Spotlight on Terrorism Hezbollah and Lebanon (Aug 10 – 17, 2026)

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• The Ali al-Taher Ridge continues to be a stumbling block in activating the pilot areas.
• Hezbollah is considering escalation and waiting for a green light from Iran.
• The negotiations between Israel and Lebanon are stalled as the Americans try to resolve the core issues.
• The controversy in the internal Lebanese arena regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament is intensifying.

 

Overview^[1]

• A Hezbollah explosive UAV struck an IDF force operating in the Ali al-Taher Ridge area, wounding three IDF soldiers. In response the IDF attacked Hezbollah targets, including north of the Litani River.
• The United States continues its attempts to preserve the negotiation process between Israel and Lebanon and advance an international monitoring mechanism. Despite growing frustration in Beirut, President Joseph Aoun still considers the diplomatic track a strategic choice, but the Lebanese leadership demands tangible achievements which will help it gain support in the internal arena.
• The dispute in the internal Lebanese arena over Hezbollah’s disarmament and the negotiations with Israel has intensified. Hezbollah continues to oppose disarmament and calls for an end to the negotiations with Israel, while Hezbollah opponents demand its disarmament as a condition for restoring sovereignty and progressing toward an arrangement with Israel.
• Hezbollah is making efforts to preserve and restore its wiggle room in the internal and regional arenas while military-political pressure is being exerted on it, including renewed channels of dialogue with President Aoun, a limited rapprochement with the Free Patriotic Movement and attempts to open a channel of communication with the new Syrian leadership.
• In south Lebanon, difficulties continue regarding the return of residents and the reconstruction of the communities which were damaged. Even in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, the first pilot area in which the Lebanese army deployed, the extensive destruction, lack of services and continued Israeli activity indicate that the transfer of security control to the state has still not translated into a full return to normal.

The Military Situation in South Lebanon

The IDF

• On August 15, a Hezbollah explosive UAV struck an IDF force operating on the Ali al-Taher Ridge in the security zone in south Lebanon, wounding an officer and two soldiers. The IDF reported the attack was a violation of the ceasefire agreement and responded with a wave of attacks on Hezbollah targets, including in areas north of the Litani River. In a strike in the Ansar area, Ali Samir al-Hajj Hassan, a battalion commander in Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Unit and other operatives who were involved in advancing terrorist attack plans against IDF forces were eliminated. The IDF confirmed that members of Hassan’s family were also hit in the attack. They were not targets but had been used as human shields. A key Hezbollah headquarters in the Ansar area, used to command activity in the area, was attacked, and in an attack in the Deir al-Zahrani area, Abu Hassan Alaa, a senior commander in the Badr Unit (responsible for the area between the Litani River and the Awali River) was eliminated. Lebanese sources reported that the attack in Ansar hit a house on the outskirts of the village and killed seven people, while the attack in Deir al-Zahrani killed four and wounded seventeen (IDF spokesperson, Reuters, AP, Lebanon Debate, August 15–16, 2026).
• This past week IDF forces continued activities in the security zone in south Lebanon, focusing on entrenching their hold on the ground, locating and destroying Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons and removing threats to the forces. Operations continued in the Ali al-Taher Ridge area, with Israeli media reporting an expansion of the Israeli hold on the ridge and activity targeting Hezbollah’s military and underground infrastructure in the area (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 11–14, 2026).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah exploited the IDF attacks to reiterate its position that direct negotiations with Israel were fruitless and would not lead to an Israeli withdrawal. The organization again called on the authorities to reconsider the diplomatic track and reliance on American guarantees, warning that continued attacks and the attempt to establish facts on the ground would be met with an appropriate response (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 15, 2026).
• Hezbollah did not issue claims of responsibility for operations against IDF forces, even when Israel attributed them to the organization, and has thus far not expanded the confrontation by shooting at Israeli territory. However, the developments on the Ali al-Taher Ridge show that public silence does not necessarily indicate a lack of operational activity. Even before August 15, al-Diyar, citing Arab diplomatic sources, reported that Hezbollah was preparing for a possible Israeli escalation and limited ground operation, with the ridge viewed as a possible focal point of confrontation. The report was not verified by official or independent sources (al-Diyar, August 12, Hezbollah Telegram channel, IDF spokesperson and Lebanese media, August 10–16, 2026).

