Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (May 19-26, 2026)

The IDF

• IDF forces continued activity to expose and destroy terrorist infrastructure and locate terrorists, eliminating operatives who approached the forces or attempted to infiltrate the Yellow Line area. Hamas terrorist operatives who planned attacks against IDF forces and against Israeli civilians were eliminated, including those involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. The forces also attacked weapons depots, explosive devices, rocket launchers, mortar shells, anti-tank missiles and other combat equipment (IDF spokesperson, May 19-26, 2026).
• Palestinian sources reported that the IDF fired artillery, burned houses, issued evacuation orders and carried out demolitions in the Yellow Line area. The main centers of activity were the Jabalia, al-Maghazi and al-Bureij refugee camps, Khan Yunis and eastern Gaza City (Telegram channel of journalist Hadeel Abbas, May 21, 2026). Hamas accused Israel of “systematic aggression,” contempt for the mediators and the states guaranteeing the ceasefire agreement, and continuing the “siege” (Hamas Telegram channel, May 23, 2026).
• Reportedly, five officers in the police force and three policemen were killed in an attack on a Hamas police position in the Gaza Strip. The Hamas ministry of interior and national security claimed 42 policemen had been killed since the beginning of the ceasefire in October 2025 and accused Israel of attacking the police force to spread chaos while violating the ceasefire agreement (Telegram channel of the Palestinian police, May 23, 2026).
• Palestinians reported new “waves of displacement” in the central Gaza Strip, mainly in the al-Bureij and al-Nuseirat refugee camps, following evacuation notices and targeted Israeli strikes (Telegram channel of Hamza al-Masri, May 23, 2026). Hamas sources claimed that armed groups operating in areas under Israeli control had sent Gazans messages and called from Israeli numbers with allegedly fake evacuation demands because of fears of bombings in the al-Katiba area in Khan Yunis and the al-Maghazi refugee camp. Hamas is reportedly examining if the objective was to make it possible to carry out “sabotage operations” after the evacuation of the residents (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 22, 2026).

• During a UN Security Council session, Nikolay Mladenov, the representative of the Board of Peace for the Gaza Strip, said the current situation in Gaza could become a permanent territorial division. Israel holds close to 60% of the Strip territory, while Hamas continues to rule militarily and administratively over more than two million residents crowded into less than half of it. He said the Hamas refusal to disarm and relinquish control was the main obstacle to implementing the peace and reconstruction plan. However, he also acknowledged Israeli “violations” and the continued killings, as well as the funding gaps for reconstruction. He warned that continuing the situation would lead to another generation of Gazans living in tents, would be detrimental to Israel’s security and would block any practical path to establishing a Palestinian state (Reuters, May 21, 2026). Hamas claimed Mladenov’s report was rife with distortions which absolved the Israeli government of responsibility for violating the ceasefire agreement. Hamas also rejected the claim that it was the obstacle to the reconstruction of the Strip and that it refused to relinquish control over the Gaza Strip (Hamas Telegram channel, May 19, 2026). Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem accused Mladenov of adopting the Israeli narrative and exerting pressure on the movement instead of on Israel (Hazem Qassem Telegram channel, May 21, 2026).
• During the Security Council session Mladenov presented a 15-point framework for implementing the peace plan in the Strip and later described it in detail on his X account. It includes implementation of the existing commitments, including the entry of aid; a commitment by one side must be matched by the other side, with verification before moving to the next stage; disconnecting “the armed groups” from managing the affairs of the Strip; establishing the principle of one authority, one law, one weapon, under which only official Palestinian institutions would be able to administer the Strip and bear arms, and all “armed groups” would cease their activity; constructing a civilian police force; gradual disarmament under Palestinian leadership and international supervision; prohibition on revenge operations and internal killings and on the public display of weapons; the temporary international stabilization force would separate between the Israeli and Palestinian forces and assist in implementing the agreement and protecting humanitarian aid; gradual withdrawal of IDF forces according to a timetable linked to verification of the disarmament process and deployment of the stabilization force; the Palestinian Authority would become responsible for the demilitarized areas; reconstruction would only be possible if effective civilian control and disarmament were ensured (X account of Nikolay Mladenov, May 21, 2026).
• In response, Hamas political bureau member Basem Naim condemned the issuing of the details of the framework via a social media post, since “serious negotiations were not conducted through the media,” unless Mladenov believed that making the document public would create a popular front which would exert pressure for its implementation. He claimed Hamas was committed to negotiations and wanted the second stage, but not selectively or according to Netanyahu’s interpretation of the agreement, adding that Mladenov dealt only with the issue of weapons while ignoring the Security Council resolution and the American plan. He said that for the “political ideology” of Hamas and the other Palestinian “factions,”^[2] the issue of weapons was connected to the “occupation” and to the Palestinian people’s right to all forms of “resistance”^[3] as an inherent right of “occupied” peoples. He added that they agreed in principle with one authority, one law and one weapon, but on the condition that the authority was legitimate and elected, and that the one weapon belonged to a fully sovereign independent Palestinian state (X account of Basem Naim, May 22, 2026).
• Four sources in Hamas, both inside and outside the Strip, said the movement’s leadership had not received any guarantees that the agreement taking shape between Iran and the United States also included the Gaza Strip, after the Iranian media declared that the agreement would include stopping the war on all fronts. One of the sources admitted that even if an agreement were achieved, the Gaza Strip would remain the weak link, and that if calm prevailed in the Lebanese arena, Israel might escalate the fighting in the Strip again. A leading source in one of the Palestinian terrorist organizations also admitted that Iran had not updated them regarding the possibility that the Gaza Strip was included in the agreement with the United States (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 26, 2026).

