Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (February 2-9, 2026)

Overview^[1]

• IDF forces attacked Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and to prevent Hezbollah’s renewed military buildup. The IDF detained a senior operative from Hamas-affiliated al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Lebanon.
• Hezbollah’s secretary general, Na’im Qassem, called the confrontation with Israel and the United States part of a regional campaign led by Iran, and argued that political pressure was being exerted to achieve gains which Israel had not achieved militarily.
• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam visited the border villages in south Lebanon and received a sympathetic welcome. He said the state was committed to repairing the damage of the “campaign against Israel” and enabling residents to return to their houses.
• Israel reportedly told Lebanon that it would continue its attacks until Hezbollah had been completely disarmed, and would withdraw IDF forces from positions in south Lebanon only in exchange for a declaration ending the state of hostility between the two countries and the signing of a new security agreement. It was also reported that a secret meeting was held in the United States between senior officers from the Lebanese army and the IDF.
• Lebanese army Commander Rodolph Haykal visited the United States to present the army’s needs and its difficulties in completing missions, especially the state’s monopoly on weapons. A senior Republican senator cut his meeting with Haykal short after the army commander refused to call Hezbollah a terrorist organization.
• The Hezbollah leadership accepted Wafiq Safa’s resignation as the head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit, an unprecedented step in the organization’s security apparatus. He reportedly resigned following serious disputes at the upper echelons of the organization, alongside a reduction of powers and Safa’s deviation from Lebanon’s line.
• Tension continues between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. Senior Hezbollah figures accused the Lebanese authorities of hesitation, concessions and conduct that allowed Israel to intensify its attacks, while they themselves promoted restraint and willingness to continue dialogue with the president and Lebanese institutions without deviating from the organization’s core positions. Senior figures in Lebanon opposed a Hezbollah-Lebanon involvement if a confrontation with Iran developed.

Israel-Hezbollah Tensions

The IDF

• The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and prevent Hezbollah’s renewed military buildup. The forces attacked several weapons depots and shafts used to store weapons at Hezbollah military sites in south Lebanon and in the Beqa’a Valley (IDF spokesperson, February 9, 2026). The Lebanese ministry of health reported that an attack on a vehicle in the town of Yanouh killed three people, including a father and his young son who were passersby (al-Nashra, February 9, 2026). The IDF spokesperson confirmed an attack on a Hezbollah terrorist artillery officer, and expressed regret over harm to uninvolved people while emphasizing that steps had been taken to reduce the likelihood of harm to civilians (IDF spokesperson, February 9, 2026).
• In the Mount Dov area, IDF forces detained a senior operative in al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Hamas-affiliated Muslim Brotherhood branch in Lebanon, to obtain intelligence on the organization’s activity in Lebanon and Syria (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, February 9, 2026). According to al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, an Israeli force entered the town of al-Habbariyah in south Lebanon and “abducted” one of the organization’s senior figures, Attoui Attoui. The organization claimed it was a response to the Lebanese prime minister’s visit to the south of the country and called on Lebanese state institutions to protect the residents of the south (al-Arabi, February 9, 2026).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem delivered a speech marking the 33rd anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Association for Education and Culture, where he represented the struggle against Israel and the United States as part of an Iranian-led “existential campaign.” He claimed the “resistance”^[2] protected Lebanon’s sovereignty against “American-Western hegemony,” and rejected international demands to disarm Hezbollah, claiming it was an attempt to achieve by political means what Israel had not achieved militarily. He also called for internal Lebanese unity and dialogue, while warning against cooperation with “the enemy” or applying internal pressure on the “resistance.” Qassem represented Hezbollah as a “responsible” force, a central partner in forming the government and stabilizing the economic system, and set four conditions for any future discussion: stopping the “aggression,” Israel’s withdrawal, release of prisoners and rehabilitating the state (Hezbollah secretary general’s website, February 3, 2026).

