Spotlight on Terrorism and the israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 19-27, 2026)

The IDF

• On January 26, 2026, IDF forces located the body of police officer Major Ran Gvili, the remaining murdered Israeli hostage held in the Gaza Strip since the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023. The body was discovered after two days of searching in a cemetery in the al-Shuja’iya neighborhood of Gaza City after intelligence information was received from a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operative who was captured in December 2025 (IDF and Shin Bet spokespersons and Israeli media, January 26, 2026). Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem claimed the return of the body showed the movement’s “commitment to implementing the agreement” and called on the mediators and the United States to force Israel to stop “violating” the agreement (Sunud News Agency, January 26, 2026). The spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, Abu Hamza, claimed they had given the mediators the location of the body three weeks ago, but Israel “deliberately did not advance the coordination and search processes” (Hadath Telegram channel, January 26, 2026). IDF forces continued destroying terrorist facilities within the Yellow Line (the area under IDF control) in the Gaza Strip. In the southern Gaza Strip, the forces located a tunnel shaft containing dozens of weapons used by terrorist organizations, found five inactive rocket launchers and completed the destruction of a four-kilometer tunnel. In the refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip, they destroyed a kilometer-long attack tunnel. Terrorists who crossed the Yellow Line or approached it and posed a threat to the forces were eliminated. The smuggling of a MAG machine gun via drone across the Egyptian border was prevented (IDF spokesperson, January 19-27, 2026).

• IDF forces attacked a vehicle belonging to the Egyptian Committee while it was documenting aid activities and photographing camps in the central Gaza Strip, and three Palestinian “journalists” were killed in the incident. A spokesman for the committee called it a “crime” and claimed the “journalists” were on their way to carry out a “humanitarian mission” (Quds Agency, January 21, 2026). The IDF spokesman said in response that several suspects had operated a Hamas drone which threatened the forces, and they had been attacked after having been given the necessary authorization (IDF spokesperson, January 21, 2026).
• Hamas sent a report to mediators and international bodies claiming that 100 days after the ceasefire agreement went into effect, Israel was [allegedly] “systematically violating” the agreement and emptying it of content, while the movement itself had fully adhered to the timetables. Hamas alleged that since the start of the ceasefire, 483 Gazans had been killed and 1,294 injured, most of them civilians, including children and women, with the vast majority of the injuries allegedly occurring within the Yellow Line, which is supposed to be protected. Hamas also alleged 1,298 daily “violations,” including direct gunfire, airstrikes and artillery fire, the bombing and destruction of residential areas, and the detentions of civilians. According to Hamas, Israel has expanded its area of ​​control and carried out engineering and demolition work whose objective is to establish a new geographical, security and demographic reality, as opposed to the agreement (Hamas’ Telegram channel, January 20, 2026).
• “Sources in the Gaza Strip” claimed that IDF forces had increased the pace of construction of military posts and placed observation towers and cranes equipped with cameras and machine guns in several areas along the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, and numerous excavation operations were observed daily in areas adjacent to the Line. Huge earthen barriers are also being erected. According to Hamas, the IDF seeks to maintain the area as a buffer zone under its control (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 23, 2026). Reportedly, according to satellite images of the al-Tuffah neighborhood in eastern Gaza City from mid-December 2025, the IDF moved yellow-painted blocks, which mark the Yellow Line, about 200 meters into the territory controlled by Hamas, and then demolished dozens of buildings. In response, the IDF rejected claims it was changing the Yellow Line (Reuters in Arabic, January 23, 2026). Reportedly, residents of the al-Raqab neighborhood in Bani Suheila, east of Khan Yunis, were required to evacuate their homes and tents and move west to the al-Mawasi area. Locals noted that the area was not previously within the Yellow Line, but IDF forces advanced the yellow blocks and annexed them to areas under Israeli military control (al-Ayam, January 21, 2026; Reuters in Arabic, January 21, 2026).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• The chairman of the Palestinian technocratic committee of the Gaza Strip, Ali Shaath, said the resumption of the Gaza Strip power plant’s activity had been promised, efforts were being made with factors in international solar energy and work was being done with electricity suppliers to restore electricity as soon as possible (Dr. Ali Shaath’s Facebook page, January 24, 2026). He announced that the Rafah Crossing would soon be opened in both directions (Shehab Agency, January 22, 2026).^[2]
• The Gaza municipality said only 24 water wells were operational, and the sanitary and environmental situation in the Strip had become “catastrophic” due to the leakage of sewage and the damage to most water sources. According to the municipality, the amounts of fuel available to operate essential facilities are very limited, and therefore the remaining wells and wastewater treatment plants may cease to operate (Shehab, January 22, 2026).
• The al-Quds Hospital, which belongs to the Palestinian Red Crescent, announced it was able to reactivate the cardiac surgery department and perform the first open-heart surgery in the Gaza Strip since the outbreak of the war. To resume operations, the hospital took in two International medical teams, the Pal Med team led by Dr. Kifah Alwan, a heart surgeon from Lebanon, who arrived as part of a medical team from France, and the BAMA Foundation team led by Dr. Miriam Sadek, an intensive care and anesthesia specialist, who worked with local teams (Ma’an News Agency, January 23, 2026).
• The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) said health and reproductive services for women and girls in the Gaza Strip were being negatively impacted, even during the ceasefire period, in light of the damage to medical facilities, conditions of displacement and overcrowding. According to the Fund, more than 230,000 women and girls have been affected by restrictions on access to services, including about 15,000 pregnant women, adding that the situation in the Gaza Strip has created an increase in exposure to gender-based violence, exploitation and vulnerability, as well as a growing risk of child marriage (al-Aqsa Network Telegram channel, January 24 2026).