The Humanitarian Situation

• Dr. Muhammad al-Mughayyir, head of the humanitarian aid and international cooperation department in the Hamas civil defense apparatus, claimed that approximately 80% of the buildings and facilities in the Strip had been completely or partially destroyed, resulting in the accumulation of almost 61 million tons of rubble and waste, including 55 million tons of rubble from buildings and infrastructure in addition to approximately six million tons which had crumbled into dust. He claimed the rubble was dangerous not only because of its quantity, but also because of the explosive and toxic materials within it, since an estimated 15% of the ammunition used by the IDF during the war did not explode, amounting to approximately 19 thousand tons. He added that large portions of the rubble contained carcinogenic and other dangerous materials, including asbestos, heavy metals and chemical waste from factories and infrastructure. Agricultural expert Nizar al-Wahidi claimed that the rubble had become an ideal breeding ground for rats, reptiles and parasitic insects which transmit diseases, some of which could spread diseases such as plague. That exacerbates the destruction of the sewage networks, causing wastewater to flow and mix with chemical residues and toxic materials from the bombardments, threatening to contaminate water sources and constituting a long-term threat to health and food security in the Gaza Strip (al-Risalah, May 19, 2026).
• A recession in the markets in the Gaza Strip and minimal customer movement before Eid al-Adha were reported, since most Gazans could not afford a sacrificial animal or new clothing for the holiday, and their primary concern was searching for food and survival. Clothing merchant Wasem Na’im, from the market in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp, said clothing prices had risen by approximately 25% compared to prices before the war and some items had risen by more than 40%, depending on quality, raw materials and manufacturer, claiming that only small quantities of clothing entered the Strip. Hussam al-Huwaiti, treasurer of the clothing merchants’ union and a member of the board of directors of the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, said the current rise in clothing prices was mainly the result of the increase in transportation and import costs through the crossings. He said institutions had begun distributing shopping vouchers to enable families to purchase clothing from humanitarian aid programs, but the need was still far greater than the available resources (al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 19, 2026).

