attempt to disarm the organization or advance the pilot areas could lead to civil war (al-Markazia, July 15, 2026; al-Diyar, July 17, 2026).

• Despite the rhetoric, it is generally agreed in Lebanon that Hezbollah does not currently intend to use force to prevent implementation of the agreement. Sources close to the organization said it would first assess Israeli withdrawals, rejected a confrontation with the Lebanese army and continued to coordinate with the army regarding its deployment in the south. Commentators claimed Hezbollah and Iran currently wanted to buy time and avoid a regional escalation until the political developments had become clearer. It was further argued that Iran and Hezbollah prefer to buy time until the regional developments become clearer, adding that Lebanon was being pulled in two directions: the state’s efforts to advance the agreement and strengthen its sovereignty, versus Iran’s desire to preserve Hezbollah as a strategic asset (Nidaa al-Watan, July 17, 2026; al-Joumhouria and al-Akhbar, July 18, 2026; Asharq al-Awsat, July 18, 2026).

Support for the Agreement

• The Kataeb Party again expressed its support for President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the Lebanese delegation to the talks with Israel in Rome. The party called for formulating the implementation mechanisms and establishing a timetable for the Israeli withdrawal, and accused Hezbollah of attempting to undermine the arrangement and keep Lebanon as a bargaining chip in Iran’s hands (Kataeb Party website, July 14, 2026).
• Nadim al-Gemayel, a member of the Kataeb Party faction in the Lebanese Parliament, called President Aoun to use his visit to Washington to advance a plan for Hezbollah’s disarmament, which he said was a prerequisite for strengthening the state’s sovereignty, rehabilitating the economy and attracting investment (al-Markazia, July 17, 2026).

The Fighting in Lebanon

The IDF

• The IDF continued ground and aerial operations throughout the week in the security zone in south Lebanon to enforce the terms of the ceasefire and prevent Hezbollah from reestablishing itself near the border. The forces identified and eliminated three armed terrorists in Beit Yahoun within the security zone and attacked a Hezbollah cell operating explosive UAVs near the security zone (IDF Spokesperson, July 13-20, 2026). Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets reported “Israeli violations,” including IDF air and artillery attacks in various areas of south Lebanon, both inside and outside the security zone, including al-Mansouri, Kafr Tebnit, Nabatieh al-Fawqa and the Ali al-Taher Ridge area. They also reported the demolition of buildings and infrastructure in towns within the security zone (Bas Shadeed [“severe punishment]” Telegram channel, July 13-20, 2026).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah still does not issue claims of responsibility for attacks on IDF forces, a policy it has pursued since June 20, 2026.
• Lebanese security sources estimated that between 30 and 40 Hezbollah operatives, most of them from the Badr Unit and a minority from the Radwan Force, have remained trapped for more than a month in an underground complex beneath Ali al-Taher Hill, south of al-Nabatieh. Reportedly, the complex is the Badr Unit’s command center and has weapons depots and a tunnel network constructed over many years. According to the sources, Hezbollah has not yet succeeded in rescuing the operatives after Israel isolated the complex by establishing fire control over the surrounding area, although Israel has not entered it directly. It was further claimed that Hezbollah has not directly addressed the reports regarding the fighters’ presence at the site (Aram News, July 15, 2026).
• Lebanese military sources reported that Hezbollah continued to reorganize its forces following the losses it sustained during the hostilities. According to the report, the Radwan Force has shifted from assault missions to reconnaissance, ambush and launching UAVs and guided missiles, while the Badr Unit has assumed responsibility for the defensive array and military infrastructure north of the Litani. The organization has reduced its presence in the border villages, relocated headquarters and infrastructure deeper into Lebanese territory, primarily to the al-Nabatieh area and is transitioning to a more decentralized command-and-control model to reduce its exposure to Israeli intelligence and strikes (Aram News, July 14 and 16, 2026).
• Hezbollah held more collective funerals for its terrorist operatives killed during the fighting. A funeral was held in the town of Majdal Selem for 45 Hezbollah operatives, most of them killed during the hostilities. Pictures of Iran’s previous leader, Ali Khamenei, were also displayed at the funeral. The ceremony reflected the organization’s continuing efforts to commemorate its fallen and preserve its ideological affiliation with the “resistance axis” (al-Araby al-Jadeed, July 18, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• The Lebanese army announced it had received the body of a soldier who had been killed in April 2026 and was transferred to Lebanon through the Red Cross (Lebanese army X account, July 16, 2026).
• A Lebanese soldier was reportedly killed and two others were wounded after a military vehicle drove over a suspicious object in the al-Mansouri area (Lebanese army X account, July 18, 2026). The IDF Spokesperson stated that a preliminary examination indicated it was an explosive device which had been planted previously, apparently by Hezbollah, and the incident occurred in an area entered by the Lebanese army force without prior coordination under the existing coordination mechanism (IDF Spokesperson, July 18, 2026).