Lebanon

• Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam condemned the IDF attacks, claiming they were undermining efforts to stabilize the south. Referring to the casualties in Ansar, he said civilians were not military infrastructure and that even when military infrastructure did exist, the state was responsible for dealing with it through the army and legitimate institutions. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri condemned the attacks and called for a unified Lebanese position and for the sponsors of the arrangement to stop them (al-Akhbar, Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, Lebanese News Agency, August 15, 2026).

• The attacks following the events indicate that the Ali al-Taher Ridge is not only a disputed issue but also has the potential to expand the campaign. According to commentaries in the Lebanese media, Israel could expand its activity against Hezbollah infrastructure beyond the ridge and even north of the Litani River while using military pressure to advance its demands in the negotiations. Hezbollah remains ambiguous regarding its activity and currently does not take action to expand the confrontation. According to a diplomatic source, following the wave of attacks there were contacts between Beirut and Washington which led to the understanding that Israel would not escalate and Hezbollah would not respond to the killing of its commanders (al-Madan, August 15, Nidaa al-Watan, August 16–17, 2026).
• An op-ed piece in al-Madan claimed that the escalation on August 15 could signal an expansion of the campaign around the Ali al-Taher Ridge beyond the ridge itself and even north of the Litani River. According to Lebanese sources, the attack on the Israeli force came from outside the compound itself and Israel could expand its activity against Hezbollah infrastructure in the area between the ridge and the coast and even toward the al-Rayhan, al-Jarmaq and Iqlim al-Tuffah ridges. Hezbollah may not escalate its response, given the developments in Iran–United States relations. A Lebanese political source said Hezbollah was looking for an opportunity to cancel the option of direct negotiations and had begun to increase its military activity while waiting for a green light from Iran which would enable another significant escalation given the tensions with the United States. According to the source, the escalation in south Lebanon could herald more serious scenarios, including a renewal of the outright hostilities and the collapse of the direct negotiations (al-Madan, August 15, 2026, Nidaa al-Watan, August 16, 2026).
• It was reported in Lebanon that Israel demanded Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the compound and its transfer to the control of the Lebanese army, and linked the handling of the compound to progress in expanding the pilot areas and in the verification mechanism. It was also reported that the president suggested handing over the compound and the heavy weapons in it to the army, while guaranteeing the departure of the operatives and preventing Israeli action against it. It is unclear whether Hezbollah responded to the proposal. Another report claimed that Hezbollah was adjusting its military deployment in the area and preparing positions and weapons with the assistance of the Iranian Qods Force, but the report is unverified (al-Diyar, al-Markazia, August 14, al-Nahar, al-Madan, August 15, 2026).

The Direct Negotiations and the Framework Agreement

• The seventh round of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon ended without a breakthrough or a date for another round. According to reports, Israel focused on coordination mechanisms with the Lebanese army and a mechanism for verifying its activity, and would not proceed with the establishment of an additional pilot area at this stage. The Lebanese were dissatisfied with the lack of progress in the negotiations. The head of the Lebanese negotiating team, Ambassador Simon Karam, had reservations about participating in more talks without progress on the issues of withdrawal and the cessation of infrastructure demolition, while at the same time differences were reported between the Lebanese political and military delegations. President Joseph Aoun continued to present the negotiations as a strategic option with the backing of the United States and Saudi Arabia (al-Akhbar, August 10, 2026).
• In addition to committing to the diplomatic track, Lebanon hardened its position in the wake of the limited results of the seventh round. Reportedly Lebanon told the United States it might not participate in more talks without progress on the ground, especially the cessation of demolitions and land-clearing activities and the expansion of the pilot areas. However, following increased American involvement, it was decided to continue and wait for a date to be set for the eighth round because of the absence of a practical alternative and concern that halting the talks would lead to escalation. Accordingly, currently there is no Lebanese decision to suspend the negotiations, although the date of the next round has not yet been officially set (al-Nashra, Eram News, al-Joumhouria, al-Liwaa, August 10–14, 2026).
• An official in the American State Department was more positive, claiming operational parameters and maps for the pilot areas had been completed during the talks in Rome, joint benchmarks for verification and mine clearance were formulated and a roadmap was agreed upon for subsequently expanding the model. Lebanon is expected to present plans for securing additional areas during the next technical round, and the diplomatic track may resume in early September (Nidaa al-Watan, August 11, 2026).
• Hezbollah gave the Lebanese army and official parties a list of Lebanese nationals who were being held or missing and believed to be in Israeli hands, and requested that the state handle their cases as part of the negotiations rather than as a file belonging solely to the organization. The list includes Hezbollah operatives captured during the fighting, alongside civilians and missing persons (Eram News, August 11, 2026).

