Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (August 31-September 7, 2026)

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• Efforts were made to continue direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.
• The rift between Hezbollah and senior officials in the Lebanese government and army is growing.
• Hezbollah was dealt a severe blow as the IDF takes control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge.
• Hezbollah relies on a younger command echelon following the elimination of its veteran leadership.

 

Overview^[1]

• Israel released five Lebanese prisoners to promote direct bilateral negotiations despite the continuing dispute over the framework agreement and the pilot zones.
• Direct negotiations with Israel and the Lebanese government’s plan for a state monopoly on weapons have caused a rift between the Hezbollah leadership and the president’s office and army command. Parliament speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri has criticized Hezbollah for not including him in its decisions.
• The IDF gained operational control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge. Hezbollah’s opponents criticized the organization for not transferring the facilities and assets on the ridge to the Lebanese army, but instead abandoned them to Israel.
• The IDF attacked Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons depots, after explosive UAVs were launched at IDF forces; there were no Israeli casualties. In Lebanon, more than 20 people were reported killed in the attacks, including Hezbollah terrorist operatives.
• Hezbollah now relies on young operatives who were trained for command positions because of the elimination of veteran commanders. Hezbollah has reportedly begun transferring some of its weapons to dozens of small sites, including private properties, to reduce their exposure to attacks and searches.
• Senior Hezbollah figures said they were proud of the alliance with Iran and confident the Lebanese issue was Tehran’s top priority in its negotiations with the United States.
• The EU is considering establishing a new civilian-military mission in Lebanon after UNIFIL’s mandate ends, while France and Italy are promoting a framework for an international presence under UN auspices.
• Fatah and other PLO organizations continued handing over weapons to the Lebanese army, while Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad currently remain outside the process.

Direct Negotiations and the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement

Direct Negotiations

• Israel returned the first five detainees to Lebanon. According to the announcement, the five, who were transferred with the assistance of the Red Cross, are civilians who were not involved in terrorist activity. The United States called the move an initial gesture of mutual goodwill which could serve as a basis for including other civilian issues in the discussions. The five were reportedly released as Lebanese assisted in the search for the remains of Lebanese Jews who disappeared during the Civil War, after Israel provided Lebanon with information regarding possible burial locations (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026; al-Akhbar and al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 5, 2026). Lebanese deputy prime minister Tarek Mitri said the release reflected American pressure on Israel for flexibility in the negotiations, adding that chances for another round of talks in mid-September or shortly thereafter had increased (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).

• The eighth round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel is reportedly set for Rome on September 15 and 16, 2026. The decision was made after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met with the American ambassadors to Lebanon and Israel, who are involved in the mediation. However, the Lebanese presidency confirmed that preparations were underway for the next round but did not provide an official date (al-Joumhouria, September 2, 2026; Lebanese presidency X account, September 4, 2026).
• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam discussed preparations for the next round with the American ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa. Aoun said the release of the detainees was the first step in implementing the memorandum of understanding with Israel, while Salam reiterated that Lebanon wanted a full Israeli withdrawal and the extension of state authority throughout the country (X accounts of the Lebanese presidency and Lebanese prime minister’s office, September 4, 2026).

• Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and head of the Amal movement, reiterated his opposition to the framework agreement and the current format of the negotiations with Israel, particularly the pilot zones, stating that so far the talks had not ended the fighting. According to Lebanese sources, Berri believes that continued negotiations should be contingent on guarantees and Israeli measures on the ground. His position was criticized in Washington, where it was argued that the Lebanese government was the legitimate party to conduct the negotiations and expanding the authority of the state and the army and disarming Hezbollah were conditions for progress toward an arrangement. Despite the differences between him and President Aoun, who continues to support the negotiations, Berri said he was not planning to end relations with him (Lebanese News Agency, August 31, 2026; al-Nahar, September 1, 2026; al-Nashra and Nidaa al-Watan, September 3, 2026).

