Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (June 9-16, 2026)

The IDF

• IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line and other areas of the Gaza Strip, destroying Hamas weapons depots containing launchers, mortar shells, RPGs, explosive devices and other military equipment. The forces eliminated Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists and field commanders who were about to attack IDF forces, as well as two senior operatives in the Hamas financial-transfer system (IDF Spokesperson, June 9-16, 2026).
• According to a report, between the morning of June 9 and the afternoon of June 11, 2026, the IDF suspended its military activity following pressure from the mediators, the American administration and the Board of Peace, to allow the ceasefire talks in Cairo to progress (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 12, 2026).
• IDF forces allegedly bombed buildings in the al-Maghazi refugee camp and near al-Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah after local residents had received telephone calls instructing them to evacuate; dozens of Palestinian families reportedly left the area (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 12, 2026; Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, June 13, 2026). In response, Isma’il al-Thawabta, director of the Hamas government media information office, claimed there had been an increase in the bombing of residential apartments, particularly in Gaza City, and that more than 50 apartments of residents and displaced persons had been bombed in recent weeks (Safa, June 11, 2026). An increase was also reported in the demolition and destruction of homes, civilian facilities and infrastructure remaining within the Yellow Line, particularly in central Jabalia and the al-Tuffah neighborhood of Gaza City (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, June 13, 2026; al-Ayyam, June 14, 2026).

• According to Palestinian reports, IDF forces moved the concrete blocks marking the Yellow Line in the al-Tuffah neighborhood, east of Gaza City, to a position more than 100 meters farther west (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, June 13, 2026). Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem accused Israel of violating the ceasefire agreement by repositioning the Yellow Line, along with the bombings and the displacement. He called it the implementation of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s threats to expand the scope of Israeli control in the Gaza Strip, amid the silence of the Board of Peace and its representative, Nikolay Mladenov, and the inability of the mediating and guarantor states to prevent new violations. He added that the “violations” reflected Israel’s unwillingness to implement the ceasefire agreement and its desire to derail the negotiation and continue escalating for political and electoral reasons (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 12, 2026).

• Hamas announced that on June 13, 2026, it had delivered the response of the Palestinian “factions”^[3] to the roadmap presented by Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov, regarding the second phase of the ceasefire agreement. Reportedly, the response was submitted after Hamas, the “factions” and the mediating states held several meetings in Cairo which resulted in a unified “national position.” Hamas said it had discussed the roadmap in a “responsible and positive” manner and noted the need to implement the first phase, especially the humanitarian protocol and the cessation of all forms of “aggression” against the Gazans. It also noted the need for the entry of the Palestinian committee for the administration of the Strip, the completion of the “Zionist ” withdrawal from the Strip, reconstruction and the advancement of Palestinian aspirations for statehood and self-determination. Hamas added that its delegation would continue talks in Cairo to advance implementation of the understandings (Hamas Telegram channel, June 14, 2026).
• A source close to Mladenov said he had received the “factions’” response from an Egyptian representative and had been frustrated by the response, particularly regarding Article 8 of the roadmap, which related to the restriction and storage of weapons. According to the source, Mladenov criticized the absence of any direct reference to military infrastructure, personal weapons and their future disposition. Sources close to the “factions” said the mediators had tried to persuade them to amend the wording relating to the term “infrastructure,” but no agreement had been reached regarding its definition or what its implications would be for the various assets and facilities involved, including tunnels, weapons-production workshops, and consequently, discussion of the issue was postponed. As a result, sources within the “factions” thought Mladenov’s position, and probably Israel’s as well, was that the dispute surrounding Article 8 had to be resolved before progress could be made on an agreement regarding other issues (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 15, 2026).
• The terrorist organizations reportedly agreed to the principle of one authority, one law, one weapon, while nothing that there had to be a national consensus. According to the report, the terrorist organizations insisted that collecting weapons would not begin until after completion of the first phase of the agreement, and once inside the Gaza Strip, the governing committee would be responsible for handling the issue of personal weapons, registering them and issuing licenses. Unlicensed weapons would gradually be dealt with by civilian mechanisms, including cash-for-weapons programs and social assistance packages. The terrorist organizations agreed to the deployment of an international stabilization force, but insisted it would not possess security or policing powers in the Strip (Hana al-Haqiqa Telegram channel, June 15, 2026).
• Sources familiar with the details of the response of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations said the core of the consensus was the transition from the first phase to the second phase and the extent of Israel’s implementation of its obligations under the agreement. Accordingly, the issue of the weapons of the “resistance” was contingent upon a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip. Hamas and other terrorist organizations agreed to a gradual handover of weapons over a six-month period, parallel to an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied areas of the Strip. A Palestinian committee composed of representatives of the terrorist organizations would carry out the process and the weapons would remain under the supervision of a local Palestinian authority. According to the sources, the terrorist organizations do not object to the Gaza administration committee’s confiscating and supervising the weapons, but they categorically reject disarmament according to the Israeli vision. They also did not object to coordination with the international stabilization force, although that still requires Israeli approval (al-Akhbar, June 16, 2026).
• Reportedly, the issue of government employees in Gaza was also discussed during the latest round of talks. Instead of requiring employees to undergo a security screening, they would undergo “a professional assessment examining the need for them in their current positions or their reassignment to other positions, while employees deemed unfit would be retired with pensions” (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 13, 2026).

• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem criticized the Arab media outlets, claiming they covered the Cairo talks in a way that pressured the Palestinians and made it responsible for the delay, rather than stating that the causes were “Israeli intransigence, American backing and the disregard of both for the mediators’ efforts.” He later rejected assessments or expectations of Hamas’ collapse, claiming that those who relied on Israeli promises would be disappointed because Hamas “will remain deeply rooted within the Palestinian public and continue to enjoy its loyalty” (Hazem Qassem Telegram channel, June 11, 2026).

The Situation in the Gaza Strip

• The Palestinian Authority ministry of social development warned of worsening food security challenges in the Gaza Strip due to the continuing decline in the quantities of flour and basic food products entering the Strip. According to the ministry, available flour supplies have fallen to approximately 200 tons per day, while daily needs are estimated at no less than 450 tons. In addition, several bakeries and community kitchens are finding it hard to operate because of a lack of funding, limited resources and shortages of fuel and materials. The ministry warned that if the situation continued, the quantities of bread and food supplied to families would fall, particularly because a large number of residents relied on humanitarian assistance as their primary food source (Facebook page of the Palestinian Authority ministry of social development, June 10, 2026).
• Muhammad Aboud, the engineer heading Hamas’ ministry of public works and housing, reported that approximately 410,000 housing units in the Strip had been completely destroyed and were unfit for habitation, and that hundreds of housing units were classified as dangerous because of the risk of collapse or the presence of hanging concrete blocks which posed a direct threat to local residents and passersby. He said that more than 350,000 families were displaced because of the lack of shelter centers and the shrinking area available caused by the continued expansion of the Yellow Line. He added that approximately 200 shelter centers had to be renovated to accommodate displaced persons and provide them with minimum living necessities. He also noted that the volume of rubble accumulated throughout the Gaza Strip was approximately 60 million tons, posing a significant challenge to reconstruction efforts (Radio al-Alam and the Facebook page of the ministry of public works and housing in the Gaza Strip, June 11, 2026).
• A protest rally was held in the Fash Farash area of al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis outside the aid distribution warehouses of the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to protest the exclusion of their area from the organization’s aid package distribution zones, unlike other local displaced-person areas, despite the fact that the organization’s warehouses are located in Fash Farash itself. Residents demanded that their claims be examined and assistance be provided to them (al-Motakadimon Telegram channel, June 9, 2026). Adults and children held a demonstration calling for assistance to overcome water shortages and the threat of thirst (journalist Muhannad Qashta Telegram channel, June 9, 2026).

• The PCRF (Palestine Children’s Relief Fund) announced registration for medical and rehabilitation services for children under the age of 18. Services include eyeglasses, hearing aids, wheelchairs, basic medications, surgeries, medical formula, orthopedic devices and other medical equipment (activist Hamza al-Masri Telegram channel, June 12, 2026).

