Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 1-11, 2025)

The IDF in Gaza

• IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line (the area under IDF control) in the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the Israeli political echelon. They destroyed tunnels in operational areas and located weapons. Terrorists who crossed the Yellow Line and posed a threat to the forces were eliminated. A terrorist operative who had held six Israeli hostages during the war was eliminated. IDF forces prevented the terrorist organizations from using UAVs to smuggle weapons across the Egyptian border (IDF spokesperson, November 1–11, 2025).

     
Right: Destruction of a Hamas tunnel (IDF spokesperson, November 5, 2025). Left: A UAV carrying weapons intercepted on the Egyptian border (IDF spokesperson, November 7, 2025)

• “Palestinian sources” claimed that IDF forces continued intensive activity even beyond the Yellow Line, including using a “belt of fire” around various areas, among them the al-Tuffah neighborhood in Gaza City and in Khan Yunis (Telegram channel of Hamza al-Masri, November 3, 2025). For the one-month anniversary of the ceasefire, Hamas listed a series of alleged Israeli “violations,” which including killing more than 270 Gazans, detaining dozens of residents, destroying structures within the Yellow Line, entering Gazan territory beyond the agreed Yellow Line, restricting the entry of humanitarian aid and closing the Rafah Crossing. Hamas called on the mediators, guarantor states and international organizations to ensure “the occupying regime’s compliance” (Hamas Telegram channel, November 10, 2025).

Implementing the Ceasefire

• Since November 1, 2025, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have returned the bodies of six murdered Israeli hostages held since the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. The body of IDF Lt. Hadar Goldin, held by Hamas since Operation Protective Edge in August 2014, was also returned. The bodies of four murdered Israeli hostages remain in the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, November 1–11, 2025). In exchange for the return of the hostages’ bodies, Israel returned the bodies of 315 terrorists to the Gaza Strip. The ministry of health in Gaza claimed that only 91 of the bodies were identified, while the Hamas government media office accused Israel of deliberately “damaging” the bodies (Quds News Agency, November 10, 2025).
• To locate the bodies of the murdered hostages, Israel allowed armed operatives from Hamas’ military wing, including members of its Shadow Unit who had “guarded” the hostages, to operate alongside the Red Cross, even in areas under Israeli control beyond the Yellow Line (Israeli media and Quds and Shehab news agencies, November 1–11, 2025). Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades [Hamas’ military wing] had demonstrated their “security and intelligence superiority over the occupation army in all matters related to the captives held by the resistance”^[2] (Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, November 8, 2025).

• Hamas claimed that the transfer of the hostages’ bodies showed the movement’s intention to comply with the ceasefire agreement. It said that despite the enormous destruction in the Gaza Strip, the large quantities of unexploded ordnance, the lack of heavy engineering equipment for clearing debris, and the deaths of many “resistance fighters”^[3] who had “guarded Israeli prisoners,” they had located 24 of the 28 bodies. Hamas claimed it was making “intensive efforts” to find the remaining bodies and “not willing to give the occupation any excuse” (Hamas Telegram channel, November 10, 2025).
• Another issue disputed by Israel and Hamas concerns the fate of the armed operatives of Hamas’ military wing trapped in tunnels in Rafah, in territory under IDF control. Hamas’ military wing claimed “the occupation” was responsible for the “clashes with our fighters in Rafah, who are defending themselves within an area under its control.” It claimed the operatives “do not recognize the principle of surrender” and called on the mediators to find a solution that would ensure the continuation of the ceasefire. Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem claimed that Israel had not honored an alleged understanding to allow the gunmen to leave Rafah in exchange for the body of Hadar Goldin. In an effort to prevent a crisis that could endanger the ceasefire, the United States, Turkey and Qatar said they were trying to formulate an agreement that would allow safe passage for the trapped operatives. Reportedly, they might consider transferring them to a third country (Al Jazeera, November 10, 2025). “Hamas sources” claimed that the number of trapped operatives was between 50 and 60 and that Israel’s claim that there were 200 operatives was merely “an excuse to justify violations and delays in implementing the terms of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement” (al-Araby, November 11, 2025). Hamas political bureau member Muhammad Nazzal said the movement absolutely rejected proposals for their deportation from the Strip (Arabi21 Facebook page, November 10, 2025).

Humanitarian Aid

• Supplies entered the Gaza Strip every day. According to reports, ten semi-trailers loaded with 24 tons of meat and poultry entered (Telegram channel of Mutabaa Min al-Midan, November 7, 2025), as did dozens of trucks carrying fruits and vegetables, soft drinks, semolina, soybean oil and olive oil, chocolate manufactured in Judea and Samaria, and containers of clothing and footwear for the commercial sector (Sahm Unit Telegram channel, November 8, 2025).
• The Qatari Committee for the Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip announced the arrival of the first shipment of residential tents donated by the Emirate of Qatar, the first installment of the 87,754 tents allocated by Qatar to provide safe and adequate shelter for more than 436,000 people in various areas of the Gaza Strip (Telegram channel of journalist Muthana al-Najjar, November 10, 2025).