Civilian Governance

• The Hamas ministry of national economy in the Gaza Strip called on shopkeepers and business owners to accept and trade in all currencies in circulation, in all denominations and in all situations, and warned that refusing to accept banknotes or restricting their use imposed an additional burden on Gazans and disrupted market activity. The ministry announced it would launch monitoring and awareness-raising campaigns and would later take legal action against violators of the law (Facebook page of the ministry of national economy in the Gaza Strip, January 19, 2026). However, according to reports, the guidelines have not been widely implemented, and daily arguments between merchants and citizens continue due to widespread refusal to accept worn-out banknotes on the grounds that they are unusable, with high reliance on cash and coins despite an increase in the use of money transfers. It was also noted that 20-shekel bills had almost disappeared from circulation due to wear and tear, most 50-shekel bills had gone out of circulation, about half of 100-shekel bills were no longer accepted, while 200-shekel bills remained relatively usable were but in lower circulation (al-Ayam, January 22, 2026).
• The Hamas ministry of social development announced the launch of the We Are Your Welfare project to ease the Gazans’ burden of daily life, especially the neediest families, and aims to distribute 500 shekels to 50,000 families in the most affected groups. The source of the money is funds confiscated by the committee for combating economic crimes from a number of merchants who had exceeded “the bounds of law and morality” and illegally exploited the needs of Gazan civilians since the ceasefire went into effect (Hamas government media information office Telegram channel, January 20, 2026).

Security Governance

• “A senior source in the Rada Force” said its operatives had prevented the “collaborating gangs” from carrying out a “hostile” operation, causing casualties. According to him, the “gangs” operate under direct orders from Israeli security officers (Telegram channel of the Rada Force, January 19, 2026). It was later reported that in eastern Gaza the Rada Force had killed Ra’ed Yasser al-Jamal, assistant to Rami Halas, the commander of an Israeli-backed militia (Telegram channel of Sahm ​​Unit 103, January 19, 2026; Telegram channel al-Siyad, January 19, 2026). Halas and his militia, the Popular Defense Forces, issued death notices for al-Jamal, and Ghassan al-Dahini, commander of the Popular Defense Forces militia in Rafah, added that al-Jamal was killed in a security operation against “terrorist groups” in eastern Gaza City, during which two of their operatives were “neutralized” (Rami Halas’ Facebook page, January 19, 2026; Popular Defense Forces Facebook page, January 19, 2026; Ghassan al-Dahini’s Facebook page, January 19, 2026).
• Rada Force operatives were filmed shooting the legs of a resident who was allegedly working with “collaborator” groups in the al-Shuja’iya area of ​​Gaza City, while local residents cheered. The “agent” was reportedly tricked by the force into showing himself, arrested and interrogated, and his involvement in actions against the “resistance^[3] was “proved” (al-Siyad Telegram channel, January 23, 2026). Two additional videos were later released in which Rada Force operatives were filmed shooting the legs of two Palestinian “agents” in eastern Gaza City (al-Siyad Telegram channel, January 23 and 24, 2026).
• A “security source in the Gaza Strip” claimed that an increasing number of Hamas military wing field operatives were selling equipment and ammunition, and filing off serial numbers from weapons to make them untraceable. Hamas operatives are reportedly selling light arms, ammunition, radios and military raw materials because they are not being paid, they lack operational leadership, combat activity has ceased and the operatives feel abandoned while the leadership conducts negotiations outside the Gaza Strip. The equipment reportedly reaches arms dealers, Israeli-backed militias, local armed groups and criminals, and is used to disrupt public order, loot humanitarian aid trucks, collect protection fees and terrorize civilians. According to the report, the Hamas leadership is aware of the situation but does not take steps for fear of an internal explosion, which could lead to an escalation of armed anarchy and justify an external “security guardianship” in the name of restoring order (Aman News Facebook page, January 21, 2026).