Challenges for Hezbollah

• Lebanese security agencies arrested Fouad Abd al-Karim Khalifa at Beirut airport on suspicion of spying for Israel and passing information about senior Hezbollah figures, their family members and institutions affiliated with the organization. According to the reports, Hezbollah views the affair as part of a broader effort to uncover intelligence penetrations following the wave of assassinations of senior organization figures. In response, Hezbollah reinforced its information security measures, tightened compartmentalization between its units and increased coordination with the Lebanese security forces (al-Nahar, al-Madan, Lebanon Debate, Lebanon 24, July 14-17, 2026).
• The planned opening of a new branch in Tyre of al-Qard al-Hassan, Hezbollah’s financial arm, was reportedly opposed by local residents and business owners, who feared its affiliation with Hezbollah would make the building a target for attacks. Despite the opposition, work on preparing the branch is continuing and it is expected to operate without a sign to identify it (Lebanon Debate, July 16, 2026).
• The Iraqi finance ministry instructed all banks and state institutions operating under the ministry to enforce the United States anti-terrorism sanctions imposed on individuals and entities linked to ISIS and Hezbollah (Shafaq News, July 15, 2026). According to the Lebanese daily al-Liwaa, the tightening of financial oversight in Iraq over entities linked to Hezbollah reflects a broader regional trend of reducing the organization’s sources of funding and increasing economic pressure on it as part of the American-led effort to strengthen financial compliance mechanisms in the region (al-Liwaa, July 18, 2026).
• The Syrian interior ministry reported that the smuggling of a large quantity of advanced weapons to Hezbollah through the border with Iraq had been prevented. According to the announcement, the inspection of an oil tanker entering from Iraq revealed a large quantity of concealed weapons, including long-range missiles, about 150 explosive UAVs, guided anti-tank missiles and artillery shells. The investigation found that the shipment was supposed to cross Syrian territory and reach the “terrorist militia” Hezbollah in Lebanon and the authorities were reportedly continuing efforts to identify those involved (SANA News Agency, al-Ekhbariya Syria Telegram channel and Al Arabiya, July 16, 2026). Hezbollah denied involvement in the affair and claimed that the accusations were “false” and intended to harm the organization (SANA; al-Diyar, July 16, 2026).

     
UAVs and weapons discovered in the tanker
(Right: SANA News Agency. Left: al-Ekhbariya Syria, July 16, 2026)

• Syrian security sources said Hezbollah was conducting an accelerated effort to transfer weapons remaining in Syrian territory to Lebanon to preserve and restore as much of its military capabilities as possible before Damascus completed tightening its control along the Syrian-Lebanese border. Reportedly, the Syrian authorities have expanded their control to about 75% of the border and have increased security coordination with Lebanon to reduce the activity of smuggling networks (Nidaa al-Watan, July 20, 2026).

UNIFIL

• Eighty-six members of the Lebanese Parliament appealed to the UN Security Council, calling for the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate, which is due to expire at the end of 2026, and to consider expanding the peacekeeping force’s authority. They said the conditions that led to the deployment of the force in 1978 still existed and the continued fighting and the absence of a stable ceasefire required its continued presence in south Lebanon. They warned that ending the force’s operations could undermine regional stability and the credibility of the international system (al-Nahar, July 13, 2026).
• German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul proposed replacing UNIFIL with an EU force which would also operate under an international mandate. He said such a force could help prevent a security vacuum, support the IDF’s withdrawal and prevent the renewal of Hezbollah’s military activity (Nidaa al-Watan, July 17, 2026).

The Situation in Lebanon

• Lebanon was once again included on the list of “hunger focuses” compiled by two UN agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), as one of 13 countries and territories where food insecurity was expected to worsen in the coming months. Reportedly, about 1.2 million Lebanese are expected to face severe food insecurity. However, the report noted that the crisis was not primarily caused by shortages, but by a sharp decline in the population’s purchasing power due to the hostilities, displacement, loss of sources of income and rising prices, particularly in south Lebanon and Nabatieh Governorate (al-Akhbar, July 15, 2026).
• A report issued by the International Labour Organization (ILO) stated that the average labor income in Lebanon had fallen by about 40%, about one-third of workers who were employed before the war had lost their jobs and the highest unemployment rates were recorded in Nabatieh Governorate and South Governorate. In addition, more than one-quarter of families have been forced to reduce their spending on food, while only about 4% of Lebanese have received government cash assistance. The report warned that the continued decline in income and consumption was expected to increase poverty and delay the process of economic recovery (al-Akhbar, July 14, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] See the June 2026 Amit Institute report, The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement: Insights and Responses.
^[3] An "objective, neutral" website.
^[4] A daily Lebanese newspaper considered objective.
^[5] Identified with Hezbollah's opponents.
^[6] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[7] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

Related Articles