Civilian Governance

• Hamas’ ministry of social development announced the distribution of a cash grant of 500 shekels as part of the “We Are Your Support” project. According to the announcement, the one-time grant will be provided to 3,225 families which did not receive assistance under the two previous “We Are Your Support ” campaigns; individuals with special medical needs and chronic illnesses; persons with severe disabilities (complete or partial paralysis, amputees, the completely blind and individuals with Down syndrome); and urgent social and humanitarian cases (families of those killed and imprisoned in Israel after October 7, 2023, families of those missing after October 7, 2023 and widows whose husbands died after October 7, 2023) (Facebook page of the ministry of social development, June 10, 2026).

Security Governance

• Hamas “resistance security” announced that during a “security operation,” a group of agents collaborating with Israeli intelligence was arrested. Allegedly, during interrogation the “agents” admitted to inciting civilians and “creating chaos” in the Gaza Strip to draw police personnel into the open and thereby facilitate attacks against them by Israel and its agents. The investigation also allegedly revealed plans to target “resistance” operatives^[4] and “senior members of the security and police forces.” According to the statement, weapons and other equipment were confiscated and further operations are underway to “neutralize them and completely eliminate the security threat” (al-Araby TV Telegram channel, June 9, 2026; Rada Force Telegram channel, June 9, 2026). It was later reported that three “collaborators” had been executed after allegedly being involved in actions that led to the deaths of Gazans and “resistance operatives” (Amsik Amil Telegram channel, June 12, 2026).
• Sources in “resistance security” reported that prior to the elimination of Izz al-Din al-Haddad, commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, an agent monitored his house and vehicle until the attack and then went to the hospital to confirm the success of the operation. The Israeli media allegedly reported a 45-minute phone call between the agent and his Israeli handler while the prime minister listened in and supervised the elimination. According to the report, “resistance security” arrested the agent during the call and forced him to confess to involvement in the assassination. A senior source in “resistance security” claimed that the arrest of the agent reflected a Hamas security penetration of the Israeli security system (al-Akhbar, June 10, 2026). Sources revealed the arrest of two collaborators directly involved in the eliminations of al-Haddad and his successor, Muhammad Odeh, and additional suspects were arrested in connection with a series of recent eliminations (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 12, 2026).
• A report by an independent UN commission of inquiry determined that Hamas and forces affiliated with Hamas in the Gaza Strip were responsible for serious violations of human rights and the laws of war. According to the commission, 249 cases of executions and severe physical violence were documented in the Strip during 2024-2025, resulting in at least 108 deaths and 384 injuries. At least 60 of the incidents were attributed to Hamas-affiliated forces, including two public executions of 11 men. The commission concluded that the acts could be considered war crimes, including murder and torture. The report described Hamas rule in the Strip as based on fear, exploiting the vacuum created by the destruction and fighting while harming a civilian population already severe distressed. The report also pointed to an increase in attacks on Israeli civilians by Palestinian “armed organizations”^[5] and individual Gazans in 2023 and expressed concern that some of the attacks violated the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law and therefore could also constitute war crimes (UN website, June 9, 2026).
• Activist Hamza al-Masri stated that 22 anti-Hamas university graduates were executed near Nasser Hospital in the southern Gaza Strip. He claimed that all the executions were carried out without evidence and without due process, and that their families were warned to remain silent or their sons would be branded collaborators. The Hamas-affiliated Be Aware channel claimed the report was false and that no evidence or family testimony supporting the incident had been found (al-Arabiya Palestine channel, June 11, 2026; Be Aware Telegram channel, June 12, 2026).
• Anti-Hamas militias supported by Israel continued operating in various areas of the Gaza Strip:
  • Operatives of the militia commanded by Shawqi Abu Nuseira infiltrated the area of the Wadi Gaza Bridge on Salah al-Din Street, the area separating northern and central Gaza, and stopped civilian vehicles and a bus carrying several Gazans for inspection. An Israeli force reportedly advanced into the same area after militia members secured the road and checked every vehicle passing through it. According to sources on the ground, militia members detained three Gazans and transferred them to the Israeli force, while others in the vehicles were questioned (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 9, 2026). The Palestinian Red Crescent Society later demanded the release of two ambulance crew members after claiming that the militia stopped two of its ambulances, questioned all seven crew members on site and released five of them (Palestinian Red Crescent Society Facebook page, June 10, 2026).
  • Operatives of the militia commanded by Ghassan al-Dahini infiltrated the al-Bardawil area in al-Mawasi of Rafah, northwest of Rafah City. They reportedly raided several houses and tents of displaced persons, assaulted residents and confiscated mobile phones for inspection. They then questioned several homeowners and arrested four young men. According to sources, quadcopter drones flew over the area and militia members forced the detainees to identify themselves to one of the drones, which was flying at a very low altitude (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 9, 2026).