• On January 22, 2026, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, the American government announced the establishment of a Peace Council to manage the Gaza Strip (White House website, January 22, 2026). The Palestinians issued the following responses:
  • Hamas called on the Peace Council to fulfill its responsibilities, implement the agreement primarily by introducing aid and shelter equipment in light of the humanitarian situation and the worsening weather conditions in the Gaza Strip (Hamas’ Telegram channel, January 22, 2026).
  • Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said that the establishment of the Peace Council carried with it initial positive signs which reflected regional and international interest in establishing a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, adding that the participation of Arab and Islamic countries could be viewed positively as having “positions clearly supporting the Palestinian cause.” However, he said there were fundamental questions regarding its practical content and its commitment to forcing Israel to stop its “violations.” He claimed Hamas was concerned it would become a “council for maintaining the security of the occupation” through conditions related to the disarmament of the “resistance,” or gradual reconstruction and buffer zones. Qassem demanded that the council exert pressure on Israel to stop “violating the agreement” and open the Crossings, and mobilize financial support and humanitarian aid for the Gazans. A Hamas spokesman warned that in such a council, including Israel, and in particular Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, would provide it with cover to evade responsibility for the “crimes” [allegedly] committed in the Gaza Strip (aljazeera.net, January 22, 2026).
  • The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) attacked the invitation extended to Prime Minister Netanyahu to join to the Peace Council and claimed he should not be in a peace forum but in the International Criminal Court in The Hague (Shehab Agency, January 21, 2026).

