Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (May 5 –12, 2026)

• IDF activity continued within the Yellow Line to locate terrorists and destroy weapons, tunnels and other terrorist infrastructure, including a tunnel used to hold Israeli hostages in the central Gaza Strip, and a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) weapons manufacturing site in the northern Gaza Strip. Terrorists who approached IDF forces or tried to infiltrate the Yellow Line were eliminated, as were those promoting attacks against IDF forces, including operatives involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, May 5-12, 2026).
• On May 6, Azzam Khalil al-Hayya, the son of Khalil al-Hayya (head of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip and head of the negotiating team), was critically wounded in an attack on a field commander in the Hamas military wing in eastern Gaza City, and died the following day (Shehab News Agency and al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 6-7, 2026). Al-Hayya, three other of whose sons had been killed in Israeli attacks in the past, claimed that not only his son had been attacked, but the “entire Palestinian people” were in the crosshairs. He said his son had not been the target of the attack, and called it an attempt to pressure him and force him to surrender, or to send the message that the leaders and their families were not immune. He added that if Israel thought that by harming leaders or families it could take what the Palestinians did not want to give and achieve its objectives, it was deluded because that would never happen (aljazeera.net and Hamas’ Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, May 7, 2026). Many senior Hamas operatives attended the condolence events, including Muhammad Darwish, Khaled Mashal, Zaher Jabarin, Nizar Awadallah, Osama Hamdan, Musa Abu Marzouk and Maher Salah. Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas, the prime minister of Qatar, the heads of Egyptian and Turkish intelligence and other figures reportedly offered their condolences (Hamas’ Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, May 8-9, 2026).

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Right: Al-Hayya with his four dead sons (Hamas Telegram channel, May 7, 2026). Left: A claim that the sons of the “resistance” leaders do not live in 5-star hotels but pay the same price as other Gazans (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas’ house cartoonist, May 9, 2026)

• Sources in Hamas and the PIJ said that the [terrorist] organizations in the Gaza Strip were working on a plan in case Israel renewed the fighting, based on “self-defense.” They alleged they had no plan or intention to initiate an attack on Israel. A Hamas source claimed the movement’s operatives had been instructed to avoid friction with IDF forces and maintain the current calm. Another source claimed the objective was to prevent IDF forces from advancing beyond the Yellow Line (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 5, 2026).

• The head of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, who heads the movement’s negotiating team, accused Israel of reneging on all agreements and decisions and of failing to implement the clauses of the first stage of the ceasefire agreement, while violating it for the past seven months. He claimed that during those months more than 850 Palestinians had been killed, thousands wounded, and restrictions on the entry of aid continued. He said that Hamas had conveyed daily reports on the [alleged] “violations” to the mediators and guarantor countries, but Israel ignored them and continued to act as it pleased. He demanded that the mediators and the guarantors, especially the United States, assume their responsibility to enforce the agreement. Israel, he said, was focusing only on the issue of weapons, which he represented as the Palestinian people’s “right” as part of their “struggle” for a state and their legitimate rights. He added that the failure to fully implement the first stage was preventing the transition to the second stage, and Hamas had informed the mediators and Nikolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace representative, that it was ready to begin the second stage immediately after completion of the first stage. Referring to the possibility of renewed war, al-Hayya said that if the Palestinian people were attacked, they would defend themselves (Al Jazeera channel, May 6, 2026).

• Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said pressure was being exerted by Israel to change the course of the negotiations in light of the “firmness” displayed by Hamas’ negotiating delegation. According to him, Hamas’ “firmness merged with its flexibility” made it possible to present the needs and interests of the Palestinian people, but not at the expense of the supreme interests of the Palestinian people and their right to freedom, independence and self-determination, as well as their right to “resistance” in all forms, including “armed resistance.”^[2] He added that the message Israel sought to convey by eliminating Khalil al-Hayya’s son had not been received, and Israel would not succeed in extracting from the Hamas delegation at the negotiating table what it had failed to achieve on the battlefield. Regarding Israeli threats to renew the war, Na’im said that Israel was continuing the fighting, albeit at a reduced pace, and claimed that if it had the operational capability to wage a full-scale war it would not hesitate or wait for negotiations (Al Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, May 7, 2026).
• The head of Hamas’ office for international relations, Musa Abu Marzouk, said what was taking place could not be described as fair negotiations or negotiations based on professional principles, but were rather an attempt to impose Israeli dictates in a new form. He claimed that the course of the negotiations had to be corrected to preserve the rights of the Palestinian people. He added any talk of disarmament before Israel fulfilled all its obligations was a continuation of the war, and the weapons were tied to ending the war against the Palestinian people, as well as to achieving political rights, foremost among them the establishment of a Palestinian state. He claimed Israel had escalated its political and military discourse and actions against the Gaza Strip but noted that Hamas did not believe Israel would return to war at this stage and its threats were part of the pressure it was exerting in the negotiations (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 5, 2026).