Security Governance^[4]

• Hamas continued to suppress “collaborators” and groups threatening its control of the Gaza Strip. The Rada Force of “resistance” internal security reported the arrest of five members of the “agent” Hussam al-Astal’s group and the confiscation of weapons and sums of money during an operation in southern Khan Yunis (Telegram channel of the Rada Force, November 3, 2025). In response, al-Astal published a video in which he and armed members of his militia burned the Hamas flag. He also denied Hamas’ claims that his men had been harmed and that weapons were had been confiscated (Hussam al-Astal Facebook page, November 3, 2025).
• Hamas “security forces” and the Rada Force claimed to have exposed an intelligence mechanism used by “the enemy” to gather information about civilians and the “resistance.”^[5] They claimed to have disrupted electronic communication networks used by promoters, merchants and unknown financiers who turned out to be IDF intelligence officers. Funding sources, equipment and resources used for espionage and operational activity were allegedly seized. Hamas security forces warned merchants, entrepreneurs and project owners to be cautious about cooperating with unreliable or unauthorized entities or associations and called on them to report any funding offers from suspicious sources (Khan Yunis News and Updates Telegram channel, November 11, 2025).

Civil Governance^[6]

• Hamas continued to exploit the governmental vacuum in the Gaza Strip to tighten its control over the civilian-economic sphere with the slogan of “maintaining order and social justice:”
  • The ministry of health in Gaza ordered the evacuation of tents and the closure of all shawarma [doner kebab] restaurants and grill stands along the central Salah al-Din road, claiming that a small group of merchants was making high profits at the expense of the population, which could not afford meat. It was also announced that anyone caught stealing from or attacking aid trucks would be expelled from reception centers and banned from residing in the district (Sahm Unit Telegram channel, November 1, 2025).
  • Journalists, activists, and social media influencers affiliated with Hamas were instructed not to post photos of food, especially meat and poultry, in light of the [alleged] continued Israeli restrictions on the entry of basic food aid and the difficult conditions faced by most of the Gazan population. Hamas claimed that such photos could be used “out of context to distort the truth, whitewash the occupation’s crimes and present a misleading picture of the [dire situation] in the Gaza Strip” (Seham Unit Telegram channel, November 2, 2025; Amsak Amil Facebook page, November 2, 2025).
  • The ministry of health in Gaza announced that on November 9, 2025, a vaccination campaign for children under the age of three began in cooperation with UNRWA, the Red Crescent, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization. It would continue for ten days in 150 medical centers across the Strip and be carried out in three phases, with a one-month interval between each stage (Hamas ministry of health channel, November 9, 2025).
  • The director general of the Hamas government media information office, Isma’il al-Thawabteh, denied reports of the renewal of tax and fee collection in the Gaza Strip. He said the governmental authorities in the Strip were only providing services and humanitarian assistance, stood alongside the people, and imposed no financial burden on them. He claimed that all types of taxes, customs duties and fees had been completely suspended, adding that price of some goods had risen for “objective” reasons, the result of limited supply versus increased demand, rising transportation and shipping costs, and [alleged] Israeli restrictions on the entry of goods (Shehab News Agency, November 8, 2025).
• Local authorities in the Gaza Strip reported difficulty in restoring destroyed infrastructure. Gaza municipality spokesperson Husni Muhanna said that most wells and the city’s desalination facility were out of service and that there was a shortage of fuel and equipment, with massive accumulations of waste (Akhbar Gaza al-A’an, November 5, 2025). The municipalities of Khan Yunis and Jabalia reported that they were halting road clearing and debris removal work because of fuel shortages and debts to fuel companies (al-Mutaqaddimun Telegram channel, November 4, 2025). In addition, there was serious concern about flooding during the coming winter, especially in low-lying flood-prone areas, given that water, drainage and roads had been damaged during the war, and thousands of families lacked basic protection and means of heating (ministry of social development Facebook page, November 4, 2025).
• An UNRWA spokesperson said the agency was increasing the number of classrooms and schools in shelters across the Gaza Strip. According to the announcement, the agency operates about 485 temporary classrooms in 67 shelters, and nearly 8,000 teachers are working to restore and reinstate the educational framework (Yafa News, November 3, 2025).