• Hajj Hussein al-Nimr, responsible in Hezbollah for the Beqa’a Valley region, delivered a speech during the funeral of Ali Hussein Saleh, a senior figure in Hezbollah’s military wing since its founding, who died of an illness. Al-Nimr praised the steadfastness of the Lebanese home front, the mothers of the shaheeds and the fathers of the fighters, who, he said, “are waiting for their turn.” He also noted the leadership of Hezbollah’s secretary general and said the organization would “walk with him to the end of the road.” He said the “struggle” would continue until “decision or martyrdom,” representing the “resistance” as strong and stable despite pressures and losses (al-‘Ahed, February 2, 2026).

The Lebanese Government

• Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun, met in Madrid with Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, and thanked him for Spain’s support for Lebanon, especially Spain’s continued assistance to the Lebanese army and its expected participation in the conference to support the army and the Internal Security Forces in Paris on March 5-6, 2026. Aoun also thanked Spain for its condemnation of Israel’s activity in Lebanon, and praised its contribution to UNIFIL’s mission in the south, while discussing the possibility of keeping Spanish forces after the end of UNIFIL’s mandate at the end of the current year (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 2, 2026).

• Aoun also noted that the return of trust and support of foreign countries for Lebanon was a direct result of the authorities’ efforts to rebuild the state on foundations of the rule of law and the exclusivity of weapons, which he defined as objectives they would not abandon. He said he was working with all relevant parties to prevent another war because the Lebanese could not bear another confrontation and the state had to be realistic and responsible, given international circumstances (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 3, 2026).
• The French foreign minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, visited Lebanon and met with state leaders. Meeting with Barrot, Aoun noted France’s importance as a strategic partner for Lebanon. Aoun said the Lebanese army had made efforts to meet its commitments south of the Litani River while Israel had done nothing, and he called for concrete progress on Israeli withdrawal and the release of prisoners (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 6, 2026). Barrot said Paris continued to stand by Lebanon despite regional tension and internal difficulties, adding that France saw three central issues: strengthening security and advancing to the second stage in the plan to deploy the Lebanese army beyond south of the Litani River, mobilizing international support for the army and the security forces, and promoting economic rehabilitation and restoring the trust of the citizens, all of which were conditioned on reforms and stabilizing security (Lebanon 24, February 6, 2026).

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam toured south Lebanon, including villages on the line of confrontation, such as Kafr Kila, Aita al-Shaab and Aitaroun. Salam received a sympathetic welcome, without displays of force or protest by Hezbollah supporters, and stressed the direct link between the state’s sovereignty, the deployment of the army and the restoration of civilian life. He clarified that the state “is here to stay,” not only to rebuild, but to allow residents to return and to continue to hold their land (X account of the Lebanese prime minister and Lebanese media, February 7-8, 2026). In response to his visit, Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the government had exclusive responsibility for reconstruction, applying sovereignty and protecting citizens, but he was also harshly critical of its ongoing failures in view of the destruction, killing and continued “occupation.” He claimed Hezbollah was prepared to cooperate with the state in reconstruction, but as long as “Israeli aggression” and the delay in residents’ return continued, Lebanon had neither security not stability (Lebanese News Agency, February 7, 2026).

     
Right: Salam welcomed in Yarin. Left: A sign for Salam in Aita al-Shaab reading, “You are welcome” (X account of the Lebanese prime minister, February 7-8, 2026)