The Palestinian Committee for Managing the Gaza Strip

• Sources in Hamas and other terrorist organizations said the issue of Hamas government employees, which had been one of the points of disagreement in the negotiations before and after the “road map,” had largely been resolved, and that fair solutions had been found for everyone, and only the completion of the agreement on the matter remained. The sources noted that Hamas and the “organizations” had agreed on the deployment of a new police force which would operate under the authority of the committee for managing the Strip, and the main obstacle remained Israel’s refusal to allow the committee to enter. According to the proposed plan, 12,000 policemen would work under the committee’s supervision, with 5,000 of them deploying in the first stage. Sources in the terrorist organizations and sources connected to the committee for managing the Strip said that 5,000 policemen had been selected from among those who had received training in police colleges in a number of Arab countries after leaving the Strip before and during the war, and they would undergo Israeli security screening. The sources added that there was a plan to enlist some operatives from the Palestinian Authority security forces from among those for whom decisions had been issued regarding their placement in the forces in 2005, with policemen from the Hamas government who would undergo Israeli security screening and were under the age of 45 (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 10, 2026).

Palestinian Authority Involvement in the Gaza Strip

• Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem criticized the Palestinian Authority leadership for dragging its feet regarding the Gaza Strip and other national issues, accusing it of weakening the overall Palestinian position and enabling external forces to influence the Palestinian arena. He called on Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas to instruct the Authority’s institutions to take practical steps against what he termed the “occupation’s plans” in the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, and to lead a united national position based on the strategy of a “shared struggle” and one legitimate national institution. Qassem also criticized the Arab-Muslim countries and the international community, which he claimed continued to watch what was happening in the Strip without taking real action (Hazem Qassem Telegram channel, May 6, 2026).

The Situation in the Strip

• The Gaza Center for Human Rights said it was “concerned” about what it claimed were growing indications of an undeclared “Israeli displacement policy” aimed at causing Gazans to leave through non-transparent arrangements and concessions managed outside a declared framework. The Center called on the international community to assume its legal responsibility to protect the civilian population, ensure its right to remain on its land and protect the Gazans’ right to travel and return without harming their legal status or national rights (Gaza Center for Human Rights website, May 5, 2026).
• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that hundreds of pallets of medical equipment had been transferred to the Red Cross field hospital in Gaza. The supplies included advanced medical systems, equipment for laboratories and treatment rooms, equipment for ventilators, generators, medicines, tents and dozens of new beds. It was noted that the additional equipment and medical supplies would lead to a significant improvement in the hospital’s operations, expand the capacity of its hospitalization and treatment departments and improve its ability to provide advanced medical care to a larger number of patients, including in the fields of emergency medicine, surgery, women’s health and maternity care (COGAT Arabic Facebook page, May 7, 2026).

• Nevertheless, Hamas’s ministry of health in Gaza continued to reiterate its usual litany of shortages of medicines and medical supplies, claiming 47% of “essential” medicines were out of stock, 59% of disposable medical supplies were “completely” out of stock, as were 87% of laboratory testing materials. The ministry of health also claimed that the shortage of materials for laboratory tests required for blood tests, blood gas analysis and biochemistry, and of disposable laboratory materials, threatened the continuation of laboratory tests (Facebook page of the ministry of health in Gaza, May 7, 2026).
• UNRWA claimed rats were biting children during the night inside the displaced persons’ tents, and called for the entry of pesticides and medicines into the Strip. According to UNRWA, the mass displacement, overcrowding in the tent camps, shortage of clean water and the collapse of sanitation and environmental health systems increased the risk of the spread of disease (Wafa, May 8, 2026). The COGAT reported that hundreds of cartons of anti-rodent pesticides had been transferred, as well as 20 tons of pesticides and extermination equipment, and during recent weeks the approximately 110 tons of pesticides entered in cooperation with aid organizations and the international community (COGAT X account, May 7, 2026).

