Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March 24-30, 2026)

• IDF activity continued within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to locate terrorists and to destroy weapons, tunnels and terrorist infrastructure and assets. Terrorist operatives were killed in targeted killings, including armed nukhba terrorists who carried out military training in the central Gaza Strip, a network of about ten Hamas terrorists in the central Gaza Strip, and a terrorist who had been released from an Israeli prison in the deal for the release of hostages in January-February 2025, violated the ceasefire agreement and transferred funds to persons suspected of terrorist activity (IDF spokesperson, March 30-24, 2026). According to a report, one of the commanders of the nukhba in the central Gaza brigade of Hamas’ military wing, who participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and abducted several Israelis, was also eliminated (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 25, 2026).
• Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem claimed that Israel sought to sabotage the ceasefire and the efforts of the Board of Peace with targeted killings. He claimed it was a direct continuation of the war, although at a different pace and in a different form, adding that violations of the ceasefire agreement required the mediators and the parties guaranteeing the agreement to exert pressure on Israel in order to bring about their cessation (Telegram channel of Hazem Qassem, March 25, 2026).

• The Board of Peace’s high commissioner for the Gaza Strip, Nikolay Mladenov, told the UN Security Council that the first phase of the American 20-point plan had largely been completed, and the ceasefire was continuing despite the challenges. He added that his office, along with the guarantor states [the United States, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar], had developed a framework for disarmament and the reintegration of the “armed groups,”^[2] it had been presented to all relevant parties and serious discussions were currently taking place. Mladenov said disarmament was not only a basic requirement, but the only way to move forward toward reconstruction and an Israeli military withdrawal (UN news website, March 24, 2026).

• Mladenov’s remarks angered Hamas, and the movement accused him of ignoring the “Israeli violations.” Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas political bureau, claimed Mladenov was trying to be “holier than the Pope” as he tried to link everything to the issue of weapons, including the entry of the management committee and international forces into the Gaza Strip, the “Zionist” withdrawal and the reconstruction. He accused Mladenov of completely ignoring the fact that Israel had not implemented any first stage requirements or presented guarantees for the implementation of future commitments (Telegram channel of Bassem Na’im, March 25, 2026). Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said Mladenov’s assurance that the ceasefire was being maintained ignored the deaths of more than 680 people and the continued destruction. He added that the success of the discussions regarding the second phase required the creation of a genuinely positive environment based on “imposing a halt to the violations,” stopping the killing, lifting the siege, beginning reconstruction and implementing the agreed-on withdrawals (Telegram channel of the al-Araby channel, March 25, 2026).
• According to reports, the disarmament plan conveyed to Hamas by the Board of Peace in meetings in Cairo integrates the issue of disarmament within a political and security framework based on the principle of parallel and gradual implementation of Israeli steps and Hamas commitments within a specified timetable, with the transition between stages taking place only after both sides had implemented their parts. According to the reports, the plan includes five stages spread over about eight months: in the first stage there will be a complete halt to military activity, accompanied by urgent humanitarian steps taken by Israel, in exchange for Hamas’ commitment to cease its “military”^[3] activity and the entry of the national committee for the management of the Strip. In the second stage (days 16-60 of the plan), Israel will withdraw from the areas under its control within the Gaza Strip and allow an increase in the entry of aid and reconstruction materials. In exchange, Hamas will commit to begin mapping heavy and medium weapons in those areas, provide detailed information on their locations, completely cease “military” activity and clear the security arena for the national committee. In the third stage, Hamas will hand over all its heavy weapons and military equipment to the national committee and will allow the destruction of all tunnels, explosives and military infrastructure. In the fourth stage, a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces to the red line will be carried out, and in exchange the police forces of the national committee will collect and register all remaining weapons, including pistols and rifles. In the fifth stage, complete disarmament will be verified and IDF forces will withdraw from Gaza, except for their continued presence at the security perimeter near the border. At that point, a new security situation will be established, based on civilian governance free of armed elements, with ongoing international monitoring of the implementation of the final arrangements, and the beginning of reconstruction efforts (Aljazeera.net, March 26, 2026; Reuters, March 27, 2026).
• Two Hamas sources, one inside the Gaza Strip and one outside it, said the movement tended to partially reject the disarmament plan and would demand amendments to make it “more fair” to the Gazans, especially because it did not clearly obligate Israel to implement the conditions of the second stage, nor to complete the implementation of the conditions of the first stage. Another Hamas source and a source from a Palestinian “faction”^[4] in the Strip said each organization was holding internal discussions and discussions were also being held at the collective national level. According to the sources, despite its many negative aspects, it would be examined positively with an eye to preserving Gazan rights, and a unified Gazan response would be submitted, which would approve of the plan and demand clarifications, guarantees and amendments. A Hamas source in the Gaza Strip said such a program of disarmament was unacceptable. He said “wanted persons” and prominent operatives had the “right” to keep their personal weapons “to defend themselves,” given the large movements of Israeli special forces and armed gangs, and their ongoing activity to eliminate “resistance fighters”^[5] (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 27, 2026).
• Other terrorist organizations criticized the plan. Isma’il al-Sandawi. a senior figure in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), called the weapons of the “resistance” a “natural result of the occupation,” and with the removal of the “occupation,” all causes of tension and conflict would disappear. He claimed the weapons were a “legitimate right” of the Palestinian people to achieve their national goals and the Palestinian people would not give up their right to “resistance”^[6] until it had realized all its rights. Al-Sandawi called on Mladenov to assume his responsibility and compel Israel to meet the commitments in the agreements which it has completely ignored. Omar Murad, a member of the political bureau of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, said any proposal that ignored the “right of the people to resistance” opened the door for the “occupation” to escalate its killing and destruction without deterrence, which constituted an existential threat for the Palestinians (Sunud website, March 26, 2026).

