Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March 30 – April 14, 2026)

The IDF

• The IDF continued activity within the Yellow Line, locating terrorists and destroying weapons, tunnels, terrorist facilities and assets. Terrorist operatives who approached IDF forces or tried to infiltrate the area behind the Yellow Line were eliminated. Operatives identified preparing to carry out attacks were eliminated, among them a terrorist from Hamas’ naval unit, a Hamas expert in manufacturing explosive devices, al-Jazeera correspondent Muhammad Washah, an operative in the rocket and weapons production headquarters of Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, and terrorists involved in the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre. On the night of April 1, 2026, a terrorist infiltrated an IDF post in the southern Gaza Strip; he was eliminated. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, March 30-April 14, 2026).

• Palestinian sources claimed that the IDF continued expanding the Yellow Line, using tanks which advanced beyond the Line and fired randomly. They claimed it led to deaths and injuries almost daily in the areas adjacent to the line (the Hamad Residential City Telegram channel, April 5, 2026).
• Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip claimed Israel was escalating its attacks on checkpoints of Hamas police, security forces and operatives in the organizations’ “military” wing. In Hamas assessment, its request to amend the disarmament plan will cause Israel to intensify its attacks in the Strip, while presenting the request as the movement’s rejection of the plan. A senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) figure said instructions had been given to the operatives to take the necessary measures to prevent being attacked, especially if the war with Iran ended (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 6, 2026). Two Hamas and PIJ sources claimed there were indications that Israel was planning to intensify its activity in the Strip, adding that the organizations were on high alert (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 9, 2026).

• On April 3, 2026, a Hamas delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya concluded a visit to Cairo, during which it held a series of meetings with Egyptian officials, the mediators and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations, and with Nikolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace high commissioner for the Gaza Strip. The terrorist organizations noted the need to complete the implementation of the first phase of the agreement, and demanded that the Palestinian national committee for the administration of the Gaza Strip immediately began managing life and basic services, which would contribute to restoring calm and a return to routine, and would prepare the atmosphere for recovery and reconstruction. The Palestinian representatives noted the “seriousness and positive approach” of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations toward implementing the ceasefire agreement in all its phases (Hamas Telegram channel, April 3, 2026).
• Two Egyptian officials and a Palestinian said Hamas had told the mediators in Cairo that the movement would not agree to discuss disarming as long as there were no guarantees for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the principles of the Board of Peace plan. They said the Hamas delegation had presented a series of demands and amendments to the council’s plan, among them ending the Israeli “violations” of the ceasefire, full implementation of all the clauses of the agreement, clarifications regarding the expansion of the Israeli control zones in the Strip, and a full Israeli withdrawal, as a precondition for any discussion of disarmament (Reuters, April 2, 2026).
• Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Hamas military-terrorist wing, called Israel’s demands of the Palestinian “resistance”^[2] and the Gazans, through the mediators, “dangerous.” He claimed the Palestinian side had met all its commitments in the first phase “responsibly and in good faith,” out of consideration for the Palestinian interest and the mediation efforts. He called for Israel to be pressured to meet its commitments before a discussion of the second phase, and for the United States to be required to bear its responsibility, because “Israel was sabotaging the agreement.” He claimed that raising the issue of disarmament in an undiplomatic way was intended to allow Israel to continue the fighting, and insisted Hamas would not agree to it, and Israel would not achieve through negotiations what it had not achieved on the battlefield (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, April 5, 2026).
• On April 10, 2026, a Hamas delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya arrived for another round of talks in Cairo. Meeting with the mediators, Hamas reiterated its demands: stop the Israeli violations, dismantle Israel’s points and military bases west of the Yellow Line, open the crossings and increase the number of patients and their escorts leaving and returning through the Rafah crossing to 200 a day, a complete withdrawal of the IDF forces from the Rafah and Beit Hanoun areas, and the entry of 600 aid trucks a day (al-Sharq, April 12, 2026).
• Two Hamas sources said the movement’s response to the Board of Peace’s disarmament plan conditioned the start of disarmament on formulating a timetable for the implementation of Israel’s commitments in the first phase of the agreement. They added that a meeting of representatives from all the organizations was expected to be held with Nikolay Mladenov, where they would present their response to the plan. A source in the Gaza Strip said there was general agreement among the organizations and the mediators that the phases should be implemented gradually. On the other hand, two other sources said the PLO organizations were prepared to begin immediate implementation of the second phase after the completion of the first phase, rather than gradually (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 13, 2026).