The Pilot Areas Plan and the Verification Mechanism

• Sources in the Lebanese army denied Israeli claims of coordination between the army and Hezbollah and claimed Israel was using them to delay its withdrawal from the pilot areas. They claimed Israel sought to retain a key role in verifying the army’s activity and demanded the mechanism permit searches of private homes. Conversely, a diplomatic source said that Israel presented information during the talks about Hezbollah tunnels and infrastructure and demanded guarantees they would not be rebuilt following its withdrawal. Reportedly, the main dispute is that Lebanon demands an Israeli withdrawal, after which the army will deploy and carry out its mission on the ground, while Israel seeks first to see Hezbollah infrastructure dismantled and proof of the state’s ability to prevent its reconstruction, and only then to proceed with the withdrawal (al-Joumhouria, August 10, 12, 2026). The dispute has a practical side as well, in that according to a source in the Lebanese army, in recent months Hezbollah has mined roads and buildings in areas where Israeli forces operated, while Israeli attacks have left a large amount of unexploded ordnance and remnants of munitions in the south. The transfer of additional areas to army control will therefore require searches, mine clearance and engineering clearance, further illustrating the importance of the verification mechanism (Eram News, August 12, 2026).
• The American State Department said it expected the Lebanese army to complete infrastructure-clearing operations in the initial pilot areas. A senior American State Department official said Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem was subordinate to Iran, adding that the organization was a major obstacle to Lebanon’s economic recovery and a threat to its security and stability. He said Hezbollah had to be disarmed and dismantled (Lebanon Debate, August 16, 2026).
• The head of the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L), General Joseph Clearfield, arrived in Beirut after holding talks in Israel. Meeting with President Joseph Aoun, Lebanese army Commander Rodolphe Haykal and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Clearfield focused on implementing the agreement, the verification mechanism, the deployment of the Lebanese army and Israeli withdrawals. The American effort is focused on advancing a gradual Israeli withdrawal and the presentation of tangible Lebanese steps to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure (al-Joumhouria, al-Akhbar, al-Diyar, August 14, 2026).
• Discussions continued for the formulation of an international mechanism to verify the Lebanese army’s activity in dismantling military-terrorist infrastructure. Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia were mentioned as possible participants, but its composition, authorities and chain of command have not yet been decided. The dispute is expected to intensify if the mechanism’s activity is expanded north of the Litani River. According to Lebanese sources, Hezbollah opposes that, while the Lebanese army claims searches of homes and private property require individual warrants and appropriate legal proceedings. Accordingly, expanding the verification mechanism northward could present the army with the challenges of enforcing the state’s monopoly on weapons while preserving the legal framework and avoiding friction with the local population (Reuters, al-Diyar, al-Nahar, August 12–14, 2026).

     
Right: Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and American Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa meet with the head of the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L), American General Joseph Clearfield. Left: Clearfield meets with Lebanese army commander Haykal (Lebanese presidency and Lebanese army X accounts, August 12, 2026).

The Lebanese Government

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated his commitment to negotiations with Israel, which he said were making progress and were preferable to continued war. He claimed that since the signing of the framework agreement, Israeli attacks had decreased and the Lebanese objective remained a full Israeli withdrawal, the return of the prisoners and the reconstruction of damaged areas. He sharply criticized Hezbollah’s concept of “resistance,”^[2] saying that experience had proven the slogan “what was taken by force can only be restored by force” was irrelevant and the residents of the south should not be dragged into wars waged in their name for non-Lebanese objectives. He said his goal was to rebuild the state, whatever the cost (Lebanese presidency X account, August 11, 2026).
• Prime Minister Nawaf Salam condemned the continued Israeli incursions and land-clearing and demolition activities in the south and claimed they damaged homes, infrastructure and public buildings and made it difficult for residents to return and for the villages to be rebuilt. He said Lebanon’s sovereignty and the right of the residents of the south to return to their homes were not matters to be bargained over (Nawaf Salam’s X account, August 12, 2026).
• Apparently, the main problem for the Lebanese leadership is the need to show the diplomatic track has produced tangible returns. Continued Israeli activity in the south without progress on withdrawal enables Hezbollah to argue that the state is being required to disarm the organization and expand the army’s control without receiving corresponding Israeli concessions. The Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar claimed Lebanon was receiving nothing in return for the pilot areas, which are based on deployment of the Lebanese army and a subsequent gradual Israeli withdrawal from them. That increases the pressure on President Aoun and the government to prove that transferring security decision-making to the state and choosing negotiations over “resistance” can produce results, and that state’s monopoly on weapons will also be translated into achievements vis-à-vis Israel (Eram News, al-Akhbar, August 10, 2026).