• A pre-holiday recession was also recorded in the livestock market. A merchant named Salem Dhahir said the price of a single sheep had risen from approximately 1,500 shekels (about $525) before the war to approximately 15,000 shekels (about $5,250) [sic] today, leading to a drop in the demand to less than 5% compared to previous years. He added that animals were bought and sold for cash only, making it difficult for civilians and charity organizations to purchase them (Ultra Palestine, May 20, 2026). Sheep breeders in the Strip said it was the third consecutive year of no holiday sacrifices because of the prohibition on importing animals and the “destruction” of livestock during the war. According to the Hamas ministry of agriculture, the number of sheep and goats in the Strip declined from 60,000 before the war to only 3,000, while cows and calves had “almost disappeared.” In addition, the prices of livestock for sacrifice rose to $7,000, after ranging between $500 and $600 before the war (Shehab Agency, May 25, 2026).
• Israel’s Supreme Court rejected the petition of 37 foreign NGOs operating in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem, including Doctors Without Borders, which opposed the state’s requirement to undergo a new registration and screening process, including providing details of Palestinian employees as a condition for continuing their activity. The court accepted Israel’s argument that the process was intended to prevent Hamas infiltration into humanitarian organizations and as cover for terrorist activity, while the organizations and their attorneys claimed that the requirement endangered their workers and interfered with their ability to bring aid, medical equipment and foreign teams into the territories (al-Arabiya, May 20, 2026).
• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) sent a letter to the UN World Food Programme (WFP) demanding an immediate halt to fuel transfers and any other support to the Turkish aid organization IHH in the Gaza Strip, a designated terrorist organization (COGAT X account, May 21, 2026). A spokesman for the UN agency told Agence France-Presse that the demand would harm aid to more than 166,000 people, including approximately 111,000 who received hot meals daily and approximately 55,000 pregnant and nursing women and young children (al-Arabiya, May 22, 2026).
• Isma’il al-Thawabta, director general of the Hamas government media information office, reiterated his claim that Israel used food, medicine and humanitarian aid as tools for political pressure, after he claimed there had been an alleged “sharp, dangerous decline” in the number of aid trucks permitted to enter the Gaza Strip because of the restrictions imposed by Israel. He claimed that since the ceasefire agreement went into effect in October 2025, Israel had allowed the entry of only 37% of the trucks that were supposed to enter (48,636 trucks out of 131,400), and from the beginning of May 2026 until May 18 it allowed only 25% of the trucks to enter (2,719 trucks out of 10,800) (Isma’il al-Thawabta’s X account, May 19, 2026). Later, the Hamas government media information office claimed that between May 15-21 only 1,287 trucks entered out of 4,200 that were supposed to enter (30%), including 693 aid trucks, 35 fuel tankers and 559 trucks carrying merchandise (Telegram channel of the Hamas government media information office, May 22, 2026).
• The Palestinian ministry of health announced the renewal of the national corneal transplant program in the Gaza Strip after a three-year hiatus. The surgeries resumed at the Specialized Eye Hospital in Gaza City, led by Dr. Hussam Dawoud. The success of the first surgeries is represented as a symbol of the local ability to overcome difficult conditions and as good news for hundreds of patients who lost their sight and are awaiting treatment (al-Quds, May 25, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• Deputy minister in the Hamas ministry for social development in the Gaza Strip, Riyadh al-Bitar, reported that the poverty rate in the Strip exceeded 90%, with the almost complete collapse of economic activity and the rise in unemployment rates to unprecedented levels exceeding 80%, according to various estimates. He said his ministry was operating with a multi-track emergency plan which included the management and monitoring of shelter centers; provision of social services within them; protection of children, women, the elderly and disabled; provision of psychological and social support to war victims; coordination with international and local organizations for the distribution of food and financial assistance; follow-up on cases of orphans and families without a provider; monitoring urgent humanitarian cases and providing rapid responses; organization of databases of families and displaced persons, and support for community protection initiatives. He said the shelter issue was one of the most complex, and they housed approximately one million people (aljazeera.net, May 20, 2026).
• Commander of the Gaza police, Jamal Abu Kamil, said there was an increase in crime because of the economic conditions, hunger and social collapse caused by the war, however, he claimed the crime rate in the Gaza Strip did not exceed 2%. He said public awareness played a decisive role in preventing the spread of organized crime, adding that the police, in cooperation with the ministry of economy, were pursuing “war profiteers” and hoarders of goods who exploited the Gazans’ suffering by stealing aid and selling it at exorbitant prices. He said the police were deployed in the field, and the traffic police and the municipalities regulated traffic in the streets and facilitated civilian movement. Regarding the prisons, he said the detention centers operated in alternative places and were as safe as possible. He added that the anti-drug department pursued dealers and those involved in the field, and the use of drugs had not become a widespread threat thanks to public awareness and the high cost of drugs (Palestine Online, May 20, 2026).

Security Governance

• The Rada Force of Hamas “resistance security” announced it would give members of the “collaborating gangs” a final opportunity to surrender before it was too late (Telegram channel of the Rada Force, May 21, 2026). Reportedly, ten requests were later received from operatives seeking to “regularize their status and return to the embrace of their people” (Telegram channel of the Rada Force, May 23, 2026).
• The special forces apparatus in the Popular Army militia, under the command of Ashraf al-Mansi, announced it would give Hamas operatives in the Strip an opportunity to “repent” and hand over their weapons, and called on them to go to the organization’s main headquarters in the northern Gaza Strip. The announcement gave Hamas operatives a choice, to surrender and return to normal life or “face an unknown fate where regret would be useless” (Facebook page of the Popular Army in the Northern Strip District, May 22, 2026).
• Following the increase in Israeli orders to evacuate civilian areas inside the Gaza Strip ahead of bombardments, “resistance security” warned against the “enemy’s” exploitation of panic and confusion to carry out security operations or suspicious movements through the “collaborating gangs.” “Resistance security” called on Gazans to remain alert to any suspicious movement of vehicles, motorcycles or people, and to report them immediately (Telegram channel al-Hares, May 22, 2026).