• According to Western diplomatic sources, the United States may increase pressure on Hezbollah because of its weapons, citing the difficulties in implementing the framework agreement. According to the sources, Washington views disarming Hezbollah as a key condition for full implementation of the agreement and a full Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. The sources noted the remarks of the American ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, who said that as long as Hezbollah did not disarm it would be difficult for Washington to demand that Israel meet the requirements of the agreement (al-Joumhouria, September 3, 2026).

The Pilot Zones

• Reportedly, establishing a monitoring system in areas to be transferred to Lebanese army control is under consideration. The system would combine technological means and intelligence, and operate through the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L). Information about the presence of armed Hezbollah terrorist operatives or military infrastructure would be conveyed through the coordination and verification mechanism rather than as a direct Israeli instruction to the Lebanese army; the army would verify the information and decide how to act. Meanwhile, no agreement has been reached on the identity of the international party which would participate in verification. Italy is reluctant to assume responsibility for leading it, the United States and Israel reportedly oppose a French or Spanish role, and the possibility of including Azerbaijan faces opposition from Hezbollah. The head of the MCG4L, General Joseph Clearfield, said establishing the verification mechanism could make it possible to expand the pilot zones to areas under Israeli control (Erem News and al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2026).
• The United States reportedly conveyed Israeli reservations about the Lebanese army’s performance in the south to the army command, along with demands to expand searches for weapons beyond the pilot zones. The army command said Israel had not yet fully withdrawn from the areas where the army was supposed to deploy and that some of the Israeli demands “exceeded the existing understandings.” According to a Lebanese source, the army does not intend to take additional steps so long as Israel does not take corresponding withdrawal measures (al-Akhbar, September 4, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Position

• Hezbollah opposed continuing direct negotiations with Israel and accused President Aoun of acting contrary to constitutional principles because of his desire to end the state of conflict between the countries:
  • The Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament claimed the Lebanese authority’s gamble had failed and the enemy used the framework agreement for all matters related to life in the occupied territories. The faction demanded the Lebanese government end the direct negotiations because they only exacerbated the national crisis. It also criticized President Aoun’s seeking to end the hostility toward Israel and claimed he disregarded the national pact because hostility toward Israel was a constitutional principle rooted in the Taif Agreement and legal sources (Loyalty to the Resistance bloc website, September 3, 2026).
  • Hezbollah said that despite its importance, the release of the five Lebanese held by Israel did not justify continuing the negotiations as long as the attacks and the Israeli presence in the south continued (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 5, 2026).
  • Ibrahim al-Moussawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, criticized a draft resolution on solidarity with the Lebanese republic submitted by the Lebanese foreign ministry to the Arab League council of foreign ministers for discussion. He objected to three paragraphs which he claimed undermined the national consensus established in the Taif Agreement and the legitimacy of the “resistance”^[2] against Israel, and called on the Arab League states to express reservations about the wording (al-Manar, September 4, 2026).
  • Hezbollah said it demanded continued reliance on the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement and opposed establishing new security and political arrangements under the framework agreement. Hezbollah said it did not consider itself bound by the results of the direct negotiations if they included measures detrimental to its weapons or status, even if they had Lebanese authority approval. According to claims, their position is coordinated with Parliament Speaker Berri (al-Diyar, September 1, 2026).
• President Aoun is determined to continue the negotiations, and sources noted no progress had been made in contacts between the presidential office and Hezbollah, and a return to direct dialogue between the sides is not immediately expected (al-Liwaa, September 3, 2026). According to a report, meetings between Hezbollah and Lebanese army officials have ceased over the issue of a state monopoly on weapons. Figures in Hezbollah’s “security” forces no longer visit army headquarters and the security clearances of party officials have been revoked. However, contacts for local coordination continue at the field level between military intelligence officers and organization operatives, mainly in south Lebanon and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Nahar, September 1, 2026).
• Tensions were reported with the Amal movement, Hezbollah’s Shi’ite ally. According to a source, the movement’s chairman, Nabih Berri, is dissatisfied with Hezbollah’s conduct and the situation in the south, amid claims that the organization does not include him in all its military and regional decisions and his ability to influence them has diminished. The source noted tension between Amal and Hezbollah supporters in some villages in the south because of the destruction and the effects of the fighting, but claimed it did not mean a rift between Berri and Hezbollah or that Amal planned to dissolve its alliance with the organization (Erem News, September 4, 2026).
• On the other hand, a Hezbollah delegation headed by political council deputy chairman Mahmoud Qamati met with Free Patriotic Movement chairman Gebran Bassil for the first time in almost a year, one in a series of meetings the organization is holding with political parties and figures. They discussed the state monopoly on weapons, negotiations with Israel and the situation in the south. The mutual assessment was that the resumption of dialogue was positive but did not constitute a renewal of the alliance, and the dispute over Hezbollah’s weapons and “security” strategy remained unchanged (al-Diyar, September 5, 2026).
• Reportedly, the possibility of direct dialogue between Hezbollah and the United States is stalled and the organization regards Nabih Berri as the channel for contacts concerning the south, while watching developments in the negotiations between Iran and the United States (al-Diyar, September 5, 2026).