• A senior Hamas delegation headed by Musa Abu Marzouq, head of the Hamas international relations office, met in Moscow with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko. They discussed the ceasefire negotiations in the Gaza Strip, international efforts to end the war and developments in the Gaza Strip, east Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria. Hamas claimed commitment to stabilizing the ceasefire while adhering to the realization of Palestinian rights and achieving self-determination and an independent state. Borisenko reportedly reiterated Moscow’s support for Palestinian rights and its desire to advance negotiations aimed at achieving security and stability (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 10, 2026).
• Hamas welcomed the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States and called it an “Iranian achievement” in the face of pressure and attempts to impose regional dictates. Hamas said it supported Iran’s insistence on its rights and national interests and expressed hope that the agreement would contribute to regional stability and positively affect other issues, especially an immediate end to what it called the “Zionist aggression against the Gazans,” as well as an end to attacks in Lebanon and on other fronts. Hamas also noted that genuine security and stability would not be achieved as long as Israel continued its current policies (South Lebanon – Watching the Enemy Telegram channel, June 15, 2026).

• Germany’s federal prosecutor revealed a recorded video raising suspicions that a Hamas terrorist cell uncovered in recent months apparently planned to carry out an attack in Europe marking the second anniversary of the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre. According to Federal Prosecutor General Jens Rommel, the video indicated that the attack was allegedly to be carried out around October 7, 2025, but several days beforehand the first three suspects were arrested. To date, nine suspects have been arrested, including in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Cyprus. They are accused of transporting and storing weapons for Hamas, apparently for an attack on Israeli or Jewish targets in Germany and other European countries (Die Zeit, June 16, 2026).

Counterterrorism Activity

• Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria, detaining dozens of wanted individuals, including persons involved in promoting terrorist activity, incitement propaganda and weapons trafficking. Weapons, ammunition, a lathe used for manufacturing weapons, a drone, military equipment and approximately 250,000 shekels used to finance terrorist activity were seized. In addition, an attempt to smuggle weapons across the Jordan border was foiled, resulting in the seizure of dozens of handguns, four rifles and other weapons, and the detention of a suspect from Bethlehem. An IDF officer was critically wounded and another soldier superficially wounded by an explosive device during operational activity in Jenin (IDF Spokesperson, June 9-16, 2026). The military wing of the PIJ claimed responsibility for the bombing (Jerusalem Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, June 11, 2026).

Hamas Activity in Judea and Samaria

• Hamas welcomed the release of Sheikh Hassan Yousef, a Hamas leader in Judea and Samaria, from administrative detention after more than two and a half years. Hamas represented him as a national symbol and a model of steadfastness, and adding that he had spent more than 20 years in Israeli prisons. Hamas said the prisoner issue would remain at the top of its agenda and called for increased public and international support for prisoners (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 11, 2026). His son, Musab Hassan Yousef (aka The Green Prince), said his father would return to Hamas activity and that despite his health, he still wielded great influence on the Palestinians street. He said his father would attempt to rebuild Hamas’ infrastructure and reactivate its cells in Judea and Samaria, potentially leading to serious escalation (Shavua Israeli Facebook page, June 12, 2026).
• Hamas criticized the Palestinian Authority security forces in Judea and Samaria, claiming they continued to arrest and pursue “resistance operatives” and wanted Palestinians. Hamas called it a “revolving door,” whereby “activists”^[6] were released from Palestinian Authority prisons only to be immediately detained by Israel. Hamas portrayed it as security cooperation with Israel and a blow to the Palestinian “struggle,” and demanded that the Palestinian Authority immediately end political arrests, release all political detainees and terminate security coordination with Israel, and called on the Palestinian public to unite around a common national position against security coordination and pressure the Palestinian Authority to protect “resistance operatives” rather than act against them (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 11, 2026).

