Spotlight on Terrorism Hezbollah and Lebanon (April 27 – May 4, 2026)

Overview^[1]

• Hezbollah issued 49 claims of responsibility for attacks on IDF forces in south Lebanon, about half of them using explosive drones. Hezbollah admitted that thousands of the organization’s operatives had been killed since the beginning of the hostilities on March 2, 2026. Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem claimed there was no ceasefire in Lebanon and praised the “resistance fighters'”^[2] hit-and-run methods against Israeli forces.
• Simon Karam, former Lebanese ambassador, will reportedly participate in the third meeting held by the ambassadors of Lebanon and Israel in the United States to demonstrate his country’s commitment to direct talks with Israel. However, Beirut said a meeting between President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not on the agenda, and they continued to demand a complete halt to Israeli attacks. The issue of negotiations continues to cast a shadow over the relations between President Aoun and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.
• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem accused the Lebanese authorities of stabbing the resistance in the back and claimed that direct negotiations with Israel would serve only the interests of Netanyahu and the United States. The editor of Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar warned that if Aoun met Netanyahu he would be considered a president working on behalf of the “occupation.”
• A satirical video on a Lebanese television channel showed the Hezbollah secretary general as a character from Angry Birds and angered Hezbollah supporters, who responded with drawings that insulted the Maronite Christian leader. Lebanon’s President Aoun and Parliament Speaker Berri called for respect being shown to religious symbols and warned of a deterioration into a sectarian conflict.
• Hezbollah supporters fired shots into the air at a funeral in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut contrary to the government’s decision to disarm Beirut, and tried to prevent army forces from arresting those involved in the incident.
• The authorities in Lebanon stated that at least 2,659 people had been killed since the beginning of the hostilities on March 2, 2026. A quarter of the population reportedly suffers from food insecurity and the fighting and its consequences worsened the situation.

The Fighting in Lebanon

The IDF

• The IDF continued extensive ground activity within the forward defense zone (the Yellow Line) in south Lebanon, destroying launchers, headquarters, weapons and additional terrorist facilities and assets, some of which operated inside civilian structures; terrorists who posed a threat to the forces were eliminated from the air and from the ground. A large tunnel was destroyed in the Qantara region. It had been built with Iranian assistance, was about two kilometers long and about 25 meters underground, and had 30 shafts, fully-equipped living spaces and weapons for the use of the Radwan Force. Extensive airstrikes were carried out within the Yellow Line and in others areas in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley, attacking launchers, headquarters, weapons warehouses, weapons production facilities and terrorist facilities and assets. An IDF soldier and a Defense Ministry contractor were killed by explosive drone strikes in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, April 27-May 4, 2026).

     
Right: A launcher inside a civilian structure (IDF spokesperson, April 29, 2026).
Left: Destruction of a Hezbollah tunnel (IDF spokesperson, April 30, 2026)

Hezbollah

• Between April 27 (13:00) and May 4, 2026 (12:00) Hezbollah issued 49 claims of responsibility for attacks using explosive drones (23 attacks),^[3] UAVs, rockets, artillery shells and anti-aircraft fire. According to the organization all the attacks were directed against IDF forces in Lebanese territory (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, April 27-May 4, 2026).

• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem issued an open letter claiming there was no ceasefire in Lebanon, but rather only ongoing “Israeli-American aggression;” he condemned the harm to civilians, villages and towns. He said the resistance chose actions suited to the current situation and learned lessons from the past. He praised the resistance’s surprises in the field, and said the “fighters”^[4] came from all parts of Lebanon with their weapons and used hit-and-run tactics to cause the enemy the greatest number of casualties and prevent it from establishing a permanent presence in the occupied territory (al-‘Ahed, May 4, 2026).
• Three sources, including two senior Hezbollah figures, said the Lebanese ministry of health data regarding more than 2,600 deaths in the fighting did not include many of the organization’s casualties. According to the sources, thousands of Hezbollah fighters have been killed, although there was still no final number. However, Hezbollah claimed that the numbers did include the organization’s dead. One source, identified as a Hezbollah “commander,” said there were still many dead who have not been recovered from the rubble in Bint Jbeil and al-Khiam (Reuters, May 3, 2026).
• A Lebanese military source said the decline in Hezbollah activity in south Lebanon resulted from a combination of damage to its freedom to maneuver and restrictions imposed by the Lebanese army, as well as the erosion of the organization’s logistical capabilities. According to the source, the closure of the main Tehran–Damascus–Beirut supply route damaged the flow of ammunition, prevented Hezbollah from replenishing its stocks and directly affected the tempo and nature of operational activity in the south (al-Hadath, April 28, 2026). However, Hezbollah figure Yusuf al-Zein claimed the organization maintained operational continuity and succeeded in moving fighters and means into the area despite the limitations on deployment in the south, while using alternative routes south of the Litani River. He said that despite damage to infrastructure and the transfer of some weapons, the organization had restored its strength and was prepared for prolonged hostilities, while recognizing Israeli military superiority and trying to balance it by exploiting weak points and adopting advanced tactical capabilities, including fiber-optic guided UAVs (Lebanon Debate, May 1, 2026).
• Lebanese media analyzed Hezbollah’s activity during the ceasefire:
  • One article noted that Hezbollah maintained effective operational capability both north and south of the Litani River, while preserving freedom of movement and supply lines between sectors. Meanwhile, operational flexibility was evident in the diversification of types of attacks and weapons, from short- and medium-range rockets to the use of anti-aircraft weapons, which had intercepted several Israeli UAVs. There was also a prominent upgrade of suicide drone capabilities, including the integration of advanced technologies which enabled more precise strikes, indicating the organization’s continued recovery and operational adaptation despite pressure from the IDF (al-Madan, May 1, 2026).
  • Leaks from inside Hezbollah indicated that the organization had examined a return to the terms and combat concepts identified with the 1980s, especially istishhadiyyin (suicide attackers), raising questions regarding the possibility of escalation or a shift to more extreme types of warfare. However, sources close to the organization said the use of the term did not necessarily refer to a renewal of classic suicide attacks, but [allegedly] reflected an operational concept of intensive fighting under difficult conditions, including readiness for close contact and continued confrontation to the limit of capability under the constraints of the terrain and the siege in south Lebanon (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 30, 2026).
  • Sources said Hezbollah’s military patterns had shifted from the use of broad firepower to measured attacks, mainly through UAVs and rockets on a limited scale. According to the sources, that reflected an attempt to preserve resources and select targets with high impact at low cost, given the limitations of supply and loss of operational freedom of maneuver caused by sustained IDF pressure and the activity of the Lebanese army. As a result, the organization’s capability to take the initiative has diminished and it operated more from a defensive position, although it continued to maintain an operational presence and frame its activity as tactical achievements in the internal arena (Nidaa al-Watan, May 1, 2026)

The Lebanese Government

• Lebanese Minister of Information Paul Morcos said Lebanon’s leadership continued to closely monitor developments in the south, with emphasis on the human cost and the damage to the security forces. President Joseph Aoun noted the continuation of diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the United States to exert pressure on Israel to implement the ceasefire (Lebanese presidency X account, April 30, 2026).
• Following the deaths of three civil defense personnel during humanitarian activity in Majdal Zoun in south Lebanon, apparently in an Israeli strike, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam condemned the incident, calling it a violation of international humanitarian law. He said the Lebanese government would condemn the incident in the international arena and mobilize pressure on Israel to stop “violating” the ceasefire (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, April 28, 2026).