Opposition to Hezbollah

• Fouad Makhzoumi, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and an opponent of Hezbollah, said he supported President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam and the framework agreement, which he called as way to end the war, restore sovereignty and begin reconstruction. He said weapons and declarations of war and peace should be solely in the hands of the state, along with a full Israeli withdrawal (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, September 4, 2026).
• The Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Democrat coalition said they supported continuing the negotiations and the framework agreement and called for transferring responsibility for weapons and declarations of war and peace to the state. They said it was necessary to restore sovereignty, achieve an Israeli withdrawal, enable the displaced residents to return and rebuild the country (al-Diyar, September 1, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, September 5, 2026).
• Lebanese Forces Party chairman Samir Geagea said the framework agreement was the only available opportunity to end the current fighting and the cycle of wars on the southern border. He said a key condition for the success of the agreement was dismantling the “military and security” groups which operated outside the state, especially Hezbollah, and called on the organization to surrender its weapons and on the state to take practical measures if it did not (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).

The Security Situation in South Lebanon

The IDF Takes Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge^[3]

• The IDF announced it had completed clearing two Hezbollah tunnels on the Ali al-Taher Ridge in the security zone in south Lebanon and stated the forces had operational control of the area above and below ground. According to the announcement, Hezbollah operatives were eliminated while others fled; rooms for planning military operations, for storing weapons, and infrastructure for extended stays were found. The IDF said the compound had been built over two decades, planned and funded by Iran (IDF spokesperson, September 3, 2026).
• Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said the Lebanese president’s proposal, which received the support of Parliament Speaker Berri, to transfer the facilities on the ridge and control of the site to the Lebanese army, was intended to prevent a large-scale Israeli operation, but efforts to reach understandings encountered difficulties (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).
• A source familiar with the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel said Hezbollah could not have evacuated the Ali al-Taher Ridge without consulting the Iranian leadership, given Tehran’s threat to act on Hezbollah’s behalf if Israel attacked the site, and therefore Iran had given the organization the green light to leave. The source said Hezbollah had surprised the Lebanese leadership because the organization had forfeited an opportunity to transfer the ridge to the Lebanese army and thereby give the Lebanese delegation an advantage ahead of the next round of negotiations with Israel, but added that Hezbollah had wanted to redeploy and ensure its continued hold on weapons north of the Litani River (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 6, 2026).
• Fouad Makhzoumi, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and an opponent of Hezbollah, said that if the reports about the fall of the ridge were correct, Hezbollah had prevented the Lebanese army’s deployment at the site but had failed to prevent Israel from entering it (Fouad Makhzoumi’s X account, September 5, 2026). Lebanese Forces Party chairman Samir Geagea also criticized the fact that the area had not been handed over to the Lebanese army before the IDF entered it (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).
• Before the Israeli announcement, Iran reportedly warned the United States through Oman that it would respond to a large-scale Israeli move to take control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge. A White House official denied the report, while Hezbollah stated that a such large-scale Israeli operation would be considered a return to all-out war (al-Madan, September 3, 2026).