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the state’s sovereignty and structural reforms were cornerstones for rescuing it and restoring security. He said restoring the state’s authority to decide war and peace for the first time since 1969 made full operational control possible in south Lebanon, and its goal was to rehabilitate international trust in the economy and state institutions. He called for support from Arab countries and the international community, stating that the government not would allow Lebanon to be dragged into a new “security adventure,” and achieving the goal meant supporting the state (X account of al-Hadath, February 3, 2026). Interviewed by CNN, Salam said UNIFIL’s mandate would end in December 2026 and would not be extended in its current format, but Lebanon would need some form of international presence. He said the second stage in the Lebanese army’s five-stage plan was supposed to make it possible to declare full government exclusivity of weapons in the south, subject to additional international support. He added that peace with Israel was currently impossible because of its continued “occupation and violations of [Lebanese] sovereignty” (X account of the Lebanese prime minister, February 4, 2026).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of Hezbollah’s Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, claimed that former ambassador Simon Karam, who heads the Lebanese civilian delegation for talks in the ceasefire committee, received conditions from Israel after presenting the request to stop the attacks, withdraw IDF forces from south Lebanon, release Lebanese held in Israel and demark the border between the countries. Israel’s conditions were that it would attack until Hezbollah had been completely disarmed and its military wing had been dismantled, Israel’s right to demand searches of any house where the presence of weapons was suspected would be preserved, including south of the Litani, Israel would withdraw from five positions in south Lebanon only after Lebanon declared it was ending the state of hostility with Israel and signed a new security agreement, the border area could be rebuilt only with Israel’s consent and every project would have to take into account Israeli needs to prevent a new “October 7” situation, and residents who wanted to return to their homes near the border would be forbidden to have ties to Hezbollah and the border area would become an economic and tourism zone (al-Akhbar, February 9, 2026).
• The Lebanese ministries of agriculture and environmental protection claimed laboratory tests showed that the material sprayed from Israeli aircraft in south Lebanon was an herbicide significantly exceeding acceptable concentrations. The ministries claimed it would cause severe damage to vegetation, agricultural produce, soil fertility and ecological balance, and posed a threat to food security, sources of livelihood and public health (al-Diyar, February 4, 2026). Lebanon’s president Aoun sharply condemned the act and called it a “blatant violation” of Lebanese sovereignty and an “environmental and health crime.” He noted the need for involvement by the international community and UN bodies to stop the actions and protect Lebanon’s sovereignty, and instructed the foreign ministry, in cooperation with the ministries of agriculture, environmental protection and health, to prepare a file for taking legal and diplomatic steps and submitting complaints in the relevant international forums (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 4, 2026). UNIFIL reported that it received notification from the IDF about aerial activity to drop a “non-toxic” chemical near the Blue Line, which required the force to cancel more than ten operational activities, take shelter and resume routine activity only after more than nine hours. UNIFIL said the action was unacceptable and violated UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 2, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• The commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal, paid an official visit to the United States, meeting at the Pentagon with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dan Caine, and with American politicians. In Florida he met with the heads of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) (al-Madan, February 4, 2026). “Sources who accompanied the visit” said he described the difficulties delaying completion of the army’s missions, particularly north of the Litani River, especially a lack of logistic and military equipment. He asked for the administration to accelerate the transfer of aid funds approved in the past. The “sources” said that despite various reports, he had not presented an operational plan for north of the Litani River, but merely the general framework of the army’s plan, accompanied by maps and documents, for the Lebanese government monopoly on weapons (al-Diyar, February 4, 2026).
• Republican senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), who heads the Senate Appropriations Committee, said he cut his meeting with the commander of the Lebanese army short after a few minutes when Haykal told him he did not see Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization “in the context of the Lebanese situation.” Graham said Hezbollah had been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by American administrations of both parties since 1997, and as long as such a perception prevailed in the Lebanese army, the United States would not see it as a reliable partner (X account of Lindsey Graham, February 5, 2026). The meeting was supposed to discuss pressure on Hezbollah and the possibility of approving military aid to the Lebanese army in the amount of $200–300 million (Lebanon 24, X account of MTV Lebanon, February 5, 2026).
• “Sources ” told the Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar that the meetings Haykal held with senior officials at the National Security Council, the State Department and other figures were businesslike and focused on the future of military aid and the next stage in the plan to restrict Hezbollah weapons north of the Litani River. According to the “sources,” the Americans showed understanding for Haykal’s explanations of the army’s needs, even if they reiterated that continued aid was conditional on completing the missions and deploying the army throughout Lebanese territory. There was initial understanding for Lebanon’s demands regarding Israeli withdrawal and stopping the “violations.” Reportedly, the positions of Graham and pro-Israeli figures did not reflect the administration’s position, seen by the visit of the American ambassador to Beirut, Michel Issa, and in the continuing preparations for the conference to support the army which will be held in Paris on March 5, 2026 (al-Akhbar, February 7, 2026).
• It was reported that Army Commander Haykal left for Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Paris conference on March 5, 2026 and to update senior Saudi Arabian officials on the result of his visit to the United States. He is expected to state that the army is ready for the second stage of securing the state monopoly on weapons and to present its needs to implement the plan (al-Nahar, February 8, 2026).
• CENTCOM’s Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT) hosted a coordination meeting with senior commanders from the Lebanese army at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida to strengthen dialogue and coordination within the framework of the oversight committee for the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon. The committee’s chairman, Joseph Clearfield, said it was important to have continuous contact between the two armies and the organized involvement of the mechanism in supporting the cessation of hostilities and maintaining regional stability (MTV Lebanon, February 2, 2026).
• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, claimed that CENTCOM representatives had organized a secret meeting at the base in Florida between the head of the Planning Directorate in the Lebanese army, Brigadier General George al-Sakr, and an Israeli officer, also attended by a senior American officer (al-Akhbar, February 9, 2026).