The Committee for Administering the Gaza Strip

• Reportedly, the Hamas delegation headed by Khalil al-Hayya presented the mediators in Cairo with a full plan for handing over all the ministries, government bodies, police and security forces to the committee for administering the Strip (al-Sharq, April 12, 2026).
• Congratulations were posted to the social networks regarding Palestinian national committee appointments for administering the Strip: Major General (apparently retired), Hasnine Zannoun (aka Abu Alaa’) was appointed deputy commander of the security forces in the Gaza Strip (Facebook page of the al-Nahhal clan, April 2, 2026, Facebook page of Muhammad al-Jarrah, April 2, 2026); retired Major General Na’im Abu Hasnine (aka Abu al-Saeed) was appointed head of the crossings and borders administration in the Strip. He was formerly an officer in Palestinian General Intelligence (Facebook page of Joni al-Hamas Abu Maher, April 2, 2026, Facebook page of Hamza al-Masri, April 6, 2026).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• Nikolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace commissioner for the Gaza Strip, praised the entry of 602 trucks to Gaza carrying essential supplies on April 9, 2026. He said it had been made possible thanks to the intensive involvement of his team, the Palestinian national committee for administering the Strip and the Board of Peace (X account of Nikolay Mladenov, April 9, 2026). In response, the Hamas government media information office claimed that Mladenov’s statement was baseless, since [allegedly] “the data showed” that 207 trucks entered, of which 79 carried aid. The office claimed that the rate of trucks entering the Strip since the beginning of the ceasefire in October 2025 had not exceeded 38% (Hamas government media information office Telegram channel, April 10, 2026). The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that about 600 humanitarian aid trucks entered the Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing on April 9, and thanks to the ceasefire in Iran through the Zikim Crossing as well, as noted in Mladenov’s statement. He accused Hamas of spreading false information and trying to obscure data verified by official bodies, motivated by a desire to preserve its rule and interests (the al-Munasaq (COGAT in Arabic) Facebook page, April 10, 2026).
• The World Health Organization announced the suspension, until further notice, of the evacuation of patients from the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing into Egypt, after a security incident in which a Palestinian working as a contractor for the UN agency was killed (X account of the WHO director general, April 7, 2026). The IDF confirmed that forces fired at the vehicle, but claimed it was unmarked and moving toward them and toward the Yellow Line in a way that threatened the forces. Reportedly, two World Health Organization workers who were in the vehicle were wounded, but the driver was not killed (Israeli media, April 6, 2026). On April 12, 2026, the Palestinian Red Crescent and the World Health Organization resumed the evacuation of patients through the Rafah Crossing (Facebook page of the International Red Crescent, April 12, 2026).
• Hamas continued to promote propaganda claiming “distress and crisis:”
  • The Hamas government media information office accused Israel of causing hunger in the Strip through complete control over the flow of basic goods, especially flour and bread. Hamas claimed that in recent months there had been a sharp decline in bread production because of a shortage of flour, caused by Israeli restrictions on the entry of goods and humanitarian aid, and international organizations had stopped supplying bread and flour. Reportedly, about 30 bakeries are operating, producing about 133 thousand loaves of bread a day, which do not meet the needs of the population (Telegram channel of the Hamas government media information office, April 12, 2026).
  • Dr. Muhammad Abu Salmiya, director of the al-Shifa medical complex in Gaza City, warned that a “humanitarian disaster” threatened the lives of tens of thousands of patients in the Gaza Strip because of a shortage of maintenance oil for hospital generators. He claimed the generators were the only lifeline of the hospitals and had been operating continuously around the clock for more than three years, leading to wear and tears. He reiterated the claim that shutting down the generators meant stopping dialysis, neonatal intensive care, intensive care for children and the elderly, and shutting down operating rooms, emergency wards, laboratories and other services (Shehab, April 4, 2026).
• Gazans reported a transportation crisis following a shortage of motor oil and a spike in price to 1,200 [sic] (about $400) shekels per liter, leading to the shutdown of most passenger vehicles on urban and intercity routes. As a result, the number of vehicles still operating was very small and did not meet the needs of the population, and many people were forced to walk long distances in the absence of available alternatives. Other means of transportation have also almost disappeared, among them animal-drawn carts, after most of the animals died or were killed, as well as motorized three-wheelers, which are not in use because of a shortage of spare parts (al-Ayyam, April 11, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• Hamas’ deputy minister of economy, Hassan Abu Riyala, claimed that currently neither taxes nor customs duties were being collected (Facebook page of the Hamas ministry of national economy, April 11, 2026).
• Residents of the al-Tuffah neighborhood in Gaza City claimed that for more than half a year they had been dealing with uncleared debris which led to the collapse of a ceiling and a death, as well as with flooding sewage, the spread of disease, an increase in rodents and especially difficult living conditions in a crowded area inhabited by people with special needs. They added that despite repeated appeals to the Gaza municipality, civil defense and other bodies, no real response had been given, and they were the completely helpless victims of ongoing neglect (Telegram channel of activist Hamza al-Masri, April 3, 2026).
• Muhammad Aboud, Hamas’ deputy minister of public works and housing, said the ministry had begun recycling the rubble of destroyed houses and buildings with funding from the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP. He said the amount of accumulated rubble in the Gaza Strip exceeded 80 million tons, the result of the destruction of more than 410 thousand housing units and thousands of industrial and commercial buildings, public institutions and facilities leveled to their foundations. He said a wide tract of government land was selected in the Netzarim area, south of Gaza City, as a center for collecting, sorting and processing the rubble. The first phase would focus on processing the rubble and turning it into primary construction materials for restoring roads destroyed by military vehicles and to reconnect neighborhoods. Aboud claimed the “Israeli siege” was the biggest obstacle to the effective implementation of the project because the entry of heavy equipment and necessary technical equipment has been prohibited (Palestine Online, April 8, 2026).
• The Khan Yunis municipality stated that its emergency teams continued efforts to repair and maintain sewage and drainage lines damaged during the war to prevent sewage overflow and reduce health hazards. The municipality claimed that during the fighting Israel had destroyed more than 170 thousand meters of sewage lines and shut down four sewage treatment stations (Facebook page of Khan Yunis municipality, April 5, 2026).