The IDF

• IDF forces continued operations in the security zone in south Lebanon targeting Hezbollah infrastructure, locating and destroying anti-tank missiles, RPGs, launchers, explosive devices and other weapons, as well as organization assets concealed within civilian facilities. In response to three incidents in which explosive UAVs were launched at IDF forces, causing no casualties, the IDF attacked Hezbollah facilities, terrorist operatives and weapons depots in the al-Nabatieh area and other areas in south Lebanon, including a Hezbollah headquarters operating in a building formerly used as a hospital (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 31-September 7, 2026).^[4] IDF forces simultaneously blew up 15 tunnels between the Beaufort (al-Shaqif) area and the Ali al-Taher Ridge (MTV Lebanon, September 6, 2026).

• The Lebanese ministry of health and civil defense reported at least 23 people killed, including children, and more than 50 wounded in Israeli attacks in south Lebanon during the week, including ten people killed in attacks in Kafr Rumman. The ministry condemned the attack on the building used by al-Ghandour Hospital in al-Nabatieh al-Fawqa, calling it a violation of international humanitarian agreements. According to the announcement, the hospital had been forced to cease operations approximately two months earlier because of Israeli attacks in the al-Nabatieh area (al-Nashra and al-Mayadeen, September 4-7, 2026). According to Hezbollah-affiliated channels, some of those killed were organization operatives (Hezbollah in the Field Telegram channel, September 4 to 7, 2026). A large number of residents fled from Deir al-Zahrani the IDF’s Arabic-language spokesperson issued a warning before an attack on a local building (al-Nahar, September 7, 2026).
• According to the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, between the signing of the framework agreement on June 26 and August 31, 2026, at least 655 incidents of Israeli military activity were documented in south Lebanon, including 190 airstrikes and 225 operations involving the demolition and destruction of houses and buildings, as well as artillery fire, tank fire and other operations. Most of the activity during was in al-Nabatieh al-Fawqa and al-Mansouri (al-Akhbar, September 1, 2026).

Challenges Facing Hezbollah

Preserving and Reconstructing Military Capabilities

• Following the damage to Hezbollah’s veteran commanders, the organization is filling military and security command positions with operatives from a younger generation. Hezbollah-affiliated commentator Qassem Qassir said commanders in their 30s and 40s, who were trained in advance for command positions, currently managed some of the military and “security” activity. The secretary general of Iran’s national security council, Mohsen Rezaei, also claimed two new generations of commanders had emerged and Hezbollah had preserved its command capability (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 31, 2026).
• According to a Lebanese source, Hezbollah has begun transferring some of its weapons, ammunition and military equipment from known depots and military sites to dozens of smaller sites, including private properties, farms and commercial warehouses owned or managed by parties close to the organization. It is not a complete evacuation of the main depots, but rather the dispersal of some of the weapon stockpiles, mainly light weapons, ammunition, portable missiles and military equipment, to reduce their exposure to attacks and searches, including in the pilot zones (Erem News, September 4, 2026).

Hezbollah and Iran

• Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization had decided to join the fighting in 2026 after 15 months during which the state had failed to implement the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. He said Hezbollah had consequently become part of an Iranian-led regional “equation.” He said the organization was proud of its alliance with Tehran and its reliance on Iran’s power, and did not intend to relinquish its sources of strength (al-Joumhouria, September 5, 2026).
• Hassan Ezzeddine, also a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, admitted the organization was having difficulty restoring the deterrent capability it had before October 2023, although he claimed it still halted the expansion of Israeli activity. He represented Iran as the main actor capable of changing the situation in Lebanon and claimed the Lebanese issue was Tehran’s top priority in its contacts with the United States (al-Joumhouria, September 1–2, 2026).
• An American intelligence source said Washington suspected elements in Lebanese general security had granted Hezbollah concessions at Beirut airport and the port and helped Iranian operatives obtain Lebanese documents. According to the source, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel moved into and out of Lebanon and in some cases the identities of Lebanese citizens are being investigated, including people who are no longer alive, whose names were used to issue documents to Iranian operatives. Cases in which Iranians passed through the airport and land crossings using Lebanese documents are also under investigation (al-Hadath, September 2, 2026).