Challenges for Hezbollah

The Resignation of Wafiq Safa

• According to reports, Wafiq Safa submitted his resignation as the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit. According to “various sources,” the resignation was the result of disputes with the organization’s secretary general, Na’im Qassem, and Shura Council member and head of the parliamentary bloc, Muhammad Raad, along with a reduction of his powers and deviation from the decisions of the organization’s leadership, including the encouragement of motorcycle protests against the Lebanese president because of government discussions on restricting weapons. “Sources” noted that Safa had submitted his resignation some time ago, but Hezbollah’s leadership accepted it only at his insistence. The powers of the Liaison Unit were transferred to Hussein Abdallah, close to Qassem and former security chief in the south, while Ahmed Mahna was authorized to manage relations with the state and external factors. Safa, who was a central figure in the interface between Hezbollah and state institutions, was sanctioned by the United States in 2019 and was at the center of sensitive cases in the judicial and security system. He also survived an attempted Israeli targeted killing in October 2024 (Reuters, al-Hadath, al-Jadeed, February 6, 2026).

• According to reports, acceptance of Safa’s resignation has not been not viewed as merely a personal or administrative move, but as a marker of a process being played out deep within the organization. According to “political sources in Lebanon,” when and how the announcement was published point to a reexamination of the organization’s structure, roles and internal patterns of activity, given growing regional and international pressures directed at Lebanon as a whole. The “sources” called it an attempt to “do some spring cleaning” and prepare for broader political scenarios, especially the possibility of future understandings between Washington and Tehran. Safa’s departure is seen as a redefinition of roles and balances within the organization, and not as the end of his path or as evidence of a deep strategic change (Lebanon Debate, February 7, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Disarmament

• Lebanon’s minister of information, Paul Morcos, said the Lebanese army had completed the “restriction of weapons” plan south of the Litani River and the “containment of weapons” north of it. Morcos stressed that south of the Litani it involved the army’s practical control of the ground area and key points, even if not complete control over all weapons. As for the area north of the Litani, “containment” meant that Hezbollah had no ability to transfer, move, display or operate weapons openly (Al Jazeera, February 4, 2026).
• Lebanon’s deputy prime minister, Tareq Mitri, accused Hezbollah of refusing to hand over its weapons, while stating that the state would continue to disarm it throughout Lebanon and would not abandon its objective (al-Hadath, February 3, 2026).
• A “senior American official” said that based on intelligence from the United States, the Lebanese army had located a large weapons’ cache in a warehouse in al-Khalousiyeh in south Lebanon. He said 348 crates were discovered at the site, each containing 1,000 bullets. The “official” urged the Lebanese army to act faster to disarm Hezbollah and stated that the army could operate simultaneously on both sides of the Litani River (al-Hadath, February 9, 2026).