Security Governance

• Hamas continues the violent implementation of its security governance: The family of a Gazan named Imad Adel Aqal claimed their son had been kidnapped at a checkpoint erected in the Abu Sharar Square area in the Jabalia refugee camp on April 1, 2026. He had been taken by more than 40 armed men who identified themselves as operatives of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades [Hamas’ military-terrorist wing]. According to the family, the men took him to an unknown location, took his car and personal belongings, and since then there had been no contact with him. The family of Mamdouh Ahmed Said said he had been kidnapped by Hamas’ Sahm Unit at the entrance to the central prison in Deir al-Balah, moments after he was released by order of the Supreme Court in Gaza, and taken to an unknown location. According to the family, he had been arrested two months earlier, underwent harsh interrogations, had not confessed and no evidence had been found against him (Telegram channel of the activist Hamza al-Masri, April 3, 2026).
• The clashes between Hamas’ security forces and operatives of the militias opposed to the movement’s rule and operating with Israeli support continued:
  • Hamas’ ministry of the interior and national security claimed 14 operatives in the “criminal gangs” and groups linked to Israel in the central Gaza Strip had turned themselves in through the direct mediation of clan dignitaries. According to the ministry, the gangs had been dealt a “decisive intelligence blow,” including by preventing the assassination of senior figures in the Palestinian “resistance”^[3] and security forces. The ministry said it planned to “reopen the door of repentance” and offer one last opportunity to those interested in turning themselves in and returning to the “national fold” through the mediation of the dignitaries and the mukhtars (Palestine Online, April 4, 2026).
  • On April 6, 2026, Gazans rioted in the al-Maghazi refugee camp in the central Strip when an armed group operating with Israeli support infiltrated civilian homes and a UNRWA school where there were displaced persons, leading to heavy exchanges of fire and clashes with residents and gunmen affiliated with Hamas. The incident lasted more than an hour and a half, and at least ten Palestinians were killed and 44 were wounded. The casualties included displaced civilians staying in the school. Eyewitnesses claimed the “armed group” received cover from Israeli fire and drones, helping it to withdraw (aljazeera.net, April 8, 2026). A source in a terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip claimed the exchange of fire began after operatives from the militia of Shawqi Abu Nassira tried to lure operatives from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades into an ambush, and following the exchange of fire Israel intervened to provide cover for the gunmen (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 8, 2026). Abu Nassira stated that five Hamas operatives were killed in the attack, and their equipment had been seized (Facebook page of Shawki Abu Nassira’s militia, The Free Homeland Forces, April 6, 2026). Ghassan al-Dahini, who heads the Popular Forces militia, stated that the People’s Forces in the Central Governorates had killed Musa al-Ayedi, commander of the Hamas’ Sahm Unit, and six of the unit’s operatives in an attack in the al-Maghazi refugee camp, and accused Hamas operatives of opening fire at civilians in revenge (Facebook page of Ghassan al-Dahini, April 6, 2026). The Raad Force of “resistance security” said it supported and thanked the residents for their initiative to establish popular defense committees to combat the militias’ activity (Telegram channel of the Raad Force, April 11, 2026).