Hezbollah

• Hezbollah and elements within the Shi’ite community intensified their criticism of the framework agreement and direct negotiations with Israel because of the lack of tangible achievements regarding the withdrawal and the continuation of Israeli activity in the south. Opponents of the agreement represented the results of the seventh round in Rome as proof of the failure of the diplomatic track and argued that the demand for Hezbollah’s disarmament advanced without an Israeli quid pro quo. The escalation on August 15 added momentum to the criticism and led to more demands to halt the negotiations and rely on the “resistance”^[3] to confront Israel
• In a speech marking 20 years since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem again said he opposed the negotiations and seven rounds of talks had produced nothing for Lebanon, while Israel continued to “attack, destroy and occupy Lebanese territory.” He called on the Lebanese authorities to acknowledge the failure of the negotiations and rely on Lebanon’s elements of strength, including the “resistance and unity.” He also criticized the pilot areas and the verification mechanism, which he said undermined the army’s sovereignty and status. He reiterated that Hezbollah would not accept any degrading of the capabilities of the “resistance” and accused the authorities of subordinating Lebanese interests to the United States and Israel (Na’im Qassem’s website, August 14, 2026).

• Exchanges between supporters and opponents of the agreement continued in the Lebanese parliament. Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, criticized the leadership’s adherence to the “failed” framework agreement, and Sami Gemayel responded that if Hezbollah opposed government policy, its ministers should resign from the government (al-Nashra, August 11, 2026).
• The Shi’ite religious and political leadership which supports Hezbollah’s position remained faithful to criticism of the agreement. Sheikh Ali al-Khatib, the deputy chairman of the Islamic Shi’ite Council, claimed the demand to disarm the “resistance” meant surrender, while Ali al-Miqdad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the results of the Rome talks were proof the negotiations had failed. Following the attacks on August 15, he called for the immediate cessation of the negotiations and the convening of a national dialogue to formulate an alternative course of action. He said the attacks showed the failure of the diplomatic track, and the anger of residents in the areas which had been attacked reached a level which could lead to an uncontrollable eruption. Similar positions were expressed during the week by Jaafari Mufti Sheikh Ahmad Qabalan and Ali Fadlallah, who called for a change in policy in view of the continued Israeli activity in south Lebanon. Qabalan presented the demand to disarm the “resistance” as also directed against the Shi’ite community and called for an arrangement between the army and Hezbollah within an internal Lebanese consensus (al-Diyar, August 10, 12 and 14, 2026, al-Joumhouria, August 14, 2026, al-Nashra, August 15, 2026, Lebanese News Agency, August 16, 2026).

Support for the Agreement

• The supporters of the framework agreement and of strengthening state authority continued to demand Hezbollah’s disarmament, calling it a condition for restoring sovereignty and the success of the negotiations. Kataeb Party chairman Sami Gemayel reiterated his support for the diplomatic track and said Hezbollah’s disarmament and the extension of state authority over all Lebanese territory were currently the main tasks. He said partial solutions were insufficient and dealing with the weapons issue should not be postponed, since resolving it was a condition for stabilizing the state and rebuilding the economy. He called for an internal Lebanese dialogue to address concerns and prevent reliance on external actors, adding that his party’s support for the state leadership was conditional on the continuation of the track (al-Diyar, August 11, 14, 2026).
• Lebanese Forces Party chairman Samir Geagea placed responsibility for the difficulties in the negotiations with Israel on Hezbollah and the political echelon. He said the failure to meet the commitment to dismantle Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus had damaged the state’s credibility and was delaying Israel’s withdrawal. He said responsibility did not rest with the Lebanese army but with the political echelon, which he claimed postponed decisions and waited for regional developments instead of enforcing its decisions regarding the state’s monopoly on weapons. Parliamentary bloc member Pierre Bou Assi called for disarmament to begin north of the Litani River and subsequently throughout the country, but reiterated the demand for a full Israeli withdrawal, warning that the continued escalation and the delay in establishing the verification mechanism were detrimental to the negotiations. He said the framework agreement should be reinforced, including as a means of further distancing Lebanon from the Iranian track (al-Markazia, August 14, Lebanese News Agency, August 16, 2026).
• Charles Jabbour, head of communications for the Lebanese Forces, raised the possibility of separation and partition of the country if it proved impossible to reconcile Hezbollah’s concept of “resistance” with the aspiration for a state which had a monopoly on force. He said that just as Hezbollah should not be forced to accept a project in which it did not believe, the rest of the Lebanese should not be left hostages to the project of weapons and war (Charles Jabbour’s X account, August 13, 2026).