     
Right: Map of the spread of rodents and other pests in the Khan Yunis area (Facebook page of the Khan Yunis municipality, May 9, 2026). Left: Extermination equipment brought into the Strip (COGAT X account, May 7, 2026)

• Reportedly, in the weeks following the war on Iran, there was a sharp decline in the flow of international aid to the Gaza Strip, particularly aid from the Gulf States and private donations from Arab citizens. Various sources estimated that financial support had declined by more than 80%, in part because donors were now redirecting their resources to victims of the war in Iran and because of damage to their economic situation. A Qatari association noted that the decline was also evident in the number of aid trucks arriving through Egypt, which had been far higher before the war. Meanwhile, organizations funded by Gulf money complained about bureaucratic difficulties and complex money transfer procedures, causing significant delays and impeding their ability to carry out humanitarian projects in the Strip on time (al-Ayyam, May 9, 2026).
• After more than two years during which no frontal studies had taken place, UNRWA began renewing its educational activity in southwest Khan Yunis. The agency opened two temporary schools in the regional park area and more than 700 students registered on the first day alone (al-Motakadimon Telegram channel, May 11, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• The Hamas ministry of national economy announced the launch of a campaign to supervise commodity prices in malls and markets, with the participation of all ministry employees, in cooperation with the supply investigations department and the ministry of agriculture. The ministry noted that the campaign was part of its ongoing efforts to ensure that merchants complied with its pricing directives and to maintain price stability in malls, markets and shops (Facebook page of Hamas’ ministry of economy, May 6, 2026).
• Sources in the Gaza Strip reported the entry of a large shipment of cigarettes, nicotine and tobacco through one of the international institutions operating in the Strip. Sources following the issue claimed that the scale of the merchandise and the high cigarette prices in the Strip, reaching approximately 800 shekels [sic] per pack (about $275), indicated the existence of a network of interests benefiting from the trade, on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. According to claims, after the trucks entered and the merchandise was unloaded, it was distributed to merchants according to quotas determined in advance. Reportedly, the merchandise was distributed in vehicles escorted by armed men (Telegram channel of the Aalam al-Midan network, May 8, 2026). Hamas’ governmental emergency committee said it was monitoring all humanitarian aid trucks entering the Gaza Strip and “handling” smuggling and violations of procedures. The committee rejected the exploitation of humanitarian aid or its use for personal profit or to undermine the institutional and humanitarian role of the organizations, and shifted the responsibility to Israel, as the “occupying power” which controlled the crossings into the Gaza Strip and supervised the entry of trucks and goods after subjecting them to inspection and verification procedures in accordance with its standards (Telegram channel of the Hamas government media office, May 10, 2026).

Security Governance

• The Hamas security forces claimed they had foiled an attempt to incite chaos and undermine internal stability after arresting two individuals described as “linked to collaborator gangs.” Reportedly, the two had tried to exploit an incident between the police and wanted persons in order to incite the public against the security forces by spreading the “false rumor” that a member of the al-Kafarna family had been killed by the police, and by attempting to incite family members to attack policemen. The report claimed that the objective of the operation had been to turn a simple legal issue into a bloody confrontation between families and the security forces (Amsak Amil Telegram channel, May 5, 2026).
• The Hamas “resistance security” warned against responding to calls from elements in militias operating with Israel to come to the yellow zone, which is under Israeli control, claiming they would receive food and be secure. According to the statement, “the collaborators” were trying to trick civilians to go to the Yellow Line areas in order to use them as human shields to protect the gangs, especially in light of the negotiations entering a sensitive stage which included dismantling the militias and ending their activity. The public was called upon to ignore the calls, not go to the area and report anyone intending to do so (al-Akhres Telegram channel, May 6, 2026).
• The “resistance security’s” Rada Force claimed to have ambushed a group of “collaborators” who crossed the Yellow Line east of Musa Square in south Khan Yunis. Some of the “collaborators” were shot at point-blank range and the rest fled back to the Yellow Zone, abandoning a jeep (Telegram channel of the Rada Force, May 6, 2026). In response, the militia leader, Hussam al-Astal, stated that his men had been on a special mission in Musa Square assisting civilians, and that Hamas personnel had opened fire on them but none of them had been hit. He displayed two rifles and claimed his men had killed two Hamas operatives and taken their weapons (Facebook page of Hussam al-Astal, May 6, 2026).
• The Popular Army in the Northern Strip District, under the command of Ashraf al-Mansi, stated that its forces had raided Kamal Adwan Hospital in the northern Strip and cleared it of Hamas terrorist cells which had used the medical facilities as cover for their sabotage activities. Reportedly, quantities of weapons and equipment hidden by Hamas operatives in the hospital corridors had been seized (Facebook page of the Popular Army in the Northern Strip District, May 7, 2026).