Security Governance

• The Raad Force of Hamas’ “resistance security” continued attacking collaborators and members of militias supported by Israel:
  • According to a report, a security operation was carried out targeting the gang of Shouqi Abu Nuseira which had barricaded itself in a school inside the Yellow Line east of Deir al-Balah. According to the announcement, 11 members of the cell were eliminated, including a senior operative (Telegram channel of the Raad Force, March 26, 2026).
  • The Raad Force claimed that in mid-March 2026 its personnel had arrested two operatives in “mercenary gangs” who tried to attack a senior figure in the “resistance” (Telegram channel of the Raad Force, March 24, 2026). The two allegedly admitted during interrogation that Shouqi Abu Nuseira had gathered the members of the network and organized a meeting for them with an Israeli intelligence officer at an Israeli military site, where the details of the mission were explained to them. The members of the network were trained in the use of silenced pistols and could operate hidden cameras which would broadcast the operation live to the “enemy’s” operations room. They were also promised direct Israeli aerial and intelligence assistance during the operation. It was further claimed that the members of the network disguised themselves for the mission, but the plan was exposed before it could be carried out (Telegram channel of the Raad Force, March 26, 2026).
  • According to the Raad Force, two “resistance fighters” prevented “collaborator gangs” from abducting them from their home east of Gaza City, killing and wounding some. The Force claimed that when the two tried to withdraw from the area, an IDF UAV dropped a grenade on them and they were killed. It was further stated that “resistance” operatives had received instructions to confront the “collaborators” with determination and local residents were called in to provide information on the matter (Telegram channel of the Raad Force, March 28, 2026).
  • Reportedly, “resistance forces” arrested four “collaborators” after they tried to infiltrate Gaza City (Telegram channel al-Siyad, March 28, 2026). It was also reported that in a planned ambush in the city center, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades arrested a veteran collaborator in the Rami Hallas militia (Sahm Telegram channel, March 29, 2026).
• Sources in Gaza reported that “gunmen” had abducted a company commander in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza City’s Tel al-Hawa neighborhood. Large forces of Hamas’ military wing were deployed throughout the city and chased two suspicious vehicles, with exchanges of fire heard in various areas (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 29, 2026). It was also reported that in al-Zawayda in the central Strip, an attempt was made on the life of an officer in the Hamas government security forces. The officer was also an operative in the military wing; he was superficially wounded. One of the suspects was arrested after a pursuit (al-Ayyam, March 30, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• It was reported that public and private property in the Gaza Strip was being invaded because of the security chaos, the collapse of enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of the war. According to the report, state lands, sidewalks, streets, urban areas and even the private property of missing or displaced persons have become targets for takeover by influential families, criminal elements and armed groups, which rent them to displaced persons and those in need without legal authority and sometimes at excessive prices. It was further noted that the return of the police and authorities to partial activity after the ceasefire in October 2025 made it possible to begin addressing some of the cases, but invasion was widespread and citizens were required to submit complaints and present ownership documents to try to recover their property (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 24, 2026).