• Palestinian sources reported clashes between operatives of the militias of Hussam al-Astal and Shawqi Abu Nassira operating in east Khan Yunis. It was claimed that the clashes broke out because some of the operatives refused to work directly with Israeli intelligence and refused to undergo training in Israeli territory (the Telegram channel Mutaba’a min al-Midan, April 3, 2026; the Telegram channel of Amsak Amil, April 3, 2026).

Another International Flotilla to the Gaza Strip

• The organizers of the Global Resilience Flotilla announced the departure of a new flotilla from the port of Barcelona whose objective was to “break the siege of the Gaza Strip.” The organizers claimed that about 70 vessels with about 1,000 volunteers from 70 countries would participate, calling the flotilla a “humanitarian and moral” mission. In October 2025, the Israeli Navy prevented about 40 vessels from reaching the Gaza Strip, but the organizers said they were confident that this time they would succeed because the current flotilla was larger and would be joined by international organizations, including Greenpeace (al-Jazeera, April 12, 2026). Hamas praised the organizers and the participants and claimed the number of activists “proved” the failure of the “occupation’s” strategy to prevent flotillas from “breaking the siege.” Hamas called on the international community and the UN to ensure the security of the flotilla and prevent the “occupation army” from attacking it (Hamas Telegram channel, April 13, 2026).

• Before the talks with the mediators and the other terrorist organizations in Cairo, a Hamas delegation, which included Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin and Maher Salah, went to Turkey for two days to meet with the head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, and with the foreign minister, Hakan Fidan. They discussed developments in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria and the Israel’s alleged violations of the ceasefire agreement. The delegation noted the importance of implementing the agreement and the need to compel Israel to meet all the commitments of the first phase. They also discussed the dangers posed by the death penalty for Palestinian terrorists passed by the Israeli Knesset (Hamas Telegram channel, April 2, 2026).
• Later, another delegation from the Hamas leadership arrived in Turkey, headed by the chairman of the Shura Council, Muhammad Darwish, with Khaled Mashal, Khalil al-Hayya and Zaher Jabarin. They met with the Turkish president to discuss the situation in the Gaza Strip and the need to implement the ceasefire agreement, bring aid into the Strip and ensure normal life. Darwish briefed Erdogan on the “Zionist violations” in east Jerusalem and at al-Aqsa Mosque and on the danger for Palestinian prisoners inherent in the newly-passed death penalty law. Erdogan noted Turkey’s consistent position in support of the Palestinians and their rights, and Darwish said they appreciated Erdogan’s efforts to support the Palestinian issue and thanked him for Turkey’s position (Hamas Telegram channel, April 5, 2026).