Hezbollah: The Internal and External Arenas

The Internal Political Arena

• Reports indicate growing differences between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, primarily over the weapons issue and their attitudes toward government policy, with a joint effort to prevent their differences from developing into an open confrontation within the Shi’ite camp. Reportedly, contrary to Hezbollah’s position, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri supports the government’s decisions on the state’s monopoly on weapons, opposes toppling the government and takes a more pragmatic approach toward the negotiations with Israel and the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Despite the differences, both sides are careful to preserve their alliance and channels of coordination, based on a shared interest in preventing confrontation within the Shi’ite community and waiting for regional developments to become clearer (Lebanon 24, August 12, Asas Media, August 16, 2026).
• Hezbollah is making efforts to preserve and restore channels of political cooperation. Coordination between Hezbollah and Amal was reported with the objective of reducing mutual accusations, along with a renewed rapprochement with the Free Patriotic Movement after members of parliament from both camps adopted similar positions on several issues. Although the Movement said that did not mean a return to the strategic alliance and the dispute over Hezbollah’s weapons remains unchanged, both sides appear to want to renew the dialogue ahead of the parliamentary elections and as part of Hezbollah’s attempt to restore some of its lost Christian support base (Lebanon 24, August 12, al-Diyar, August 14, 2026).
• In addition to the public confrontation over the organization’s weapons, channels of communication between Hezbollah and President Joseph Aoun had reportedly been renewed after a period of tension. There has thus far been no change in the substantive disputes, but the renewal of contacts indicates an attempt to manage them through dialogue. Meanwhile, Hezbollah circles continue to criticize the president. An article in al-Akhbar claimed he was working not only to disarm the organization but also to reduce its sources of Iranian funding. The presidency denied reports concerning statements attributed to Aoun during his meeting with the American president (Lebanon 24, August 12, al-Akhbar and the Lebanese presidency X account, August 13, 2026).

Hezbollah and Syria

• Reports continue of a possible a channel for dialogue between Hezbollah and the new Syrian leadership. After Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said they were prepared, in principle, to engage in dialogue, Na’im Qassem said Hezbollah was as well. Lebanese reports pointed to mediation attempts, initially through Russia and subsequently through Turkey, to open channels of communication between them and reach understandings which would prevent escalation along the border. So far there have been no reports that the contacts have matured into an official channel (al-Diyar, al-Liwaa, Nidaa al-Watan, August 11–12, 2026).
• The Lebanon-Syria border remains a security challenge. An increase in human smuggling and the diversion of some fuel-smuggling routes northward, primarily in the Wadi Khaled area, were reported. Security sources noted that smuggling networks rapidly adapted their routes to enforcement measures and the topography, the large number of illegal crossings and the shortage of personnel made it difficult to seal the border. Meanwhile, coordination between the Lebanese and Syrian security services continued in view of concerns about the entry of individuals with military backgrounds or ties to “armed organizations” (al-Akhbar, August 15, 2026).

Iran, Funding and the Social System

• Questions are being asked about Hezbollah’s ability to finance its extensive organizational and social apparatus. Iranian religious-political figure Mohammad Baqer Kharrazi called on the organization to reduce its dependence on Iranian funding and expand local sources of income. It was later reported that he was summoned for legal proceedings following his remarks. Currently there is no indication of a change in Iranian support policy, but the remarks are significant in view of the scope of the apparatus Hezbollah is required to finance: the National Relief Authority – Samidoun reported that during the war it had approximately 40,000 operatives and volunteers and provided assistance to approximately 226,000 displaced families, alongside health services, food, education and psychological support (Nidaa al-Watan, al-Akhbar, August 13, 2026).

Increasing Pressure on Hezbollah’s Infrastructure

• Four months after the government’s decision to put weapons in Beirut under the authority of the state, a Hezbollah cell was reportedly exposed in the Ras al-Nabaa area (the southeastern part of central Beirut) following an investigation that began with a family dispute. According to the report, one of the detainees admitted that he belonged to a group of ten operatives who carried out security, control and surveillance missions under the direction of an organization field commander. The case was transferred to the military court, and the incident led to renewed criticism over the failure to implement the government’s decision to make Beirut free of illegal weapons (al-Markazia, August 10, 2026).