• On May 19, 2026, Israeli naval forces completed the takeover of approximately 60 vessels of the Global Resilience Flotilla which attempted to reach the Gaza Strip. All 430 “activists” were transferred to Israel and held for one day at the Ketziot Prison before being deported from the country on flights to Turkey. The Israel Prison Service denied the claims by the flotilla organizers regarding assaults and the abuse of some of the detained activists and stressed that they had been held in accordance with the law and received medical treatment as needed (X account of the ministry of foreign affairs and Israeli media, May 19-22, 2026).
• Hamas issued a condemnation statement regarding the alleged scenes of “humiliation” carried out under the supervision of “Zionist minister” Ben-Gvir when he visited the detention facility where the flotilla “activists” were held. Hamas called the scenes “an expression of the moral degeneration of the leaders of the criminal Zionist entity and an attempt to break the will of the activists.” Hamas called on the international community, the UN and human rights organizations to document the “crimes and violations” and submit complaints to the International Criminal Court (Hamas Telegram channel, May 20, 2026). Hamas also welcomed the decision by several European countries to ban minister Ben-Gvir from entering their territory following the allegations of abuse against the flotilla “activists” and called to expand the sanctions to all members of the Israeli government (Hamas Telegram channel, May 23, 2026).

• The American Treasury Department announced the imposition of sanctions on four individuals connected to the Gaza Strip flotillas, calling the most recent one it a “terrorist flotilla” whose objective was to undermine the American administration’s efforts to promote a regional arrangement. According to the statement, the flotilla organizers were senior figures in the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), which was established with Hamas funding and is directed by it. Some of the flotilla leaders are senior figures in the Samidoun organization, a front organization for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. One of the individuals, Saif Abu Kishk, participated in the flotilla and had also been detained in Israel after the previous flotilla attempt at the beginning of May 2026. Sanctions were also imposed on the Association of Palestinian Religious Scholars in Gaza and its chairman, senior Hamas figure Marwan Abu Ras (United States Treasury Department website, May 19, 2026).

• Hamas sources said that in the elections for the head of the Hamas political bureau, blank ballots were used for the first time. According to sources, the large number of blank ballots was not random, but rather a protest against the movement’s policies and a desire for younger leadership, or reflected opposition to the selection of a temporary leader and a preference to wait for comprehensive elections (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 19, 2026).

Counterterrorism Activity

• The Israeli security forces continued extensive activity throughout Judea and Samaria, detaining three Hamas terrorists in Hebron on suspicion of planning shootings, and detaining a terrorist in Deir al-Ghusun, near Tulkarm, who was organizing a terrorist network. Weapons and a large quantity of ammunition were seized and two suspects were detained in the village of Sawachra, and the smuggling 26 hand guns and magazines near the Jordan border was prevented (IDF spokesperson and Israel Police spokesperson, May 18-25, 2026). Palestinian media reported that the Israeli security forces operated in the Nablus area and carried out detentions, blockaded traffic and searched houses. It was also reported that the forces detained a groom in Barta’a, north of Jenin (Wafa, May 22-23, 2026).

     
Right: Twenty-six hand guns near the border with Jordan. Left: Rifles and ammunition found in the village of Sawachra (Israel Police spokesperson, May 21-22, 2026)

Settler Terrorism

• This past week settler terrorism and violence in Judea and Samaria continued. There were reports of shots fired at Palestinian vehicles near the junction of the village of Jit, east of Qalqilya, and at homes in the al-Masoudia area, northwest of Nablus; in Halhul, Jewish rioters set fire to Palestinian vehicles and sprayed racist slogans (Telegram channel of the military media of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, May 21, 2026). In Abu Nijem, southeast of Bethlehem, rocks were thrown at Palestinian homes and a local resident was injured. In Masafer Yatta, near Hebron, agricultural equipment was stolen, a foreign activist was attacked and trees and crops were damaged; in Wadi al-Hayat, west of al-Auja, Jewish rioters entered a compound, searched one of the houses and stole approximately 5,000 shekels; in Sa’ir and Khirbet Masoud, armed Jewish settlers moved among residents’ homes and threatened to shoot; in the Salfit area, more than 40 olive trees were cut down (Wafa, May 22-25, 2026).