• Sources reported that Hamas had decided to postpone the elections for the movement’s leadership until the end of the current year because of internal disputes. According to the sources, Ali al-Amoudi, acting head of the Hamas political bureau, appointed pro-Iranian operatives to the bureau, raising internal tensions. The objective of the appointments was also to strengthen the influence of Khalil al-Hayya, who represents the Gaza Strip, in the contest for the movement’s leadership against Khaled Mashal, Hamas leader “abroad” (al-Hadath, April 13, 2026).

Counterterrorism

• The Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity throughout Judea and Samaria, seizing weapons and detaining dozens of wanted persons and individuals suspected of terrorist activity, among them Palestinians involved in shootings, rock and Molotov cocktail throwers, bomb makers, arms dealers and Palestinians involved in incitement. In Tulkarm, the security forces blew up an explosives laboratory with a large quantity of weapons, including hundreds of explosive devices, about 200 pipe bombs, small fire extinguishers for attaching explosive devices to vehicles, large gas balloons which could be used as undercar bombs, as well as more than 50 kg of improvised explosives. In the village of Deir Jarir, Palestinians threw rocks at IDF forces and Israeli civilians; one of the attackers was shot and killed by a reserve soldier. The smuggling of weapons across the Egyptian and Jordanian borders was prevented (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, March 30-April 14, 2026).

     
Right: Pipe bombs found in Tulkarm. Left: Weapons found in the village of al-Ram
(IDF spokesperson, April 12, 2026)

Settler Terrorism

• Jewish rioters attacked a Palestinian and set fire to property in the Samarian village of Qusra. Eight Jewish suspects, aged 13 to 48, were detained on suspicion of involvement and of presence in a closed military area. During the searches, an IDF M-16 rifle and an Airsoft gun, which shoots plastic spheres, were seized (Police spokesperson, April 5, 2026).
• An Israeli civilian was wounded in an attack by Palestinians in a clash near an illegal outpost established close to the village of Tayasir, while a Palestinian civilian was killed by gunfire from an off-duty IDF soldier (Israeli media, April 9, 2026).

International Activity

• PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian leadership welcomed the ceasefire between the United States and Iran, representing it as an important step towards strengthening regional stability. They said that any regional arrangement had to include the Palestinian issue, the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem, and end the attacks in Lebanon (al-Araby al-Jadeed, April 8, 2026).
• Mahmoud Abbas spoke with the president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, saying he supported the Lebanese people and the steps Lebanon was taking to preserve its security, stability and sovereignty, given the “difficult conditions” in the country. Aoun affirmed the strength of their bilateral relations, and noted Lebanon’s commitment to improving mutual coordination (Wafa, April 8, 2026).
• A senior Palestinian delegation headed by PA deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh, and the chairman of the Palestinian National Council, Rawhi Fattouh, visited Turkey and met with officials, including the Turkish president. They discussed the latest regional developments and ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation and relations, and thanked Turkey for its support of the Palestinians. Al-Sheikh said it was necessary to end the “suffering” in the Gaza Strip, prevent displacement and promote the reconstruction of the Strip, exert pressure to stop the Israel’s unilateral measures in Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem, and promote a political process based on international legitimacy for the establishment of a Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital. Turkey’s president noted his country’s support for the rights of the Palestinian people and for the establishment of a Palestinian state (Wafa, March 31, 2026).

Responses to Passing the Death Penalty for Palestinian Terrorists

• The Palestinians strongly condemned the Knesset’s decision to pass a law that would allow the death penalty for Palestinian terrorists, accusing the “occupation” of being “violent and vengeful” and a direct threat to the lives of the prisoners. The PA president alleged it was a “war crime” and violation of international humanitarian law. The PA claimed such laws would not break the will of the Palestinian people or undermine their steadfastness, and would only intensify tension and threaten regional stability (Wafa, March 30, 2026). Hamas claimed the law posed an immediate danger to the prisoners and called for urgent international intervention, while the Palestinian terrorist organizations represented the law as part of a broad policy of “repressing and killing prisoners,” and called for legal, media and popular escalation. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the military-terrorist wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, warned that any harm to a prisoner would be met with a harsh response and viewed the law as a declaration of open war (Telegram channel of Sada Khan Yunis, March 30-31, 2026).