• The al-Fares al-Shahem marathon was held on Salah al-Din Street in the Gaza Strip, with the participation of about 400 runners. Hamas police stated that traffic and patrol forces in the central district secured the event and worked to regulate traffic (Telegram channel of the Palestinian police, March 28, 2026).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) published a direct appeal to the Gazans and said that from reading their responses there the prices of goods in the Strip had decreased, the direct outcome of the entry of hundreds of trucks daily which fully supplied their needs. He added that Hamas continued to reap profits at the expense of the population by selling certain products at excessively high prices. He further stated that they intended to continue transferring aid on a weekly basis in cooperation with the UN and international organizations, and in order to adapt the aid to needs on the ground. Residents were requested to indicate in the comments which products were still sold at particularly high prices to assist in the struggle against Hamas price manipulation. The appeal received more than 2,300 responses, many of which claimed that there was no real improvement in prices, and that even if some products were slightly more available, most goods were still very expensive or lacking. Complaints were also raised about the lack of liquid funds, a black market, merchants who inflated prices, and aid which did not reach the public equally (COGAT Facebook page, March 27, 2026).
• Hamas’ media outlets continued to promote propaganda of distress and crisis:
  • Dr. Alaa al-Din al-Batta, deputy chairman of the association of local authorities in the Gaza Strip and mayor of Khan Yunis, claimed that the Strip faced a worsening environmental and health disaster caused by the extensive destruction during the war, the collapse of service and health systems, and the accumulation of enormous quantities of rubble and waste. He claimed that about 70 million tons of rubble were scattered throughout the Strip, of which about 15 million tons were in Khan Yunis alone, alongside hundreds of thousands of tons of waste that accumulated in random locations after access to the central landfill was prevented. He noted that the local authorities were struggling to deal with hazardous waste, including medical waste, chemicals, fuel residues and unexploded ordnance because they suffered from a severe shortage of engineering equipment, skilled personnel, fuel, spare parts and protective gear (alresala.net, March 28, 2026).
  • Several hospitals, including the al-Shifa medical complex in Gaza, reported a reduction in electricity consumption. The director of the complex, Muhammad Abu Salmiya, said that the generators had been operating continuously for a long period without required maintenance because the entry of the necessary oils was banned, and there was “real concern” regarding their ability to continue functioning. He called for urgent intervention by the mediators and the international community to allow the entry of the necessary materials (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 28, 2026).
  • There is allegedly a bread crisis in the Gaza Strip due to a decrease in supply caused by a reduction in the quantities received through the World Food Programme. That has led to long lines at bread distribution points and the renewed emergence of a black market for bread with a sharp rise in prices. The chairman of the bakers’ association, Abd al-Nasser al-Ajrami, confirmed that the current quantities of subsidized bread did not meet the needs, especially because of increased consumption after the month of Ramadan. According to him, the World Food Programme reduced the quantities during Ramadan but did not increase them after Eid al-Fitr. that led directly to shortages in the markets while demand remained unchanged (Palestine Online, March 27, 2026; al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 28, 2026).

• A Hamas leadership delegation, which included Muhammad Nizzal and Abd al-Jabbar Said, paid condolence visits to four mourning tents set up in Doha following the crash of a Qatari military helicopter, in which four Qatari citizens and three Turkish citizens were killed. The two conveyed condolences and solidarity to the families of the dead on behalf of the leadership of the movement, and said the deceased had met their deaths while carrying out “a noble national mission for the defense of their homeland, their land and their people.” Hamas said that among the dead were three Qataris, three Turks and one Palestinian, and the movement claimed that expressed the unity of fate and partnership among the peoples (Hamas Telegram channel, March 25, 2026).