International Activity

• The UN announced that the Palestinian ambassador to the UN, Riyadh Mansour, had withdrawn his candidacy for the position of vice president of the UN General Assembly, and his place would be taken by the Lebanese ambassador. According to a source familiar with the matter, the Palestinian delegation conveyed through an Arab country that Mansour would not run for the position of vice president of the General Assembly during the next two years, apparently hinting at the end of the current administration. The spokesman for the president of the General Assembly confirmed that the Palestinian delegation had withdrawn his candidacy (NPR website, May 22, 2026). It was preceded by pressure on the Palestinian delegation to the UN from the American administration. According to an internal State Department cable, diplomats at the American embassy in Jerusalem were instructed to warn the PA that if the candidacy were not withdrawn, Washington might reconsider easing measures granted to officials of the Palestinian delegation regarding visas. It was claimed that the candidacy inflamed tensions and could harm the American plan in the Gaza Strip, and the administration was concerned the Palestinians would exploit the position to chair high-profile sessions, including on Middle East issues (Reuters in Arabic, May 21, 2026).
• PA deputy chairman Hussein al-Sheikh spoke with Egyptian intelligence minister Hassan Rashad, who said he hoped the results of the 8^th Fatah conference would provide a strong incentive for uniting the Palestinian house from within, strengthening Fatah unity and improving Palestinian national unity. Rashad affirmed Egypt’s support for the Palestinian people and their “struggle to achieve national rights.” He also spoke with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov about the activity of the Israeli security forces in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and about ways to cooperate with Arab states and the international community to find a political path which would lead to ending the conflict and implementing international resolutions. Lavrov congratulated al-Sheikh on the success of the 8^th Fatah conference and said he hoped it would be a step toward achieving Palestinian national unity. He added that the two-state solution was the solution to ending the conflict and reiterated “Russia’s commitment to international law and international legitimacy” (Hussein al-Sheikh’s X account, May 21, 2026).
• The office of PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas welcomed the announcement by seven Western countries calling on Israel to stop the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria and halt settler violence against Palestinians, which according to them had reached “unprecedented levels.” The countries also accused the Israeli government of worsening the instability in Judea and Samaria and damaging prospects for the two-state solution, and warned that the E1 project (the connection between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim) was a serious violation of international law. Mahmoud Abbas’ office called to turn the announcement into practical steps to exert pressure on Israel (Wafa, May 22, 2026).
• Chairman of the Palestinian land authority, minister Alaa’ al-Tamimi, and chairman of the authority for the struggle against the wall and the settlements, minister Mu’ayyad Sha’ban, paid a solidarity visit to the village of Khan al-Ahmar. They called Israel’s decision to evacuate Khan al-Ahmar a “declaration of war” against the Palestinian presence and a “new step in annexation and colonization.” During the visit, a telephone conversation was held with PA prime minister Muhammad Mustafa, who noted the government’s full support for the residents, its commitment to provide everything required to strengthen “their steadfastness on their land,” and the continuation of its political and legal efforts to confront the “schemes of forced displacement” (Wafa, May 20, 2026). Hamas also condemned the order to evacuate Khan al-Ahmar and represented it as part of an “Israeli plan to divide the West Bank, isolate Jerusalem and expand the settlements.” Hamas called for Palestinian unity and the formulation of a “resistance plan”^[4] against Israel’s measures (official Hamas Telegram channel, May 19, 2026).
• Senior Fatah figure and chairman of the Palestinian Football Association Jibril Rajoub met in Ankara with Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan to discuss developments in the Palestinian arena, the fighting in the Gaza Strip and the [alleged] “escalation” in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. Fidan congratulated Fatah on its 8^th conference and Rajoub on his reelection to the central committee, and reiterated Turkey’s support for Palestinian rights and for efforts to end the fighting and ease the humanitarian situation. Rajoub called for a firmer international move against Israel beyond condemnations, and claimed that action had to be taken to provide international protection for the Palestinians and preserve their national rights. He called ending the internal Palestinian schism “urgent,” adding that the next stage should be based on restoring Palestinian legitimacy and on the principle of one state and one weapon (Wafa, May 25, 2026).

Payments to Families of Shaheeds, the Wounded and Prisoners

• Murad Shamroukh, spokesman for the Palestinian wounded, said an agreement had been reached with the PA government for a one-time payment of 1,500 shekels (about $525) to families of shaheeds, prisoners and the wounded, and for beginning a dialogue regarding the payments after Eid al-Adha. The understanding was reached after the wounded held a sit-in strike opposite government headquarters in Ramallah to protest the salary cuts. According to Shamroukh, they demanded payment to the three groups be carried out by the ministry within the framework of the PLO, and not transferred to the Economic Empowerment Fund, as instructed by PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Alam Radio, May 21, 2026). However, Muntaser Abu Ghalyon, a Fatah activist who was released from Israeli prison and deported to Egypt, said it frustrated him that the payments would be made only after Eid al-Adha, asking if the holiday would also be postponed until next week. He said that “they keep giving us promises, but we still have not seen our salaries” (Quds Agency, May 25, 2026).