• A “Palestinian source” claimed an agreement existed between Hamas and the American administration, according to which the movement would hand over weapons and maps of the tunnels in the Gaza Strip in exchange for confirmation that it would be able to operate as a political party and not targeted for attacks. According to the “source,” Hamas had already transferred weapons and maps through “a mechanism that has not yet been disclosed.” “The source” that as part of the understanding, Hamas’ military and political leaders would be able to leave the Strip if they wished, and the United States had pledged that Israel would not harm them or other leaders who were already abroad. He noted that Turkey might be one of the destinations for the senior leaders (Sky News in Arabic, January 22, 2026). However, a “Hamas source” denied the reports, and claimed no such agreement had been reached and had never been proposed during the discussions. He claimed the issues of weapons and the future of the “resistance” had not been discussed with the mediators or the Americans, although he noted that there had been recent discussions in which general questions were raised regarding the “factions'”^[4] approach to the issue of weapons (Ultra Palestine, January 26, 2026).
• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem that the movement’s weapons were meant to “protect the Palestinians from the IDF,” but made it clear that the issue would not be an obstacle to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. He claimed Hamas was prepared to hold an internal Palestinian discussion on the methods of the “national struggle,” and then discuss it with the mediators to remove Israel’s “excuses” (al-Jazeera, January 22, 2026). Qassem further noted that despite Hamas’ renunciation of running the Gaza Strip, the movement had not withdrawn from its “national role” and it would continue to work for “freedom, independence, and self-determination for the Palestinian people” (Shehab News Agency, January 25, 2026).
• “Three sources at the field and leadership levels in Hamas in the Gaza Strip” said that a number of prominent political and military leaders who had survived the war had been “preparing for a safe exit” from the Gaza Strip for several years. “One source” said that the departure would be voluntary, within the framework of specific arrangements and in full coordination with the movement’s leadership abroad, while “another source” noted that there were several leaders who refused to leave under any circumstances. According to “the sources,” many released prisoners, who were released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal in 2011 and held various files in the Hamas leadership, would be among those who would leave for Turkey. However, “a senior Hamas leader living outside the Gaza Strip” denied the reports and claimed that the issue had not been not raised (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 19, 2026). According to another report, “Hamas sources” claimed that after lists of individuals of various ranks in the movement’s leadership and operatives had been prepared, obstacles and difficulties began to emerge regarding the feasibility of such a plan. They claimed that Israel conditioned the departure of any Hamas leader on the movement’s complete disarmament and dissolution (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 24, 2026).
• Following the return of the body of the last murdered Israeli hostage, senior Hamas figure Suheil al-Hindi said that before discussing disarming Hamas, IDF compliance with the agreement had to be examined. He claimed there was talk of a long-term ceasefire, but the “right to resist”^[5] was non-negotiable, and the decision on the “future of the weapons” would be made in coordination with all the factions^[6] (al-Arabi Channel, January 26, 2026). A member of Hamas’ political bureau, Hussam Badran, added that after locating the body of the murdered Israeli hostage, there was no longer any justification for Netanyahu’s delay in implementing the agreement. He called on the mediators to force Israel to implement its provisions, including the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip, the introduction of aid and the opening of the Rafah Crossing in both directions (al-Jazeera, January 26, 2026).
• A Hamas delegation led by the head of the political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Khayya, met in Istanbul with the head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, to discuss the second phase of the ceasefire agreement and the completion of the provisions of the first phase. They reportedly agreed to continue consultations and joint coordination to “end the suffering of the Palestinian people [i.e., the Gazans],” starting the activities of the technocratic committee, opening the Rafah Crossing in both directions, introducing the necessary aid and “emphasizing the fundamental principles of the Palestinian people.” The delegation also thanked Turkish President Erdogan for his efforts in achieving an agreement to end the war (Hamas Telegram channel, January 24, 2026). The Hamas delegation met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara and discussed the negotiations for the second phase (Reuters and the Shehab News Agency, January 26, 2026).

Palestinian Authority Involvement in the Gaza Strip

• According to “Egyptian sources,” Cairo is working to promote the establishment of a force Palestinian police force subordinate to the Palestinian Authority (PA) as part of arrangements designed to enable its future deployment in the Gaza Strip (al-Akhbar, January 20, 2026).
• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, said that within two years full control of the Gaza Strip was expected to be transferred to the PA, and the government was rebuilding all the necessary institutions. He said the PA sought to accelerate cooperation with Egypt, Europe and Jordan to strengthen the Palestinian security force, with an emphasis on the police, with the possibility of supplementary assistance from an international force, and at the same time promote the functioning of civilian institutions in the Strip to provide services for the Gazans. He added that the strategic goal was to unify the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria in preparation for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and economic reconstruction depended on opening the Crossings and improving the situation (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 23, 2026).
• The PA minister of public works, housing and urban development, Ahed Basiso, met with a delegation from the European Union to promote cooperation for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The meeting discussed the ministry’s areas of responsibility in shelter, sanitation, water and waste disposal, and emphasized the role of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip and its importance in distributing humanitarian aid (Wafa, January 22, 2026).