UNIFIL

• In view of discussions regarding the future of the international presence in south Lebanon, UNIFIL commander Diodato Abagnara reiterated that UN Security Council Resolution 1701 remained the basis for the force’s activity and coordination with the Lebanese army. Human Rights Watch called on the Security Council to ensure the presence of a significant international force in the south even after UNIFIL’s current mandate ends at the end of 2026, arguing that a withdrawal without an alternative could have a negative impact on protecting the civilian population (al-Nashra, August 11, Nidaa al-Watan, August 14, 2026).

Syria-Lebanon

• Farah al-Atassi, an adviser to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, met in Beirut with senior Lebanese officials, including Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, an adviser to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Lebanese army commander Rodolphe Haykal and General Security Director General Hassan Choucair. Reportedly, al-Atassi presented Damascus’ positions and concerns regarding Hezbollah’s weapons and activity related to the organization along the Lebanon-Syria border, and related to the pressure being exerted on Syria on the issue. She also conveyed the message that Damascus wanted regional stability and to “extend a hand and cancel problems” in its relations with Lebanon (al-Nashra, August 12, 2026).

The Civilian Situation in South Lebanon

• The Lebanese ministry of health reported that from the beginning of the fighting on March 2, 2026 through August 16, 2026, 4,346 people were killed and 12,301 were wounded in Lebanon (Lebanese News Agency, August 16, 2026).
• More than two weeks after the deployment of the Lebanese army in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, the first pilot area under the framework agreement with Israel, it has become clear that the transfer of control to the army still does not allow a return to normal life. According to the mayor, approximately 50% of the town’s homes were damaged, electricity and water services have not yet been restored and compensation and reconstruction have not yet actually begun. Meanwhile, continued Israeli activity around the town increases the sense of insecurity and makes it difficult for residents to return. The council for the south has begun assessing the damage, while the army and aid organizations are providing a partial response to basic needs (al-Nashra, August 10, 2026). The attacks on August 15 exacerbated the situation and led to the renewed displacement of families from Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh and other sites in the south, particularly children and the elderly. Some residents leave the area at night and return during the day. Meanwhile, the ministry of social affairs and the disaster risk management unit began preparing for a possible expansion of the wave of displacement, and authorities in the Iqlim al-Kharroub area are preparing to receive additional families (al-Nashra, August 10, al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 16, 2026).
• Difficulties in returning to normal and restrictions were also reported in the town of al-Mansouri, south of Tyre, and local residents held a rally whose theme was “al-Mansouri is not occupied,” to protest continued Israeli activity and restrictions on returning to parts of the town. According to the municipality, approximately 120 families returned during the past month and a half and began rebuilding their homes and cultivating their land, but continued Israeli activity was delaying a full return and raising concerns about renewed displacement (al-Nahar, August 10, 2026).
• Similar reports of difficulties and restrictions in reconstruction were recorded by residents of border villages who were still unable to return to their homes. The association of residents of the southern border towns warned that displaced families faced eviction from reception centers or were struggling under the cost of rent, while the assistance they had been promised had not yet been provided in full. The association called on the state to expedite solutions involving compensation, rental assistance and temporary housing, in view of the continuing situation and the lack of a clear prospect for the safe return of residents to their homes (al-Diyar, August 11, 2026).
• Despite the reported difficulties in the reconstruction process, government efforts to accelerate the process are evident. Meeting with World Bank Regional Director Dalia Khalifa, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam noted the need to accelerate damage assessments, infrastructure reconstruction and the mobilization of international assistance. Aoun noted that more than 600,000 civilians had already returned to their areas. Salam convened an ad hoc meeting on the reconstruction of Nabatieh to discuss infrastructure, service rehabilitation and the acceleration of projects in the city (Lebanese presidency and the Lebanese prime minister’s office X accounts, August 10 and 14, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

• The alliance of Palestinian forces, which includes, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reactivated the Palestinian consultation framework to formulate a common position on the issue of weapons in the camps and renewing dialogue with the Lebanese state. The move comes after a rupture between Hamas and its allies and Fatah and the PLO, which has effectively paralyzed the joint Palestinian framework, and with an attempt to increase security coordination within the camps in view of concerns about renewed escalation (Nidaa al-Watan, August 11, 2026).

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