Direct Negotiations Between Lebanon and Israel

The Lebanese Government

• Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said advancing negotiations with Israel was being carried out in full coordination with the state leadership and as part of a national strategy to end the fighting. He said the ceasefire was not a binding agreement but a preliminary stage, and transition to an arrangement was conditional on its full implementation by Israel and the cessation of the attacks. He presented the negotiations as the only alternative for achieving security and stability, with strengthening the state’s presence in the south, and claimed there was broad international and regional support for the move. He pointed to increasing American involvement and viewed the period as a strategic opportunity to advance an arrangement and remove Lebanon from the cycle of conflict (Lebanese presidency X account, April 29, 2026).
• The American administration continued its efforts to promote a meeting between President Aoun and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The American embassy in Beirut said Lebanon was facing a “historic moment of decision” and called for it to take advantage of the window of opportunity created by the ceasefire to advance toward direct contacts with Israel. The embassy noted that a direct meeting between Aoun and Netanyahu, mediated by the American president, could lead to obtaining American guarantees for sovereignty, border security, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, while restoring state authority over all its territory (American embassy in Beirut X account, April 30, 2026). However, a political source said Aoun was not expected to travel to Washington for a meeting with Netanyahu, while the contacts conducted under American auspices continued and their objective was to reach a ceasefire. The source said Aoun’s top priority was maintaining internal stability and civil peace in Lebanon, which were perceived as a red line, while avoiding any move that could undermine the delicate balance between the country’s sects and its social fabric (al-Nashra, May 1, 2026).
• According to reports, the third meeting between the ambassadors of Lebanon and Israel in the United States might take place in Washington on May 7 or May 8, 2026, when the Lebanese side would be expected to focus on enforcing the ceasefire and stopping the destruction of villages in south Lebanon as a condition for moving to direct negotiations (Nidaa al-Watan, May 4, 2026). Official sources said it was possible that the former ambassador, Simon Karam, would participate in the third meeting between the ambassadors of Lebanon and Israel in the United States to demonstrate Lebanon’s commitment to the process and its desire to reach an agreement which would completely stop the Israeli attacks. They added that a meeting between President Aoun and Prime Minister Netanyahu was not on the agenda, and Aoun might visit Washington alone if he received an invitation from the American president. Political sources opined that Israel had increased its activity in south Lebanon to create facts on the ground if the Americans obligated it to a ceasefire to preserve the direct negotiations (al-Joumhouria, May 4, 2026). Before the possibility of another direct meeting, President Aoun was reportedly preparing to appoint teams of “experts” who would support the formulation of Lebanon’s positions regarding security, economy and resources (Nidaa al-Watan, May 1, 2026).
• Meanwhile, tension continues within the Lebanese leadership. While Aoun and Salam promote a course of direct negotiations under American auspices, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri opposes it and advocates indirect negotiations conditional on prior Israeli withdrawal, a condition perceived as not feasible at this stage. In addition, Berri expressed dissatisfaction with Aoun’s statement that whoever initiated the hostilities against Israel betrayed Lebanon. The dispute led to the postponement of the trilateral meeting between the leaders and deepened the gaps at the top, although communication channels between them remain open and contacts continue (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 29, 2026; al-Madan, April 30, 2026). Berri denied coordination with the president and cast doubt on the effectiveness of the lull and the credibility of American mediation, while presenting the negotiations as being conducted under ongoing military pressure which harmed Lebanon’s position (al-Akhbar, April 30, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 1, 2026). Later, it was reported that relations between Aoun’s office and Berri’s office began to improve following the involvement of several mediating factors, although there is still no direct contact between the sides and it is not clear when they will meet (Nidaa al-Watan, May 4, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Position

• Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem wrote an open letter criticizing the Lebanese authorities, who he claimed were trying to stab the “resistance” in the back, and wondered if there was another country in the world where the government agreed with the enemy to confront the “resistance.” According to Qassem, the communities of northern Israel [which he referred to as northern occupied Palestine] already had security when Lebanon implemented the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, while Israel did not fulfill any part of the agreement and [allegedly] violated it more than ten thousand times. Qassem added that four components would make it possible to overcome the current situation. They were continuation of the “resistance,”^[5] internal Lebanese understanding, the exploitation of the Iranian-American agreement and the leveraging of every international or regional pressure on Israel. He said the solution would not be to manipulate Lebanon through military or political means to make it weak and subordinate, adding that they agreed only to indirect negotiations, as in the maritime border issue, while negotiations would only lead to concessions and would serve the interests of Netanyahu and the United States (al-‘Ahed, May 4, 2026).
• Other Hezbollah figures opposed direct negotiations with Israel. They said that any political progress was conditional on a full ceasefire and prior Israeli withdrawal, and represented negotiations under fire as an expression of the weakness of the Lebanese leadership, which was accused of surrendering to American dictates:
  • The deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, said the organization’s position was that there had to be a complete ceasefire before any indirect negotiations with Israel. He said it was impossible to ignore Berri’s opposition to direct negotiations and added that any attempt to promote direct talks with Israel was expected to fail (Al Jazeera, April 29, 2026).
  • Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, asked how the date for the next meeting with Israel could be arranged while Israeli “aggression” escalated and the hostilities to destroy the villages in the south continued. He called the government’s position “vague and weak” and claimed there was a secret agreement between Israel and the United States granting Israel freedom of movement against possible threats, and claimed President Aoun supported it (al-Nour Radio, April 30, 2026).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, declared that the negotiations, with all their results, held no interest for Hezbollah, which had no intention of implementing the decisions or allowing them to be approved. He said they would foil any plot directed against the “resistance,” and did not need approval or national consensus to “defend the land” (al-Manar, May 3, 2026).
  • Members of the Lebanese Parliament from the Hezbollah and Amal factions participated in a protest rally of mayors and mukhtars from villages in south Lebanon which was held in Beirut. Hussein al-Hajj Hassan from Hezbollah said it was a “duty” to stand with the authorities confronting “the enemy that destroyed the villages.” Regarding Hezbollah’s remaining in the government, he said Israel demanded the removal of Hezbollah from the government, a demand they rejected, and they would continue to represent “effective opposition” from within the government, the Parliament and the rallies (al-Akhbar, April 30, 2026). A minister from the so-called Shi’ite duo [Hezbollah and Amal] was quoted as saying in a closed meeting that “Hezbollah dragged us into a war [of its own]… It is impossible to cope with the burden of loss, I wish I had not been appointed minister” (Nidaa al-Watan, April 30, 2026).

• Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, claimed that President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, whom he called the “American-Saudi guardianship duo,” were not reading the map correctly and did not understand Hezbollah’s strength in Lebanon or its military power. He claimed the organization had been patient for 15 months, since the ceasefire in November 2024, despite Israeli aggression, and did not carry out revenge attacks in Israel, while providing social support to 135,000 families which were harmed in the previous hostilities. He said no agreement would pass without Hezbollah approval and warned that if President Aoun met Netanyahu, he would in effect become a “president on behalf of the occupation” and therefore resistance to him in every form would be a duty at all times and in every way. He added that every path to an arrangement in Lebanon passed through Iran (al-Akhbar, May 4, 2026).

Opponents of Hezbollah

• Hezbollah’s political opponents continued to present a united front of support for President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, who are determined to hold direct negotiations with Israel to end the fighting, cause IDF forces to withdraw from Lebanese territory and establish state sovereignty over all its territory:
  • The Sovereign Front said it fully supported Prime Minister Salam and President Aoun, renewed its adherence to state institutions and emphasized the need to restore sovereignty and end Hezbollah’s exclusivity over declaring war and peace. The Front called for direct negotiations with Israel as a basis for restoring state control, the return of displaced persons and the rehabilitation of the south, alongside a demand to limit Hezbollah’s weapons and take legal measures against any violation of state decisions (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, April 27, 2026).