• The United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Zaher Birawi, a Hamas activist in Britain who is behind the flotillas to the Gaza Strip, including the failed Global Sumud Flotilla of early October 2025 and the violent Mavi Marmara flotilla of June 2010.^[7] Sanctions were also imposed on the Popular Conference of Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), an umbrella organization in which Birawi is among the senior figures and which is also involved the flotillas and receives its instructions from the Hamas leadership abroad. Sanctions were imposed on six associations that operate in the Gaza Strip under the guise of charitable activities and assist Hamas’ military wing, including the employment of Hamas internal security personnel and financial transfers. The information about the associations was revealed in documents seized from Hamas offices in the Gaza Strip during the war (United States Treasury Department, January 21, 2026). Hamas condemned the decision, calling the measures “unjust” and the result of Israeli “incitement and pressure.” Hamas claimed the sanctions would increase the suffering of the Gazans and demanded that the United States administration reverse the sanctions (al-Aqsa Network, January 22, 2026).
• The German federal prosecutor announced that a 36-year-old Lebanese-born Hamas operative was arrested at Berlin airport after arriving on a flight from Beirut. According to the prosecution, he is also suspected of belonging to a network which purchased weapons and ammunition for attacks on Israeli and Jewish institutions in Europe, including the alleged purchase of nearly 300 rounds of ammunition. The arrest is related to an affair in which three suspects of Syrian and Lebanese origin were arrested in Germany in October 2025 on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks on behalf of Hamas, and the son of a senior Hamas official, Bassem Na’im, was also arrested in Britain, and a cache of weapons was discovered in Austria (Die Welt, January 24, 2026).^[8]

Counterterrorism

• Israeli security forces completed a week-long counterterrorism operation in the Jabal Johar neighborhood of Hebron. They surrounded the neighborhood, searched about 350 buildings, detained 14 wanted persons on suspicion of involvement in terrorism and possession of weapons, and confiscated eight weapons, including rifles and pistols, as well as dozens of knives and other weapons (IDF spokesperson, January 22, 2026). In another operation, the Israeli security forces detained a manufacturer of explosives who belonged to a terrorist organization in the Tulkarm area (IDF and Shin Bet spokespersons, January 21, 2026).

Friction between Palestinians and Settlers

• A group of Israeli settlers used rocks to block the road leading to the Wadi Sa’ir area east of Hebron. They also reportedly attacked several Palestinian houses near a settlement in the area (Ma’an Agency, January 24, 2026).

     
Settlers block the road Wadi Sa’ir (Ma’an Agency, January 24, 2026) 2026)

• PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Abbas thanked Russia for its support of the Palestinians in international forums, and the two discussed strengthening bilateral relations and promoting cooperation. Abbas also noted the need for the full implementation of the American plan to lead to an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the start of reconstruction, while noting the PA’s central role in managing the Strip and the unification of the institutional system between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. He also demanded a halt to the construction of Israeli settlements and an end to settler violence, the release of Palestinian funds and the cessation of all measures detrimental to the PA and the two-state solution. He reiterated his commitment to a Palestinian state with the June 4, 1967 borders and east Jerusalem as its capital, under the principle of one system, one law and one legitimate weapon, which would live in peace and security with its neighbors (Wafa, January 22, 2026).

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, participated in the World Economic Forum in Davos and met with senior officials, including Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, Irish Prime Minister Micheal Martin, and Spanish Foreign Minister José Albers. Mustafa briefed them on the latest developments in the Gaza Strip and called for increased international pressure on Israel to open the Crossings for the entrance of humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials. He referred to the ongoing Israeli “escalation” in Judea and Samaria and discussed the economic challenges facing the PA government (Wafa, January 20-22, 2026).
• On January 20, 2026, Israel demolished several buildings at the UNRWA headquarters in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of Jerusalem, after the government and Knesset decided to end working relations with the UN agency after some of its employees were involved in the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023 (Israeli media, January 20, 2026). The Palestinians reacted angrily: the PA’s foreign ministry condemned the demolition of the buildings, claiming it was a “grave violation” of international law and the “immunity of UN institutions.” It called on the UN and the countries supporting UNRWA to protect the agency (Facebook page of the PA foreign ministry, January 20, 2026); The chairman of the Palestinian National Council, Rawhi Fattouh, stated that raising the Israeli flag at the demolition site “carries political and legal implications that reflect Israel’s attempts to impose sovereignty by force” (Rawhi Fattouh’s Facebook page, January 20, 2026). Hamas called for widespread international condemnation and immediate action “that will oblige Israel to stop attacking UNRWA, allow the agency to act in accordance with its mandate, and ensure its protection as an international body which represents the Palestinian refugees, primarily the [so-called] right of return” (Hamas Telegram channel, January 20, 2026).