The International Flotilla to the Gaza Strip

• According to reports, another International Resilience Flotilla, which was supposed to set sail for the Gaza Strip, was postponed for the time being in response to a request from the United States, which approached Turkey requesting it prevent 15 ships from leaving its territory as part of the flotilla. The new flotilla is expected to include approximately 60 vessels, 35 of them anchored in Crete, 15 in Turkey and the remainder in Sicily. Turkey had been approached because of Israeli concern that ships departing from Turkey would lead to a violent confrontation, similar to the events of the Mavi Marmara in 2010. According to the report, United States secretary of state Marco Rubio conveyed messages to Turkey (Ynet, May 5, 2026).
• Tiago Avila and Saif Abu Kashk, the two pro-Palestinian activists who were detained by IDF forces during the Global Resilience Flotilla and brought for questioning in Israel, were released after several days and deported from Israel (Al Jazeera “Palestine,” May 12, 2026).

• Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan met in Ankara with a Hamas delegation headed by Muhammad Darwish, chairman of the movement’s Shura Council. They discussed efforts to establish sustainable peace in the Gaza Strip and ensure the entry of humanitarian aid, as well as the latest regional developments in the region. Fidan said the ongoing regional war should not overshadow the Palestinian issue, adding that strengthening Israel’s presence in the Strip and preventing the supply of the necessary humanitarian aid were unacceptable. He added that his country would strongly oppose any step to uproot the Gazans (Anadolu Agency, May 10, 2026).
• The Turkish foreign minister paid a condolence call on Khalil al-Hayya in Qatar, during which Turkish president Erdogan telephoned to express his condolences. Erdogan noted his solidarity with al-Hayya, his family and the Palestinian people, while Fidan praised the “steadfastness, sacrifice and patience” [sic] shown by the Palestinians. Al-Hayya thanked them for the visit and the call and added that the “Zionist enemy’s” actions only strengthened the Palestinians’ determination to preserve their “rights and principles” (Hamas Telegram channel, May 11, 2026).

• Palestinian sources stated that in recent months Hamas operatives had been exploiting Turkish territory for training in the use of small arms and the operation of UAVs. Under civilian cover, the operatives regularly trained at public shooting clubs, and also underwent training and received licenses for operating UAVs. According to the report, Hamas intends eventually to transfer the operatives to Lebanon, Jordan or Judea and Samaria, fronts which are potential arenas for future confrontation with Israel (X account of Elior Levy, head of the Palestinian affairs desk at Israel TV’s Kan 11, May 7, 2026). Turkey’s communications directorate at the presidential office rejected the claims that various groups were receiving weapons and UAV training in Turkey (X account of the Center for Combating Disinformation at the communications directorate of the Turkish presidential office, May 8, 2026).

• According to a source in Hamas, the results of the election for the position of head of the political bureau were expected to be announced by the Shura Council within a week to 15 days, after the results from Judea and Samaria and abroad had been received, since voting in both regions had already ended. According to the source, the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip had completed counting votes and transferred them to the movement’s central elections committee, while Khalil al-Hayya had again been appointed head of the political bureau in the Strip, and a deputy had also been appointed for him, whose name was not published. Alongside the announcement of the new leader, the identities of the 19 members of Hamas’ executive council would also be published. The source further noted that if Khalil al-Hayya were elected head of Hamas’ political bureau, Zaher Jabarin would serve as his first deputy for Judea and Samaria and Khaled Mashal as his second deputy for foreign affairs. However, if Mashal were elected, al-Hayya would serve as his first deputy for Strip affairs and Jabarin would serve as the second deputy (Ultra Palestine, May 7, 2026).
• Three Hamas sources residing outside the Strip stated that all members of the Hamas political bureau, except for those in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, as well as members of the Shura Council, had held meetings in Istanbul over several days, and had also participated in the mourning events for the death of Khalil al-Hayya’s son. According to the sources, al-Hayya left Turkey for Qatar to console his family members, but was expected to return to Istanbul to complete the final steps in selecting the new head of the bureau, who would serve until the end of 2026 or the beginning of 2027. The sources denied claims of an attempt to advance al-Hayya’s election because he had sacrificed four sons, however one of the sources said it was not unreasonable that he would be voted in because of it (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 11, 2026).
• With the contest between al-Hayya and Mashal for Hamas leadership, Mashal used his remarks at a condolence event in memory of al-Hayya’s son to praise his rival. Mashal said that when they met in Jordan in the mid-1990s he identified al-Hayya as “a patient and faithful Muslim with high morals,” and denied claims that there were power struggles between them. Mashal said, “Since I met brother Abu Osama [al-Hayya’s nom de guerre], I have known his patience, his faith and his character, as well as his family. Allah knows that Abu Osama has a great place in my heart, far from what people believe on social media” (Hamas Telegram channel, May 7, 2026).