• • The chairman of the Christian Phalange Party, Sami Gemayel, noted the need to limit weapons to the state, strengthen the Lebanese army and deploy its authority over all the country’s territory, and said negotiations were the realistic option for achieving stability (Lebanese presidency X account, April 30, 2026).
  • Lebanese Parliament member Ghassan Hasbani pointed out that the growing international interest and involvement in Lebanon currently exerted significant pressure on Israel and created a diplomatic window of opportunity, but Hezbollah’s weapons had shifted from an apparent asset to Lebanon’s central weak point in negotiations. He said the state’s inability to impose a monopoly on weapons damaged its credibility and increased the risk of renewed escalation, especially given the organization’s refusal to cooperate with official institutions. He warned that Lebanon stood at a crossroads, either it would limit weapons to the framework of the state and move toward an arrangement which included a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, or it would deteriorate into another confrontation with more severe consequences (al-Madan, May 1, 2026).
  • Sunni members of parliament supported the Lebanese government decision to conduct negotiations with Israel within a constitutional framework to reach a ceasefire and neutralize the consequences of the hostilities. At a consultation meeting dealing with ways to curb deterioration, the participants noted their commitment to the Taif Agreement^[6] as a basis for political stability, and the principle of state exclusivity in declaring war and peace, alongside a demand for the return of all Lebanese territories, the return of prisoners and the completion of border demarcation. They said they supported the Salam government and steps to implement the state’s monopoly on weapons, strengthen the army and expand state control over all state territory, while condemning Israeli attacks on civilians and infrastructure. They also noted the importance of exploiting international support for the reconstruction of the state, strengthening the economy and maintaining national unity, and strengthening the Arab dimension, especially Saudi support, as a means for stabilizing Lebanon and advancing along a diplomatic path (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 2, 2026).

Sectarian tension in Lebanon

• A satirical video aired on the LBC channel, presenting the confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel as a game of Angry Birds, and depicted Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem as leading the Hezbollah birds which launch primitive attacks at the enemy (LBC, May 2, 2026). The video was sharply criticized by Hezbollah supporters who saw it as contempt for the organization’s leadership and the sacrifice of its “fighters.” They responded with videos and images of their own which were directed against Christian symbols, especially the Maronite Patriarch, Bechara Boutros al-Rai (al-Nashra and Akhbar al-Youm, May 2, 2026).

       
Right: Na’im Qassem in the video (LBCI, May 2, 2026).
Left: A response against the Maronite Patriarch (Charbel Makhlouf X account, May 2, 2026)

• The political and public systems in Lebanon rushed to respond out of concern over a further escalation of sectarian tension:
  • Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun condemned the attacks on religious figures and spiritual authorities, calling them unacceptable and harming national values beyond the religious dimension. He noted that everyone had to maintain the boundaries of political discourse and refrain from personal attacks, in light of the urgent need to preserve national unity and solidarity, and said the law prohibited such offenses and required punishment for those who committed them (Lebanese presidency X account, May 2, 2026).
  • Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri condemned the wave of incitement and attacks on religious and national symbols in Lebanon, and warned of a dangerous slide into internal sectarian conflict (fitna), which he said primarily served the enemies of Lebanon from all sects. He linked a series of incidents of vandalism and attacks on religious sites, both Islamic and Christian, to the danger of the disintegration of national cohesion, and called on the public and the judicial system to act decisively to curb the attacks and bring those responsible to justice. He said national responsibility obligated everyone to prevent internal escalation, refrain from incitement and preserve the unity of Lebanese society (al-Nashra, May 2, 2026).
  • Hezbollah warned of a deliberate attempt to ignite an internal conflict in Lebanon, while accusing the media, especially the LBC channel, of disseminating offensive content which incited the street and deteriorated political discourse. The organization called on its supporters to show restraint and not to be dragged into provocations intended to create an uncontrollable fitna among the Lebanese (al-Akhbar, May 2, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

• This past week the Lebanese army reported the deaths of two soldiers killed in IDF strikes, and the wounding of several others (Lebanese Army X account, April 27-May 4, 2026).
• Given the effort to stabilize the ceasefire, the commander of the Lebanese army, General Rodolph Haykal, met at the air force base in Beirut with the chairman of the mechanism for monitoring the cessation of hostilities, American General Joseph Clearfield, who arrived for a brief visit. They discussed Lebanese and regional security developments, and ways to improve the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism, while noting the central role of the Lebanese army and the need to reinforce it at such a sensitive time (Lebanese army X account, May 2, 2026).
• During a funeral procession for four dead in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, shots were fired into the air by Hezbollah supporters, contrary to the government’s decision to disarm the capital, resulting in several injuries. When the Lebanese army arrived at the scene to arrest the shooters, Hezbollah supporters formed a human chain to prevent arrests and allowed some of the shooters to escape. Subsequently, army and intelligence forces were deployed in the area (al-Markazia, May 3, 2026). Following the incident, the Lebanese army launched extensive security activity which included raids on the homes of suspects, vehicle patrols and the erection of checkpoints. Reportedly, one of the shooters was arrested and quantities of weapons were seized (Lebanese army X account, May 3, 2025).