Finances

• With the pressure on Hezbollah’s financial apparatus, in recent months the organization has reportedly increased its purchases of gold bullion and transferred it to storage as a financial reserve outside the banking system (Erem News, September 2, 2026).
• The al-Qard al-Hassan Association, Hezbollah’s financial arm, is reportedly reopening branches damaged in Israeli attacks, and in some cases operating without identifying signage. In Tyre, the opening of a planned branch was canceled following opposition from residents and business owners (Nidaa al-Watan, September 1, 2026; al-Diyar, September 5, 2026).
• According to Lebanese sources, concern over the expansion of American sanctions on networks assisting Hezbollah is growing among politicians, businesspeople and bodies identified with the pro-Hezbollah camp. Some of them have begun reassessing their financial and business ties and reducing their public identification with the organization’s positions out of concern they could be included in sanctions (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026).

Reconstruction

• Hezbollah and its affiliated bodies continue operating aid networks in villages in the south. According to a Lebanese security source, the organization expanded the distribution of financial aid, food and medicine as well as its involvement in recording war damage and assisting families (Erem News, August 31, 2026). At the same time, the Wa Ta’awanu Association distributed household equipment in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, which is part of the pilot zones, including refrigerators, washing machines and water tanks, with the aim of helping residents remain in their villages and encouraging other residents to return (al-Manar, September 4, 2026).^[5]

• However, criticism of Hezbollah and the bodies providing aid to the population was reported among some residents of towns in the south. According to a local source, residents complained about the limited presence of senior organization officials and the lack of direct follow-up regarding their needs, while there were claims of favoritism and personal connections in the distribution of some aid funds (Lebanon24, September 2, 2026).
• A Lebanese political source said Hezbollah and the Amal movement were trying to preserve the role of institutions in which they had influence in managing compensation, reconstruction and social-service funds, especially the council of the south, because of the new government mechanisms to manage some reconstruction funds under centralized supervision. As part of the 2026 budget discussions, the transfer of approximately $90 million from the reserve to the council of the south was approved, while the World Bank began financing $250 million under a separate government reconstruction program based on oversight and transparency mechanisms (Erem News, September 3, 2026).

Hezbollah and Syria

• It was recently reported that several meetings had been held by Hezbollah representatives and representatives of the new Syrian government, with Turkish mediation. They agreed to establish a technical committee to coordinate movements on both sides of the border and discussed issues concerning the dead, prisoners, wounded and missing persons. The committee operated for more than three months, but meetings have since ceased, although according to the report the Syrian government continued to convey positive messages regarding turning over a new leaf in relations with Hezbollah (al-Diyar, September 2, 2026).
• Lebanese security forces arrested five Lebanese and Syrians on suspicion of membership in a network of loyalists of the former Assad regime which transferred operatives from Syria to Lebanon and train them. According to legal and security sources, 50 operatives were transferred in small groups through north Lebanon, and some underwent training in operating explosive devices and UAVs in the Beqa’a Valley area. The investigation is examining whether operatives linked to Hezbollah gave network members training and protection and if an association based in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia gave some of them financial assistance. Hezbollah denied any connection to the network or its training activities (al-Madan, al-Nahar, Lebanon Debate and Hezbollah’s combat information channel, September 2, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, September 3, 2026; Lebanon Debate, September 4, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• Preparations continue for the meeting in Paris before the international conference in support of the Lebanese army and internal security forces scheduled for September 17, 2026. President Aoun and Interior Minister Ahmad al-Hajjar discussed preparations for the meeting and mobilizing the support required to strengthen the capabilities of the security forces and extend state authority throughout Lebanese territory. Army commander Rodolphe Haykal visited Jordan, where King Abdullah II said he supported strengthening the army’s capabilities (Lebanese army X account, September 1, 2026; Lebanese presidency X account, September 2, 2026).