Settler Terrorism

• This past week Jewish settler attacks targeting Palestinian and Bedouin communities in Judea and Samaria continued. The home of a resident of Arab al-Ka’abneh in the Khan al-Ahmar area was reportedly attacked. In the village of Yasuf, east of Salfit, Jewish rioters allegedly attacked homes and vehicles, broke windows and caused property damage before fleeing to a nearby outpost. In the village of Jit, vehicle arsons were reported (Wafa, June 12, 2026; Ramallah News Facebook page, June 13, 2026). A Palestinian was shot and wounded after approaching an Israeli farm near the village of Duma. According to residents of the farm, he was holding a rock and tried to attack them. A preliminary investigation indicated that the Palestinian behaved violently and suspiciously and was therefore shot (Moriah Asraf and Doron Kadosh Telegram channel, June 13, 2026). Jewish rioters set fire to the al-Nour Mosque in the village of Burqa and burned vehicles after four Jewish settlers were injured when their vehicle overturned following a stone-throwing attack (Quds News Network, June 15, 2026).

     
Right: Vehicles burned in the village of Jit. Left: The attackers leaving the village
(Ramallah News Facebook page, June 13, 2026)

• Hamas welcomed an Amnesty report alleging “ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. The report alleged that Jewish settler violence was not a series of isolated events but rather part of a systematic policy supported by the Israeli government. Hamas accused the international community of maintaining a silence that encouraged such actions and called for Israeli leaders to be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court, for relations with Israel to be severed and for the imposition of sanctions (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, June 10, 2026).

International Activity

• The Israel Knesset approved a bill freezing funds from the tax revenues transferred to the PA which are then used to pay individuals with connections to terrorism. In response, Rawhi Fattouh, chairman of the Palestinian National Council, called it “organized piracy” and part of a “siege policy” against the PA, drying its financial resources, weakening its institutions and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its obligations toward the Palestinian people. He claimed Israel’s measures violated international law and signed agreements and showed the government’s use of economic blackmail and collective punishment to subjugate the Palestinian people and break their national will (Wafa, June 9, 2026).
• Jibril Rajoub, chairman of the Palestinian Football Association, told Agence France-Presse that the United States and Canada had not granted him entry visas. Rajoub, who was in Mexico for the FIFA World Cup matches being held in the three countries, said the American conduct was “ridiculous” and he would watch Tunisia’s national team play in Mexico and then return home. He also accused Israel of exerting pressure to prevent him from obtaining the visas (Alarabiya.net, June 12, 2026).

Elections to the Palestinian National Council

• PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas updated the Palestinian election law ahead of the anticipated elections for the Legislative Council and the National Council. He increased the number of Legislative Council members to 200, lowered the electoral threshold to 1%, raised the minimum number of candidates on each list to 20, established mandatory representation for women so that at least one woman appeared among every three candidates and lowered the minimum age for candidacy from 28 to 23. The amendments are intended to broaden political representation, increase the participation of women and young people and allow more diverse lists to enter the elections scheduled for November 1, 2026 (Wafa, June 14, 2026).
• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem criticized the changed claiming their objective was to designed to adjust the political rules of the game to the needs of the PA’s ruling leadership. He said the decision did not reform the political system but rather perpetuated its twisted state because it was adopted unilaterally and not through genuine national dialogue. Qassem said it contradicted calls for broad political reform based on national foundations, broad Palestinian agreement and national consensus (Hazem Qassem Telegram channel, June 14, 2026).