Hezbollah-Lebanese Government Tensions

• Hezbollah held a mass rally in central Beirut whose theme was “The entire homeland is resistance.”^[3] Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, was critical of the Lebanese authorities, who he said had failed to achieve an Israeli withdrawal, release of prisoners and the return of residents to the border villages, and warned against managing a national position through retreat and surrender. He called for “reconciliation” and understandings between the state and the “resistance” as the basis for building a strong, sovereign state, while stressing the organization’s commitment to national unity, stability and support for the Lebanese army as a national army (al-Madan and al-‘Ahed, February 4, 2026).

• Despite the harsh statements, Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, was conciliatory and relatively restrained after meeting with Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun, and stated the need for national responsibility and internal unity in view of the “sovereignty situation.” Raad claimed Hezbollah was willing to reach understandings and cooperate with the state to achieve shared national objectives while stressing the state’s responsibility to defend sovereignty and provide it assistance “when necessary.” He claimed the sides had agreed to continue dialogue and consultations to agree on a strategy which would advance the objectives quickly and “at minimal cost,” while rejecting any form of foreign intervention or patronage (al-‘Ahed, February 4, 2026). Reportedly, Raad’s decision to read a prepared statement after the meeting was a sign of Hezbollah’s decision to take a more measured and controlled media line toward state institutions (al-Akhbar, February 5, 2026).

• A member of the Strong Republic bloc from the Christian Lebanese Forces party, Pierre Bou Assi, said Lebanon would be unable to fulfill its purpose of protecting its citizens and stability as long as Hezbollah “strangled it” and in practice built a “state within a state.” He said the organization gave the Shi’ite community a false sense of being threatened, while the state was supposed to protect all citizens, adding that Hezbollah failed to protect its environment. He called for dismantling Hezbollah’s military and “security” apparatus and imposing state authority over all of Lebanon’s territory (Lebanese News Agency, February 2, 2026).

Hezbollah-Amal Tensions

• “Diplomatic sources” said Hezbollah’s determined stance against appointing a civilian to the ceasefire oversight committee was directed not only against the Lebanese president and prime minister, but also against Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, who was a partner to the move and even gave his consent. According to the “sources,” Berri does not identify with the campaign led by Hezbollah against President Aoun, and Berri’s conduct during the budget discussions reflected widening gaps between him and Hezbollah. Although the dispute has not yet developed into an open rift within the “Shi’ite duo,” the “sources” said there were fundamental issues concerning the future of weapons, the relations of the Shi’ite community with the state and the system of internal Lebanese alliances, and that signs of distancing were already evident, especially ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring of 2026 (al-Markazia, February 2, 2026).
• In response to the tension between the Shi’ite movements, Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, called the meeting of the joint leadership of Hezbollah and Amal “very positive,” adding that Berri said the elections would be held on time. He said Hezbollah would run in the elections in full partnership with the Amal Movement, stating that the existing political alliance was maintained in coordination and close bilateral cooperation (Lebanon Debate, February 6, 2026).