Disarming Hamas^[7]

• Ziyad al-Nakhalah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, ,said the American ceasefire plan posed many obstacles and conditions which could not be implemented. Speaking at the 34^th Arab National Conference session held in Beirut, he claimed that every clause in the plan entailed numerous requirements, but Israel could not reject the plan because it wanted to extract itself from the crisis on the ground (Quds Press, November 7, 2025). His deputy, Muhammad al-Hindi, said that only a Palestinian entity could administer the Gaza Strip and any attempt to demilitarize the Strip would fail. He added that no Palestinian entity had the authority to relinquish the Palestinian people’s right to “resistance”^[8] (Al Jazeera Mubasher, November 8, 2025).
• Fatah spokesperson Abd al-Fattah Dula stated that if Hamas wanted to demonstrate responsibility, it had to address the issue of disarmament within the framework of the PLO, rather than negotiate with Israel or the American administration in an attempt to gain legitimacy in the Gaza Strip. He said that the goal was to reach an internal agreement on the principle of “one disciplined weapon under one leadership” (Radio Alam, November 11, 2025).
• The American-Palestinian businessman Bishara Bahbah, who is involved in negotiations with Hamas, said he had discussed the issue of Hamas’ disarmament with senior officials in Washington and they told him disarmament could be defined as Hamas surrendering its heavy weapons while retaining light arms for self-defense [sic]. He claimed that the senior Hamas figures with whom he spoke were open and willing to consider that kind of disarmament. He added that Hamas had “committed not to develop weapons in the Gaza Strip or smuggle in new ones,” but Israel insisted that demilitarization had to include the destruction of the entire tunnel system [approximately 350 kilometers, or about 217.5 miles], a process which he claimed “could take years and delay reconstruction” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 3, 2025).

Administration of the Gaza Strip and Palestinian Authority (PA) Involvement^[9]

• Hussein al-Sheikh, deputy PA chairman and deputy chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, said the PA had full authority over the Gaza Strip, even if it was a transitional stage which would lead to a political process preserving the two-state solution. He said they were coordinating with Arab and Islamic bodies to promote amendments to the American plan to ensure the geographic and political connection between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria. He added that they had proposed to Hamas that it hand over its weapons to the PA, since that was the only way to end the internal Palestinian schism, but an agreement had not yet been reached (Sky News Arabia, November 8, 2025).
• Senior Hamas figure Ali Baraka claimed that an understanding had been reached according to which the committee to administer the Gaza Strip would consist of eight Palestinian figures, including one woman, headed by Amjad al-Shawa, a human rights activist who heads the Palestinian NGO Network (al-Aqsa TV, November 9, 2025). In response, Fatah said Hamas had insisted the committee members would not belong to the PA government. Fatah warned that such an approach deepened the schism and would lead to a complete separation between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria (al-Arabiya, November 10, 2025).
• Hamas political bureau member Muhammad Nazzal said the movement’s position om the international stabilization force to be deployed in the Gaza Strip depended on its composition and spheres of responsibility (Al Jazeera Mubasher, November 3, 2025). In contrast, Musa Abu Marzouq, Hamas deputy head “abroad,” said the movement rejected the idea of an international or foreign military force in the Gaza Strip and insisted that all security arrangements in the Gaza Strip must be exclusively Palestinian (al-Akhbar, November 4, 2025).
• Meanwhile, the PA continued preparing to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip. Amjad Barham, PA minister of education, participated in a meeting held at the government operations room. They discussed emergency interventions in the Gaza Strip regarding the plan for early aid and reconstruction of the education system. Barham said the ministry was coordinating with UNRWA to ensure education continued in schools despite the destruction and shortage of equipment, and viewed the agency as an essential part of the education system in the Strip. He pointed to several factors delaying the resumption of the education process, among them “the ongoing Israeli blockade,” which he claimed prevented the entry of school supplies and teaching materials, the presence of thousands of displaced people inside and around school grounds, and the extensive destruction of infrastructure (Palestinian government Facebook page, November 10, 2025).

Hamas’ International Activity

• A Hamas delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya, head of the political bureau in the Gaza Strip, met in Istanbul with Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan to discuss developments in the Palestinian issue and the situation in the Gaza Strip following the ceasefire. The delegation gave Fidan a detailed memorandum on the [alleged] “Israeli violations” of the agreement since its implementation began and said an independent committee had to be established to administer the Gaza Strip, complete Israel’s withdrawal and meet all related commitments, including increased aid and shelter ahead of winter (Hamas website, November 1, 2025). The delegation also met with Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkish intelligence, to discuss political developments and the continuation of “Zionist violations” of the agreement. Al-Hayya thanked Turkey for its role in formulating the agreement and for its continued support for the Palestinian people “throughout all the occupied areas of Palestine [sic], particularly in the Strip,” and called on mediators and international actors to exert pressure to stop [alleged] “Israeli violations” against Palestinian prisoners in prisons (Hamas Telegram channel, November 6, 2025).