UNIFIL

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said his country wanted a continued UNIFIL presence in the south, but if extending the mandate was impossible, Lebanon would welcome the participation of countries which would support the army and the population of the south. He said contacts were underway to devise a legal framework which would make such an international presence possible after UNIFIL’s activity ended in December 2026 (Lebanese presidency’s X account, September 3, 2026).
• The EU is considering establishing a new civilian-military mission in Lebanon after the end of UNIFIL, which would focus on advising, training and strengthening the capabilities of the Lebanese forces. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that more than ten member states were willing to allocate personnel and resources to the mission. According to Lebanese sources, it would not be a force which would undertake combat missions or military supervision, but rather would provide logistical assistance, training, equipment and mine clearance. Ireland has already announced its willingness to participate (al-Arabiya, September 1, 2026; al-Liwaa, September 3, 2026).
• France and Italy are working to formulate a separate framework which would make an international presence in Lebanon under UN auspices possible after the end of UNIFIL’s mandate. A French diplomatic source said consultations were taking place with members of the Security Council, while UN Secretary General António Guterres proposed several alternatives for a continued international presence. No agreement has been reached on the nature, authority or composition of the mechanism (al-Arabiya, September 1, 2026).

The Civilian Situation in South Lebanon

• The Lebanese ministry of health reported that from the beginning of the fighting on March 2, 2026 through September 6, 2026, 4,362 people had been killed and 12,378 wounded. Since October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah began its “support campaign” for the Gaza Strip, the cumulative number of people killed was 8,929 and the number of wounded was 30,614 (al-Nashra, September 6, 2026).
• The Lebanese government continues measures to assist the displaced and enable residents of the south to return. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with representatives of several border villages and discussed residents’ needs and the conditions required for their return. President Joseph Aoun called on the council of the south to accelerate reconstruction and infrastructure projects and to act transparently in areas where security conditions permitted (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, August 31-September 1; Lebanese presidency X account, September 3, 2026).
• During a visit to al-Nabatieh, social affairs Minister Hanin al-Sayyed announced the third phase of the social safety net program, under which $14.3 million in assistance will be provided to approximately 128,600 families comprising approximately 426,000 people (al-Diyar, September 2, 2026).
• The new school year begins on September 15, 2026, but 21,000 displaced residents reportedly remain in reception centers operating in schools, most of them residents of villages inside the Yellow Line. The Lebanese ministry of education devised a program in which schools used as reception centers would, if necessary, shift to remote learning or transfer their students to alternative buildings, while some of the reception centers would continue to operate (al-Diyar, September 1, 2026).
• Mines and unexploded ordnance pose a risk to residents and delay the return to villages and reconstruction work in south Lebanon. According to the Lebanon mine action center, since October 2023, 14 people have been killed and 43 wounded by unexploded ordnance and mines in areas where survey and clearance operations have not yet been completed. Approximately half of the casualties were farmers and shepherds, and most of the incidents were recorded in the Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun districts, followed by Tyre and Hasbaya (al-Akhbar, September 5, 2026).
• Hezbollah has begun to resume social activity. The “Proud Dahiyeh” festival opened in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, the first held since the war, with the participation of more than 200 exhibitors from Beirut, the south, the Beqa’a Valley and other areas in Lebanon (al-Madan and the Hezbollah parliamentary faction website, September 3, 2026).
• the mechanism (al-Arabiya, September 1, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

• Fatah and other PLO organizations transferred quantities of weapons and ammunition to the Lebanese army, including medium weapons. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have not yet joined the process. According to a Palestinian source, a decision regarding the weapons of the two organizations is also linked to Hezbollah’s position and the discussion regarding the future of its weapons (Lebanon24, September 3, 2026).
• Representatives of Hezbollah and the so-called alliance of Palestinian forces, headed by Hamas’ political representative in the Tyre area, discussed the situation in the Palestinian refugee camps and developments in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and noted the continuation of coordination between the Palestinian and Lebanese “resistance”^[6] (Nidaa al-Watan, September 5, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Hezbollah, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating to destroy the State of Israel.
^[3] See the August 2026 Amit Institute report, Dismantling the Hezbollah Infrastructure at the Ali Taher Ridge to Advance the Ceasefire Agreement.
^[4] Hezbollah does not issue claims of responsibility for launching explosive UAVs.
^[5] See the August 2026 Amit Institute report, Hezbollah in the Pilot Zones Disguised as Civilian Organizations.
^[6] Hezbollah, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations working to destroy the State of Israel.

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