     
Right: Hezbollah supporters demonstrate in Beirut (al-Markazia, May 3, 2026). Left: Lebanese army forces arrive (Lebanese army X account, May 3, 2026)

• According to a report, Egypt sent a message to the Lebanese president telling him not to attempt to disarm Hezbollah with military force or by means of the Lebanese army, lest the situation slide into an internal conflict. According to Egyptian sources, implementation of an American proposal on the issue could open an internal front against the army and undermine stability in the country, and therefore efforts should be focused on strengthening the Lebanese army and improving its capabilities for border defense, not on placing it in confrontation with Hezbollah (al-Akhbar, April 29, 2026).
• Lebanese army intelligence forces raided a building in central Sidon and uncovered a cache of weapons stolen from an apartment belonging to a senior operative in one of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, part of a broad investigation into a weapons trafficking affair. So far, seven suspects have been arrested, including a former prisoner who was involved in clashes in Sidon in 2013 between supporters of a Salafi Sunni cleric and Lebanese army and Hezbollah forces. The assessment is that the weapons were only part of a larger quantity which was distributed. Reportedly, the investigation focuses on both identifying the amount and types of the weapons and on mapping the distribution network and its destinations, which indicates an ongoing challenge of control over illegal weapons and a potential for undermining internal security stability (al-Madan, April 30, 2026).

The Situation in Lebanon

• According to the Lebanese ministry of health, since the beginning of the hostilities on March 2, 2026, 2,659 people have been killed and 8,183 others have been wounded (al-Nashra, May 2, 2026). Since the beginning of the ceasefire on April 17, 2026, about 100 people have been killed, most of them men (al-Akhbar, April 30, 2026).
• The Lebanese minister of the economy, Amer Bassat, estimated Lebanese economic losses since the beginning of the hostilities at about 5% to 7% of the GDP, amounting to billions of dollars, given the damage to business activity, a decline in remittances and an increase in unemployment and inflation. It was also reported that the number of displaced persons in Lebanon had exceeded 1.2 million, a significant economic and social burden on the state (al-Madan, April 25, 2026).
• The Lebanese minister of agriculture, Nizar Hani, said that since the beginning of the hostilities, the number of Lebanese in need of food assistance had risen from 17% to 24% percent of the total population. He added that about 22.5% of agricultural lands had been directly damaged, and the damage to supply chains and regional pressures led to a worsening of food security distress in Lebanon (al-Hadath, April 30, 2026). The IPC report of the hunger index, which was issued by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme and the Lebanese ministry of agriculture, pointed to a sharp worsening in the food security crisis in Lebanon, when more than a quarter of the population (about 1.24 million people) suffered from severe food insecurity, an increase of about 367,000 people compared to the period before the war. In south Lebanon, 50% of the population is in nutritional distress because of market collapse, the destruction of infrastructure and a sharp rise in prices, especially of fuel and food (al-Akhbar, May 1, 2026).
• The European Union announced an allocation of €45 million to Lebanon, which for the first time will be transferred directly through Lebanese government institutions, signaling the increase of cooperation with the state and strengthening of international trust in its mechanisms. The main sum, €40 million, will be directed to the national assistance program Aman to support nearly 90,000 families, alongside an additional €5 million to improve the capabilities of the institutional system and the management of databases for the purpose of effective distribution of aid (Nidaa al-Watan, April 29, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Terrorist operatives.
^[3] See the May 2026 ITIC report, "Hezbollah Uses First Person View Drones Against Israel."
^[4] Terrorist operatives.
^[5] Attacks on Israel by Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[6] The Taif Agreement, signed in October 1989 in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, and ratified that November, was the National Reconciliation Accord that ended the 15-year Lebanese Civil War. It restructured Lebanon's political system by transferring power from the Christian presidency to a more balanced cabinet, divided parliamentary seats equally between Christians and Muslims, and mandated the disarming of militias.

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