• Hamas welcomed the decision of the Turkish attorney general to issue arrest warrants for 37 senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Katz and his predecessor Gallant, and Chief of Staff Zamir, for the “deaths in the Gaza Strip” (Hamas Telegram channel, November 7, 2025).
• Khalil al-Hayya spoke before the 34^th session of the Arab National Conference held in Beirut. He represented the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre as a victory and a turning point that returned the Palestinian issue to center stage. He called on the world to rebuild the Gaza Strip and to continue together the “journey of return and liberation” until the establishment of a Palestinian state, and to pursue legal action against Israel’s leadership (Hamas Telegram channel, November 8, 2025).

• A 39 year-old British citizen was arrested in London on suspicion of involvement in a case in which three men of Syrian and Lebanese origin were arrested in Germany in early October 2025 on suspicion of being Hamas terrorist operatives who were in an advanced stage of preparing attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in the country.^[10] According to reports, the suspect, who is to be extradited to Germany, had met one of the three suspects last summer, received weapons and ammunition from him, and transferred them to Austria. Austrian security services announced that five pistols and ten magazines were found inside a suitcase in a rented storage unit in Vienna, suspected to have been intended for Hamas terrorist attacks (Kurier, November 6, 2025).
• According to the report, the suspect arrested in Britain, identified as Muhammad A., is the son of Hamas political bureau member Bassem Na’im, former minister of health in the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. The report also noted that the four detainees were suspected of belonging to a Turkish-Lebanese gang which established a logistical route for smuggling from the Middle East, through Istanbul, to Scandinavian countries and Germany, and that they had ties with Hamas (Die Welt, November 10, 2025).

Counterterrorism Activities

• Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations in various areas of Judea and Samaria to prevent escalation related to the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. During the operations dozens of suspects involved in terrorist activity were detained, weapons were seized and a lathe used for manufacturing weapons was located. The forces eliminated three terrorists who attempted to attack IDF forces during operational activity in three separate incidents, as well as two terrorists who threw Molotov cocktails at a main civilian traffic route. The home of the terrorist who shot and murdered an Israeli mother and her infant son in May 2025 was demolished (IDF spokesperson, November 1–11, 2025). The Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military wing confirmed that a man killed in the al-Fara refugee camp was one of its operatives (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, November 8, 2025).

Friction between Palestinians and Settlers

• In Judea and Samaria clashes broke out during olive harvesting between Israeli settlers and Palestinian olive harvesters. Eleven Palestinians were injured, including journalists, near the town of Beita in the Nablus area (Palestine al-Yawm al-Akhbar Telegram channel, November 8, 2025). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported that 11 people had been injured in a “settler attack” near the town of Beita in the Nablus area (Palestine al-Yawm, November 8, 2025). Hamas claimed that among the injured were journalists and emergency teams and called for international action (Hamas Telegram channel, November 8, 2025).

International Activity

• Saudi Arabian Prince Mohammed bin Salman sent a letter to PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas stating that Saudi Arabia supported the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights, including the establishment of an independent state within the 1967 borders with east Jerusalem as its capital. He pledged to continue supporting the PA, work to lift the “financial blockade” and release the tax revenues, and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. He also noted the kingdom’s efforts, in coordination with international partners, to promote recognition of the “State of Palestine,” a step he described as “historic” (Wafa, November 5, 2025).
• Mahmoud Abbas met with Pope Leo XIV at the Vatican and thanked him for supporting a just peace in “Palestine” and for his calls to ease the suffering of the Palestinian people. He reiterated the need to preserve the historical and legal status of the holy places in Jerusalem, ensure freedom of worship and access, and protect the city from unilateral measures (Wafa, November 6, 2025). Later, Mahmoud Abbas met with the president of Italy, Sergio Mattarella, and thanked Italy for sending humanitarian aid, admitting wounded Palestinian children [to Italian hospitals], training the Palestinian police and participating in the international force at the Rafah Crossing (Wafa, November 7, 2025). Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Mahmoud Abbas reiterated his request that Italy recognize the “State of Palestine” (Wafa, November 7, 2025).

• Hussein al-Sheikh, PA deputy chairman and deputy chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, spoke with Russian deputy foreign minister Sergey Vershinin. Vershinin noted the importance of a stable, sustainable ceasefire and Moscow’s consistent position that there was no alternative to a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue other than the well-known international legal principles calling for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state living alongside Israel in peace and security (Wafa, November 6, 2025).