The Israeli Security Forces

• This past week the Israeli security forces detained terrorist operatives and wanted persons in various areas of Judea and Samaria. Some of them, including a Palestinian policeman and an ISIS operative, were suspected of planning attacks in the immediate future. Three young men who threw Molotov cocktails and rocks near the wall above the Tunnel Road were detained in Bethlehem. On May 11, the Israeli security forces eliminated a Palestinian terrorist who shot at them during activity in the Qalandia refugee camp; there were no casualties. The smuggling of weapons using drones along the Egyptian and Jordanian borders was prevented (Israel Police spokesperson and IDF spokesperson, May 5-12, 2026).
• Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Hamas military wing, said the shooting in Qalandia and an earlier stabbing in Silwad at the end of April 2026 “reflected the strength of our people and their resistance to injustice” [sic]. He called on Palestinian youths to “resist”^[3] and do whatever they could against the “occupying soldiers and their settler gangs,” adding that their sticks and knives “harmed the Zionists like rocket attacks” (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, May 11, 2026).

Settler Terrorism

• Palestinian media outlets reported incidents of attacks by Jewish settlers at several locations in Judea and Samaria. In Beit Fajar south of Bethlehem, a Palestinian was attacked while on his land and his phone was taken from him; in the village of Shweikeh south of Hebron, two farmers were wounded after being attacked with sharp instruments and their vehicles were damaged; in al-Lubban al-Sharqiya south of Nablus, the home of a Palestinian resident was set on fire; in Abu Falah near Ramallah, vehicles were torched and racist slogans sprayed on the walls of houses; in the al-Balqa area near al-Auja north of Jericho, a Palestinian was seriously wounded during an attack by Jewish settlers on Bedouins living in the area. Reportedly, a new outpost has been established near schools and residents’ homes in the town of Burqin west of Salfit (Wafa, May 8-9, 2026).
• Kaja Kallas, the European Union representative for foreign affairs and security policy, said the EU’s foreign ministers had approved imposing sanctions on Israeli settlers because of violence against Palestinians. They also agreed on new sanctions against senior Hamas figures (Kaja Kallas’ X account, May 11, 2026). Hamas political bureau member Bassem Naim accused the EU of “political hypocrisy and racism.” He claimed the EU equated the “aggressor with the victim lawfully defending himself.” (Shehab Telegram channel, May 11, 2026).

International Activity

• PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney discussed developments in the Palestinian arena, the regional situation and strengthening relations between “Palestine” and Canada. Abbas thanked Canada for its recognition of the “State of Palestine” and its support for the two-state solution. He noted the need to implement the second stage of the peace plan, stabilize the ceasefire, achieve a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, disarm the “factions’^[4] and promote the principle of one state, one law and one legal weapon. In addition, he called for Israel to be pressured to stop the “escalation” in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, the “annexation” and settler violence, and to transfer the Palestinian tax funds it held. Carney reiterated Canada’s commitment to the two-state solution and to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state and condemned Jewish settler violence (Wafa, May 8, 2026).

Payments to Palestinian Prisoners

• The administrative court in Ramallah overturned the decision of the Palestinian minister of finance to stop payments to a Palestinian prisoner from mid-2025 and ordered the renewal of his payments. The ruling was issued following a petition filed by the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) in August 2025, claiming that the suspension of the payment was illegal, among other things because Article 22 of the amended Basic Law obligated the PA to regulate by law the treatment of the families of shaheeds and prisoners, the wounded, victims and persons with disabilities, and to ensure them education services, health insurance and social insurance, as well as by virtue of the law concerning prisoners and released prisoners. The court accepted the argument that the payments had been suspended without an official written decision, and therefore defined it as an implied and unwritten decision by the minister of finance. The director general of the Independent Commission for Human Rights, Dr. Ammar al-Dweik, said it was a precedent that could serve as the basis for renewing the payments to more than 1,600 prisoners retroactively from the date payments were stopped. He said the appeal to the court had been made after approaches to political and official bodies, including Mahmoud Abbas, had been exhausted. Al-Dweik said that the ruling made it clear that any action to stop the payments to prisoners was illegal (ICHR, May 4-5, 2026; al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 5, 2026).