Hezbollah-Iran Tensions^[4]

• Hezbollah’s faction in the Lebanese Parliament claimed that the concentration of American forces in the region and the threats against Iran were deliberately pushing toward confrontation, which could develop into an uncontrollable regional war. The faction expressed full solidarity with Iran and stated its determination to confront aggression, while representing Iran as a model of sovereign steadfastness (website of the Loyalty to the Resistance faction, February 5, 2026).
• In response to statements by Hezbollah’s secretary general about the organization’s readiness to enter a confrontation if a war broke out against Iran, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated that his country “will not allow” itself to be dragged into a new war. Salam said the “confrontation” begun by Hezbollah against Israel in October 2023 as a “support front” for Hamas had exacted “a very high price,” and stated that no one was prepared to subordinate the state to that kind of “security adventure” (Al Jazeera, February 3, 2026).
• The deputy prime minister, Tareq Mitri, said Beirut opposed any attempt to involve Lebanon in a regional war or to turn it into an arena for others’ confrontations. He said that in the event of a war against Iran, the government would act “wisely” to prevent the country from being dragged into a confrontation (al-Hadath, February 3, 2026).

International Action against Hezbollah

• Kuwait’s foreign ministry announced that it added eight hospitals in Lebanon to its terrorism list and prohibited the country’s citizens from transferring funds or other economic assistance to the declared medical institutions, which are located in south Lebanon, the Beqa’a Valley and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia. The hospitals are suspected of being linked to Hezbollah, after Kuwait placed the organization on the sanctions list for terrorist activity in July 2025 (al-Anbaa, February 8, 2026).

Restoring Lebanon to Its Pre-War Status

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with a senior delegation from the World Bank headed by Jean-Christophe Carret, with the director of the bank’s Lebanon office, Enrique Blanco Armas, in attendance. They discussed monitoring the projects financed by the bank, especially the emergency project to assist in restoring the state, and on setting priorities for the next stage. The sides reviewed the World Bank’s decision to approve two new loans to Lebanon totaling $350 million, a step reflecting continued international financial involvement in the process of stabilizing and rehabilitating the country’s economy (Lebanese News Agency, February 2, 2026).
• The Lebanese government approved the official reconstruction and compensation program for those negatively impacted by the last war and for those harmed in the Beirut port explosion in August 2020. The program is based on an annual report by the National Council for Scientific Research summarizing damage to people, the environment, agriculture and infrastructure, and on the World Bank report from March 2025, which estimated reconstruction needs at approximately $11 billion, not including damage caused after the ceasefire. However, the existence of a clause allowing compensation in the case of complete destruction without reconstruction, alongside the lack of willingness or ability on the part of the United States, the European Union and Arab states to finance broad reconstruction, and Israeli opposition unless there are political-security conditions, make it likely that the process will stall or be carried out only partially (Lebanon 24, February 4, 2026).
• Hezbollah announced that it would begin paying housing assistance allowances for 2026 to families whose houses were destroyed in the last war against Israel, through the organization’s Jihad al-Binaa Association.^[5] The Association will pay $1,500 to families in the Beirut area and $1,000 in other areas for the months of February to April 2026, including families whose houses were destroyed after the ceasefire. According to “sources close to the organization,” the delay in reconstruction, which is attributed to governmental “incompetence,” prevented the return of approximately 7,000 families to the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. Reportedly, the move illustrates the continued assumption of a civilian-rehabilitation role by Hezbollah, while deepening the gap between it and state institutions (al-Akhbar, February 3, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

• Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with a delegation from the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee headed by Ambassador Ramez Dimashkieh, who gave him the initial draft of the national governance plan for the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Salam praised the committee’s work and its ongoing efforts in managing the Palestinian file, while noting a balanced approach based on state sovereignty, the rule of law and protection of rights. He also noted the importance of a partnership of political actors, administrative and security echelons, Lebanese and Palestinian civil society organizations, UNRWA and international actors, in preparation for completing the consultations required ahead of approving the plan and its official adoption by the Lebanese state (X account of the Lebanese prime minister’s office, February 6, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[3] Anti-Israeli terrorism, attacks and violence.
^[4] See the February 2026 ITIC report, Threats by Axis of Resistance Organizations amid Tensions between the United States and Iran
^[5] See the June 2019 ITIC report, Jihad al-Bina Association in Lebanon: A Hezbollah social foundation engaged in construction and social projects among the Shiite community, being a major component in Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure

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