Counterterrorism

• Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity throughout Judea and Samaria, during which at least 80 wanted Palestinians and 40 involved in incitement were detained, including terrorist operatives who planned attacks and terrorists who threw rocks and Molotov cocktails. Weapons, UAVs and more than 100 thousand shekels intended for financing terrorist activity were confiscated. According to reports, a Hamas network from the village of Beita was exposed; it had been responsible for IED attacks which injured three IDF soldiers, and was preparing to attack again. A Hamas terrorist operative involved in shooting attacks in 2008 was detained. A terrorist who tried to attack IDF soldiers with a knife in Dura was eliminated, and two terrorists who tried to attack security forces with a vehicle in al-Ram and near Tulkarm were eliminated. The house of a terrorist who killed an IDF soldier in September 2025 by ramming into him with his car was demolished (IDF spokesperson and the Israel Police spokesperson’s unit, March 30-24, 2026).
• Palestinian media reported that IDF forces operated in the village of Madama south of Nablus, in the town of al-Khader south of Bethlehem, in Tubas, in the village of Biddo, in al-Zawiya and Yasuf in the Salfit district (Wafa, March 28-25, 2026). According to reports, two Palestinians were killed during clashes with IDF forces in the Qalandiya refugee camp north of Jerusalem and another Palestinian was killed during a raid on the Dheisheh refugee camp south of Bethlehem (al-Araby al-Jadeed, March 28, 2026).

Activity of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces

• The Palestinian security forces arrested released prisoner Omar Assaf at his home in Ramallah after he published a statement regarding the war in Iran, which included provocation against Arab states. According to the Palestinian security forces, such statements did not reflect a responsible Palestinian national position, harmed relations with the Arab world and could harm the interests of Palestinians living, working and studying in Arab states (Telegram channel of the Palestinian Authority security forces, March 26, 2026). Mahmoud Mardawi, a senior Hamas figure, criticized the arrest and called it the continuation of a policy of political arrests and the “persecution of activists.” He claimed it disregarded national calls and was an attempt to silence “free national voices” and a serious violation of public freedoms and citizens’ rights (official Telegram channel of Hamas, March 26, 2026).

Jewish Settler Terrorism

• A confrontation broke out between Israeli civilians and Palestinians in the Harmala area in Gush Etzion, when an illegal outpost was reestablished at the site on private Palestinian land, after having been previously evacuated. An Israeli civilian shot at people gathered in the area, killing a resident of east Jerusalem and injuring three other people (IDF spokesperson, March 26, 2026). Hamas claimed that a resident of the town of Sharafat was killed while confronting settlers in an attempt to defend his land in the town of Janata east of Bethlehem (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, March 27, 2026).
• According to reports, Jewish rioters set fire to vehicles in the al-Aroub refugee camp north of Hebron. Jewish rioters also set fire to vehicles and sprayed racist graffiti in the town of Nahalin in the Bethlehem area (Quds Agency, March 30, 2026).

• Hala Abu Hassira, who was the PA representative in France as of 2021, submitted her credentials to President Emmanuel Macron as the first ambassador of the “State of Palestine” to France. That followed Macron’s declaration to recognize a Palestinian state in September 2025. Abu Hassira called it a “historic event” and expressed esteem for the “steadfast Palestinian people” in their “struggle” for the right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent, viable and geographically contiguous state with the June 4, 1967 borders, with east Jerusalem as its capital (Instagram channel of Hala Abu Hassira, March 28, 2026).

• Muhammad Mustafa, PA prime minister, met in Ramallah with delegations of the European Union supporting the Palestinian police (EUPOL COPPS) and the Rafah Crossing (EUBAM). They discussed the difficulties in operating the Rafah Crossing and the need to ease the movement of patients and wounded from the Gaza Strip, alongside a call to increase international pressure to operate the Crossing regularly. Mustafa also referred to the increase in attacks attributed to settlers, movement restrictions and the economic crisis caused by the delay in the transfer of customs revenues. The parties discussed strengthening cooperation with the European Union in developing police and rule of law institutions through training and capacity building to strengthen stability and governance (Wafa, March 25, 2026).